Book Reviews


In 1975 Karl Jettmar published a monumental study in the series “Die Religionen der Menschheit” (Kohlhammer, Stuttgart) entitled *Die Religionen des Hindukusch* (“The Religions of the Hindukush”). The first part of this volume contained a study of the religious traditions of Kafiristan, while the subsequent parts dealt with the Shina and the Burushaski-speaking peoples, as well as the Kalashas and the Kho (Chitral).

The present volume is a thoroughly revised translation of the first part of *Die Religionen des Hindukusch*. It also contains a completely new chapter on “The Comparative and Historical Context of Kafir Religions”, in which the author discusses the important reviews of the German version of his book by Gérard Fussman. Recent publications by Georg Buddrus, A. L. Grujnerog, and others are also taken into account. The result is a study of the religious traditions and beliefs of the people of Kafiristan which is as complete as it is ever likely to be, as the Kafiri tribes were forcibly converted to Islam at the end of the nineteenth century; by the middle of this century, only a certain amount of mythological accounts were still remembered by a few elderly individuals.

There are short outlines of South Kafiri religious systems by Schuyler Jones and Max Klimburg, as well as a useful “Etymological Glossary of Kafiri Religious Vocabulary” prepared by Peter Parkes, and, finally, a number of interesting photos from the Prasun Valley and from Waigal by Max Klimburg, showing pillars with sculptures of various deities.

With the exception of various mythological themes also found in the Gesar epic as recorded among the Burushos (pp. 56, 61) and in Ladakh (p. 61), the religion of the Kafiris hardly has any connection with that of the Tibetan world. It is, nevertheless, interesting to gain insight into religious beliefs and practices of a mountain people of Asia living in a natural environment not unlike that found in parts of Tibet. Above all, the volume serves to introduce two forthcoming volumes (which together with the
present volume will form the complete, revised translation of the German version) in which other peoples, e.g. those of Chitral are dealt with; peoples whose historical contacts with Tibet are well known and whose religions have many traits in common with the popular religion of regions such as Ladakh.

Professor Jettmar is the undisputed expert on the religions of this remote part of Asia; his account is authoritative and carefully documented, and yet continuously opens up vast vistas of Central Asian religious and cultural history. It may be safely assumed that this study will not be replaced as a standard work of reference.

Per Kvaerne
Oslo


With the almost exclusive emphasis of studies of Tibetan philosophy upon the Cittamātrin and Mādhyamika schools of philosophical tenets, Anne Klein’s excellent discussion of Sautrāntika thought from the perspective of the Dge-lugs-pa is a welcome addition to the growing corpus of Western exegetical studies of Tibetan Buddhist philosophy. Her title, Knowledge and Liberation, does not reveal this important fact, however, and the volume would have been better titled, “Sautrāntika Epistemology.”

The Sautrāntika formulate many of the essential epistemological issues of Buddhism—direct perception, conceptual thought, affirming negatives, non-affirming negatives, naming, etc.—working largely within the context of Dharmakirti’s work, and these formulations occupy many of the initial years of philosophical study in the Tibetan philosophical training colleges. Klein’s presentation will help students of Tibetan Buddhism in the West to appreciate the diversity of philosophical tenets that have influenced Tibetan religious thought and practice.

Klein’s work provides one more piece of evidence against the notion that the Tibetans were not intellectually creative. Her study draws extensively from Phur-bu-lcog’s Collected Topics (Bsdus grva), Lcan-skya’s Presentation of Tenets (Grub mtha’i rnam bzhag), Bstan-dar Lha-ram-pa’s Presentation of Generally and Specifically Characterized Phenomena (Rang mishan spyi
mtshan gyi rnam gzhag), 'Jam-dbyaṅs-bzad-pa's Great Exposition of Tenets (Grub mtha' chen mo'), along with relevant contributions from Mkhas-grub, Rgyal-tshab, Sa-skya Pandita, the 15th century Sa-skya scholar Stag-tshan, and a variety of Dge-lugs-pa debate manuals and college textbooks, giving the reader some sense of the Dge-lugs-pa philosophical enterprise. The debate with Stag-tshan, who took issue with the Dge-lugs-pa formulation of the two truths, is especially interesting, only Klein relies upon the Dge-lugs-pa reduction of Stag-tshan and not upon a Sa-skya-pa presentation and defense. A more extended treatment of some of the major philosophical debates between Dge-lugs and Sa-skya scholars of the 15th and 16th centuries is much needed.

