Articles

PADMA DKAR-PO ON INTEGRATION AS GROUND, PATH AND GOAL

Michael M. Broido

II.I: Yukanaddha (integration) in general

That yukanaddha (Tibetan zung-'jug) is one of the most important technical terms of the vajrayāna is a platitude which needs no comment from me; one need only look at the writings of Prof. H. V. Guenther or of Prof. Alex Wayman. At the same time it is hardly possible to think that this word has been adequately explained by either of these distinguished authors or by anyone else. It is clear that the use of this word by different Tibetan writers varies; as in Part I, the treatment here will be restricted to Padma Dkar-po. However, Padma Dkar-po himself has criticized various earlier Tibetan authors in this area, and we will be able to bring some of the differences which he discusses into sharp focus.

Both Guenther and Wayman have used a great variety of English renderings for yukanaddha. In Guenther we find e.g. "unity", "unity of opposites", "union of opposites", "unitive Being", "togetherness", "coupled together", "harmoniously blended", "harmonious juxtaposition", "coincide", and "coincidence". Given the overriding importance of this term for Guenther, he is careless about his use of these words to represent the views of different authors; for instance it is Padma Dkar-po (and not the Bka'-rgyud-pas in general!) who in criticizing Tsong-kha-pa, attributes to him, as I will show below, a view of yukanaddha which might be interpreted as "harmonious juxtaposition", a phrase, however, which does not fit the attributed passage very well. Most of Guenther's other renderings of yukanaddha represent either Padma Dkar-po's view (as he understands it) or Indian authors, such as Nāropa, whose views Padma Dkar-po accepted.

In Wayman's writings we find e.g. "pair united", "pair combined", "pair-wise united", "combined together", and "coupling". On the whole these renderings represent (confusedly, as we

*This is the second of two papers appearing in successive issues of the Journal of the Tibet Society, the first being called Padma Dkar-po on tantra as ground, path and goal. In the present paper, references to "Part I" are to this earlier paper.
will see) a "lexical" approach to the notion of translation, but insofar as they represent the view of a specific author, it is Tsong-kha-pa (and, in LW, his pupil Mkhals-grub-rgi).

In the introduction to his translation of the hagiography of Bu-ston, Prof. D. Seyfort Ruegg has several times translated zung-'jug by "integration", representing the views of various Sa-skya and Dge-lugs authors whom he quotes at some length. For reasons given below I feel that this word is a happy compromise between various Tibetan views of zung-'jug, and so I will sometimes use "integration" as a cipher for yuganaddha or zung-'jug.

Methodologically, Seyfort Ruegg (and perhaps Wayman) is committed to a "lexical" notion of translation, in which one English word is used uniformly to translate one foreign word. Guenther seems to dislike this approach, though it is not clear to me what he wants to put in its place. In any case the lexical approach hardly constitutes a method of translation, since it tells us nothing about which word to use uniformly for each foreign word. When interpreting, I shall concentrate, on the whole, on sentences, without worrying overmuch about uniformity; but when focussing attention on single words such as yuganaddha I shall follow Gilbert Ryle's recommendation to consider carefully their logical grammar: features such as the syntactic type (whether noun, verb, predicate with 1,2,3... places, &c.). Ryle also emphasized the semantic categories of words with which a word may be combined, and though his notion of category is perhaps not clear enough to provide a basis for solving philosophical problems it is still of heuristic value in demarcating specific philological ones. As Ryle showed in English, these modest considerations may not tell us the meaning of a word, whatever that is, but at least they may prevent us from making mistakes.

Padma Dkar-po's own "etymology" of yuganaddha may be rendered thus: yuga means 'joined' and naddha means 'non-dual', and so yuganaddha is said to be "integration". The phrase "and so" (de'i phyir) is tongue-in-cheek. The syllable-by-syllable analysis is not meant to be literal, but merely to give the right result.

The full form of the Tibetan zung-'jug is found quite frequently, and is zung-du 'jug-pa. The syntax of this full phrase gives us an important part of its meaning. 'jug-pa is in general a verb or a verbal noun (Skt. vṛtti) and here is a verbal adjective (modifying a noun to yield another noun). Zung-du just modifies this verbal adjective (yielding another). (Of course the semantics do not follow this simple course; it is partly for this reason that Padma Dkar-po's nirukta must be so non-literal — see note 25 — and also that lexical translation into English runs into problems.) Also yuga or zung acts syntactically as a two place predicate (two things are joined). The logical grammar described so far may
be summed up in the schema:

\[(X,Y) \text{ zung-du 'jug-pa'i } Z \]  

(1)

where of course the semantics will impose restrictions on what can fill the three places here labeled with variables X, Y, Z. In Tibetan the two-variable slot \( (X,Y) \) is usually filled by some phrase denoting two things, either in the explicit form \( X \text{ dang } Y \) (X and Y e.g., thabs dang shes-rab), yielding from (1) the schema

\[
X \text{ dang } Y \text{ zung-du 'jug-pa'i } Z
\]  

(2)

or by contraction of such a phrase (e.g. thabs-shes, corresponding more closely to the Sanskrit prajñāpāya); or by a phrase of some other form but similar function (e.g. bden-gnyis, Skt. satyadwara). Most of these features are found in the phrase:\n
\[
\text{ bden-pa gnyis-ga gnyis-su mi-phyes-pa zung-’jug-gi ting-ngo-’dzin }
\]  

(3)

which may perhaps be translated “the samādhi which "integrates the two satyās inseparably". This concludes the summary of the syntax of zung-’jug.\n
On its semantics according to the schemata (1) and (2), the first thing is to say something about the semantic character of what may replace X, Y and Z. Now Z is normally omitted, but when it appears, the word substituted is almost always, as in (3), ting-ngo-’dzin (Skt. samādhi). I believe that any appearance whatever of zung-’jug or zung-du ‘jug-pa (at least in the kind of context considered in this paper) is to be taken as an ellipsis of zung-du jug-pa'i ting-ngo-’dzin (Skt. yuganaddhasamādhi). In particular we see quite often the phrase

\[
\text{ zung-’jug-gi rim-pa (yuganaddhakrama) }
\]  

(4)

which according to Padma Dkar-po\n
\[
\text{ zung-’jug-gi ting-ngo-’dzin-gyi rim-pa (yuganaddhasamādhi-krama). }
\]  

(5)

The expansion of (4) into (5) is not special to the yuganaddhakrama; he describes all six (sic) stages of the Pañcakrama as ting-ngo-’dzin.\n
Similarly, Padma Dkar-po's most detailed discussion of yuganaddha, that in the gzhung-’grel,\n

which means roughly: “If one enters into non-discursiveness by means of yuganaddha-samādhi, without a doubt one will obtain the great siddhi of mahāmudrā.” Another standard phrase is zung-du ‘jug-pa’i sku where again the standard contexts make it clear that a samādhi is intended.\n
30
The claim, then, is that *yuganaddha (zung-'jug) is a technical term used in Buddhist (and especially vajrayāna) soteriology; a *samādhi, a state of mind. As far as I know there is no colloquial use competing with this technical use. From this point of view the problem of finding a suitable translation is quite different from that of translating terms like *rtung (vāyu).  

