TIBETANS IN KARNATAKA

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Introduction

There are now around 80-100,000\(^1\) Tibetan refugees in India. Almost 23,000 of them live in agricultural settlements in Karnataka State (see Table 1), the first of which was established in 1960, the most recent in 1973-4. During the brief visits I made to these settlements in December 1981,\(^2\) I came to regard them as potentially an extremely interesting subject for study, and this for several reasons.

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1. I have been unable to trace a more exact figure. For 1970, Woodcock (1980: estimates a total of "between 65,000 and 70,000 Tibetans in India and Sikkim". Conway (1975: 12) suggests a figure of 80-100,000 Tibetan refugees, most of which have remained in India but, considering Indian Government estimates as unreliable, he makes no estimate of his own. From a table in *Tibet Under Chinese Communist Rule* (Tuoccr, 1976: 206), reproduced here the Tibetan population in India and Sikkim reaches a total of 68,747, no larger than Woodcock's total for six years earlier. In the same table, the refugee population in Karnataka is given as 17,077. My own figure, collected *in loco* in December 1981, is 22,731, a considerable increase. Taking the Karnataka growth rate as exemplifying a general trend, I have suggested the above 'guesstimate' of 80-100,000 Tibetans now living in India and Sikkim, just to give an approximate idea of the percentage now living in Karnataka.

2. As research assistant to Dr. Erberto Lo Bue, who was collecting data on contemporary Tibetan art and artists under the Central Research Fund of the University of London and of the British Academy.
The first concerns the special status of the settlements. Over the past five years, I have spent a total of about seven months amongst exiled Tibetans and in Tibetan refugee communities in Nepal, Ladakh, Himachal Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Darjeeling and Sikkim. That the status of the Tibetan Resettlement and Rehabilitation (TRR) settlements in Karnataka differs greatly from that of those in the areas listed above, was brought home forcibly on arrival at Dhonden Ling, the settlement near Kollegal (see Map 1), where the problem of entry into the settlement itself was immediately raised. All the TRR settlements in South India are officially 'protected areas' and a special permit, issued by the Ministry of Supply and Rehabilitation, Government of India, is theoretically\(^1\) required for entry, to be shown to the Indian administrator attached to each settlement. This system does not obtain for the other areas listed,\(^2\) in many of which Tibetans had been present prior to the Chinese takeover of Tibet in 1959\(^3\) and were, and still are, integrated with the local population to a considerable degree. In Karnataka, and probably in all non-Himalayan regions of India, however, Tibetans are more evidently

\(^{1}\) I say theoretically, because we had no previous knowledge of this requirement and were in each settlement allowed entry under the responsibility of the local Representative of the Dalai Lama, as the duration of our visits was short.

\(^{2}\) Special permits of limited extension are required for the frontier regions of Darjeeling and Sikkim, but this is not connected with the Tibetan presence.

\(^{3}\) The exceptions are Himachal and Uttar Pradesh, where substantial numbers of Tibetans have established themselves in the Himalayan foothills. The seat of the Dalai Lama's administration-in-exile is in Dharamsala, Himachal Pradesh. The earlier presence of Tibetans in Darjeeling, Sikkim, Nepal and Ladakh is attested by the foundation dates of Tibetan dgon-pas (monasteries and nunneries) in those areas, with which Tibet also had trade connections, and by the literature, too. See, for example, Waddell (1900 and 1974), who wrote his works on Tibetan religion and culture from research undertaken in Sikkim and Darjeeling.
an uprooted people resettled in a foreign land with which they had little previous contact and which offers no cultural affinities, whereas the Himalayan ranges count many peoples of Tibetan stock and/or Tibetan culture amongst their inhabitants. This is especially so in Karnataka, where the Tibetan communities are basically agricultural and have definite boundaries. In the Himalayan areas, Tibetans tend to have entered the pre-existing local economy or to have developed a more mixed and varied economy of their own.

A second reason is the scarcity of published material on the current situation of these refugees. To the best of my knowledge, there are only two books on the subject: Tibetans In Exile 1959–1980 and Palakshappa's Tibetans In India: A Case Study of Mundgod Tibetans. The former is mainly a compilation of facts and figures, and deals almost exclusively with the bureaucratic and organizational aspects of the refugee community as a whole.² Palakshappa (1978), on the other hand, purports to present a detailed sociological case study of the TRR settlement of Doeguling, near Mundgod, Karnataka (see Map 1). In short, his book is superficial, simplistic, badly researched,

1. Like Tibet Under Chinese Communist Rule, which I have abbreviated TUCCR, this volume is compiled, edited, and published by the Information Office of H.H. the Dalai Lama. This edition follows, and partially includes information from, the earlier Tibetans in Exile 1959–1989. For simplicity, I shall abbreviate it as TIE in bibliographic references.

2. A fact which has received some criticism from amongst the Tibetans themselves. Norbu (1981: 25) laments the fact that the newly-developed institutional framework established primarily to handle incoming aid "is not examined in terms of home economics, life-style changes, the psychology of the people, generational differences; or its impact on the refugees, relationship with their host country nationals".
and often factually incorrect.¹ Perhaps the most positive comment to be made on it is that I met only one Tibetan who had heard of it and even he, happily, had not read it. Several articles have been published on specific aspects of Tibetan life in exile (see Bibliography), but there is nothing resembling an overall and detailed examination.

The third reason is that, despite the short time I spent in these settlements, I was struck by the extent to which Tibetan culture has been preserved, but also modified, in Karnataka, and also by the positions the settlements have taken in indigenous Indian economies.

My aim in this paper, then, is to present an overall, if sketchy picture of the TRR settlements in Karnataka. What follows, however, is not the product of systematic research in the field, for which I had insufficient time,² but of information extracted from countless informal conversations with Tibetans.

¹ For example, Tibetan Buddhism comprises four major orders—Nying-ma-pa, Kargyu-pa, Sakya-pa, and Gelug-pa. With reference to the latter, Palakshappa (1978: 33) states: "dGelukpa was the founder of that sect and all the monasteries are named after him". Actually, 'Gelug-pa' (Tib.: dGe-lugs-pa) translates as 'the followers of virtue', a description of those who follow the reformed Buddhism established by Tsong-kha-pa (1358-1419) in the fourteenth century (Bell, 1931: 94). This fact is recorded in numerous books on Tibet, including at least two cited in Palakshappa's bibliography, and is also well-known to Tibetans, including those who were the subject of his research. In fact, the anniversary of Tsong-kha-pa's passing away is celebrated annually on the 25th day of the 10th Tibetan lunar month, which in 1981, fell on the 20th December, when I was at the settlement of Rabgyay Ling, near Hunsur (see Map 1, p. 39). Almost every household took part, and nobody hesitated when asked the nature of the event. I can only presume that Tibetans at Doeguling are as knowledgeable. Many more examples could be quoted. It is clear that Palakshappa has little knowledge of Tibetan history and society, and hence is not qualified in his 'speciality', the "adjustment patterns of minorities", for in this case, he has not made an effort to discover what the Tibetan minority in India is adjusting from.

² A total of less than three weeks and, evidently, my time was not my own.
and from observations made in loco, supplemented with data available in the little published material that exists.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF EXILE AND RESETTLEMENT

A useful general history of Tibetan exile to India and the process of their resettlement there is to be found in the combination of two articles: Woodcock (1970) and Conway (1975). The following summary is drawn almost exclusively from those sources.

Although families from the nobility and some of the wealthier Lhasa merchants began leaving Tibet, with all portable forms of wealth, when the Chinese reached the capital in 1951, it was not until 1959, with the Dalai Lama's flight and the concurrent uprisings in Lhasa and Khams (Eastern Tibet), that large numbers of Tibetans from all classes crossed the Tibetan frontiers into India, Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan.¹ Many died while crossing the 16,000 ft. high passes or fighting the Chinese, but there are no figures to tell us how many, or the original size of the exodus itself (Woodcock, 1980: 1).² For 1970, Woodcock (ibid.: 2) quotes official Indian Government estimates of 55,000 Tibetans in India,³ excluding children born on the subcontinent⁴ and Tibetan men recruited into the

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1. This point should be stressed, for there is a popular misconception that only the wealthier Tibetans left their country under the threat of Chinese communism. Even a superficial survey of the Tibetans in Karnataka indicates the contrary. Most people I met, including many now holding local administrative posts, came from farming and trading families.

2. Conway (1975: 12) suggests around 80-100,000.

3. Which includes those in Sikkim, annexed by the Indian Union in 1975

Indian army. Bhutan provided land and organized seven settlements for around 3,000 refugees, and some 10,12,000 initially arrived in Nepal: approximately 3,000 in the Nepal Valley, the rest in more remote border regions (ibid.).

The fortune of Tibetan refugees in Bhutan changed in 1979, when the Bhutanese Government, "(c)harging the Tibetans of creating 'a state within a state', (...) resolved that all of the 4,000 Tibetans who did not accept Bhutanese subjectship would be deported to Chinese-occupied Tibet (...unless) there were countries willing to receive them" (TIE, 1981: 192). In

1. 7,000, according to Woodcock (ibid.), who obtained his figure from "a high official in the Dalai Lama's administration". Some of them are organized into special commando units, and in Karnataka I met two Tibetans who had fought in Bangladesh. The figures they gave me for the number of Tibetans in the Indian army are much lower than Woodcock's; one spoke of 400, the other of 1,000.