The fundamental question underlying these epistemological investigations is how does consciousness, how do words and thought, ascertain external objects; or, in other words, what is the process of knowledge and expression. The Sautrāntika investigate direct perception, conceptual thought, and how the two are intertwined, i.e., how thought makes possible a conceptual identification of what is perceived in direct perception. For example, the identity of ‘sameness’ of an object which extends from the past to the future is a construction of conceptual thought; a flowing river, for example, is conceived only by thought, for direct perception never perceives the same parts of the stream twice. Thought develops a generic image (“flowing river”) and superimposes this meaning-generality upon the object, thereby providing an identification to direct perception. This generic image and the object become mixed; however, thought does not naturally recognize that this is the case. Although the generic image seems to be one with its referent object, in fact it is not, and thought loses sight of this; hence, thought is obscured from fully knowing reality. “Thought cannot perceive specifically characterized phenomena in a manner that accords with the object's actual way of abiding” (p. 128); only direct perception can do so. So each is in some sense dependent upon the other.

Direct perception is hampered by a lack of ascertainment—of noticing what appears to it—and thought, despite being obstructed with respect to a clear and vivid appearance of impermanent things, is the instrument whereby one can cultivate ascertainment of what appears unnoticed to direct perception. (p. 211)
How does direct perception directly know an object? By its aspects (rnam pa), is the answer the Sautrāntikas give: an object casts its aspects toward consciousness, and the perceiving consciousness takes on the aspect of the object. But are these aspects subjective or objective phenomena? The Sautrāntikas reply that aspects are both subjective and objective, but they never satisfactorily clarify which one is at work at which moments:

a presentation of aspected direct perception involves a number of difficulties, especially that of identifying exactly what the apprehension aspect is and detailing whether or not the directly perceiving consciousness knows its object by means of a subjective apprehension aspect. (p. 114)

Klein dissolves the issue, a move which is both a merit and a frustration, in terms of a metadiscourse she provides concerning the pedagogical values of the various views she summarizes. The shortcomings in the philosophical arguments of the Sautrāntikas Following Reasoning and the Sautrāntikas Following Scripture have heuristic value for students, leading them naturally to the perspectives of the higher schools of philosophical tenets. This is a merit, in that it draws from the actual methods of Tibetan philosophical training, but it is a frustration in that the issue is never fully resolved.

Further, does conceptual thought apprehend only the generic image, as many commentators on Indian Buddhism have held, or does it also apprehend the object itself? Since Sautrāntikas do not subscribe to a selflessness of phenomena (phenomena are selfless for them only in the sense of their not being capable of being used by substantially existent persons), how do they maintain the integrity of the object being apprehended by conceptual thought? They argue that thought is not dealing with something merely imputed by thought (and the “merely” is critical here) but is “explicitly realizing” (dngos rtog) a specifically characterized phenomena. This “realizing” (rtog pa) performs a great deal of work for the Sautrāntika investigation of conceptual thought (this matter is not made any easier by the fact that Klein has translated rtog pa as “thought” and as its subsidiary “realization”). Thought does not realize an object directly, but it does realize it explicitly by way of an image. That an actual object is obtainable in dependence upon such a consciousness is proof that some contact has been made with a real object.
Den-dar-hla-ram-ba explains that the thought apprehending pot does not explicitly apprehend pot; it explicitly apprehends the meaning-generality. Yet it is necessary to assert that thought explicitly realizes pot since, as stated above, a specifically characterized pot is undeniably obtainable in dependence upon such a consciousness. (p. 196)

The Sāmkhya and other realists assert that meaning-generalties dwell in the things themselves, that there is a substantially existing nature which pervades all similar objects (e.g. tree). Buddhists contest that if the same partless meaning-generality pervaded two separate instances, those instances must be identical; hence, the nature of cedar would have to exist in an oak. Rather, Buddhists assert that thought apprehends only meaning-generalties, which then by imputation pervade its instances. This is like having it both ways:

thought does actually get at impermanent phenomena even though, technically, these cannot be appearing objects of thought . . . the term ‘pot’ has two explicit objects. These two are the meaning-generality of pot and pot. However, it is still not the specifically characterized pot that is an explicit object of expression, but pot’s self-isolate [rang ldog]. (p. 196)

Despite this proliferation in terms, one is left querying just where the point of contact between conceptual thought and the object rest.

Some suggestion is provided in an able discussion of the Dgelugs-pa elaboration of the Indian Buddhist concept of exclusion (apoha, sel ba). Countering the Brahmanical conception that words refer to something positive, Dignāga maintained that a word merely serves to distinguish a phenomenon from other things. Dignāga, however, persisted to claim that the referential meaning of a sentence composed of words is positive. In terms of semiotics, this is like saying that the signer is a negative phenomenon while the signified is a positive phenomenon. the Dge-lugs-pa, building upon Śāntarakṣita, reformulated the latter to assert that the image by which an object is known is both positive and negative. It is negative in that it excludes images generated by other words; hence, objects (and self-isolates, one can suppose) are realized through a process of exclusion, or in Sa-skya Pandita’s words, “Exclusion is the mind’s mode of operation.”
There is much to recommend this volume. If there is a flaw, it is that the text is occasionally repetitive. Chapters repeat identical or similar treatment of topics (e.g. affirming negatives, or the Sautrāntikas Following Reasoning interpretation of the two truths). The technical regimen is painful enough to endure (in Klein's words, "sometimes dry debate") without having to endure unnecessary repetition. In Tibetan poetics and pedagogy, however, repetition is a virtue, not a vice, so much of Klein's difficulty lies with the indigenous form; nevertheless, such form may well deter the educated but nonspecialist reader. As we face the happy appearance of a growing number of competent studies of Tibetan philosophy and epistemology, it would serve us well to consider who the audience for these studies will be. The material is too technical to interest greatly the general public, and even many practitioners of Buddhism are reluctant to undertake such intellectual rigors. This leaves academics generally, and students of Buddhism more specifically. If we are not to reserve these studies to a community of specialists, some means of providing a Western academic audience with easier access to these investigations must be found.