Now we turn to the main remaining feature of the schemata (1), (2), namely the two variables X and Y, that is, the two items joined or *integrated in *yuganaddha. Padma Dkar-po has pointed out several times that in this respect the terms zung-'jug and *lhan-skyes (sahāja) are very similar. In both cases the fundamental feature is the inseparability of the two items so related; this feature is already present in the example (3). A further point upon which Padma Dkar-po not only insisted but contrasted his view with that of others is that this inseparability is non-contingent (ma-bcos-pa). However, it seems that this non-contingency applies only to certain zung-'jug pairs, viz. those which are also *lhan-skyes, i.e. “born together”, roughly the “positive” type discussed below; these are the most interesting and controversial cases. Sahāja (*lhan-skyes) is a two-place relational attribute, saying of the two terms that they are born together or arise or emerge together, rather than separately. There is no one term with which it stands in a privileged relationship (as does zung-'jug with tīng-nge-'dzin), and this difference emphasizes the extent to which *lhan-skyes is a purely relational attribute, in contrast to the way zung-'jug stands for a kind of individual in the broadest sense (viz. a kind of state of mind).

Next we can ask: is there just one *yuganaddha-*samādhi, of which the different types listed in the standard sources (see below) are merely different aspects? Or are there several different such *samādhi? The texts give no clear answer to this question. A possible line of attack is this: we may look at the possible ways of individuating a thing such as a *samādhi. These will provide us with possible criteria on the basis of which individual *yuganaddha-*samādhis might potentially be individuated. Then we can look at the actual ways in which *yuganaddha is described in the texts, and see whether the differences in these modes of description can be related in any way to those possible criteria. Two kinds of criteria suggest themselves. First, there are purely physical criteria, such as are used to distinguish between more familiar states of mind, such as sleep-states (frequency of the dominant electromagnetic mode active in the brain, movements of the eyeballs, &c.). It seems perfectly plausible to suppose that some of the different types of dihyāna and *samādhi distinguished in Abhidharma texts and elsewhere might be individuated in this way. But when we review the different descriptive phrases used of *yuganaddha, as I will do later, it begins to seem very implausible that they could be correlated with such physical criteria. (Still, I have no reason to dismiss it as impossible.) Second, one
might try to use dispositional criteria. Such-and-such a kind of samādhi will dispose the subject to behave in such-and-such ways.... The only criteria of this kind, relevant to yuganaddha, which I can think of are those related to the powers and activities of the buddha and perhaps of bodhisattvas on the highest levels. It is not clear to me that there are any genuinely empirical distinctions in this area, but suppose there are. It seems most unlikely (say from Padma Dkar-po’s own descriptions) that these will be clearly related to the different pairs of yuganaddha items listed in the Yuganaddhakrama, or to Birupa’s snang-stong/gsal-stong/bde-stong/rgin-stong. It might seem somewhat more plausible that such criteria might be related to the šaikṣa/māśaikṣa (slob-pa’i /mi-slob-pa’) distinction in yuganaddha. But, as we see in the next paragraph, there is independent textual evidence that these two form a continuum of similar states. Accordingly, from now on I shall tentatively assume that we are dealing with one basic yuganaddha, perhaps in slightly varying forms or aspects, and not with a family of different ones, related by some family resemblance. Should this tentative assumption prove mistaken, it will not be difficult to reformulate most of the remaining arguments.

According to Padma-Dkar-po, šaikṣayuganaddha is the period from the understanding of the radiant light until ultimacy, and corresponds to the distinction of the bhāvanāmārga (sgom-lam), during which one cultivates satya (already) freshly seen. Its counterpart māśaikṣayuganaddha is just the buddha-level or ultimacy about which nothing more need or perhaps can be said. But these are not two different yuganaddha; rather the šaikṣa stage is already the real thing, as far as it goes, and he criticizes the views of those who construct an artificial šaikṣayuganaddha (see below).

The term yuganaddha has a long history in India in connection with non-tantric Buddhist meditation, both in the Hinayāna and the Mahāyāna. We find dhyāna and samādhi used almost interchangeably, Tibetan often using ting-nge’-dzin for both. Samatha (zhi-gnas, mental quiescence) and vipaśyanā (thug-mthong, insight) are first practiced separately and later joined together: yuganaddha, Tib. zung-‘brel or zung-du ‘brel-ba, and not zung-‘jug. They are associated with one-pointedness (ekāgratā, rtse-geg) of mind. In Tibet all these terms are prominent in non-tantric mahāmudra meditation (see note 45) and as such are frequently discussed by Padma Dkar-po, who was famous for his expert descriptions in this area. Some details:

(a) Poussin (ADK vol. V, p. 131, n.2) gives references to the Pali literature with the spelling yugananda, about which he is unhappy, e.g. samatha-vipassanām yuganandham bhāvetai, &c. He translates with “attelle”. He also gives refs. to BCA, Sikṣ., MSL &c.

(b) Vaibhāṣika texts such as Saṅghabhadra’s Abhidharmakośa-kārīkā-sāstra-bhāṣya (Sde-dge Bstan-‘gyur, Mgon-pa, vol. klu 95b1), and the
Abhidharmadipā (author unknown, ed. Jaini) do mention one-pointedness (ekārata) where one would expect it, viz. at the beginning of chapter VIII (resp. 265a5 and p. 404) but without reference to yuganaddha.

(c) Abhidharmakośa VIII.1c runs: saṃpattīḥ śubhaikāgryam (snyoms-'jug dge-ba rtse-geg-pa). Vasubandhu comments: ... / sa hi śamathavipaśyanābhājan yuganaddha-vāhītottād dṛṣṭādharmasukhavāhāra uktāḥ (de ni zhi-gnas dang lhag-mthong zung-du 'brel-bar ngang-gis 'byung-ba'i phyir mthong-ba'i chos-la bde-bar gnas-pa dang/ lam sla-ba zhes gzungs-pas: Sde-dge kha 66b4, quoted by Padma-dkar-po, Mgon-maṭod 152b4). According to the Vyākyā, this is a sūtra passage. The normal sense of vāhin is "conveying along" &c., and Poussin has accordingly rendered yuganaddha-vāhīn (in a longer phrase taken from the Vyākyā, Shastri ed. vol. 4 p. 1128) by "attelés au joug". However, the Tibetan in the ADK passage is ngang-gis 'byung-ba (spontaneously generated, cf Jāscheke s.v. ngang), and this is in broad conformity with the sense "causing, producing, effecting" for vāhin (Monier-Williams, s.v.). So it is clear that Poussin's colloquial translation receives little support from the Tibetan. But every other occurrence of yuganaddha mentioned in paras. (a)-(g) is technical, relating to the śamathavipaśyanā combination.

