SOME ASPECTS OF DHARMAKĪRTI’S ONTOLOGY RECONSIDERED

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It is now almost fifty years since Th. Stcherbatsky published his monumental work *Buddhist Logic*¹, and thereby “opened the way” (srol. byed. pa) as the Tibetans would say, for the present-day study of the system of ontology, epistemology and syllogistic reasoning first established by Dignāga and given its final shape by his grand-disciple Dhammakīrti. Since its publication, a significant number of texts have come to light which have of necessity widened the range of inquiry into this field. In addition to the Nyāyabindu² and the Tattvasaṃgraha³, which were the most important of all the extant Sanskrit treatises on these subjects known to Stcherbatsky, and which were utilized by him as the prime sources for *Buddhist Logic*, scholars today have access to the complete Sanskrit text of Dhammakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttikam, as well as to a number of commentaries upon it.⁴ In addition, we now possess an important sub-commentary on the Nyāyabindu, i.e. Durvekaśīra’s Dharmaṭtarapradīpa⁵, and in the area of Bhauma-pramāṇavāda in general the monographs of Jñānaśī⁶ and Ratnakīrti⁷, the Tarkabhāṣā of Māṇḍakaraṇa⁸, etc.

However, when we turn to the work of subsequent researchers who have had the opportunity to utilize this great mass of newly discovered material, we find that Stcherbatsky’s idiosyncratic line of interpretation has continued to so influence them that they have been unable to correct the crucial errors in it, even when confronted with textual evidence which points to radically different conclusions than those drawn in *Buddhist Logic*. That such has been the case is a great tribute to the excellence of Stcherbatsky’s pioneering work, and is a consequence of both his forceful mode of expression and the seductive character of his views; nevertheless, we hope to demonstrate here that *Buddhist Logic* is greatly flawed respecting some of the keypoints of Dignāga and Dhammakīrti’s system, specifically as regards ontology. Firstly, we shall deal briefly with Stcherbatsky’s own philosophical predilections and the effect which these had upon his interpretation of Bhaumānyāya, and secondly shall try to delineate more clearly Dhammakīrti’s ontology with reference to the Pramāṇavārttikam and some of the Indian and Tibetan commentaries on this text.

It is to be regretted that Stcherbatsky, despite his vast erudition, viewed Buddhist doctrine through the Idealistic spectacles of 19th century academic philosophy; among the Western authors most often cited by him are Bradley, Bosanquet, Lotze and Sigwart⁹, the second-rate successors to Hegelian obscurantism. But it is to Kant and Hegel themselves that we must look for the basic models which Stcherbatsky

¹ Stcherbatsky, Th. *Buddhist Logic*. ² Nyāyabindu. ³ Tattvasaṃgraha. ⁴ Dhammakīrti. ⁵ Durvekaśīra. ⁶ Jñānaśī. ⁷ Ratnakīrti. ⁸ Tarkabhāṣā. ⁹ Bradley, Bosanquet, Lotze and Sigwart.
used in his explications of the Buddhist doctrinal systems. In viewing the Mahāyāna, especially the school of the Madhyamaka, Stcherbatsky imposed an Hegelian pattern of radical monism upon it; i.e., he held that the Madhyamaka school accepted an Absolute Whole as the final reality (śūnyatā), based on their dialectical reduction of all compound phenomena to unreality. Although this view had great tenacity, it has finally been overthrown by more recent interpreters of the Madhyamaka such as De Jong, Jacques May, Robinson, et al. On the other hand, as regards the Hinayāna systems, Stcherbatsky imposed upon them a radically pluralistic outlook formulated along Kantian lines, which assumes only parts to be real while the wholes are unreal, thereby confounding the quite different points of view of the Vaibhāṣika abhidharmaists and the Saṃtaṅkika logicians. Moreover the svalakṣaṇa, which is the keystone of Dharmakīrti's ontology, is taken by Stcherbatsky as being analogous to the durationless thing-in-itself (ding an sich) which is considered by Kant to be the cause of our sensations. As we shall see when we examine the concepts of svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa, nothing could be farther from Dharmakīrti's intentions as expressed in his own works and in those of his commentators. But it is Stcherbatsky's distorted view of this ontology which has enjoyed uncritical acceptance up to the present time.