The real task is to identify the fundamental telos of Tibetan philosophical inquiry, so that the arguments are not isolated philosophical vignettes. Klein's study is a contribution to this effort, as she takes up a variety of epistemological interests without losing sight of their underlying function within Tibetan Buddhism. Finally, Klein's dependence upon a wide variety of Tibetan texts and study manuals is an example of the synthetic interpretive work Western scholars need to perform. As more interpreters begin to study, compare, and include these textbooks in their presentations, the actual praxis of Tibetan philosophical reflection will begin to emerge.

Kenneth Lieberman
Eugene


Tibetanists owe thanks to the two compilers, Yoshiro Imaeda and Hallvard Kuløy, who prepared this monumental bibliography. Special thanks are also due to the publisher. The book contains 11,822 entries, far surpassing any known
predecessor. It is arranged alphabetically by author, and under the authors, by date. It is surely the last major bibliography in this field to be produced without a computer.

All the many titles from the Japanese literature appear both in Japanese and English. Those in most western languages have been left in the original form, with occasional translations from the Hungarian.

Most earlier western language bibliographies on Tibetan studies have been wholly supplanted. Bruce Walker’s, produced only in typescript, but widely distributed and even bound for the NY Public Library, in its final form in 1974, contained 825 items, alphabetized by author. It was restricted to items in English. The Office of Tibet in New York, at about the same period, also issued a typescript bibliography with 677 entries. It was broken down into 35 topics, each alphabetized by author.

One of the best of the earlier bibliographies was prepared and published in 1971 by Sibadas Chaudhuri, the librarian of the Asiatic Society. This work contains about 2430 items. It has not lost its value, despite the new and far larger bibliography, since it contains Russian, Indian and even some western material not elsewhere referenced. While Chaudhuri’s bibliographical work is noted in the Kulşy-Imaeda volume¹, the 1971 volume is not. The one significant gap in the new book is its weakness in Russian literature, except where such work has been translated into other European languages.

Another bibliography still of value was produced by Julie G. Marshall. It is titled Britain and Tibet 1765–1947, and gives 2,847 entries². It is broken down by period, topic and area and contains both an author and title index for items published anonymously. Its value is hugely increased by annotations. These indicate topics covered more clearly than titles alone. Annotations are much to be desired in all bibliographies, but unfortunately are relatively rare.

There are enormous numbers of bibliographical publications. If one incautiously asks the New York Public Library for just the subject “bibliographies” it notes, as of this day of writing, 23,568 publications. That is only a small part of its collection, since the computer does not yet include what is in the old hard bound index volumes. Some of the older bibliographies of value for Tibetans are not in the NYPL collection. Notably that of Chin-chih Hs’ü³.

In print and purchasable bibliographies also are amazingly numerous. Dawson Book Service, for example, has regularly been publishing their Bibliography sale catalogues with almost 2,000 items. Their recent catalogue 25 had 1,912 numbered and 15
unnumbered items, several multivolume, all for current sale. It
should be noted that none of the bibliographies commented on
in this review are in that particular Dawson catalogue. But many
in it do contain material of interest to Tibetologists.

Contributing to the astonishing numbers are the specialist
bibliographies which often contain hard-to-find information.
These are the bibliographies, for example, on art, botany,
Buddhism, geography, mountaineering, numismatics, philately,
and the neighboring countries, such as China, Nepal and India.
Depending upon one's special interest, such bibliographies are
worth consulting.

The best, currently, for mountaineering, and covering
Tibetanist material, is the masterful Catalogue of the Himalayan
Literature, edited by Yoshimi Yakushi, and published by
Hakusuisha, Tokyo, 1984. It lists almost 5,000 items, counting
addenda and miscellaneous sections. The wholly Japanese
publications, 856 of them, are also catalogued in English
translation. The annotations are concise and informative.

There is a much smaller bibliography for the stamps and coins
of Tibet. Undoubtedly there are other specialist bibliographies,
like this one, published privately and in small editions.