(d) Mahāyānasūtṛalāṅkāra XIV.9ab runs: yuganaddhasca viśeṣe mārgastapatpinditam punah /
/zung-du 'brel-ba'i lam ni de/ /bsdoms-pa yin-par shes-par-byal/, and Vasubandhu’s comment on this group of verses includes: śamatha manaskāraḥ / vipaśyanā manaskāraḥ / yuganaddha manaskāraḥ / (confirming the feeling associated with the word ekārata that we are not yet near the goal), Sthiramati in his Sūtṛalāṅkāra-orṭṭi-bhāṣya (Sde-dge Bstan-'gyur, Sems-tsam, vols. mi-tsi) comments on this verse (mi, 266a6):

"At the time when śamatha and vipaśyanā have not yet been joined together (zung-du ma-'brel-ba'i dus-na) they are *based (dmigs-pa; dlambana in verse 10b) separately. Śamatha is *based on words and letters, while vipaśyanā is *based on (their) arthā. But when they are joined together (zung-du 'brel-ba) there is no separate *basis of words and arthā, the two are merged (bsdu-nas) and śamatha and vipaśyanā are unified (mgo mnyam-du 'brel-te), and the path based on this is called the path of śamatha-vipaśyanā-yuganaddha. By this means, yuganaddha-manaskāra is taught."

(Here, dmigs-pa = dlambana is not adequately represented by *based, *basis, but this complex problem cannot be dealt with here. Yuganaddha = zung-du 'brel-ba throughout.)

(e) Bodhicaryāvatāra VIII.4a runs: śamathena vipaśyanā suyuktah, and the Paññika comments: śamathā cittaikāgrata-laksāṇaḥ samādhiḥ . . . vipaśyanā yathābhūta-tattvaviparītā-svabhāvā-prajñā / tayā suyuktāḥ / yuganaddha-vāhī-āśra-yogena kurute klesānāṃ vināśaṃ . . . in full conformity with (c), (d).
(f) A single example from Padma Dkar-po must suffice. At Rnal-'byor bzhi'i mdzub-tshugs 6a3 (i.e. in the rise-gcig, ekāgratā section) he contrasts zhi-lhag zung-'brel with zhi-lhag zung-'jug. Thus: zhi-lhag zung-'brel-du bshad-pa'i lhag-mthong ni lhag-mthong gi don-spyi yin-lai zhi-lhag zung-'jug-gi zhi-gnas kyang/ 'di'i skabs-kyi zhi-gnas ma-yin-nol/. The contrast is just what is suggested in the rest of paras (a)-(g) in relation to this article as a whole.

(g) Summary: in translating yuganaddha (especially in a non-tantric context) the Tibetans distinguished between zung-'jug (the goal, and with little or no manaskāra) and zung-'brel (joining or combination, not the goal, connected with ekāgratā and manaskāra and virtually always used of the samatha/vipaśyanā combination). Both words are used almost exclusively of meditational states, of samādhi or its close relative dhyāna.

Though zung-'jug is mainly a term of the vajrayāna, it also has a use in non-tantric mahāyāna44 rather as does mahāmudra.45 With regard to early Tibetan madhyamaka, in the oral tradition I have heard it said that Pa-tshaw Lotsawa, Rngog Blo-Ildan Shes-rab, Phyā-pa Chos-kyi Sengge and others spoke of a good deal of bden-gnyis zung-'jug and that it was as a reaction against the over-emphasis on this connection between the two satya in his own time that Tsong-kha-pa was moved to write the very detailed separate treatment found in his Rigs-pa'i rgya-mtsho and Dgongs-pa rab-gsal, against which Mi-bskyod Rdo-rje and other Bka'-bgyud-pas and others later protested. Although Mi-bskyod Rdo-rje does not seem to use the phrase bden-gnyis zung-'jug in the Dang-gs-prbyud grub-pa'i shing-rtsa his account of the history of Tibetan madhyamaka is broadly comparable with this one, which however I am not in a position to verify. Padma Dkar-po's summary of the tradition runs thus46

Concerning the difference between sūtra and mantra, Rgyal-dbang-rje has said that the former is concerned largely with analysis and the method of negation, while the latter is concerned with establishing something positive. Accordingly the old translators of the laksāna (śāna) said that zung-'jug is simply non-duality, as though (its substrate) did not exist; while when translating the mantras they generally indicated two existing things as (connected in) yuganaddha or sahaja-jñāna.

Padma Dkar-po himself, while broadly following Rgyal-dbang-rje's remarks, diverges somewhat from the view attributed to the earlier translators. In his vajrayāna works he uses yuganaddha pairs found both in the Pañcakrama (see below) and in the tradition of Birupa (snang-stong &c., see above). The Pañcakrama pairs are of both positive and negative type. Now in his sūtra (i.e. not vajrayāna) works, Padma Dkar-po typically considers zung-'jug pairs of the types which appear
as positive in the Pañcakrama; these even play the main role. (Later when we consider the ground/path/goal division in yuganaddha this positive/negative distinction will come to seem less fundamental than it does in these remarks. This is consistent with Padma Dkar-po’s unwillingness to make a general distinction of ita-ba (viewpoint) between sūtras and mantras.)

II.2: Yuganaddha as ground, path and goal

II.2.1: Preliminary survey

In Part I we sketched and quoted Padma Dkar-po’s own summary of the cig-car-ba’s ground, path and goal in general, as he gives it in the Gzhung-‘grel. In the previous section, II.1, we gave his view of yuganaddha in general, using a variety of sources and arguments. Now we bring the two together. As a preliminary we may note that in addition to yuganaddha, Padma Dkar-po has divided various other non-dual conceptual categories by using the ground/path/goal scheme: mahāmudrā (phyag-rgya chen-po), the radiant light (prabhāsvara, od-gsal), and the middle (way, i.e. madhyamaka, dhu-ma). While a full treatment of the ground/path/goal scheme would therefore include accounts of all these matters, yuganaddha is perhaps the most fundamental, and we confine attention to the others to the notes.