The concept of svalakṣaṇa is the foundation of Dharmakīrti's ontology, since it alone is accepted by him as being actually real (paramārthasa tat). For Stcherbatsky the svalakṣaṇa is a unique point-instant, without either extention in space or duration in time which is known only through sense perception (pratyakṣa) and which is wholly uncognizable though the intellect. He assumes that there is a strict dichotomy between the two sources of valid knowledge (pramāṇa) accepted by this school, that is, sense perception has for its object (prameya) only the real svalakṣaṇa and inference (aumāna) has for its object only the unreal mental image (sāmānyalakṣaṇa). Although Stcherbatsky gives assent to the universally accepted position of the Saṃtaṅkika logicians as regards existence, viz. "real existence, ultimate existence is nothing but efficiency. Whatever is causally efficient is real," the Idealistic bias of his personal philosophy renders this seemingly realistic and empirical ontology unacceptable to him, and he insists that this system really establishes "behind the veil of empirical reality the existence of its transcendental source, the world of things as they are in themselves." Thus for Stcherbatsky reality is in fact a transcendental absolute, and the real object (svalakṣaṇa) is not the efficient entity presented to us in everyday perception but a seemingly uncognizable thing-in-itself, stripped of all sensible qualities. To buttress this interpretation he even goes to the length of citing without attribution Sanskrit equivalents for such Kantian terminology as "pure object" (suddhārtha), "pure reason" (suddhakalpanā) etc., although such terms are not to be found in any Buddhist philosophical work, and are actually neologisms coined by Stcherbatsky himself.
In fact, such a precipitous gulf between the objects of sense perception and inference, in which the former is a transcendental point-instant and the latter a fictitious mental construct, was never intended by Dharmakīrti. Such an acceptance would have led him into insuperable difficulties, since the objects of our ordinary conceptual cognition (sāvikalpikajāna) would in that case be entirely cut off from those of our sense perceptions, and our everyday ideas about the world could not then be even indirectly related to things as they actually are. While Dharmakīrti does accept two sources of valid knowledge, he does so merely from the point of view of the causal efficiency or non-efficiency of their prime direct objects (grāhyaviṣaya); the prime direct object of sense perception is the efficient object, while that of inference is the non-efficient mental image. This however does not imply that the two pramāṇa-s are completely dichotomous in respect of their cognizables (prameya), since the object of sense perception can indirectly be a non-efficient, as for example when we perceive that there is no elephant in our sitting room; even more importantly, the object of a judgement or an inference can indirectly be a svalakṣaṇa, as for example when we make the judgement “this is a pot”, or when we infer the presence of a real fire on the other side of a hill on the basis of the presence of smoke. Thus while the directly apprehended object of the intellect is indeed a non-efficient mental image, these types of inferential judgements are connected with the world of reals indirectly, since the judge object (adhyavaśāyaviṣaya)—pot or fire etc.—of a conceptual cognition which follows in the wake of a sense perception is held by Dharmakīrti to be none other than the svalakṣaṇa. Although Stcherbatsky does accept an indirect relation between percepts and concepts, their relation actually is impossible given the dichotomous character of his epistemology.

The source of much of Stcherbatsky’s confusion as to nature of the svalakṣaṇa lay in his failure to correctly understand the Sautrāntika view on the relationship between a whole and its parts; for him “The parts alone are real, the whole is a fiction.” This position is actually that of the Vaibhāṣika, and not that of Dharmakīrti or any other Sautrāntika logician, but it is erroneously ascribed to them by Stcherbatsky. The Vaibhāṣika position as expounded in the Abhidharmakośa in the context of a discussion of the two truths, is that conventional truth (saṃvṛtisatya) is that which disappears either upon physical disintegration or intellectual analysis, and ultimate truth (paramārthasatya) is that which is capable of withstanding such disintegration or analysis. Thus for this school an efficient object is certified by common experience to perform a function, such as a car which is able to take us where we want to go, but such an object does not exist ultimately, since it can be broken down into its component parts, which can in turn be reduced to ultimate atoms of color, tangibility etc. There are however certain irreducible components of things such as color, taste, odor etc. which really exist, since they are still present when analysed to the atomic level,
and their cognition does not cease when they are considered apart from other qualities which occasionally accompany them.²⁶ In the mental sphere as well there are certain irreducible experiential states, such as feeling (vedanā), conception (samjñā) and will (cetanā) which accompany every cognition (the daśa mahābhūmika-s)²⁷, which can be reduced to a partless moment of consciousness and will not disappear when separately analysed.²⁸ It is in the Vaibhāṣika system then that the partless moment of consciousness (kṣaṇa) and the partless atom (paramāṇa) really exist (dravyasat), while all compounds are merely nominally existent (prajñāpatisat).²⁹