While there are many Buddhist bibliographies, that of Shinsho
Hanayama, published by Hokuseido, Tokyo 1961, is still one of
the more useful for Tibetanists. It is indexed by subject, with, for
example, 121 references to Jataka tales, 48 to Lhasa, 34 to the Dalai
Lama, 29 to the Kanjur. While most of the material clearly on
Tibet is found in the Kulşy/Imaeda bibliography, tangential
material is not.

An excellent Bibliographie du Népal, by Luce Boulnois and
Henriette Millot, was published in 1969 by the Centre National
de la Recherche Scientifique. It is a good example of a
neighboring country bibliography with much material pertinent
for Tibetologists. It comprises 4,515 items, with frequent
annotations. They are listed under 18 major headings, with over
40 subtopics. There are complete indexes by subject, author, and
for anonymous items, by title.

Deciding on a perfect procedure for what to include or omit
presents insoluble difficulties. One could readily prepare a
fascinating bibliography merely with items unlikely to be
included in a typical bibliographical book on Tibetology.

This reviewer's paper on the first tsha tsha published in
Europe, illustrates a good example of the problem. Out of 34
items there referenced, 28 are not in any of the cited
bibliographies. The proportion of missing items is even greater
in the bibliography of another paper by the reviewer, on the
location of Tibet, delivered at the 1985 Munich Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies. The references to maps and books containing them, since they are only tangential to any one location, tend to be listed only in geographical bibliographies. This despite their interest for Tibetanists who consider the historical view. In early material, prior to or just after 1624 and the travels of Andrade, not only the mention of Tibet but also its absence or aliases have significance.

It probably is not possible to make a truly complete bibliography, even of items which are right on target. There are so many minor publishers, so many small editions, that even significant items escape notice. The work in preparing and printing such books has to be a labor of love, since it surely supplies little other recompense. The present bibliography is so far ahead of anything else now available that it is almost carping to consider the shortcomings.

In addition to those odd missing items, one can also find a few which probably do not belong. For example, 06559, Charles Marvin, Reconnaitrind Central Asia, never once mentions Tibet, Buddhism or Lamaists. Even the map in that book stops at 75 longitude, just short of the Tibetan border.

It would, one day, be very helpful if a bibliography of this type gave location of at least rarer items. Where can one find copies of early publications? The reviewer has tried unsuccessfully to find 08222, Rehmann, Beschreibung einer thibetanischen Handapotheke, St. Petersburg, 1811. It seems to elude even our Russian colleagues. It was referred to in Bretschneider's Botanicum Sinicum.6

When books which are clearly not just tangential are missing from this tremendous bibliography, it seems clear that they must be rare. Such items are not necessarily among the oldest. Edouard Foucaux's publication of a Tibetan text plus translation of Le Tresor des Belles Paroles, choix de sentences par le Lama Sassyka Pandita, Paris, 1858, is joined by Flora Beal Shelton's Sunshine and Shadows on the Tibetan Border, Cincinnati, 1912. One delightful, far from rare book, unfortunately missing, is that of Twan Yang,7 who was the houseboy of Johan van Manen.

As with all bibliographies, names present problems. In one of the few numismatic references, Terrien de la Couperie can be found under Couperie8 and under Terrien de la Couperie.9 Russian names always present problems, especially when already transcribed by the French or Germans. So one must not be too quickly discouraged when looking up a Russian author. Overall, the listings are excellent.
This bibliography is a must for all centers of serious Tibetan Studies.

1. 01689.
8. 01936, 01937.
9. 10093.

Braham Norwich
New York


My first and most superficial reaction to this book was mixed. I glanced at the glossaries and saw that the word ‘mandala’ was listed as a Jungian, rather than a Buddhist term. There is something oddly correct in this; most first impressions of what a mandala is will have been filtered through Jung or his shadows, this reviewer not excepted.

At one time, I looked on Jung as a scientist of the mind, one who was able to make as his object the most personal and obdurately subjective aspects of the human being. His universalism was especially appealing. Since then, taking Blake’s “every minute particular is holy” as a motto, I have preferred to dwell on distinctiveness, finding human unity not in an
underground psychic unity such as Jung's collective unconscious, but in a sense of the essential interrelatedness and interdependence of human beings with all their identities forged and sustained by their differences. My current teleological hopes are less that people will settle their differences through discovery of a mental substrate which binds them to commonality; I only wish they would generously and mindfully communicate. If there is a mental substrate, it would be in their similar sense of embodiment and in the range of emotions and thoughts they might choose to share with others, not in that world of shadowy archetypes which Jung (in my opinion, quite) unquestionably tended to differentiate into distinct racial memories, giving it a basis in heredity, and hence, it would follow, genetics.