Table 1 contains a list of all the pairs of items which appear in the verses of the ‘bras-bu skye-ba’i rim-pa (goal) section of the Gzhung, integrated in yuganaddha. Without exception, all these verses are taken from the Yuganaddhakrama (col. 2); and of course all receive commentary in the Gzhung-‘grel (col. 3). With the letters N and P in column 4 I have attempted to distinguish whether the verse asserts the absence of some pair of things discursively discriminated (negative type) or the presence of some kind of unity of two things (positive type). This classification is based entirely on the words (e.g. ekatsam, one-ness) found in the verses themselves and describing the relational aspect of each separate case of yuganaddha; the Sanskrit words (as printed by Poussin) are given in column 5. The classification seems at first glance to correspond to that sketched by Padma Dkar-po in the remarks quoted at the end of the previous section. Unfortunately it seems impossible to introduce a single clear and uniform distinction on the basis of these analyses. Basically this is because two things differ (or are the same) only under a description. For instance, one is tempted to take the first pair, samsāra/nirvāṇa, as negative because the idea is to give up this dualistic conception (kalpana-dvyā-varjana, rtag-pa gnyis-po spangs-pa). But when we have done this, we are of course not left with just nothing; we are left with the world as it always was before the samsāra/nirvāṇa descrip-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PAIR</th>
<th>YK</th>
<th>gezung-grel</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ground section</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sāṃskāra/nirūṇa</td>
<td>YK 2</td>
<td>370b4</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>kalpana-dvaya-varjana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>klesa/bodhi</td>
<td>YK 3</td>
<td>371a5</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>ekabhavām</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sākāra/nirākāra</td>
<td>YK 4</td>
<td>371b4</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>abhinnatā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grāhvya/grāhaka</td>
<td>YK 5</td>
<td>ibid.</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>path section</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>utpattikrama/utpannakrama</td>
<td>YK 20</td>
<td>372a3</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>ekattvām</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pinḍagrāha/anubheda</td>
<td>YK 12</td>
<td>372b1</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>samantād</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>svadhiṣṭhāna/prabhāsvara</td>
<td>YK 11</td>
<td>372b4</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>samājaṃ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rāga/arāgā</td>
<td>YK 18</td>
<td>373a1</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>virnīmuktaḥ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prajñopāya</td>
<td>YK 8</td>
<td>373a4</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>samāpattiyā, samāsataḥ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>śāṅcetā/karuṇa</td>
<td>YK 7</td>
<td>373b2</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>aikyaṃ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>goal section</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>upadhi/anupadhi-śeṣam</td>
<td>YK 9</td>
<td>374a3</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>kalpana nāsti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pudgalaśāstra/</td>
<td>YK 10</td>
<td>374b1</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>kalpanaśīrṣikātātvaṃ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dharmasiddhiḥtya</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>śāścata/chcheda</td>
<td>YK 6</td>
<td>374b5</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>prabhāya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>samvrti/paramārtha</td>
<td>YK 13</td>
<td>375a5</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>samnīlanaṃ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>smrti/asamrti</td>
<td>YK 17</td>
<td>375b6</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>nirmuktāḥ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>suptaḥ/prabuddha</td>
<td>YK 15</td>
<td>376b4</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>dvaya varītaṃ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kārya/kārama</td>
<td>YK 19</td>
<td>377a2</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>abhinnatā svabhāvataḥ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>samādāhāna/asaṃādāhāna</td>
<td>YK 16</td>
<td>377a5</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>nāsti</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

tion was imposed upon it, and it seems difficult to see how this can be
generally and clearly distinguished from what happens in the “positive” cases. Similarly I have marked the fourth pair (grāhvya/grāhaka, object/subject) as positive because the verse describes them as non-different (abhinnatā, mi-phged); but actually what is claimed to be non-different is not these things but the particular state of mind (buddhi, blo) relating (to) them in yuganaddha. In fact virtually any one of the pairs can be seen (sometimes with a little effort) as positive if one concentrates on the things referred to or mentioned or described, and negative if one concentrates on the descriptions. This shift of perspective can easily be experienced with the two examples just discussed. A case which one might think difficult to see as either positive or negative in this sense is that of the two satya; but there is no doubt that Padma Dkar-po thought it could be seen either way, as I have shown at some length elsewhere. A case which commonsense takes as ‘obviously’ negative is
rāgā/arāgā: how can opposites refer to the same thing? But this is precisely the mistake (leading to the nonsense of “unity of opposites,” &c.). Of course desire and its opposite are not the same. But the paramānanda in which (according to the verse) both are absent (“negative version”) is simply a state without either (“positive version”). There is nothing to distinguish the two versions other than what part of the description you concentrate on. (A lot of mysticism boils down to confusions of this kind.) A case which commonsense takes as “obviously” positive is praṇā is upāya. Is it not obvious that in the buddha-mind (or whatever) praṇā and upāya are both present, in some sense? Of course; but (as in the rāgā/arāgā case), in order to see this case negatively one need only note that in general praṇā and upāya are not the same at all and that by insisting “praṇā, praṇā” one only drives out upāya, &c., so that the right kind of praṇā can arise only when we withdraw the description, as the Praṇāpāramitā sūtras never weary of insisting; this is the negative version. The conclusion is clear: if the positive/negative distinction between the different pairs of things *integrated in yuganaddha has any significance at all, each case must be seen as regarded from some quite narrowly restricted point of view. If anything general can be said about these points of view, now is the time; unfortunately I have very little.

It was suggested earlier that there seems to be little hope of distinguishing different kinds of yuganaddha on the basis of the different pairs (say, as characterized in the different verses). We can now see more easily why this is, at least in individual cases. Consider again the first verse (Table 1) on samsāra/nirvāṇa. First take it negatively: we are required to distinguish some kind of samādhi solely on the basis of the absence of the notions of samsāra and nirvāṇa (say as against another kind individuated on the basis of the absence of the notions of rāgā and arāgā). It seems difficult to see how to do this; one is almost tempted to say: it is easy to see that it is impossible. Similarly on the positive interpretation of the samsāra/nirvāṇa verse: it is understood that “samsāra” and “nirvāna” describe the same world (as it were) and on this basis alone we are to distinguish some samādhi. It seems clearly impossible. It is not only that the characterization is much too slender; it seems to be of the wrong sort altogether. Similar remarks apply to taking the positive and negative interpretations together. Of course it is possible that a distinction may be set up when one or both of these interpretations is supplemented by some other information; but to claim this is to give up any claim to characterize anything on the basis of the verses. In any case, it seems pointless to pursue this possibility in relation to Padma Dkar-po, since nothing in his comments on these verses suggests anything remotely resembling a verse-by-verse distinction of this kind.