2. Financed by the Government of India.

3. Many later moved on to various parts of India.

4. The population having grown considerably since arrival.

5. As explanation of the sharp reversal of Bhutan's attitude, it should be noted that in 1974, "28 Tibetans, including Mr. Lhading, the Representative in Thimphu of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, were arrested (...) accused of plotting the assassination of the Bhutan King (Jigme Singye Wangchuck) and the burning of the Tashichhodzong which houses the Bhutanese secretariat" (TIE, 1981: 190-1). Demands for evidence from Dharamsala, the seat of the Dalai Lama's administration, were refused and the trial of the detainees held in secrecy. The following deterioration in Tibetan-Bhutanese relations led eventually to the resolution of 1979 (ibid.: 191). A further contributing factor, mentioned also by informants in Karnataka, maybe the fact that, over the years, many refugees had become involved in petty, but flourishing businesses, controlled much of the petty commercial transactions between Bhutan and the Indian towns of Siliguri, Kalimpong and Darjeeling, and owned many of the larger shops in Thimphu. The historical relationship of Bhutan to Tibet may also have played a part.
response, India has offered asylum to 1,500 of the 3,000 Tibetans who decided to leave. A group of 540 arrived in Doeguling in April 1981.

On the Tibetans in Nepal I have little information. In 1970, the refugee problem remained officially unacknowledged (Woodcock, 1980: 3), and the Tibetans in remote frontier regions were suffering great poverty. Relations between the Nepalese Government and the refugees were strained from the outset, with Tibetan guerillas, particularly Khamkas (Tib.: Kham-pa) from Eastern Tibet, carrying out warfare operations against the Chinese from Nepalese territory. However, from TIE (1981: 192-206) it is clear that a number of small agricultural settlements have been established in Nepal, although

1. Of the 1,000 that remain, it was suggested to me that many had been established in Bhutan prior to 1959.

2. The sudden arrival of such a large number evidently posed some problems and in December 1981, the majority were still being housed in community halls. Plans for housing them are underway and land is available (through redistribution, which was to take place anyway, see p. 14, n. 1). The financial strain on Doeguling has not been too great, for the refugees from Bhutan receive some aid from the Indian Government. A smaller number of Tibetans from Bhutan have been settled at the settlement of Dhonden Ling, where housing and land have already been provided.

3. If this has changed, it is not mentioned in TIE. The situation was a difficult one for Nepal, a kingdom whose continuing independence has much to do with a long history of careful diplomacy with its giant neighbours, India and China.

4. Nepal has good relations with China and, sandwiched as it is between the People's Republic and India, its political history has been one of carefully balancing its relations with the two of them to ensure its own survival as an independent kingdom. By 1976, the Khamba guerillas had been ordered by the Nepalese Government to surrender arms: "violent clashes" ensued (Conway, 1975: 15) and the guerillas were eventually overcome.
the refugees in the Valley proper earn their living mainly through the production and sale of Tibetan handicrafts.

In India, where the majority of refugees arrived and have remained, the problem was dealt with in two distinct stages (Conway, 1975: 19). In 1959, "Nehru's government was inclined to underplay the whole Tibetan situation in the interests of peace with China, while, nationally, there was the possibility of discontent among Bengali refugees if they had any reason to believe the Tibetans were better treated than they (Woodcock, 1970: 6). As a result, the government avoided the establishment of a great number of large temporary relief settlements and "between 1959 and 1964, aid to the Tibetan refugees was haphazard and dominated by a sense of urgency" (Woodcock, 1980: 6). Initially, aid was provided by large international relief organizations, later followed by smaller bodies established especially to deal with the Tibetan problem. To these may be added large numbers of individual volunteers, many independent (ibid.: 3).

Apart from the obvious priority of providing food and other basic necessities of survival, child welfare was a central concern, and it was this first stage which saw the establishment in India of the Tibetan Homes Foundation and the Tibetan Children's Village (Dharamsala), child-care centres based on the

1. Including CARE, Red Cross, YMCA, Friends, Catholic Relief (Woodcock, 1980: 3). The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees was allowed by the Indian Government to intervene from 1968-9.

2. Including Schweizer Tibethilfe, the Tibet Society of Great Britain, Tibetan Refugee Aid Society (Canada), the American Emergency Committee for Tibetan Refugees, and others in Australia, New Zealand, and Scandinavia. "The total lack of aid from organizations in Buddhist countries was strikingly evident". (Woodcock, 1980: 3).

3. Due to an article critical of Indian official policy published by an independent Dutch volunteer in 1962, all individual volunteers, independent or representative, had been requested to leave in 1966 (Woodcock, 1980: 4).
Pestalozzi model. 1 Aid pouring in from various organizations, each with its own aims and priorities, was otherwise uncoordinated. "(T)he Indian government (...) provided food rations, funds for education, and monetary aid in some other directions" (ibid.: 2).

The commencement of the second stage can be dated to 1966, with the dedication by the European Refugee Year of $3,500,000 to Tibetan refugees with the aim of reaching a final solution by means of resettlement. On this basis, "Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands was instrumental in creating a Common Project to which the United States, Canada and some European governments as well as voluntary relief agencies" contributed (Woodcock, 1970: 4), bringing the "total funds available for resettlement to about $9,000,000" (ibid.). In 1968,"(t)he Board of Trustees for the Common Project of the European Refugee Campaign established, as its Indian partner, the Mysore3 Resettlement and Development Agency (...) a 'non-governmental' venture (which nevertheless) has worked out a continuing relationship with the local state and government bodies, and has successfully overcome the many obstacles and delays involved" (Conway, 1975: 20). The size of these funds, together with the existence of bodies formed to plan and control its use, led to a definite change of emphasis, from relief to large-scale

1. Tibetan children were also sent to Pestalozzi villages in Europe. A problem arose, however, over the Pestalozzi policy that, their education over, the children should return to work in their own countries. Tibetans, having chosen exile, have no country and many apparently refused to return to India, preferring to remain in Europe.

2. The first attempt to channel funds from foreign agencies was made by the Indian Government in 1959 with the Central Relief Committee. It made little progress, however, as the government attempted to give the CRC decisional power over where the funds were spent, which was unacceptable to the foreign agencies which largely bypassed it. (Woodcock, 1980: 3-4). Apparently, the CRC's policy was later altered and the body was accepted.

3. Now Karnataka State.
resettlement, from small sums here and there\textsuperscript{1} to the coordinated provision of capital aid for the purchase of land, machinery, technical equipment, and so forth (\textit{ibid.}).

"A first plan for resettlement was actually made as early as 1960" (Woodcock, 1980: 7),\textsuperscript{2} the year in which work began on Lugsung Samdubling, the settlement at Bylakuppe (see Map 1), Karnataka. The other settlements in Karnataka followed the establishment of the Common Project, and the Mysore Resettlement and Development Agency (MYRADA) played a central role in their development.

\textbf{THE SETTLEMENTS}

There have been altogether six resettlement projects in Karnataka, although there are effectively only five as I shall describe them here:\textsuperscript{3} Lugsung Samdubling, at Bylakuppe, which is

\begin{itemize}
  \item [1.] These are still provided by individuals and specialist agencies, particularly in the form of the sponsorship of a child's education, religious or secular.
  \item [2.] Apparently because the Central Government and the state governments of West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh were concerned about the presence of large concentrations of Tibetans along the Himalayan foothills; the former for reasons of national security, the latter because the poverty-stricken refugees spoiled the appearance of tourist hill resorts such as Darjeeling, Mussoorie and Simla, thus endangering their economies (Woodcock, 1970: 7). However, according to TIE (1981: 101), "(i)n view of the difficulties which the Tibetan roadworkers faced in 1959-60, His Holiness the Dalai Lama requested Pandit Nehru to have them properly rehabilitated in India. Mr. Nehru enquired through the State Governments whether any of them had land to spare for resettlement purposes, and a positive response came from Mysore State (now renamed Karnataka)". It is stressed very often in TIE that resettlement was aimed primarily at road labourers, to whom first priority was always given.
  \item [3.] There are a few hundred Tibetans living near Chowkur, close to Periyapatna, in a small settlement (established 1975) which I did not visit. It is not independent, having no Cooperative Society, and is apparently attached to Dickey Larsoe which has opened a shop there, and through which it is financed. (TIE, 1981: 124 and 126). However, I was informed by the Secretary of Lugsung Samdubling that Chowkur was attached, rather, to Lugsung Samdubling.
\end{itemize}
52 miles west of Mysore city and 2,600 feet above sea level (TIE, 1981: 101). It was established in 1960. The present population is 5,573, occupying about 3,000 acres of land. Dickey Larsoe, established 1969, and just south of Lugsung Samdubling at 2,750 feet above sea level (TIE, 1981: 122), now has a population of 3,500 in an acreage of 1,771. Rabgyay Ling is situated 57.6 kilometres west of Mysore, near Hunsur (TIE, 1981: 129). Established in 1971, it now has a population of 2,821 on 2,603 acres of land. Dhonden Ling, established in 1973 on 2,308 acres of land, is near Kollegal. The population is now around 4,000. Doeguling, established in 1966, is the only settlement not in Mysore district. It is located near Mundgod, near Hubli (North Kanara) at 1,900 feet above sea level (TIE, 1981: 145). It occupies 4,045 acres of land, with a present population of 6,837.

The establishment of these settlements followed a basically similar pattern, varying mainly in sources of funds and in accordance with local conditions. The Government of India,

1. December 1981. The figures which follow are those I collected in loco from the Co-operative Society concerned. They are part of an information report sent annually by each settlement to Dharamsala. See Table I, and Map 1.

2. They are in fact adjoining for some part of their borders and appear almost as one settlement. Lugsung Samdubling has built one of its dgon-pas (Chosedey Tashi Lhunpo, see Table II, on land belonging to Dickey Larsoe. However, they are economically and administratively separate, each having its own Co-operative Society.