My first reaction told me it was wrong or irrelevant to compare the psychology of Jung with the Buddhism of Tibet as if they were on equal footing when, to some degree, the former both was inspired by and used the latter for its own ends. What sense in comparison, when the comparers, quite often as it seems also in the present case, set out to study Tibetan Buddhism after being inspired to do so by the Jungians? What could psychic integration and individuation process have to do with a Buddhism in which all that is integrated falls apart? ['du-byas thams-cad mi rtag-pa] Laying aside facile identifications with the 'store-house consciousness' (kun-gzhil'i rnam-shes, which is, after all conscious), what meaning could a collective unconscious hold for a system of thought that rejects the validity of any constant substrate? Can unconscious collectivities reincarnate?

These initial judgements were partly laid to rest along the way. All these issues are raised and addressed in a way that is thought-provoking, even when not always entirely persuasive. I had expected the conclusion to be biased, as such 'comparisons' usually are, toward synthesis, but the synthesis is amply balanced by analysis; some differences are respected. A third factor is even made to play a mediating role—alchemy. Jung the enthusiastic student of alchemy was not the alter ego of Jung the psychic scientist. They were the same person, even when they were not the same persona. Unlike Buddhism, Jung followed alchemy according to his own understanding of its psychic dimensions; he felt consciously in debt to this tradition. Buddhism, on the other hand, supplied at best a useful confirmation of ideas already formulated through his alchemical studies as well as his psychiatric practice and personal introspection (his more general education as a proudly western and modern person doesn't go without saying).
The synthesis that emerges at the end of the book is a surprising one in that it is not really a synthesis. I don’t wish to give away the conclusion entirely, but the creative insight of the polarity of Padma and Self is credited to inspiration from the collective unconscious to the author. It is a duality of near unity, each term of the symbolic dialectic standing for one of the two systems that were compared in the book. This gives an extremely touching and very Jungian ending to the enterprise, but the rough-skinned skeptic in me, as partly described in my above-revealed predispositions, wants to think differently.

To my way of thinking, creative insights derive not from a concealed symbol stockpile, but from the tension formed when one carries two apparently incompatible sets of ideas around for some period of time. One has an emotional response to the emotional tensions between bodies of intellectual ideas which compels intellectual transformation. This emotional component in the intellectual equation is a mystery mainly to the intellectual, one who makes a life career out of denying emotions their power to change one’s mind. Hence, according to me, the intellectual looks too far when looking to a deep and mysterious place for the roots of creativity. The intellectual may make the unconscious into a convenient foil for warding off unwanted intrusions of the emotions, as well as for denying those ‘intrusions’ when they do occur.

This discussion of the power of the emotions to motivate, transform and rearrange the intellectual aspects of the human mind is, I believe, extremely relevant to my contention that Jung used, and did not follow or even understand the basics of Tibetan Buddhism.¹ In my opinion it is a pity, especially, that the scholarly approaches to understanding the mandala (including Moacanin’s, pp. 69–71) have so far, with few exceptions, been filtered through Jung. Forgetting Jung would seem to be the best way to start afresh. Ideally, we should lay the ‘universality’ aside and look at the specifics of the mandala as something with both background and substance within Tibetan religion and thought, not within a Jungian nexus, and above all, not as an archetype dislodged from a collective unconscious, a concept for which Buddhism in itself has no special need. This is a program for the future, not for now.

My own peculiar non-Jungian view of the mandala has developed over several years and is based partly on my reading of Tibetan texts which integrate mandalas within a variety of disparate contexts, and partly on my own predispositions. I cannot hope to fully document or convey all the reasons for this alternative view in a short space. Here I can only cite some of my
previous work, both published and unpublished, \(^2\) and limit myself to some of the results of this reassessment. First, a word of caution:

According to both Jung and Tibetan Buddhism, the mandala is a mysterious and inexplicable thing. To pretend to explain it outside its context is wrong. For both systems its context is within a therapeutic and/or transformative process, where it plays a definite and definitive role. The interpreter must have the humility to acknowledge that any interpretation outside that context will most probably be not only half-true or wrong, but what is more important, wrongly taken. Also, mandalas appear in so many different literary contexts that generalizations on their basis will be dangerous, while the primary context is initiatic, not literary. Should we stop here? Anyone who cannot conceive how myth and literary or artistic imagery could embody and convey a serious theory of knowledge should most definitely put this piece away.

Although an example appears on the cover, the mandala is hardly the focus of Moacanin’s book (see pp. 69–71). Still, I would like to use the remainder of this review to demonstrate the relevance of some issues it raises for her comparative enterprise.

What is a mandala? First and most generally it is a home, a palace. The palace shows up in the Buddha’s cynically reinterpreted Hindu story of the origins of things contained in the Brahma Jāla and Aggañña Suttas (both from among the Long Discourses of the Pali Buddhist canon). At the new formation of the present great aeon, a palace appears in space, while into it a being of the Clear Light realm descends due to his karma. He is lonely and wishes others could join him there in his new home. When other beings do make their appearance, the first god Brahma believes (wrongly) that they were brought into being by his wish, when in actuality, he as well as they were brought there from a prior status due to karma. The other beings are convinced by Brahma’s belief that they were brought into existence by his wish. All this wishful (emotive) thinking was a fundamental mistake.