It seems that the usefulness of the positive/negative distinction among the pairs of *integrated items is likely to be fairly restricted. So we can perhaps sympathize with Padma Dkar-po’s evident lack of in-
terest in pursuing systematically this distinction which he inherited from Rgyal-dbang-rje and from the earlier translators. If nevertheless we accept the limitation, we may record, as in Table 1, what seems, from the relevant point of view, to be the positive/negative character of each pair. When we do this, we notice something fairly striking. The ground section consists of pairs which seem easy to interpret either way, and the given interpretations are mixed up. The pairs of the path section are all positive except for rāga/arāga (I will try to explain the anomaly later). The goal section is virtually all negative apart from the important case of the two satya; but this is not surprising when we reflect that they generalize many of the items found in the path section.

Do the materials recorded in Table 1 suggest any other distinction between the ground, path and goal divisions? Two further points seem worth recording. First, the path verses do concern various parts of the path, which are to be *integrated; this is especially clear with the first four. Second, there seems to be no such ground of distinction between the verses of the ground and goal divisions; this is strikingly illustrated by Padma Dkar-po's use of the yuganaddha of the two satya both as the goal (in the Gzhung-'grel) and as the ground (in the Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta).

So far in this subsection we have been considering the possible divisions of the yuganaddha section into ground, path and goal, or rather the possible sense behind the division given in the Gzhung-'grel. During this procedure we have taken for granted the position given to this section in the Gzhung-'grel as a whole, viz. that of the goal (strictly: graded emergence of the goal) of the path of the cig-car-ba, taken as a whole. Now we may recall what was hinted at in the introduction to Part I, viz. that the distinction or contrast suggested by these two remarks is not as clear as one might suppose. That is: the cig-car-ba has his ground, path, and goal (viz. dngos-po'i gnas-lugs, lam, and 'bras-bu skye-ba'i rim-pa), and this goal section is further divided into ground, path and goal; and it is not at all clear that this second ground, path and goal are different from the first set, even though on a crude set-theoretic or bibliographical basis it would seem that they must be. I now want to set aside these set-theoretical and bibliographic considerations and review briefly how the subject matter of the goal1 ('bras-bu skye-ba'i rim-pa) in fact fits in with that of some of the earlier sections of the Gzhung-'grel.

When one examines the subject-matter at all carefully, it becomes clear that the topic of zung-'jug can easily be fitted into several places in the Gzhung-'grel besides the one it actually occupies. (The following observations can be clarified by using Appendix B.) In the ground section, zung-'jug could come under lus dngos-po'i gnas-lugs (especially in the section called mngon-par byang-chub-par gyur-pa'i rim-pa, 30b1); or it could come under sems dngos-po'i gnas-lugs, either in parallel with the
whole of the existing section, or as part of the subsection 'bras-bu phyang-rgya chen-po mngon-du' gyur-ba, 128b3 ff. In the path section, it could come under virtually any of the eight main sections of the rdzogs-rim (completion stage), viz. gtum-mo, las-kyi phyang-rgya &c. Guenther has rightly observed that the radiant light is the climax of the path. That doctrine, as we saw earlier,\textsuperscript{68} is itself divided into ground, path and goal; and the goal section, as set out in the Gzhung-'grel,\textsuperscript{69} is particularly closely related to the topic of zung-'jug. Now it is quite clear why Padma Dkar-po, in spite of all these considerations, put the goal section of the Gzhung-'grel where he did (viz. as the goal of the entire cig-car-ba section) and gave it the title which he did give it ('bras-bu skye-ba'i rim-pa). In both cases, the matter is decided already in the text upon which he is commenting, viz. the bka' yang-dag-pa'i tshad-ma.\textsuperscript{60} The point of my observations is not that he ought to have put it somewhere else. It is rather that the structure of his materials and argumentation would have allowed him to have it in several different places; and this fact is consistent with the view that the different gzhi are all aspects of the same ground, the different 'bras-bu of the same goal, &c. It is much more difficult to reconcile the fact in question with the view that the different 'bras-bu sections are about different goals. And to this extent, that fact supports the first of these views against the second.\textsuperscript{61} Some further detail on this point will be presented below.

Since the 'bras-bu skye-ba'i rim-pa section of the Gzhung-'grel is quite complex, it would be tedious to pursue explicitly the parallels between it and the goal division of the radiant light section. But it may be worth setting out the parallel between the latter and what may be regarded as a summary of the former, viz. the zung-'jug section of the Rim-Ingag 'khrid-pa.\textsuperscript{62} After different introductory remarks, both passages give a short account\textsuperscript{63} of the mode of rising out of the radiant light,\textsuperscript{64} including identical summaries of the "reversed"\textsuperscript{65} passage through the four lights, supported by identical quotations from the Cavyamālapakapradīpa.\textsuperscript{66} The Rim-Ingag 'khrid-pa account then concludes with a summary of how this process differs for the cig-car-ba, thod-rgal-ba and rgyús-pa.\textsuperscript{67} The account under the radiant light concludes\textsuperscript{68} with a more detailed version of how this happens for the cig-car-ba, most of which occurs again in different bits of the 'bras-bu skye-ba'i rim-pa section, though not in detail; the reader can work this out for himself.\textsuperscript{69}

Other than what has been said, I know of no general principles which clearly or explicitly underlie the division of the goal section of the Gzhung-'grel into its own ground, path and goal. It remains therefore to set down what is found in these three divisions. To do so will be, in a sense, to confront what was done in Part I with its proposed application to yuganaddha. The general discussion of the present subsection suggests that this application will take two different forms. In the first form, yuganaddha either is, or is closely related to, the goal as
set out in general terms in Part I. That there is such an application seems too obvious to need detailed argument, and I shall take what follows as an illustration of this application, regarded as already known to exist. But this is of course not the application for which most of the general discussion of this subsection has been the preparation. Rather, it has been preparation for the application, to the separate ground, path and goal divisions of the yuganaddha section, of the ground, path and goal notions in general; and here it is far from obvious or explicit that such an application is intended, apart from the rather indirect evidence already presented. It therefore seems best not to assume or to take for granted that there is such an application, but simply to present a selection of materials, in the hope that the suggestion may be found illuminating by the reader (as I personally feel it is illuminating). Thus Part I provides a set of notions which may well underlie the threefold division of the yuganaddha section, and Parts I and II may seem mutually illumined by the idea of this application. Like so many other proposals made by scholars working in this and related fields, the value of the suggestion is perhaps best assessed in terms of its capacity to bring order to the complex materials under discussion.