Moreover, Stcherbatsky’s claim that the partless moment and partless atom alone are held by Dharmakīrti to be ultimately existent is weakened by the fact that in none of the passages which he cites from the works of Dharmakīrti or his followers do we find partless moments or atoms defined as ultimately real— it is always the efficient object (vastu) which is so defined.³⁰ On the basis of the available textual evidence furthermore, we must adopt a wholly different conception of the relationship between a whole and its parts in this system. For Dharmakīrti, it is only a whole existing separately from its parts which is rejected, but the empirical whole which is made up of its parts is real, because what is real in Dharmakīrti’s system is that which is certified by everyday right knowledge to possess efficiency, i.e. the entire car or pot. Not that our ordinary cognitive mode of apprehension of these reals is correct, because they are mistakenly apprehended by us as perduring in time, and as wholes which encompass all of their parts. But although it is not exactly the same object which perdures in space and time, neither is there a universe of entirely discrete atoms and moments such as is posited by Stcherbatsky, since there does exist a continuum (santāṇa) of moments of an object which is in itself a svalakṣaṇa and which is certified as being such in our common experience.³¹ And just as Stcherbatsky has mistakenly concluded that gross material objects are fictions on the grounds that only their constituent parts are real, so he has asserted that the Buddhist logicians believed time to be necessarily a fiction, on the grounds that only the “sensible point—instant”, i.e. the shortest moment of time, is real.³² However, kṣaṇa is not always to be taken in the sense of “an indivisible time particle”,³³ two types of kṣaṇa—s or moments have been recognized by Buddhist philosophers: 1) the theoretical smallest time such as was employed in the Indian science of astronomy, and 2) the moment of everyday usage based on the time it takes for the completion of some activity (bya. rdzogs. kyi. skad. cig. ma), the origin of which is undoubtedly to be found in the biological processes of pulse and respiration.³⁴ This type of moment is known to all, and is reflected in our everyday speech, as for example when we say “wait a moment”, or “it takes just a moment”, and it is considered by Buddhist logicians to be equally as real as the multitude of innumerable time particles which go to make it up. We may conclude then that a gross material object or a time—continuum are on exactly the same footing; i.e. these wholes are as real as the
parts which go to make them up; since the gross material object or time-continua are held to be the effect of their parts, and for Dharmakīrti it is a rule that whatever is either a cause or effect is necessarily real.36

That the whole is real for Dharmakīrti is confirmed by those passages in the Pramāṇavārttikam which deal with the nature of the ālambana, i.e. the object which serves as the cause of its cognition.36 According to these passages, the atoms of color etc., which are by themselves imperceptible (atīndriya), when brought together give rise to a collection (saṅjita) which is in turn the cause for the cognition of gross form.37 And since, as we have mentioned above, whatever is a cause or effect is necessarily a svalakṣaṇa in this system, the collection of atoms is to be regarded as being as real as the atoms of which it is composed.

Since we have shown that the svalakṣaṇa, the ultimate object in Dharmakīrti's system, is actually defined in terms of its causal efficiency, and that both temporal continua and extended objects are included within its scope, we are in a position to declare that Stcherbatsky's description of ultimate reality (paramārtha sat) in this system as an "indivisible, transcendental, mathematical zero"38 is extremely wide of the mark, since it assumes that Dharmakīrti was engaged in the sort of ultimate analysis which is performed in the Yogācāra and Mādhyamika systems. In these two schools there is a search for some type of final mode of being (math. thugs, pai, yin, lags.) of the objects of our experience, which by necessity will stand opposed to the unanalysed appearances of ordinary perception. But it is Dharmakīrti's explicit intention merely to formulate an ontology and epistemology in consonance with everyday right knowledge.39 For this reason we choose to render paramārtha sat in the context of this system as "actually real", i.e. real in practice, rather than as "ultimately real", since the latter term implies the sort of ultimate analysis which is not employed by Dharmakīrti. What is meant here by "actually real" is that which is connotated in ordinary language by the expression "it really works", as applied for example to a functional automobile or medicine etc. This is not to say that an automobile ceases to be actually real when it no longer performs its intended function, for even when lying in the wreckers yard it is capable of generating the judgement "That's really a piece of junk!" On the other hand, samvṛtisat in this system means a purely nominal existence. This refers primarily to mental images, as for example the ideas of a car or pot in one's head. While these images as moments of consciousness are real40 they are unreal in the sense that the idea of a car is incapable of taking us where we want to go, and the idea of a pot is incapable of carrying water, and so on.41