The palace is rather explicitly identified with the objective realm of knowable objects in its most primitive condition, while Brahma and his subsequent cult members are the duped knowers of that objective-realm-as-palace. The palace is also an external web/trap (Sanskrit, jāla) which arose in interdependence with the subjective web of wishful thinking (‘false consciousness’ to borrow and stretch a Marxist term). The remainder of the story, which explains the beginnings of society, shifts back and forth between external environmental
developments (or devolution) and internal mental developments, showing their interdependence at every step of the way.

This interdependent origination, which would become the Realm of Dharmas of Mahāyāna dialectic, is a statement about origins (not the origin, since there is no first cause; there is at best a force-field of causations). There is no ontology as known to the Christian world, since there is no creator whose existence might need to be established through an ontological proof. There is no essentialism, since the existential emphasis here, if there were one, would be on relations between things, not in the substantiality or material existence of the things themselves, and not on what they might be ‘at core’. This is not mysticism. If it is mystifying, it is because of the difficulties of a knowing subject such as ourselves in contemplating such a basic question as, ‘What is the relationship between the set of my knowing faculties and the set of objects it knows?’

This is foundational question of epistemology, a point of departure for a theory of knowledge. Epistemologies that assert a unified, noncontingent knower will likely assert a unified, noncontingent origin for knowable objects (ex.: God, matter), while epistemologies such as the Buddhist ones which assert a diversified, mutually contingent set of factors that make knowing a possible event for us will be liable to posit diversified and mutually contingent origins for knowables. In the first case, knower and knowables will exist in a fundamentally separated way; they will be given separate origins, and ontological problems of things-on-their-own will acquire a special necessity. In the second case, ontology is not such a necessity, because knower and knowables co-originate and co-operate even if we might temporarily consider them separately as two sets of also co-originating and co-operating principles, or consider them as a single system operating through time. In the first case, the existence of a homogenous knowing self such as Jung’s makes sense; in the second, such an entity will scarcely endure, is not needed, and in fact is denied any existence to call its own.

Although I will obviously not be announcing visitations from anything like a collective unconsciousness, I would like to replace Moacanin’s “Self and Padma” (although these could perhaps do as well) with alternative organizing symbols for these two systems of knowing—the tree and the circle (=circular array). I would prefer that the following dichotomy be taken along the lines of Yin-Yang, rather than absolutely opposed, oppositions.
The tree (stemma, dendrogram) is predominantly a timist vision, while the circular array will make better sense to the spacist. The tree form, I argue, is the ideal form for tracing differentiations through time from a single origin. Concepts of individuality and selfhood are given background and necessity, starting from the individuality of the first cause and persisting through time to find expression in the individuality of the tiniest twig in the temporal tree. This individuality is rather paradoxically given background through time, but given expression in space, since it is the distillation of the twig from other twigs at any particular moment that defines its uniqueness. Yet spatial perspectives are denied, somehow, along the way; unities are found in the past, or through the reactivizing of the past. Evolutionism, creationism, historicism, romanticism, modernism, classical philology, genealogy (strange bedfellows all) and other such unilinear approaches to the knowing of particular things as they exist at a present moment are tree-type ways to knowledge, as well as ways to order knowledge.

The circular array is ideal for the spacist way to knowledge in a mutatis mutandis, very similar way. The world of knowables is conceived as an arrangement, a field or sphere, of co-determining elements in space, which, paradoxically again, contains within its force-field the tensions which make temporal transformations possible. It is, for the spacist, both a classification system and an explanation for classifications (just as the tree is for the timist). The classifications are co-classifications; no single classification can exist in its own right. If a single classification could be isolated from the full range of classifications, it would cease to be a classification. My best examples for this approach to knowing are Buddhism, functionalism and structuralism, but also some aspects of physics as well as Jung's synchronicity. Linguistics, after a long Babylonian captivity among the trees, seems to be moving in the circle direction with the emergence of areal linguistics and 'typology'.

Although both these ways to and/or theories of knowledge result in classifications, they do not yield classifications of the same type. The tree produces nomothetic classifications on the basis of ancestry or lineage. Every difference, no matter how minor, may result in a new (sub-) classification. The circle yields polythetic classifications on the basis of overall family resemblances; similar clusters of traits or qualities, or a preponderance of particular qualities, take precedence over minor or superficial differences. Following the tree system, we could say that the screwdriver is like the knife, and they belong
to the same class because the screwdriver evolved from the knife (let's say) and they both share a single origin with other single-
pronged instruments (even though, in themselves, they would
constitute two distinct subclasses within the class of single-
pronged instruments). According to the circle system, the knife
and the scissors are one class due to the deciding quality of
sharpness, while the screwdriver belongs to a diametrically
opposed category which we could call the class of dull objects.
Dullness and sharpness constitute a single field of possibilities.
Dull scissors and sharpened screwdriver? No problem for the
circle—the screwdriver, being sharpened, belongs to the same
class with knives, while the dull scissors belong to the opposing
class of dull objects. No problem for the tree either—the
sharpness or dullness of an object does not affect its ancestry, and
hence its place in the framework of the tree (although a few new
twigs may take the place of a single one). Wouldn't one of these
types of classifications be more useful for certain purposes? It has
been suggested, for instance, that the circle-type (polythetic)
classification is a necessary one in human sciences.3