3. So there are a total of 22,731 Tibetans occupying around 13,827 acres of land. Figures extracted from TIE (1981: 101-152) total 18,464 and 14,045 respectively. Their figures for population are less up-to-date than mine, some referring to as early as 1977. As far as acreage is concerned, my figures were not always exact, while those of TIE represent sometimes what was proposed, not what was actually reclaimed from the jungle.

4. This is evident from the relevant sections in TIE (1981: 101-152).

5. Doeguling, for example, grows different crops and has different water supply problems to the other settlements.
having "early made the fundamental decision to partake actively in efforts to rehabilitate the refugees" (Goldstein, 1978: 397), set about finding land on which to resettle them.¹ Mysore was one of the several States which came forward with land, and "although political considerations doubtless played a part, the availability of land in South India seems to have been the major consideration" (Conway, 1975: 16). Certainly there was a desire to develop the land in question although it is also clear that considerable care was taken to select land as suitable as possible.² The idea, reached by the Dalai Lama's administration, the Government of India, and later MYRADA, in collaboration, "was to resettle Tibetans then living in transit camps or working on road repair gangs and to provide them with assistance and resources so that within a period of five years they could become economically self-sufficient. This, if successful, would not only permanently take care of the refugee population, but it would also help India's food needs by bringing unused land under cultivation" (Goldstein, 1978: 398). All the locations offered were situated in areas of uncultivated, and largely uninhabited jungle land and given on lease³ by the Indian Government. Land reclamation was a slow process:⁴ several hundred Tibetans were moved down to each site and temporarily housed in bamboo huts and ex-army tents, often

1. N.B. that the agricultural settlements described here were not the only approach to rehabilitation. In the north of India trade and small industry play an important role.

2. Capt. Davinson (1976: 3), founder of MYRADA, mentions his rejection of land in Tungabadra, Karnataka, because "the day temperatures were very high in that region and it was evident that it would be impossible to have Tibetans living and working under these climatic conditions".

3. The land was initially leased rent-free. I do not know whether this is still the case.

4. Hence the date of each settlement (see Table I), refers to when work began. At Doeguling, for instance, work began in November 1966 and continued until 1973.
under extremely difficult conditions. The necessary machinery, equipment and technical advice and some man-power were supplied by the Indian Government and the various charitable organizations involved with the Tibetan cause. Trees were felled, their stumps and roots burned out, the ground levelled by bulldozers, then ploughed by tractors. Borewells were sunk, permanent housing built, and electricity installed. A small amount of cultivation began, on a co-operative basis, as soon as land was freed. More batches of refugees were moved in by stages and the process continued until the whole plot of land had been cleared, the villages, one by one, completed, and most of the land put under cultivation. Tibetans were involved in all aspects of the work and received a small daily wage and food rations from the Indian Government, both of which were gradually phased out as progress towards self-sufficiency was made.

An important aspect of Tibetan resettlement in Karnataka should be mentioned here, that is, the "tendency to integrate the Tibetan resettlement in Mysore with improvements in the conditions of the local people" (Woodcock, 1970: 9). Land was made available by the State Government with certain conditions

1. At Doeuling the nearest water source was 12km away. In all the settlements there were initially big problems with wildlife. Deaths from encounters with elephants and snakes were not uncommon. Dhonden Ling is still bounded by the remnants of an elephant trench, although the elephants have now retreated back into the jungle. Death from cobra-bite is still quite frequent, at Rabgyay Ling at least. Less fatal, but still problematic were, and are, the depredations of the wild boar. Night guards have to be posted in the fields during the months before harvest to protect the crops, and the livelihood of the settlers.

2. For example, at Doeuling, bulldozers were provided by Swiss Aid to Tibetans, at Dhonden Ling by the Indian Government.

3. Valuable timber, including sandalwood, was collected by the Indian Government.
attached: "Instead of paying for the land, the Mysore Resettle-
ment and Development Agency (was to) use part of its available
funds to help resettle the tribal groups and other landless
people in Mysore"¹ (Woodcock, 1970: 9). Apart from such
parallel resettlement projects, great pains have also been
taken to prevent the arousal of jealousy, and consequent
hostility, amongst the local Indian populations.² In practial
terms, the result of this policy has been that "the cost of
resettling the Tibetans has been kept carefully within the

1. I have but scanty information on the outcome of these
projects which are, however, based on a similar model to that
of the TRR settlements. Davinson (1976: 7) mentions the de-
velopment of over 5,000 acres for an equivalent number of land-
less and tribal peoples. He notes the different problems
encountered with these projects, and concludes: "We learnt a
lot about the problems of caste, tribe and religion, especially
when it came to such activities as sharing water and the forma-
tion of co-operative societies. It is more than likely that in
some cases we failed to find the right leadership and that
problems still exist". (ibid.). This is more or less the picture
I gathered from Tibetan informants, according to whom the
Indians given aid did not think in the long-term and would,
for instance, sell rather than use the fertilizer they re-
ceived, and did not respect the rules on which the cooperative
societies were based. Data on the planning and financing of
these projects can be found in Davinson (1976) and a number
of other booklets produced by the Institute of Environmental
Studies and the Institute of International Studies, Douglas
College (see Bibliography).

2. I heard of only one hostile reaction to the Tibetan
presence. A present Secretary recounted his experiences
as the first, and at that time only, Tibetan involved, with
MYRADA, in jungle clearance for Dhonden Ling, near Kollegal
in 1973. Local Indians threatened his life, and also to
burn the Indian Government bulldozers in use. Apparently
a local landowner provoked this aggression, constructed
around the Tibetans' beef-eating habits. The same land-
owner later demanded that a borewell be sunk in his compound
for private use. MYRADA was willing to provide one for the
entire village; this did not satisfy the landowner, who took
the case as far as the Indian Supreme Court, but, fortunately,
died before the proceedings came to an end.
guidelines which the Indian government has set for its own refugees from Ceylon, Burma and elsewhere. In each case, the equivalent of about $400 per head is being spent" (Woodcock, 1970: 9). The Tibetans in Karnataka are themselves very conscious of what may happen if they appear as too favoured a minority and they conduct their relations with local Indians with the utmost care.¹ There have also been numerous indirect advantages for the local Indians around the TRR settlements,² as will be seen below. For now, suffice it to say that the diplomacy with which this potential problem has been approached appears to have paid off.³

ECONOMY AND ADMINISTRATION

The physical layout of all the TRR settlements dealt with here is basically the same, although the maxim that one learns by one's mistakes holds true of course.⁴ In each case, a number of villages or camps⁵ (from 6 to 22, see Table I),

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¹ I came across more than one case in which Tibetans in TRR settlements were using their Indian 'connections' to help their Indian neighbours, often on request.

² Electrification and water supply have been perhaps the two major direct advantages.

³ I should also mention that resettlement in Karnataka was presented to both Tibetans and Indians in the locality as a temporary measure, a place of refuge until the independence of Tibet is regained.

⁴ The more recent settlements tend to be better designed. In the earlier ones, notably Lugsung Samdubling and Doeguling, the villages are fewer and larger (see Table I), with the result that the fields of most families are quite distant from their homes. I am informed that also the quality of housing is better in later settlements.

⁵ Including some inhabited only by monks, who communally own and work land separately from the lay settlers.
were built, scattered throughout the newly-reclaimed land, often centred around an open square, in the centre of which the village water-tank is usually located. The number of twin-houses per village varies from sixteen to eighty (see Table I), and each twin-house will be inhabited by two families of various composition. Space for a kitchen garden is provided for each family, favourite crops being papaya, a species of pumpkin, and some vegetables for home consumption. The quality of housing varies, that in later settlements being of concrete and more solid. Sewerage disposal, as in most Indian villages, remains a problem. All the settlements are completely electrified and, as aforementioned, each village has at least one source of water. Nowadays, each settlement has its own school and medical facilities, monasteries and temples, a residence for the Dalai Lama, shops and restaurants, banks and a post office within its boundaries. Lugsung Samdubling and Doeuling also contain what have been dubbed 'Lama Villages': parcels of land which are inhabited and cultivated only by monks and nuns.

1. Something approaching 'semi detached'.

2. 'Family' is used here broadly, to mean persons related by blood and/or marriage.

3. Or squash. It is fed mainly to cattle.

4. Although cuts were not infrequent, as is quite common throughout India.

5. Water shortages for domestic purposes exist either as a result of electricity cuts, as the pumps of the borewells are electrically run, or because of the mechanical breakdown of the pumps themselves.

6. Indian, usually a branch of the Syndicate Bank. The Tibetans are not legally allowed to establish a banking system of their own.

7. There is considerable difficulty involved in the exact translation of Tibetan religious terms such as grva-pa (monk), a-ni (nun), bla-ma (lama) and dgon-pa (monastery). The standard
a communal basis -- there are blocks of rooms, rather than houses, and a communally run kitchen. Each settlement possesses a 'centre' where communal buildings (banks, offices) and the Dalai Lama's residence are located. Land, whether to religious or lay persons, was allocated on an individual basis to all adults, although with a maximum acreage per family, and apparently only to those born in Tibet. Housing appears to have been allocated on a family basis.

translators (in brackets) can be misleading because of their Western connotations. ғров-па and a-нi describe all male and female religious whether celibate or not. In the older unreformed orders of Tibetan Buddhism, even marriage amongst the 'monastic' community was not uncommon. Hence also the translation of _tDон-па as 'monastery' is equally misleading, not only because of the question of celibacy and of the sex of the inhabitants, but also because "Tibetans use ғон-па as a generic term, applying it to a variety of religious centres where the religious reside" (Aziz, 1978: 76, n. 2) which may little resemble a Christian monastery. Бла-ma is a translation of the Sanskrit 'guru' and properly means 'master' or 'spiritual teacher'. However, the word has come to be used by non-Tibetans to refer, respectfully, to all male religious. These reservations expressed, I shall nevertheless continue to use these English terms for simplicity's sake.