Crucial to Stcherbatsky's premise that the real is an entirely unique monadical absolute, "the unrelated thing", "the mathematical point–instant"42 is the stress which he places upon those texts which describe the svalakṣaṇa as unique in the three realms (trailokyāvyāvṛtta), i.e. as existing on its own apart from all other things as a separate
existence “which is something quite unique”. As we shall see, the uniqueness of which Dharmakīrti speaks leads to no such consequences. To be “unique in the three realms” is taken by Tibetan scholars as referring to “uniqueness of space, time, and nature”. What is meant by this spatial, temporal, and essential uniqueness is simply a restatement of the law of contradiction—if X exists at place A, it doesn’t exist at place B; if it exists at time C it doesn’t exist at time D, and if it is of the nature of Y it is not of the nature of Z. Stcherbatsky assumes however that there is the element of necessity involved in these propositions, that is if X exists at place A it necessarily cannot exist at place B and so on. It is from this idea of a uniqueness which entails necessity that Stcherbatsky derives his idea that only the partless moment of consciousness and atom are svalaṅkaṇa-s, the corollary of which is that all duration and extension are logical fictions. This theory of uniqueness as involving an element of necessity was anticipated by the Gelukpa acāryas mkhas Grub rJe. and rGyal. Tshab, and is considered by them as nothing less than a form of logical overkill, for as they have shown, the consequences of such a view is that only one specimen at most of any real could possibly exist.

While the Indian and Tibetan commentators do agree that a particular instance of an object is unique as to place etc., this does not rule out the existence of a real general sāmāṇya made up of various spatial, temporal and essential instances, the possibility of which is denied by Stcherbatsky, for whom all generals are unreal per se. Just as we have noted in Dharmakīrti’s acceptance of a real, efficient whole (see above), he similarly does not assert that the general or universal is necessarily a fiction; in fact what is rejected by him is a general which is eternal, separate substance (dravyāntara) possessed in common by all those individuals to which it is related, such as accepted in various guises by the Saṃkhya, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā schools. Dharmakīrti divides generals into two distinct categories: a general which is a substantive, and a general which is a logical construct. If every instance of a general is a real (i.e., efficient) thing, then the general is likewise real, as are book, pot, car etc. In each individual instance of a book the particular and the general are the same entity, and are only logically different, because the particular book and general “book” have no other referent than the svalaṅkaṇa, which is existent in its own right and not a mere imputation by such intellect (rtogs, pas, brtags, tsham, ma, yin, par, rang, ngos, nas, grub, pa). In such instances then the general and particular do not exist apart from each other; e.g. the svalaṅkaṇa of fire is heat, and since heat is general in respect of every instance of fire all of these individual instances receive a common name on the basis of their common contrast with those things which lack heat. However, this does not mean that they possess a common heat—the heat of one fire is the specific essence of that fire alone (svam tattvam asādhaṇanam). Unlike the Brahmanical schools and philosophies of a similar tenor in the West (e.g. the Platonic), Buddhist logicians never posited the existence of a real universal “cowness” apart from specific cows, such as
Elsie, Bossie, Spots or Blots.

Only when every instance of a general is not a real is that general necessarily a logical construct. For example, object of knowledge (jñeya) and existence (sattā) fall into this class, because there are instances of an object of knowledge which are unreal, i.e. non-functional entities (anarthakriyāsāmārthya) such as space (ākāsa). Moreover non-functional relational terms—“one”, “many”, “relation” etc. fall into this class, although functional relations do not.\(^5\)\(^3\) This relegation of all non-functional entities and relations to the status of fīcta (rtog. pas. brtag. tsam)\(^5\)\(^4\) is in accordance with the tendency of this school to reduce the number of reals as compared to the more naively realistic Vaibhāṣika, Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika, Saṃkhya and Mīmāṃśa.