Unlike Durkheim and Mauss, and one interpreter of the
mandala who followed their lead,4 I do not believe that circular
array classifications originated in the spatial organization of
tribes, neither do I believe that there is anything especially
'primitive' (in terms of time or cultural 'evolution') about the
circle mode. The circle mode is used by we (post-) moderns, and
probably even more so than in the time of Durkheim, or even in
the time of Jung for that matter. The basis would therefore seem
to be prior to social classifications, perhaps embedded in the
human mind. Lévi-Strauss thought so, although his structures
are also pre-conscious (embedded in an unconscious) and
therefore prior to knowledge, a conclusion which I do not
believe to be necessary.

I also do not believe that the circle, any more than the tree,
belongs to the unconscious. Rather it belongs to the conscious
mind for which it has done and continues to do an admirable
job of organizing the things we empirically know in the waking
world. I think that these are models for ways in which the mind
does organize knowledge, rather than being primarily models of
how it should do this. I am aware, however, that this tree-
versus-circle business is itself an expression of what I have been
discussing. I have been building up a classificatory device here
which corresponds closely to the circle-type classification system.
It works, if it works at all, by setting up two opposites in tension
with each other, the beginnings of the circle. Couldn't I have
shown that the tree and circle both originated in a single
primordial act of knowing? In other words, couldn't I have approached the knowing of these two ways of knowing within the framework of the tree? My first impulse is to reply in the negative, but let us hold off on this question a bit longer and turn our attention for a minute to the mandala in Tibet.

I would not in any way suggest that the mandala is exclusively a classificatory device, only that it is, among other things, a circle classification system. The body as well as the universe of knowables are mediated by a single structure, the palace. Within the palace are, typically, five types (rigs) embodied in five Tathāgatas, Buddhas seated on thrones, the central of which is the Type Lord (Rigs Bdag). [It may be interesting for future studies to speculate on the etymological similarities of the terms Type Lord and Archetype. At present I am not at all certain what to make of this.] I hope it will be understood that when I speak of the mandala structure, I do not say what a mandala is. Just as a house frame is not a house (and a house is not a home), the structure of the mandala is not a mandala, any more than the grammatical structure of a sentence is itself a sentence.

The structure of the mandala underlies also the traditional typologies of Indian and Greek medicines as well as physics. The four elements are arranged in a way that is determined by a matrix of independently varying qualities which I will call volatility and humidity.

```
\begin{tikzpicture}
  \node (volatility) at (0,0) {volatility};
  \node (humidity) at (0,2) {humidity};
  \node (aridity) at (-2,0) {aridity};
  \node (fixedness) at (-2,2) {fixedness};
  \draw (volatility) -- (aridity);
  \draw (humidity) -- (fixedness);
\end{tikzpicture}
```

With a bit of reflection, one may already predict where each of the four (five) elements will be located in the 'field'. In the following chart, the elements water, earth, fire and air are labeled by their qualitative aspects, respectively, cohesion (byar-ba), solidity (sra-ba), radiation (snang-ba) and motility (g.yo-ba or bskyod-pa). The fifth element, space, is or course in the middle, since this is a diagram laid out in space, rather than time, and it reflects synchronic interrelationships between the elements.
There is no first element such as that for which the early Greek speculators sought.

It takes little imagination to see how this unified force-field of the phenomenal world (as it may be qualitatively understood) could correspond to a force-field of human emotion, as in the following chart, which may be superimposed on the preceding one:

There are many other correspondences, including the transformations of these five passions (the five 'poisons') into Foundational Knowledges (Ye-shes): aversion into the Mirroring Foundational Knowledge, pride/slander into the Equality Foundational Knowledge, attraction into the Particularized Understanding Foundational Knowledge, greed/slander into the Accomplishment Foundational Knowledge, and ignorance into the Foundational Knowledge of
the Realm of All Knowables. It is not the place here to go into the complexities of mandalas, but clearly such transformations take us far beyond ego-centered consciousness to an expansive, even a totalizing or universal sort of knowing consciousness, and not, as Jung or Freud would have it, to any unknowing or pre-ego-consciousness realm of instinct, rejected knowledges or unconsciousness. This points to an open, generous-minded attitude toward the realm of knowables (which includes human knowables), and definitely to neither infantile self-absorption nor mature introspection, even.