1. The effects of exile on the traditional organization of the religious community will be discussed later on.

2. At the earlier stages of resettlement Tibetans were considered as adults as young as six years old. Later the age of qualification was increased.

3. At Doeguling, for instance, the maximum is about four acres, a figure which is currently under review, with the intention of redistributing land in smaller plots to cater for the Tibetans from Bhutan who should receive an acre from each settled family. The completion of an irrigation system in the near future will prevent this redistribution from proving a burden on earlier settlers.

4. No provision was, or is, made for Tibetans born on the Indian subcontinent. Extra land, if needed, is rented from local Indian farmers.
As mentioned above, these settlements are essentially agricultural, growing two or three crops a year. Rabgyay Ling, Lugsung Samdubling, Dickey Larsoe¹ and Dhonden Ling concentrate their efforts on raising maize² as a cash crop.³ None of them have irrigation and hence are dependent on the monsoon rains. Millet is grown for home consumption,⁴ as is rice where feasible.⁵ At Doeguling, where the soil composition is different and, I am told, less fertile, a mixture of rice and maize is grown, with the emphasis strongly on the dry cultivation of the latter.⁶ Many families now possess cattle and

1. This is the settlement in which I spent least time, but I do know it to follow the same pattern as the other settlements in Mysore District.

2. A hybrid form introduced first at Lugsung Samdubling in 1966, which produced very profitable yields in comparison to other suggested cash-crops (Goldstein, 1978: 401).

3. There is an awareness of the dangers involved in growing only one crop, and the Secretary of Lugsung Samdubling was formulating plans for some sort of crop rotation.

4. In the form of chang, an alcoholic beverage made from cooked and fermented finger-millet grains, which the Tibetans drink as often, as with as much relish as they did the barley chang traditional in Tibet. Chang made from millet is common throughout the Himalayas. Millet is also grown by the local Indians, but as a foodstuff, a fact which the Tibetans find rather amusing.

5. Mainly near a water source in the settlement, and hence in very small quantities.

6. The soil at Doeguling does not produce good yields from maize. Doeguling is apparently to be supplied with water for irrigation this year from a dam (Baichanke) twelve miles distant, which has the capacity to irrigate around 4,000 acres - 1,200 belonging to Doeguling, the rest to Indian villages between the settlement and the dam. The imminence of irrigation is also mentioned by Palakshappa (1978: 55) and the fact that it still has not taken place has been explained to me in several ways. (1) The redistribution of land (less perhead if irrigated because of increased productivity) has still to be undertaken by the Co-operative Society. (2) Tibetan settlers are resisting irrigation because they do not want to be tied to the land all
chickens; I also saw herds of goats and, in Doeguling, water buffalo. The farming methods used in the settlements are relatively modernized, each Co-operative Society including a Tractor Section. Technical advice and assistance were provided from the outset by foreign agencies\(^1\) and the Indian Government.

Political authority in Lugsung Samdbling, as it devolves from Dharamsala, is discussed and described by Goldstein (1978: 406-7). As far as I know, what he says is applicable to the other settlements too. "The administrative hierarchy in the settlement consists of four levels of officials"\((ibid.: 406)\). At the village level there are a number of 'cugpon' (Tib.: gso-' grub-pon, "head of ten"), each of whom is elected annually as a representative of ten households "and is concerned mainly with organizing labor 'tax' obligations" \((ibid.)\). Above these are the annually elected "general leaders", two to each village at Lugsung Samdubling, who receive a salary "initially collected from the residents of the camp, but (...) later paid by the Co-operative Society" \((ibid.: 407)\). Then, there are three officials representing "the three major ethnic subcultural areas"\(^2\) who are "elected for three-year terms and receive a monthly salary (...) from the DLG"\(^3\) \((ibid.)\). Finally, at the apex of the local

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1. See p. 10, for an example.

2. Central Tibet, Eastern Tibet, and Northeastern Tibet.

3. DLG is Goldstein's abbreviation for Dalai Lama's Government.
hierarchy, is the "camp leader" (whom I refer to by the official title of Representative of H.H. the Dalai Lama), his secretary and his interpreter, all of whom are appointed from Dharamsala as salaried employees of the government-in-exile. They are not chosen from amongst the settlers, and have no land on the settlement. According to Goldstein (ibid.: 407), "(t)he camp leader is in charge of the overall administration of the settlement (...) he represents the needs of the settlers as a corporate collectivity to both the DLG and the Indian and foreign sectors. He and his staff plan and implement policy for the settlement with respect not only to technical, agricultural, and marketing matters, but also to socio-cultural ones (...) the camp leader attempts to integrate and articulate the various diverse sub-cultural units and present to them the views of the DLG. He also plays an important role in maintaining peace by using the prestige of his office to mediate disputes and altercations (and) he often acts on behalf of individuals in their dealings with the Indian legal and political officials" (ibid.). I quote Goldstein heavily, for I did not observe this in Lugsung Samdubling or elsewhere (except perhaps Doeguling). Rather, when asked about the general running of the settlements, it was always to the Co-operative Society that I was referred. Goldstein mentions the Society but briefly: "Parallel but subordinate to the bureau office (of the Representative) is the Co-operative Society. It is also headed by an official of the DLG¹ who is under the camp leader and works hand in hand with him" (ibid.). I make no argument with Goldstein here, except to say that the amount of space he devotes to the Co-operative Society seems incompatible with the extent of its involvement

¹. A half-truth, for although appointed from Dharamsala, the Secretary is paid by the Co-operative Society and, hence, by the settlers themselves. Like the Representative and his staff, though, the Secretary is appointed for three years to a settlement, and then to the others in rotation.
in settlement affairs as I observed it, and as I shall now describe it.\(^1\)

In the early stages of settlement at Lugsung Samdubling when little land was available for cultivation, a co-operative system was apparently adopted of necessity as most of the land had yet to be reclaimed and distributed. The Co-operative Society, on the other hand, "was started by the settlers themselves in 1961 and registered in 1964". Its "main purpose (...) was to carry on trading activities (...) a profitable undertaking, as the main town is far from the settlement, and there was no other retail outlet nearby (TIE, 1981: 501). The Society's domain expanded, however, and it is now "the overall organising body for the various schemes and projects within the settlement" (ibid.), as it is for the other settlements which followed Lugsung Samdubling's example. Decisional power within the Society rests with its Secretary and Board of Directors which meets regularly. One of the Board members is usually (always?) the settlements Representative of the Dalai Lama.\(^2\) The Secretary is "assisted by many of the younger Tibetans\(^3\) who have graduated from the school system and are

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1. Possible causes of this discrepancy are: (1) When Goldstein was in the field (1966-67) the Co-operative Society had not yet expanded into many of the areas in which it now operates. (2) The Co-operative Society does not fit well into the model of Tibetan refugee political structure which Goldstein is attempting to liken, in many ways, to that of traditional Tibet.

2. The Representative at Doeguling was in fact its Chairman.

3. This is an interesting consequence of exile. Nearly all the Tibetans who fled their country were uneducated; only those who left as young children or were born in India have, as a general rule, had educational opportunities. The importance of education was well-appreciated by the Tibetans already in the early years of exile, and provision was made almost immediately for child refugees (see above). As a result, most local administrative posts are taken by people under forty, many much younger. It would be interesting to trace the effects of this 'generation jump'. One would imagine, for example, that on a practical level, it allowed quicker adjustment to a new situation in that the younger educated Tibetans had little or no experience of 'old ways' on
being trained for the technical and clerical responsibilities of the settlement" (Conway, 1975: 18). There is considerable delegation of tasks, one or more persons taking responsibility for a specific area (the Tractor Section, or the collection of harvested maize, for instance). Regular open meetings are held for all members of the Co-operative Society, that is, all the landholders in the settlement, at which information is given to the shareholders about the Society's state of business, finances, and so forth, and at which also the latter's grievances and opinions may be aired. If a person needs to contact the Co-operative Society at any other time, s/he does so through his/her village headman. Each village has one, elected by the people of the village in question as a person considered competent to handle their affairs with the Co-operative Society on their behalf. If the Co-operative Society has any messages for or business with a villager, the village headman will be informed of it, and will relay it to the person concerned. 'Under' the headman of each village, there are several 'group leaders', chosen on an informal basis by groups of families from among themselves, whose main role is the co-ordination and

the one hand, and on the other, were more knowledgeable and informed of world affairs and 'modern ways' (many of the Secretaries were educated primarily in Europe). This may go some way to explaining the striking vitality with which the settlements are administered and run.

1. Cf. Palakshappa (1978: 42): "The centre of the 'nervous system' of the Mundgod Tibetan life is the Tibetan Co-operative Society in which all male heads of the settlement's households have the right of membership". This is a good example of Palakshappa's narrow-mindedness of approach. His "schedules" (presumably questionnaires) were directed only at family heads, presumed in advance to be adult males (ibid.: 11). In fact, all landowners of whatever sex or age are automatically members of the Co-operative Society. If Palakshappa had researched Tibetan culture more deeply, he would have further found out that for Tibetans, the 'headship' of a household is more flexibly determined by competence and forcefulness of character rather than only by sex, with the result that female household heads are not uncommon among them.
organization of the latter's agricultural tasks. These leaders also, however, play the role of intermediaries between the villagers (as groups of families) and their village headman. If a headman needs to contact a villager, he will do so through a group leader. The group leaders and village headmen, under which names they were described to me, are almost certainly the two lowest classes of officials described by Goldstein above, the only difference being that my informants spoke of them in the context of the Co-operative Society.¹

The role of the Co-operative Society is manifold. Although it appears to be involved in the organization of all aspects of settlement life, including such tasks as road maintenance, its basic tasks are in the realm of agriculture, for although the fields are owned and worked on an individual or familial basis, the necessities for cultivation are bought and owned collectively. Hence, the Co-operative Society buys fertilizer, for example, in bulk on the settlers' behalf. Often it is loaned to shareholders, for it is required at a time in the agricultural year at which finances are low; such loans will be repaid at harvest time. Tractors and ploughs are 'lent' out in the same manner. At the time of harvest, the Co-operative Society collects the maize² grown by each family, sells it,³ and purchases

¹ Perhaps Goldstein presents settlement organization from the top downwards, so to speak, and the Tibetans from below.