For mKhas. Grub. rJe, who follows the commentarial tradition of Devendra-buddhi and Śakyamati,\(^5\)\(^5\) what is rejected by Dharmakīrti is only the permanent, particleless, omnipresent universal which is accepted by the Brahmanical dārśana-s, but “in the works of Dignaga, the Seven Treatises (of Dharmakīrti) and their commentaries, there is not one word to the effect that a general is necessarily not an efficient, causal entity.”\(^5\)\(^6\) As a direct collaboration of the above statement we can look to Dharmakīrti’s discussion of the three aspects of a valid logical mark (trairūpyalinga). In the classic example:

“Sound is impermanent because it is a product”

what we are concerned with here is the ontological status of the probans “product”. The fact of being a product is general to every instance of an impermanent, and since (as has been shown above), when every instance of a general is a svalakṣaṇa the general is a svalakṣaṇa, “product” is both a general and an efficient particular. This is explicitly set out in the Pramāṇavārttikam, in which it is stated that product is an efficient particular,\(^5\)\(^7\) and in which it also is confirmed that it is a general, on the grounds that in this sequence of thesis and reason “Sound is impermanent” etc.—it pervades the probandum (impermanence).\(^5\)\(^8\) Of course “product” in its function here as the probans is a logical construction,\(^5\)\(^9\) but the general to which it refers is a real, since every instance of its occurrence is real, and hence it can be legitimately utilised to prove a proposition about the external world, namely that sound is impermanent. If the general were necessarily a fiction, inference and syllogism would be able to give us no information at all concerning the world of reals, a state of affairs which would obviously be unacceptable to the Buddhist logicians who take these as their fundamental tools.

It is apparent that Stecherbatsky’s interpretations of Dharmakīrti’s ontology, which have by now assumed the status of idées reçues in the field of Buddhology, are for the most part without solid foundation, and spring from a tendentious use of the available material. I have tried to clear up some of the misconceptions regarding a few specific aspects of Dharmakīrti’s system, but there is much that remains to be dealt with, especially regarding his epistemology, specifically in relation to perception and
theory of meaning, both of which have not yet received the detailed treatment they deserve. There is no question then that with the great amount of textual data presently at our disposal, both by Indian and Tibetan scholars, the time is propitious for a thorough reevaluation of the philosophy of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.

**Abbreviations**


**Notes**

(In the following notes Roman numerals refer to chapter number and Arabic numbers to sloka or sutra. Pada-s are indicated by small case letters. In the case of Ab. K and BL Roman numerals refer to volume number. In referring to PV the traditional ordering of the chapters is followed, i.e. I–Svārthānumāna, II–Pramāṇasiddhi, III–Pratyakṣa, IV–Parārthānumāna.)