II.2.2: SOME MATERIALS ON YUGANADDHA AS GROUND, PATH AND GOAL

The reader may find Table 1 a helpful summary of the main verses in the goal section of the Gzhung, and the following subsections will contain brief accounts of Padma Dkar-po’s comments on a selection of these verses. Textual extracts in Tibetan, corresponding roughly to these accounts, are given in Appendix C.

II.2.2.1: GROUND-YUGANADDHA

Saṃsāra/nirvāṇa (’khor-ba, myang-’das)

After defining these terms, Padma Dkar-po says that when the discursiveness (spros-pa) which holds saṃsāra and nirvāṇa to be different has been abandoned, then no matter how one properly (yang-dag-par) analyses the samādhi of him who does this properly, since the artificial imposition of duality is broken up these things become one, and so one speaks of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa as integrated.

The talk of two things becoming one is found already in the verse (see Appendix C: dngos-po gcig gyur-pa, ekibhatvah) and derives from a confusion between two things and two descriptions of a thing. In other
contests Padma Dkar-po advises abandoning the conflation of these subsumed in the notion of a don spyi.

Klesa/bodhi (nyon-mongs, byang-chub)

When the essence of klesa is cognised, by that very fact it becomes thoroughly illuminated and this is bodhi. When they are inseparable, like water and ice, klesa is made the path and this is called srid-zhi zung-’jug.

Of course Padma Dkar-po’s remark applies only to the cig-car-ba.70

Grha/graaha (gzung-ba, ’dzin-pa)71

To claim that there is a substance (dngos-po) involves the judgement (rtog-pa) that it has qualities (rnam-pa-dang-bcas-pa); to claim that there is no substance (dngos-med) is to base it on emptiness. These errors occur through taking what is to be seen (bla-byin) as an object (gzung-ba) and what sees it (ita-byed) as a subject (’dzin-pa). When one rises beyond these errors into the sphere of pratyatmadhimajna (so-so rang-rig-pa’i ye-shes), the object (gul) which is appearance rises as gtags from the sphere of the void, and the owner of the object (gul-can) understands rnam-shes (vijana) as rang-rig-pa’i ye-shes, and one speaks of snang-stong zung-’jug and rnam-shes dang ye-shes zung-’jug.72

II.2.2.2: PATH-YUGANADDHA

Utpattikrama/utpannakrama (bskyed-rim, rdzogs-rim)

When non-dual awareness occurs at the time of the utpattikrama,73 it has the same pure taste as the awareness of the diety in its own unborn incessancy (gtags), and this making the two stages non-dual is called their *integration.

Pinagaha/anubheda (ril-por ’dzin-pa, rjes-su gzhig-pa)

To destroy74 the illusory body75 all at once is pinagaha; to destroy vessel and contents76 separately is anubheda. To enter the void, to stay in the radiant light, and to rise from it as the pure and illusory (body) in this way is all done to bring about the rising of the radiant light, and since when this is done there is no movement away from the gshis,77 the sphere of the radiant light, there is snang-stong zung-’jug.

Svaadhishana/prabhushana (bdag byin-brlas, ’od-gsal)

When the depth of mind as a feature78 is not made manifest by anything (else)79 it is abhisambodi. What is fit to be the example for all clarity is the svaadhishana-diety. When that clarity generates it-
self unhindered from that depth, and that depth enlightens that clarity, there is geal-stong zung-’jug.\textsuperscript{80}

**Prajñopāya (thabs dang shes-rab)**
Here upāya is the white dharma of charity &c. while prajñā stands for prajñāpāramitā. To abide in any great realization which acts by grasping all the other pāramitās with an essenceless prajñā is prajñopāya yuganaddha.\textsuperscript{81}

**Śānyatākarunā (stong-nyid, snying-rje)**
The object or the basis is the sixteen voidnesses, and the subject or what is based on the former is the sixteen compassions. When one knows the path on which subject and object or basis and what is based on it are indivisible, one enters upon action out of desire &c., and this is called śānyatākaraṇayuganaddha. By this desire one cultivates the opposite of the path of action out of great desire, and so it is called a buddhagocara.

\textbf{II.2.2.3: GOAL-YUGANADDHA}

**Śāsatooccheda (rtag-pa dang chad-pa)**
To view (things as) existent is eternalism; to view things as non-existent is nihilism. By whatever word(s) one gets rid of all attachment to the extremes (mtha) of existence, non-existence, and lack of either of these, one consecrates the madhyamakā path in which one does not fall into any extremes, and the wise know this as the yuganaddhakrama itself. Any other explanation of “lack of extremes” which really contains attachment to some extreme represents a failure to understand the character of yuganaddha.

**Samorti/paramārtha (kun-rdzob, don-dam)**
This case is discussed at great length in my paper (1983a).

**Supta/prabuddha (gnyid, gnyid sad-pa)**
Here “sleep” (gnyid) means the stage of un-knowing, while to wake up (gnyid sad-pa) means a one-sided knowing. The state of neither sleep nor wakening is that where one has unequivocally and permanently risen up (sangs-pa) from this sleep of un-knowing. It is like a lotus flower upon which a bird sits (?) as if upon a broad (rgyas-pa) field, and so an awareness which cognises everything cognisable is called broad. When these two are “integrated (zung-du ’jug-pa) there is buddhahood (sangs-rgyas).

**Kārya/kārama (bya-ba, byed-pa)**
Since this yuganaddha\textsuperscript{82} is the essence (bdag-nyid) of all the good of others, action and agent are inseparable.
II.3 Yuganaddha revisited

One may well feel that the account of *yuganaddha* given so far is lacking in something. Part I dealt with ground, path and goal in general, illustrating the great importance, for Padma-Dkar-po, of the notion of dngos-po'i gnas-lugs. So far, Part II has presented a variety of facts about *yuganaddha* and some of Padma Dkar-po’s explanations of the Gzhung verses on it, without, one might feel, really saying what it is; and in another sense, the notions of ground, path and goal have perhaps been plausibly applied to something, but one is not quite sure what. (This is at any rate my personal reaction to the account in the Gzhung-'grul.)

Really, we still need a general account of *yuganaddha*. Now, in addition to three accounts divided into ground, path and goal in the way we have seen, Padma Dkar-po has given several general accounts, but they are too brief and cryptic for a reader who does not already have some partial grasp of his idea of *yuganaddha*, such as is provided by the materials already surveyed; these illustrate the general accounts, which in their turn enable us to see what lies behind the more specific ones. In this section I will extract from the general accounts, especially the one in the *Phyag-chen gan-mdzod*, a synthetic general account which I hope will fill the gap. Padma Dkar-po is a quite ahistoricist writer, in that he hardly ever defines his position on anything by refuting the views of earlier writers (as, say, Tsong-kha-pa so often does); but on difficult matters like this one he has sometimes clarified his views by contrasting them with those of others. Later I will show him doing this; to start off with, it seems a good idea to mimic the procedure by saying a few things about what his notion of *yuganaddha* is not, especially in relation to some of the proposed translations mentioned in section II.1.