² This applies to all settlements except Doguling, where more rice is grown than maize. Information on the process described here was gathered mainly at Lugsung Samdubling, my stay at which coincided with maize collecting. The situation at Dhonden Ling, Dickey Larsoe and Rabgyay Ling, all of which cultivate maize as a cash-crop, is certainly the same. At Doeguling, however, I received the impression that the Co-operative Society was less involved in this stage of production. I was informed by the Representative there that as soon as the irrigation system is completed, larger-scale cash-cropping will be introduced. He had cashew and ground nuts in mind as possibilities.

³ The Co-operative Society of Lugsung Samdubling also buys in maize grown by local Indian farmers. The maize gathered by the Co-operative Societies is not sold immediately, but stored until the market price increases, an advantageous practice which would be impossible for individual families.
wheat, the grain most used nowadays in Tibetan cooking. The Co-operative Society also runs flour mills, shops and 'canteens', in some cases dairies, and at Lugsung Samdubling also a poultry farm.¹ Some medical centres are also run by it. Schools² and hospitals are mainly financed by the Indian Government and usually staffed with a mixture of Tibetans and Indians.

The other major enterprise undertaken by the Co-operative Society is carpet production.³ Each settlement has at least one carpet factory, initially established to provide remunerative employment for Tibetans in 'quiet' periods of the agricultural year.⁴ There are very few full-time employees,⁵ most Tibetans working at the factory whenever they have a few hours or a day free from other activities. Consequently, payment is on a piece-work basis; per square foot in the case of carpet weavers, and per carpet in the case of carpet 'cutters'.⁶

1. Which was running at a loss at the time of my visit.
2. They follow the standard curriculum of Indian schools, with the addition of lessons in Tibetan language, history and culture.
3. Rug might be more appropriate, as the standard size is around 6' X 3'.
4. And also for the elderly. Each factory has a veranda on which one invariably finds groups of elderly women winding wool into balls. The wool no longer comes from Tibet, evidently, but from Amritsar (Punjab). Actually, some of the wool used in Tibet was imported from Kashmir and Tibetan Muslims (Kha-che) are the descendants of Kashmiri wool traders in Tibet.
5. The exception, as always, is Doeguling. Because of its poverty in comparison with the other settlements, the Co-operative Society is attempting to expand carpet-weaving and turn it into a more profitable business. Hence, about 120 people have been employed full-time.
6. After the weaving is completed, the carpet it trimmed to even up the pile and usually 'cut' around to produce a relief effect, a non-traditional practice which makes the design more striking, but shortens the carpet's life somewhat.
Carpets are made largely on and to order for three markets: the Tibetan, the Indian, and that of Western Europe and the States. Those for Tibetans almost always follow traditional designs and colour schemes (basically dark, although monks often order carpets of red-orange-yellow). Indian customers tend to prefer brighter colours, while the Western market demands a variety of designs, but most often lighter, quieter colour schemes. Carpet production appears to be a potentially profitable business as the demand in all markets is increasing. Except at Doeguling, however, the factories are run on very low profit margins, for two main reasons. Firstly, as mentioned above, their major purpose is employment, not profit; and, secondly, casual employment allows neither large-scale production, nor the accumulation of a large number of orders -- at certain times of the year production more or less ceases, and even in 'quiet' periods, workers cannot be relied upon. To this may be added the fact that the quality of the carpets necessarily varies, some weavers and cutters being less skilled and experienced than others.

The above should have given an idea of the scope and variety of the Co-operative Societies' activities. There remains one important fact in connection with them to be mentioned. In Doeguling and Lugsung Samdubling there are "Lama Villages" which have their own independent Co-operative Societies. I collected little material on these, but they are apparently, organisationally and functionally very similar to their 'lay' counterparts. The major difference, perhaps, is that they

1. Although each settlement has a show-room of sorts where carpets are for sale.

2. If the carpets are paid for in foreign currency, the Indian Government pays the Tibetans a premium.

3. They also run schools (for religious studies), restaurants, carpet factories and shops on top of organising the communities' agricultural tasks. Their Secretaries, like those of the 'lay' Societies, have a direct link with Dharamsala.
are more co-operative, in as much as also the land they possess is collectively owned and worked.

Although the greatest part of these Tibetans' income is from agriculture,\(^1\) and hence gained through the Co-operative Society, there are some individual sources of income, too. These include the sale of some produce from kitchen garden and work outside the settlements for Indian employers.\(^2\) The most important, though, is the 'sweater business'. In the winter months, harvesting over, Tibetans are to be found in towns and cities all over India, sitting by the roadside selling bright-coloured \(^3\) synthetic sweaters, very popular with Indians. Originally, these garments were hand-knitted by Tibetan women in their spare-time.\(^4\) Nowadays, however, they are purchased from a factory in Ludhiana (Punjab) at a lower cost and are resold, apparently often at 100% profit, elsewhere in India. It is a very lucrative business,\(^5\) and one which takes many Tibetans, male and female, out of the settlements for

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1. In fact, according to Goldstein (1978: 414-5), a policy was instituted at the time of settlement at Lugsung Samdubling whereby the refugees were not "permitted to engage in private jobs or businesses either in the camp or in neighbouring areas" (ibid. 414) to ensure that they concentrated on learning the agricultural skills necessary to exploit their land.

2. Particularly forestry and roadwork. It was in Doeguling that I first heard of this, and it may be confined to that settlement, where agricultural work keeps the majority of people busy for only around four months a year. I am unsure as to whether this is connected with dry rice cultivation.

3. Fluorescent pinks, lime greens, bright blues and yellows predominate. The quality, I am told, is rather poor and the sweaters rarely last a year.

4. Some women still do this. In Darjeeling there were many sweater-sellers, often women who knitted inbetween customers.

5. Which is why there may be some truth in the story that Tibetans at Doeguling do not want irrigation, and hence all-year round agricultural employment (see p. 14, n. 1).
several months a year. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this sweater business is the fact that Indian-made sweaters reach Indian customers (Tibetans prefer real wool) almost only through these extremely enterprising Tibetan traders.

Each settlement also has its quota of (usually part-time) artists and craftsmen, both lay and religious, whose production, mainly for the Tibetan market,\(^1\) brings them some additional income.

The above has given a basic, if sketchy picture of the organisation of Tibetan settlements in Karnataka. There remain, however, three aspects of these refugee communities which I should like to touch upon briefly: their relations with the local Indian populations; the extent to which Tibetan culture has been preserved within them; and their future prospects.

**RELATIONS WITH THE LOCALS**

Given the measures taken to avoid the surfacing of any potential hostility between the Tibetan settlers and the local Indian populations,\(^2\) it should come as no surprise that the relationship is uniformly a harmonious one.\(^3\) The areas of land now inhabited by Tibetans were previously unused jungle. The amount of financial assistance given to Tibetans did not exceed

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1. In areas more frequented by foreign tourists, as in the case of Darjeeling, for example, the sale of Tibetan arts and crafts is a more viable occupation. The production of such items is greater in the settlements of Himachal and Uttar Pradesh, where "ready markets are available and accessible" and to aid which "(t)he Himalayan Marketing Association in Delhi (has been) established" (Conway, 1975: 19).

2. The compositions of which are unknown to me, although they are certainly mixtures of Hindus, Christians, Muslims, and tribals.

3. This does not mean that no problems exist. I was informed of several, but asked not to repeat them as Tibetans do not wish to endanger this harmony by making complaints.
that made available to other refugee communities in India. Parallel resettlement projects were undertaken for local low/outcaste and tribal groups. An Lugsung Samdubling at least, care was taken to avoid economic competition by prohibiting Tibetans from starting private businesses either within the settlement or locally (Goldstein, 1978: 414). In addition, the Tibetan presence in Karnataka was presented as a temporary one, and many Tibetans, particularly the older generations, still view it in that light. More positively, the indigenous populations of these areas have experienced real benefits as a result of the TRR settlements -- the establishment and/or improvement of water and electricity supplies, and the dam constructed near Doeguling are obvious examples. It should be noted also that the Tibetans themselves are very conscious of the need to maintain good relations. I heard of several instances of a settlement using its Indian 'connections' to help local Indians out.

Interaction between Tibetans and Indians is mainly economic in nature. The role that the settlements have generally taken in the local economy is, in fact, particularly interesting. They of course provide a new consumer market for Indian traders, but they have also a lot to offer -- in the form of technology and expertise, as 'middle-men', and as sources of employment. The

1. The only major exception to this statement I came across was at Rabgyay Ling where I encountered a number of monks preparing a tractor-drawn cart for a procession, part of an Indian religious festival taking place in Hunsur. They had apparently been invited to represent the settlement.