4. Pramāṇavārttikam: (A) *Pramāṇavārttikasvārītī, The Autocommentary on the First Chapter Only, Together with the Subcommentary Svavṛatītikā by Kernakagomin*, ed. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, Kitab Mahal, Allahabad, 1943; (B) G; (C) *Pramāṇavārtti-
5. NB
7. Ratnakīrti-Nibandhāvali of Ratnakīrti, ed. Anantlal Thakur, Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna, 1957
8. Tarkabhāṣa of Mokṣakaragupta, ed. H.R. Rangaswami Iyengar, Mysore, 1952
9. BL. I. 549, 550
11a. Russell, op. cit., p. 707
   Shastri, D.N., *Critique of Indian Realism*, Agra University, Agra, 1964, pp. 2, 3, 5, 187, 188 et passim
   Dravid, Raja Ram, *The Problem of Universals in Indian Philosophy*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1972, p. 73
12. NB. I. 13–14: BL. II. pp. 35–37
13. BL. I. pp. 84, 87
14. BL. I. pp. 78, 184
15. BL I. p. 73
16. NB. I. 15; BL. I. p. 69; BL. II. p. 36
17. BL. I. p. 63
18. BL. I. pp. 70, 190
19. BL. I. pp. 61, 78
20. PV, III. lab; PT, III. 54
21. NB. II. 12; *Nyāyabinduṭā of Vinitadeva*, Sanskrit original reconstructed from the extant Tibetan version, with English translation and annotations by Mrnalkanti Gangopadhyaya, Indian Studies Past and Present, Calcutta, 1971, p. 131 n. 22
22. NB. II. 17
23. According to the Tibetan Scholastic tradition, Dharmakīrti distinguishes four types of objects; A—the apparent object (pratibhāsaviṣayā/snang. yul); B—the prima facie direct object (grāhyaviṣayā/gzung. yul); C—the judged object (adhyaṇavāyaviṣayā/zhens. yul); and D—the object of purposeful striving (pravṛttiviṣayā/jug. yul.) For a detailed discussion of the above see DD ff. 52b2–56b3. See as well the Tshad. Ma. Rigs. gTer. Gyi. dKa’. Bai. gNam. rNam. Par. bShad. Pa. sDe. bDun. Rab. gSal. by Go. Ram. bSod. Nams. Senge in the Sa. sKya. Pai. bKa. ‘Bum, Toyo Buno, 1969, Vol. 12, p. 6 plate 4 line 5, to p. 8 plate 3 line 2
25. BL. I. p. 86
26. Ab. K. VI. 4
27. Ab. K. II. 24
28. See note 26
29. Ab. K. II. 46
30. BL. I. p. 69 n. 1; BL. II. p. 23 n. 2
Nyāyabinduṭṭiḥpani, ed. Tn. Stecherbasky, Bibliotheca Buddhica 11, St. Petersburg, 1909, p. 11 lines 14–16
32. BL. I. p. 84
33. BL. I. p. 106
34. See note 29. Also the mKhas. Pai. Tshul. La. ’Jug. Pai. sGo, by Mi. Pham., Tashijong H.P., n.d., ff31a5–32b1 for a good explanation of this point and of time in general.
35. PV. I. 172ab
36. Ab. K. II. 62c
38. BL. I. pp. 182–183
39. NB. I. 1
40. PV. III. 9–10
41. NB. I. 15–16; PV. III. 3
42. BL. I. 104
43. BL. I. 103, 104, 402
This point is discussed by Tibetan scholars in terms of "non mixing of place, time
and nature,” (yul. dus. rang. bzhin. ma. ’dres. pa.)
Go. Ram. bSod. Nams. Senge, op. cit., refers to the following passages in PV. as
the foundation for the accepted Tibetan interpretation;
PV. I. 153a+c indirectly show yul. ma. ’dres. pa;
PV. I. 87ab & PV. I. 139ab directly show rang. bzhin. ma. ’dres. pa;
PV. I. 92b & PV. III. 487 directly show dus. ma. ’dres. pa. and indirectly dus.
’dres. pa;
PV. I. 68 & PV. I. 139cd directly show yul. and rang. bzyin. ’dres. pa;
PV. I. 98 directly shows dus. ’dres. pa;
PV. I. 136c directly shows yul. dus. rang. bzhin. ’dres. pa.

45. BL. I. pp. 86–87
46. DD ff 23b6–24a3; f. 30b1–2
47. DD f. 33a3–5
49. PV. III. 51cd. Although this text distinguishes three types of sāmānyā, they are
reducible to two without doing violence to Dharmakīrti’s intention here.
50. This is the standard definition of svalakṣaṇa accepted by the Gelugpa school. See
DD f. 21b2; rGyal. Tshab. op. cit. f. 45a6
51. I allude here to the differentiation theory of meaning (apoha) which was first formu-
lated by Dignāga in the 5th chapter of the Pramāṇasamuccaya and given its final
form by Dharmakīrti. It is discussed by him throughout the PV. but primarily in
Chapter One verses 40–185 For a useful survey see BL. I. pp. 457–482
52. NB. I. 12 and the commentary by Dharmottara thereupon.
53. DD f. 31a6–31b6
54. DD f. 33b5–6
Grangs. by KLong. rDol, contained in The Collected Works of Longdol Lama Parts
1, 2, reproduced by Lokesh Chandr from the Collections of Prof. Raghu Vira,
International Academy of Indian Culture, New Delhi, Dec. 1973, plate 661 line 5
to plate 662 line 3. In this context see also footnote 48.
56. DD f. 33a5
57. PV. I. 172ab
58. PV. II. 16
59. DD f. 39a1–6

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