There seems to be nothing mystical about *yuganaddha*, and the materials surveyed give no reason to translate it by “theunion of opposites” (Guenther). For instance, rågårågåyuganaddha, far from being the union of råga and its opposite aråga, is something lacking in both. Nor is *yuganaddha* a logical relationship such as “coincidence” (Guenther). (It is almost too obvious to be worth saying that it is not a matter of logic that action and agent are “integrated in *yuganaddha*. And even if “coincidence” is not taken as a logical term, it is really obvious that it cannot apply, other than metaphorically, to cases such as råga/aråga and pudgalanairâtyâ/dharmanairâtyâ. Similarly for “identity”.) Again, *yuganaddha* is supposed to transcend various specific dualities, and perhaps all dualities whatever, but that does not mean that it is something transcendental in the sense of being beyond experience. In particular, it does not seem at all like Kant’s “intelligible intuition.”
It may be worth examining a little more closely the claim that yuganaddha is part of experience. First, it is not claimed that it is a part of ordinary everyday experience (for no samādhi is). Second, the claim is not that it constitutes some kind of (necessary? Kantian?) ground of experience. Thirdly, the claim is not that it is some fundamental kind of experience from which all others are derivative in some sense. The status of yuganaddha as experience begins with the observation, much too neglected by everybody writing on the subject, that it is a samādhi (II.1). No claim is made that this samādhi is totally without concepts; but what is important to see now is that even a samādhi which was totally lacking in concepts would not thereby be removed from experience, any more than a similar dream would be. Such a dream might perhaps be seen by us as an uninteresting part of experience, because not connected with the rest in the right ways. But Buddhists do not see this lack of connection as making such experiences uninteresting, indeed the very opposite (hence the interest in dream as one of the six topics of Nāropa and in other ways). The claim, then, is that Padma Dkar-po’s notion of yuganaddha is consistent with our interpreting it as a kind of experience, a samādhi experienced perhaps under unusual conditions of meditation, abhiṣeka &c. or by unusually gifted people, but in no way radically different from other experiences enjoyed by perfectly ordinary people.

Guenther has frequently used the word “unity” for yuganaddha (see note 3); the points made in the last few paragraphs are sufficient reason for rejecting it as a quasi-literal translation, but I find it not without appeal as a metaphor (cf. note 90). What is this appeal based on? Attempts to expand it into such phrases as “unity of experience” and “experience of unity” seem to lead to nothing. I think some kind of case might be made out for it if it were made clear that it is a metaphor; Guenther never does this. But even then, its appeal seems to be mainly a matter of its vague suggestion of a combination of mysticism and logic; and since we now have good reasons for rejecting each of these as irrelevant, we may feel able to reject the combination.

Earlier we noted that Wayman’s translations of yuganaddha are all based on the idea of combining two things together. Though to some degree this is intended to reflect the view of Tsong-kha-pa, it does not reflect any difference in the Tibetan phrases zung-du ’jug-pa and zung-du ’brel-ba used to translate yuganaddha. Phrases like “pair combined” and “pair united” might qualify as literal translations of zung-du ’brel-ba but hardly of zung-du ’jug-pa. Neither the Sanskrit yuganaddha nor the Tibetan zung-du ’jug-pa is a colloquial expression with an obvious natural sense, and the analysis into yuga + naddha and into zung-du + ’jug-pa yields nothing literal because in both cases the second component has no “natural” sense related to these translations (viz. “pair combined,” &c.). (Just this fact is reflected in Padma Dkar-po’s own ac-
count of the analysis, given in II.1 above.) So really the suggestion that Wayman's translations are literal will not stand up to serious analysis and can itself be no more than metaphorical. Let us ignore for the moment the possibility that these translations are themselves metaphorical. If we do so, their value must be seen as resting not on any analysis of the words *yuqanaddha* and *zung·jug*, but rather on the degree to which these words as wholes are as a matter of fact *used* in the sense of "pair combined", &c. Now on the negative interpretation of the verses, such a claim would be simply ridiculous; it can rest only on the positive interpretation; and this involves us with all the difficulties that arise from the easy shift between the two styles of interpretation, to which attention was drawn in section II.2.1. But with this (serious) reservation, the claim is not without merit; it works moderately well (as far as the verses are concerned) for most of the path section (see Table 1) and also for the important case of the two *satya*. To say this is not to say that it gives the complete sense of the word *yuqanaddha* as used here (for instance it omits the *samādhī* element) but it does at least give a central element. It turns out, however, that this element is more central for Tsong-kha-pa than it is for Padma Dkar-po.

So far we have not exploited the striking fact (see Table 1) that most of the important Gzhung verses on *yuqanaddha* come from the Pañcakrama. Now in the Gzhung·grel and his other works on bse·pho, Padma Dkar-po makes much use of notions from the Guhyasamāja cycle, especially in relation to the structuring of the various practices. He also makes much of the idea that the five *krama*, the four *mudra*, and the *sadāḥṣaṭyogā* give rise to alternative structures for what are essentially the same repertoires of *sampunnakrama* practices in the Guhyasamāja, Hṛvaśīra, Cakravatīvara, Kālavaka and other tantras. So it is perhaps surprising that he interprets the *yuqanaddha* verses not in the style of the father class of tantras (of which the Guhyasamāja is the chief) but in the style of the mother class. Before going on to the details of this, it is important to be clear that the difference has nothing to do with *yuqanaddha* being *samādhī* or not; for instance the description of it as *samādhī* which opens the 'bras-bu skye-ba'i rim-pa section of the Gzhung·grel is in a verse from the Vajramāla, a father-tantra (indeed, an ākhyātantra of Guhyasamāja). Even so, says Padma Dkar-po, the full sense of *yuqanaddha* is not revealed in the father-tantras. More generally, the Gzhung receives the name Dākini-upadeśā (*Mkha·gro-ma'i man-ngag*) because it is the dākinis who, in the mother-tantra, establish fully yet briefly what is hidden in the father-tantras. This remark is supported by a verse from the Dākārṇavatantra (belonging to the mother class) running, "Confidence in the father-tantras comes from understanding the mother-tantras." Accordingly Padma Dkar-po treats the *yuqanaddha* verses as mother-tantra, whereas Tsong-kha-pa, taking them from the Pañcakrama, of course treats them as father-tantra.
Thus we may expect a difference between the two authors in their styles of interpretation. In order to understand what to expect, we need to know that the differences do not stem merely from general disagreement about the distinction between the father and mother tantras; this point needs careful consideration because prima facie their views do seem to be rather different and because Tsong-kha-pa’s views have not been well-handled in the literature.