2. The description which follows is, as always, a composite picture.

3. Muslim beef-merchants, for example. Tibetans frequent Indian markets and shops for vegetables, of which they grow few, and for anything more than the basic goods stocked by Co-operative Society shops.
Co-operative Society trucks and tractors, for example, are hired out to Indians when they are not needed elsewhere.¹ Lugsung Samdubling has developed an important motor workshop specialized in tractor repairs: "it has separate smith, auto-electrical and welding sections, with stores for spare parts and machines" with which facilities it "is able to look after all the technical needs of the settlement and render all necessary services (...) also to the surrounding towns and villages" (TIE, 1981: 111-2). The Co-operative Society of Doeguling has even established a branch of its workshop in Mundgod 148). The role of middle-man² is best demonstrated by the Co-operative Society of Lugsung Samdubling which, at harvest time, buys up for resale not only the settlers' maize, but also that of local Indian farmers.³ The settlements also offer a new source of employment for Indians. At labour-intensive periods of the agricultural year, Indian workers (men, women, and children) are employed on a daily-wage, first-come-first-served basis; many travel some distance and live in the settlement for as long as work is available. A number of Tibetan families hire Indian servants, usually youths, who receive board and lodging in return for work around the house.⁴ Indian tailors, always versatile, quickly learned how to make Tibetan women's traditional dress, and at Rabgyay Ling an Indian tailor⁵

1. Possibly, some agricultural equipment is hired out in the same way.

2. The sweater business is another example, though not on the local level.

3. Who, incidentally, began growing this crop only after witnessing the Tibetans' success with it.

4. This was noted by Goldstein (1978: 416) as early as 1966-67. Unfortunately, I am unable to say exactly how common it is. Of necessity, these servants, often Hindu, adopt the beef-based diet of their employers.

5. He lived and worked in Co-operative Society accommodation.
is employed full-time to make, among other things, school uniforms. He also supervises Tibetan trainees, suggesting that this a trade that Tibetans will take over themselves before long. A number of Indian teachers, doctors and nurses still work in the settlements' schools and hospitals, mostly, however, under Indian Government health and education schemes. Even Indian beggars have benefitted, and some have gone as far as to learn to recite a Tibetan prayer.

The above describes some of the effects of the settlements on the local indigenous economies. It also, however, describes almost the total content of local Indo-Tibetan relations. There is very little friendship and almost no intermarriage between the two communities. Language is still a major barrier to communication. Cultural differences are another important reason, the caste system presenting obvious problems to most forms of intermixing. While the latter places restrictions on drinking and eating with persons of different caste, Tibetans tend to socialize by doing just that. Another, if somewhat elusive cultural factor is

1. Necessary particularly to teach Hindi, a language which many Tibetans have still to master.

2. The Tibetans aim to replace as many of them as possible with the numerous young Tibetans now in training.

3. An examination of the full extent and consequences of the Tibetans involvement in the pre-existing local economies would certainly merit further research.

4. Both are probably more common in urban settings.

5. Tibetans need to learn not only Hindi, but also Kannada, the local language. Those who have been educated in India learn the former as part of their curriculum. Much of the remaining lay population is illiterate and must first learn to read and write Tibetan. Hence, at Lugsung Samdubling, the Co-operative Society runs an "Adult Literacy Programme" for "the older members of the settlement who have not been able to have regular schooling" (TIE, 1981: 111).

6. In the evenings, the drink is most frequently chang, normally drunk from a shared bowl with a common bamboo straw, and the food, almost without exception, contains beef in some form.
that of 'character' or way of thinking, by which I mean the often fundamental differences in the moral/value systems of different peoples. I describe this factor as elusive, because values not concretely manifest, as in caste restrictions, diet and dress, for example, are difficult to pin down, yet, nevertheless, they render close inter-relationship for the most part impossible. Simplistically, this amounts to nothing more than saying that Tibetans and Indians just do not 'think' or 'see things' the same way and, despite the epistemological problems surrounding the conception of different modes of thought, I think one must accept cultural differences for what they are -- cultural. Apart from such intangible considerations, it must be said also that the Tibetans, perhaps inevitably given their refugee status and relatively bounded settlements, tend to emphasize their 'Tibetanness' and isolate themselves somewhat from the Indians; the caste system effectively bars intermarriage, but the Tibetans do not favour it anyway. This is of course something which may change with time. The Tibetan youth, while equally as interested in preserving Tibetan identity as their parents, are also more open to friendship with their Indian peers, with whom they have increasingly more in common.

CULTURAL PRESERVATION

The preservation, in modified form, of Tibetan traditions and institutions was made possible, in the first instance, by the manner in which the Indian Government chose to handle the refugee problem. Having "made the fundamental decision to partake actively in efforts to rehabilitate the refugees", "(t)he next step obviously was to establish the ideological framework within which such rehabilitation should occur. If we view the options open to it as a continuum running between
the two poles of assimilation and pluralism, the GOI clearly opted for a policy that fell toward the 'plural' end (...)

Working together with the DLG and a variety of foreign aid groups, the GOI launched a programme of rehabilitation within a framework compatible with the maintenance of Tibetan culture (...)
The most successful of the rehabilitation strategies called for the creation of a series of permanent agricultural settlements throughout India (...)

Although the GOI would not bring all Tibetans together in one area, it also did not want to scatter them in small family units (...)
The proposed settlements were a kind of compromise, because their envisioned size of three to four thousand was large enough to sustain Tibetan language and other institutions easily" (Goldstein, 1978: 397-8). Moreover, the Government of India (and the State Government) allowed Tibetans 'considerable internal autonomy' and "had no objection to giving the DLG de facto internal administrative control of the camps and to working with the DLG instead of with the individual refugees, so long as the latter did not object" (ibid.).

As a result of this policy, combined with a strong desire of the refugees to preserve as much of their cultural heritage as possible and desirable, when one enters a settlement in

1. A phenomenon with which India is particularly well-acquainted.

2. For 'Government of India'.

3. Not least because their ideal is still, of course, to return to their home land, and to return with Tibetan culture intact and improved. It should be noted, however, that prior to 1959, Tibet was not as unified as one is often led to believe. People from 'widely disparate regions in Tibet (...) spoke mutually incomprehensible dialects, operated under different socio-political systems, and were traditionally hostile" (Goldstein, 1978: 396). The greater unity of the refugees has resulted from the fact of exile itself, their common aspirations, and the skill of the Dalai Lama's administration.
Karnataka, one walks, effectively, out of India and into a culturally Tibetan society.\(^1\) Tibetan language\(^2\) is spoken within the settlements and used for all matters internal to the community in exile. Traditional dress is still worn by the majority of Tibetan women.\(^3\) Traditional dishes still constitute the basis of the Tibetan diet.\(^4\) Where suitable, traditional agricultural practices have been incorporated into the modern system. Goldstein (1978: 402) argues that the political organisation of the Tibetan community in exile has

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1. I do not intend to become embroiled in the anthropological pastime of defining terms. I use both 'society' and 'culture' in their broadest senses. I would define culture, minimally, as a label for that which renders one collectivity of people distinct from another. The term 'society' is appropriate in this context because, although ultimately subject to the Government of India and despite the fact that the refugees are scattered, the Tibetans in India have established their own socio-political, economic and religious organisation, and to some extent also legal system; disputes tend to be settled internally, for the Tibetans do not like to use Indian courts.

2. The problem of mutually incomprehensible dialects has been overcome by making Lhasa Tibetan the *lingua franca* (Goldstein, 1978: 403).

3. A slightly modified design is worn by most younger women. This dress, the 'chuba', appears to have become an important symbol of Tibetan culture. For example, I was lent a copy of a magazine produced by a local branch of the Tibetan Youth Congress containing a short love poem by a young man to his beloved, telling her that she is beautiful only when dressed traditionally, that he can love her only then, and that he will love her still more if she upholds the Tibetan cause by wearing it in the fields, despite the fact that it is extremely impractical and uncomfortable for such work. Most men dress in (Indian) Western style. It is interesting, and quite common, that the continuation of much tradition is the lot of women.

4. With some exceptions. Tibetan tea, traditionally made with salt and butter, remains a staple mainly of monks and nuns. Ingredients have changed of necessity. Barley and yak or 'dzo' meat (Tib.: *mdzo*, a crossbreed of yak and cow) have been replaced by wheat or corn and beef.
reproduced the pattern of "hierarchical elitist authority" of traditional Tibet (ibid.:416). Tibetan Buddhism is thriving in India on both the organisational and individual levels. All the major dgon-pas of Tibet have been reconstructed, and the four major Tibetan Buddhist orders continue to be represented. Reincarnated lamas continue to be discovered amongst Tibetan children, and many families still send a son into the religious community. The standards and production of traditional religious art remain high. Tibetans have always been portrayed as a deeply religious people, and they are now in India. Every Tibetan has a personal "tzawai" (Tib.: rtsa-ba, "root") lama (spiritual guide) as was the case in Tibet.

The above illustrates the extent of cultural continuity.

1. Although some fare conspicuously better than others. There is no longer a population of labourers to support the religious communities, hence they are now more or less dependent on the generosity of wealthy patrons, although those groups of monks who were given plots of land (see above) support themselves quite successfully.

2. Reincarnation is an important part of Tibetan Buddhism, and when a spiritual teacher (lama) dies, his reincarnation is sought amongst the children born after his death.

3. Obviously, all these new dgon-pas have to be painted and adorned with statues and painted scrolls. Private persons are also becoming better customers as they become more affluent. Most lay houses have a private shrine of some kind.

4. See, for example, Snellgrove and Richardson, Waddell, and many other Western observers of Tibetan society.

5. Given the fact that the Dalai Lama is regarded by Tibetan Buddhists as a reincarnation of the bodhisattva Avalokitesvara, and both the political and religious premier, it should be evident that for a Tibetan, being Buddhist amounts to something more that the fulfillment of personal spiritual needs.

There has, of course, been as much fundamental change. Much tradition is lost forever, and not always with regret.