These mandalas may be understood as cross-sections of various cosmological, as well as personal psychological, transformations, which brings us back to a very basic question about our two classification systems. Are they really two separate systems, or only two ‘typical’ preferences (among even further possibilities, such as the ladder or spiral) for different human beings who may be utilizing them for different ends? The question is too large and problematic. Relativity theory has told us that time and space do impinge on each other’s domains. The image of the tree cannot be understood as purely an image of time. The tree itself has dimensions; it occupies space. There are spatial tensions between each of the differentiated ‘twigs’. The tree alone cannot account for the differentiations that it embodies. Likewise, the circle alone cannot embody the temporal developments and differentiations that the dynamic of its force-field presumes.

Perhaps the tree and the circle are, after all, only partial versions of a tree cum circle that could in large part embody human knowledge in both time and space. If we were to climb aboard a mental airplane and fly above the tree, we might look down to see a circular array, while a side view of a set of circles might show us some stages of development in the tree.

There were two trees in the midst of the realm of knowables named by Adam, the tree of life and the tree of knowing good from bad. My suspicion is that the second tree was no tree, but a circle, and that in fact both trees were the same tree. It was only the ones who ate from this one tree that made them different. As humans, we are, after all, responsible for these things we think we know, and I heartily recommend this book to anyone in a mood to wonder how this could be so. Others may well find themselves, as I did, put in that mood.
NOTES

1. For a thoughtful discussion of some of Jung’s misunderstandings of Tibetan Buddhism, see David R. Komito, “Jungian Psychology and Tibetan Buddhism” in The Tibet Journal, vol. 8, 1983, no. 4, winter, pp. 36–49 [missing from Moacanin’s bibliography].

2. Dan Martin, Illusion Web—Locating the Guhyagarbha Tantra in Buddhist Intellectual History contained in Christopher I. Beckwith (ed.), Silver on Lapis (The Tibet Society, Bloomington 1987, pp. 175–220); “Human Body Good Thought (Mi Lus Bsam Legs) and the Revelation of the Secret Bonpo Mother Tantras” (unpublished thesis, Indiana University, Bloomington 1985); The Rooting of our Uniquenesses—Passionate Cosmogony and Sociogenesis in Tibetan Literature with Reference to Giambattista Vico and Mary Douglas (unpublished, 1985); Anthropology on the Boundary and the Boundary in Anthropology (Human Studies 1990, forthcoming). These are listed in the order in which they were written.


5. This is the thesis of Komito’s critique referred to in note 1, above.

6. There is a danger in typological exercises of the sort we have been engaging in here, and that is that differences will be canonized as constitutive of absolute (truly existent) classifications which might then go on to ‘determine’ other things. This is a danger especially for the timist, who will be more likely to impute onto the knowledge of the circle the same background, necessity or substance as his tree-gained knowledge (and I think this goes far toward explaining Jung’s misapprehension of the ‘nature’ of the mandala). The roots of the problem extend deeply into problems of human knowing, and one would need to go much deeper than the hows to get to the why.

I suggest for the sake of argument that naively timist approaches to spacicist ways of knowledge have given growth to such ideologically (and strategically) important contrasts as that which asserts that the Buddhist (Hindu, Taoist, Confucian, etc.) east is passive and deindividualized while the Judaeo-Christian
west is actively individualistic. My heuristic aim in enunciating this type of dialectic all over again with the tree-circle problem is not to sustain it, but to locate a point at which it either commences construction or collapses altogether. Self-congratulatory posturing of the knowing subject confident of being on the right side of the dialectic will never lead to any lasting peace or understanding. The timist is faced with the problem of spacial interdependence just as the spacist is confronted with (and does in fact deal with) the problem of temporal differentiation/individuation. I must stress again that I am not engaging in any “the east is spacist and the west is timist” sort of equation, although it is explicit in my arguments that tree thinkers are bound to take it so.

To illustrate possible implications of this for understanding Tibetan Buddhist culture with a single example, one might consider the usual scholarly approach to the iconographic identity of the deities. These deities almost invariably have a “position” in the mandala (i.e., they belong to a ‘type’), and the classificational distinction between circle and tree knowledge has, I believe, a crucial importance when seeking to discover their identity, as well as the nature of that identity. The usual approach, exemplified in the classic works on Tibetan and Mahāyāna iconography by Antoinette K. Gordon and Alice Getty, presumes a tree approach, treating the deities like so many botanical specimens. I have found from my personal communications with some Tibetans, that they find this classificatory presumption by foreign scholars, and the errors resulting from it, either bewildering or amusing. All the multiple names and aspects of the same deity shading in and out of each other is perhaps just as confusing to the tree-ists who fail to recognize that the deities, as with the classification system used for them, together constitute a forcefield of possibilities which can only with much violence be forced into the segmental modes of individuation and egoic identities growing on their mental trees.


It may also be interesting in this connection to look at some fifteenth-century alchemical illustrations of the tree of Aristotle, since these often incorporate circles. Some of these alchemical

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