The politico-economic system at the base of traditional Tibetan society can no longer be supported in India. This system has most often been described within the peasant-feudal model of mediaeval Europe. So, Goldstein (1978: 404-5), for example, states that before the Chinese takeover in 1959, "(t)he most important politico-economic institution in Tibet was serfdom. Except for a few hundred families of lords and corporate religious institutions, the remainder of the lay population were serfs (mi-ser) of one sort or another, and these serf statuses were basically ascribed, that is recruitment occurred automatically at birth through parallel descent lines. Serfs owed substantial service obligations to their lords who, in turn, were obligated to protect and provide subsistence for the serfs, this subsistence generally taking the form of arable land". (Goldstein (ibid.: 405-6) describes this as "a type of centralized feudal state" as "(t)here was a central government headed by the Dalai Lama and administered by a bureaucracy consisting of an arisocratic and monastic

1. Aziz (1978: 56) translates mi-ser (literally "yellow people") as "the commoners". I find it difficult to understand Goldstein's translation of mi-ser as "serf", for, according to Aziz (ibid.: 67), it was a class which included dr'ong'pa, agriculturists who reside primarily in the villages (...) tsong-pa, traders who are full-time businessmen and officials (and) d'u-ch'ung. These are people of low rank who work as share croppers, labourers, servants, artisans". Although I continue here to quote Goldstein's description of traditional Tibetan politico-economic organisation in feudal terms I agree with Aziz in doubting its validity. The differences between feudal Europe and pre-Chinese Tibet were probably greater than the similarities, and the comparison is extremely misleading. This is a subject which should be examined in depth. For an alternative model, see Aziz's chapter on "Social Stratification".
system comprising over 100 units (...). The central government was clearly dominated by religious orientations and personnel. The ruler, the Dalai Lama, was a bodhisattva who the Tibetans believe has renounced his own nirvana to help all sentient creatures in general, and Tibetans in particular, to achieve final enlightenment. Furthermore, the regents who ruled in the Dalai Lama's infancy were also high incarnate lamas, and half of the governmental bureaucracy were monk officials recruited from the great Gelugpa monasteries around Lhasa. The overall orientation of the state, if there was one, was to promote the development of religion in Tibet".

This model, which Goldstein uses also in his descriptions of Lugsung Samdubling, is seriously questioned by Aziz (1978) in her ethnographic portrait of D'ing-ri, an area on the Tibetan frontier with Nepal: (t)he only way to understand the social structure is by piecing it together from (...) field material and applying the same standards of differentiation and rank that the people use among themselves" 52). The result of this approach is a much more varied and fluid model of Tibetan society than the usual division between serfs and landowners (lay or religious), although Aziz does not deny the heavy demands placed on Tibetan agriculturalists. For example, she says, (ibid.: 103), "(t)he laws state that persons who occupy land as tenant farmers (dr'ong-pa) are not free to leave the land at will, nor may they transfer their land by sale or debt".¹ The tax burden, particularly

1. Of dr'ong-pa Aziz (ibid.: 67-8) also says: "Even though it is almost impossible for him to loosen that tie (to his landlord), the tenant enjoys certain rights. He has hereditarily transferred rights to the holding; he has a voice in the selection of the village leader and in the internal administration of the village and the opportunities for trade and the expansion of property such as sheep and cattle are open to the cultivator, as they are to everyone else (...) By subleasing or by hiring extra labourers, they produce enough grain to feed
in the form of obligatory labour, for D'ing'ri people was also heavy.

Whatever model we choose to describe the situation in Tibet prior to 1959, it should be noted that Tibetan society was neither homogeneous nor unified. One must not overlook the existence of sizeable populations of traders and nomads, and even of small independent kingdoms, as in Khams (Eastern Tibet). It should be noted that no Tibetan I met would like to return to the old system, feudal or otherwise.¹

The loss of the traditional economic base has, obviously, had considerable impact on many other aspects of Tibetan society in India, religious organisation for example. The "religious corporate institutions" mentioned above by Goldstein, were dgon-pas, mainly of the Gelug-pa order of which the Dalai Lama was and is the head, whose material existence depended on the exacting of taxes, and also recruits, from the Tibetan agriculturists working the land leased to the dgon-pas, by the government.² In India, organized religion has had to turn elsewhere for funds. The most themselves, meet their tax, and give the labourers a share (…) the rural people enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy within the village, where they run their day-to-day affairs through a democratic local system".

1. The community in exile has more democratic aspirations. Goldstein (1978: 337) argues, however, that "traditional patterns of political hierarchy and authority" have been retained to a great extent.

2. A fact very much resented by the lay population according to Aziz (1978: 235). This was especially so when, as in the case of D'ing-ri, the spiritual allegiance of the local population lay with another Buddhist order. It should be noted, however, that lay Tibetans were, and I believe still are, happy to provide material assistance to their local dgon-pa, often that of which their 'root' lama, or his lineage, is the head.
striking development resulting from this situation is the Lama Co-operatives mentioned above; large groups of monks who, when resettled in Karnataka, were given plots of land to work collectively. These 'Lama Villages' have become self-supporting, and agricultural work is obligatory for the able-bodied.\(^1\) Although religious agricultural communities were not unknown in Tibet,\(^2\) these were never connected with the Gelug-pa order and were generally considered to contain somehow less religious and certainly less qualified persons than those able to devote themselves to Buddhism full-time (see Aziz, 1978: 191)\(^3\) This system does in fact present problems to student monks in Karnataka; they often have little time to study. On the other hand, the fact that Gelug-pa monks were not unacquainted with the financial and administrative world,\(^4\) may perhaps have aided them in their apparent success in managing their affairs in India.

As another area of fundamental change, one might mention family and kinship organisation. After feudalism and monastic Buddhism, Tibet was also renowned for polyandry, although a tendency of foreign observers to exaggerate the unknown and

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1. A system of fines has been instituted for those who shirk, as compensation for the resulting financial loss to the monastery as a whole. A number of young monks 'sponsored' in their studies by foreign aid organizations or individuals are hence exempt from working altogether. The weak, elderly, or sick are either found less demanding tasks or else supported completely.


3. I received no indication that such a negative attitude still exists.

4. So much so that sometimes sending a son to a Gelug-pa a gon-pa was a means to his education and upward social mobility, and was desirable for that reason (Aziz, 1978: 235).
exotic undoubtedly played a part in this. Actually, it seems that Tibetans practised various forms of both polygyny and polyandry, as well as monogamy.\(^1\) Any form of plural marriage is rare in Karnataka; most of those that exist were either arranged or established in Tibet before 1959. Polyandry is usually explained in economic terms, as a means, in a society with patrilineal inheritance, of preventing the dispersal of property, and particularly the fragmentation of land. This explanatory approach is not without problems,\(^2\) but, assuming it to contain some truth may help us understand why there is little plural marriage in Karnataka. Land there is held individually, and reverts to the Co-operative Society on the holder's death. Moreover, at the time of exile, and also of resettlement, many families were split, and the houses in all the TRR settlements were built for ideal families of five, not for those often larger, resulting from plural marriages.

The above examples are intended to illustrate some aspects of the fundamental changes life in exile has brought about for average Tibetans. They have experienced, in short, the construction of a 'new society', but one linked tenaciously to the traditional order, and interpreted through equally tenacious values.

A LOOK TO THE FUTURE

"Like all other refugees, the Tibetans have been confronted with two mutually contradictory pressures. If, on the one hand, they seek to keep alive the idea of return, they must somehow


2. In D'ing-ri, for example, despite the prevalence of the polyandric ideal, over 70% of marriages are monogamous, the remainder a mixture of various types of polygamy.
prevent their physical dispersion, and, by their very plight, arouse the concern of the world, in the hope that political conditions can be changed in their favour (...) On the other hand, if the refugees willingly accept the generous contributions of relief agencies, and by their own endeavors, succeed in rehabilitating themselves in their new homelands, they will inevitably be subject to pressure to assimilate or amalgamate with their host populations, with the gradual extinction of their distinctive characteristics" (Conway, 1975: 13).

The Tibetan community in exile appears to have managed to balance these two pressures extremely well. The polyethnic, polyreligious, polycultural nature of Indian society has considerably lessened the pressure to assimilate culturally, as has the Indian Government's decision to resettle the Tibetans in large, relatively autonomous communities. These latter have proved economically viable; Goldstein (1978: 401) noticed increasing signs of affluence at Lugsung Samdubling as early as 1967.¹ The settlements have also proved successful in their cultural and psychological dimensions. However, the "idea of return" is still very much alive amongst the refugees in India. The balance has been achieved, Goldstein (1978) argues, by the efforts of the Dalai Lama² and his government.

¹. This "economic success has involved a delicate blending of traditional technology and customs with the increasingly effective utilization of modern agro-business technology" (Goldstein, 1978: 402).

². As Conway (1975: 13) points out, it was fortunate that the Dalai Lama escaped not only unharmed, but at a young age, too (he was 25 in 1959), hence there was no crisis of leadership. It might be added that, as a Dalai Lama is neither elected to, nor inherits his office, but is rather discovered in a young Tibetan boy as the reincarnation of his predecessor, a lengthy process, the Tibetans were doubly fortunate in his escape: traditional qualifications for leadership would have been impossible to fulfil under the circumstances. I believe, also, that the present Dalai Lama, the fourteenth, is to be the last.
In the first instance, the "Dalai Lama was an internationally known religio-political leader whose flight to India had drawn worldwide attention to the Tibetan cause" (ibid. : 408). Moreover, "his exalted stature" enabled him to negotiate with the Government of India and to establish contact with "numerous private" and governmental personages and agencies both in India and abroad" (ibid.). Because of the ready availability of a core of highly experienced and competent governmental administrators" (ibid.), the Dalai Lama was able quickly to establish his government in exile. In simple terms, what becomes clear from Goldstein's paper is that the stance taken by the Dalai Lama's Government in order for it to remain necessary to the refugees is precisely that of keeping the pressure to resettle and amalgamate in balance with the desire to return, sometime in the future, and reclaim Tibet for the Tibetans, defined in terms of traditional culture. Hence, "the ideological policies of the DLG" followed three major lines: "(t)he development of an intense feeling of Tibetan cultural and political nationalism among Tibetans"; "(t)he maintenance and expansion of the charisma and stature of the Dalai Lama; and "(t)he fostering of social, political and economic boundaries" (ibid. :410). To illustrate this process, the following facts, all noted by Goldstein (ibid.: 410-17) might be mentioned. A new national holiday and national anthem have been created. ¹ "Although the DLG has advocated making the best of life in India, it has also vigorously maintained the position that there is hope of returning" (411). The "Tibetan media", controlled by the DLG, 'continually expound on how Chinese Communists are trying to eradicate the Tibetan race in Tibet. It is, therefore, the duty of the refugees,

¹. The new holiday commemorates the Tibetan uprising against the Chinese on March 10, 1959. The anthem is sung daily in schools.
let by the Dalai Lama and his government, to maintain the
greatness and vitality of Tibetan race and national culture" 
(\textit{ibid.} : 402). Patriotism to the Tibetan cause is synonymous
with allegiance to the Dalai Lama's Government. The fostering
of nationalism was certainly facilitated by the fact of exile
itself although it should be remembered that Tibet was not
politically unified prior to 1959. The maintenance of the
Dalai Lama's stature was perhaps an easier task. He is, by
definition, a reincarnation of the \textit{bodhisattva} Avalokitesvara,
and, for the refugees, Tibetan Buddhism is held up "as the
epitome of Tibetan cultural brilliance" (\textit{ibid.} : 412). Main-
taining the charisma of the Dalai Lama is now fundamental for
legitimizing his government which, in India, has neither
"legal foundation or control of force" (\textit{ibid.} : 413). This
has been accomplished mainly through the government controlled
input of information into the settlements through which the
"Dalai Lama has been portrayed not only as the symbol or
quintessence of Tibetan national identity but also as the
patron of the Tibetan people who is directly responsible for
their successful adaptation in India and their future ex-
pectations" (\textit{ibid.}). Boundary maintenance is effected in a
number of ways. Endogamy is vigorously encouraged as funda-
mental to the preservation of the Tibetan race. The Dalai
Lama's Government also strongly supported the teaching and
use of Tibetan language wherever possible, with the result
that many refugees cannot communicate with non-Tibetans. In
the economic sphere, at Lugsung Samdubling at least, the
policy prohibiting Tibetan settlers from undertaking private
jobs and business either within the settlement or in the
locality had taken on political dimensions by 1967. According
to Goldstein (\textit{ibid.} : 415), although, with the economic success
of the settlement agriculturally, "this rule had outlived its
utility" and "supplementary sources of financial input" were
much needed, the rule was not rescinded, because, while tied
to the land, the settlers are effectively controlled by the
Dalai Lama's Government, through the local administrators appointed from Dharamsala.

We have seen some of the ways in which the Tibetan refugee community has been able to survive, and even prosper, in exile, but also to retain its status as a community in exile with a valid cause. In 1967, however, Goldstein (ibid.: 418-19) foresaw some future political and economic difficulties. Specifically, the settler population continued to grow, but the amount of land available is fixed. Moreover, the agricultural methods in use are already intensive and an increase in yield therefore unlikely. As the land is the settlers' main source of income, at least in the case of Lugsung Samdubling, this should have proved problematic, although I saw no evidence that it had in the fourteen years that have passed since Goldstein's observations. One reason, noted by Goldstein (ibid.: 419), has been the re-establishment of monastic communities and the re-emergence of the practice of families sending a son into the monkhood, absorbing part of the growing population. As other reasons might be given the establishment of new settlements, the growing importance of the sweater business as a source of income, the leasing of land for agricultural purposes from local Indians, and the expanded activities of the Co-operative Societies,

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1. For Lugsung Samdubling, but his observations apply to the other settlements, too.

2. As a result of better health care and a rejection of birth control, although Goldstein's latter observation does not seem to correspond with my own findings fourteen years later.

3. Especially so in the case of the Lama Co-operatives which can support more people per acre than can individual families.

4. Although these were intended for the many Tibetans in India who had not yet been settled at all, they also provided for some of the overflow from earlier settlements.
providing alternative sources of employment. The settlers' desire for 'Tibetans only' has encouraged youths to take up a number of trades and professions, such as medicine, teaching, and tailoring. Whether the prohibition against private business was either general, or has since been withdrawn, I met only one Tibetan who had tried it.\(^1\) A number of artists and craftsmen fulfil the Tibetan demand for furniture, domestic and ritual objects, but usually on a part-time basis. In brief, this problem has not emerged, and shows no signs of doing so.

Goldstein (ibid.: 419) also forecast a crisis in political leadership, in as much as the better established the settlers became, the more difficult it would be for the Dalai Lama's Government to legitimize its power, especially so since, with the petering out of foreign aid, it would no longer be a source of finances or of employment; its bureaucracy would have to be trimmed and made more economic. The Dalai Lama's Government now receives Rs 1.--. per month\(^2\) from each Tibetan in India\(^3\) to help finance its existence and activities. I heard few complaints from government-employed persons, despite the fact that they are badly paid in comparison to their Indian counterparts. As Goldstein noted (ibid.), political opposition groups have re-emerged\(^4\) and criticisms of the Dalai Lama's Government are sometimes heard. In the TRR settlements in Karnataka,

\(^1\) He had taken out a loan and established a small one-man noodle-factory, and also planted a number of coconut trees on his land, both long-term projects. Apparently he is mocked somewhat by other for investing so much in India — for they are soon to return to Tibet!

\(^2\) This was described to me as obligatory. Goldstein 413) mentions only a voluntary taxation/donation scheme.

\(^3\) Refugees in other countries pay proportionately to the wages they earn.

\(^4\) There is even a small, and very little approved of Tibetan Communist Party.
however, the status of the Dalai Lama appears in no way to have diminished. Following Goldstein's line of argument, this may well be in part because his political usefulness has not decreased. The more flexible Chinese regime that has followed that of the Gang of Four has made Tibeto-Chinese intercourse possible once again. The Dalai Lama has in fact been invited to return. Moreover, the series of fact-finding Tibetan delegations to Tibet between 1979 and 1981, has perhaps rekindled patriotic nationalism. The reports of those delegations portray their fellow Tibetans in poverty, exploited by the Chinese in every possible manner. Descriptions of demolished dgon-pas abound, as do accounts of Tibetans crying in the streets and swearing undying allegiance to the Dalai Lama. Evidently, all this goes to substantiate the idea that the cultural heritage of Tibet lies with the refugee community, which must preserve and improve it ready for the day of return, should it ever arrive.

In short, it must be concluded that the Tibetans have proved extremely successful as a community in exile and every indication suggests they will continue to do so. It is perhaps a matter for regret, however, that the process of their settlement in India is so little documented, particularly since the Tibetans in India are generally as interested in their culture and future as any anthropologist or historian could be, and are more than willing to devote their time to uncovering and understanding it.
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- Tibetan Agricultural Settlements in Southern India, January 1977
- Canadian–Indian Development Projects in Karnataka, January 1977
- Visit to Tibetan Settlement in Northern India 1977, by J.S. Conway, April 1977
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<th>Foundation</th>
<th>Acreage</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Number of Villages</th>
<th>Houses per Village</th>
<th>Persons per Village</th>
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<td>3000</td>
<td>5573</td>
<td>6 Plus Sera</td>
<td>140-80</td>
<td>7-900 Sera 228</td>
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<td>Doeguling*</td>
<td>1966 November</td>
<td>4045</td>
<td>6837</td>
<td>8 Plus 2 Lama Villages</td>
<td>29-80</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Dkkey** Larsoe</td>
<td>1969 January 13</td>
<td>1771</td>
<td>3500</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>32 But two have Only 16</td>
<td>218 Av.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rabgyay*** Ling</td>
<td>1971-2</td>
<td>2603</td>
<td>2821</td>
<td>14 Plus 1 Half size</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>160</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dhonden Ling</td>
<td>1973-4</td>
<td>2408</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Chowkur</td>
<td>1975****</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>

* Figures given by the representative
** Figures from the Co-operative Society Office
*** Figures extracted from an Annual Report sent to Dharamsala (1-12-81)
**** 1974 according to TIE (1981: 41)
Built on land belonging to the Adjacent Settlement of Dickery Larsøe. 

N.B.: The accuracy of these figures is questionable. The figures listed for Dohnen Ling were not in evidence there.

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<td>Thubten Sheddup</td>
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<td>Tinsane Gon</td>
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<td>382</td>
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(Extracted from TIE, 1981: 241-250)

The Settlements' DgeonaPas

Table 2
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Handicrafts</th>
<th>Industries</th>
<th>Students and Teachers</th>
<th>Monks and Nuns</th>
<th>Business and Office</th>
<th>Old &amp; Retired</th>
<th>Labourers, House-Wifes, etc.</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>1772</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>1772</td>
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<td>(excl. Swiss)</td>
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<td>10701</td>
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<td>14166</td>
<td>758</td>
<td>16739</td>
<td>82546</td>
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</table>

*Note:* This table does not include the number of Tibetan refugees who are known to be scattered in various parts of the world, but untraceable for various reasons.