Bu-ston and Padma Dkar-po concentrate mainly on listing the various distinctions that are found in the tantras themselves. Bu-ston thought that there are three kinds of Anuttarayogatantras (father, mother, and non-dual), a view he inherited from the Sa-skya school. Padma Dkar-po follows Tsong-kha-pa in holding that there are only two (father and mother). Tsong-kha-pa’s attack on the earlier authors is directed mainly at this view of three classes, but at the same time he sought to replace the rather unclear collection of distinctions given by Bu-ston with a single general rule which would apply even to the doubtful cases and would provide a criterion for the clearer ones. Tsong-kha-pa sought this rule at the point of greatest interest, which also happens to be the point which concerns us, viz. the structure of the sampannakrama. (He is amusingly sarcastic on the uselessness of a rule based, say, on differences in the number of heads and arms of the deities.) He states the rule and summarizes the argument behind it as follows:

"The explanation of the well-established opinion on the distinction of the anuttarayogatantras as praṇā and upāya, as given in the Vajrapaṇiṭaratantra &c.

"How indeed should one distinguish them as father and mother tantras? Though it is generally held that they are to be distinguished through their upatīkrama cycle, really the difference is mainly one of the sampannakrama. If we take bliss and emptiness (bdbe-stong) as means and insight (thabs-shes, upāya and praṇā) respectively, individual tantras cannot be distinguished; all must be called non-dual as above.

In the present context this distinction cannot be maintained, either generally or in detail. For in what are accepted by everybody as mother-tantras, such as Hṛṣīkṛṣṇa, mainly bliss is taught, but not in the Guhyasamāja &c., so there would be the absurdity that the Hṛṣīkṛṣṇa would be a father- and the Guhyasamāja a mother-tantra.

"Thus as far as the distinction of upāya-tantra and praṇā-tantra by means of the sampannakrama goes, praṇā must mean paramārtha-mahāsukha-jñānā, while upāya must mean saṃvṛti-māyādeha. Of these points, the first is about the mother-tantras and is found in the 13th chapter of the Vajrapaṇiṭara:

‘Praṇā-prāṇāmitā as means is called yogini;
Entry into tattva by union (with) mahāmudra
Is called yoginitantra.’"
Tsong-kha-pa then explains in more detail how this verse is to be understood in terms of the descent and ascent of bodhicitta, &c. This brilliant and thoroughly convincing piece of analysis is ruined by Mkhas-grub-rgyas by the omission of most of the important points and the general vagueness and equivocation in what remains. (Given this unpromising material, it is not surprising that Lessing and Wayman’s translation is incomprehensible; but they make matters worse by their indifference to the meanings of the technical terms.) Now Tsong-kha-pa’s analysis is brilliant; but it leads straight to the conclusion desired by Padma Dkar-po, namely that the rule is intelligible only if the terms praśādā and upāya are taken in the mother-tantra sense, standing respectively for bliss and emptiness. For Padma Dkar-po this last point is very natural, since he regards the basic emptiness not as svabhāva-sūnyatā but as sarvākāra-svādīśamānītyātā which is samyucī-saṁyati (not paramārtha as with the Jo-nang-pas) and is means (upāya) and which describes the diety, just as in the first line of the verse. Paramārtha here is great bliss. Padma Dkar-po follows Bu-ston in his statement of the sampannakrama distinction.

“The mother-tantras show entry into tattva by the union (skyor-bas) of prajñāpāramitā-upāya in mahāmsudrā. The father-tantras mainly show the svādhīśhānakrama and abhisambodhikrama.”

The first of these remarks reflects the language of the Vajrapañjara verse (which they and everybody else quote) while the second comes from a verse from the Dīkāra-vatatantra which is also quoted by everybody. Of course Bu-ston and Padma Dkar-po list many other modes of distinction which are not accepted by Tsong-kha-pa, but these are irrelevant here; it is obvious from Padma Dkar-po’s discussion in the Phyag-chen gan-mazod that it was this particular point about the sampannakrama that he had in mind when describing Tsong-kha-pa’s treatment as pha’i lugs, and not the others. Padma Dkar-po also appears to follow Bu-ston in describing the distinctions between father- and mother-tantras as provisional (drang-don, neyārtha) whereas ultimately or really (nges-don-du) all the anuttarayogatantras are non-dual as between praśādā and upāya. Tsong-kha-pa does not make this point. But this appearance of difference is an illusion, since Padma Dkar-po’s use of these terms differs from that of Bu-ston and Tsong-kha-pa somewhat. All Padma Dkar-po means is that the more advanced person will understand the ultimate purpose (mthar-thug-gi don) without all this explanation, while the somewhat less advanced person needs to supplement the father-tantra with the mother-tantra, as explained above. (The least advanced person cannot go further than what the father-tantras strictly and literally say, and part of Padma Dkar-po’s complaint is that Tsong-kha-pa does not appear to offer more than this.)
Roughly speaking, then, the two authors agreed that the father-tantras concentrate more on the separate stages of the *sampunnakrama* practices, while the mother-tantras tend to prefer a more unified or holistic approach. Hence the phrase “fully yet briefly” (*tshig nyung-ngus zhib-mor*) mentioned a few paragraphs ago in connection with the phrase *Dākini-upadesa*. And now, taking the last few paragraphs together, we can see part of what, in Padma Dkar-po’s view, lies behind his differences with Tsong-kha-pa over *yuganaddha*. For Padma Dkar-po, the notion of *yuganaddha* is to be understood in a unified or holistic way, the analysis into pairs and their modes of combination being secondary and relatively unimportant. For Tsong-kha-pa the notion is one of combination, the constituents being as it were primary and their combination, as a product of those constituents, secondary. More generally, for Padma Dkar-po what is primary is the buddha-knowledge (*sangs-rgyas-kyi ye-shes*) or sahajajñāna (*lhan-cig skyes-pa’i ye-shes*). This corresponds roughly to the anuloma (*lugs ’byung-ba*) approach. For Tsong-kha-pa (as Padma Dkar-po sees him) what is primary are the components, say the two *satya* or the two *krama*, and it is only when these are known separately (cf. YK13) that they can then be combined in *yuganaddha*. This corresponds roughly to the pratiloma (*lugs ldog-pa*) approach.

Now we can see why the translations of *yuganaddha* proposed by Wayman are so much less unsatisfactory for Tsong-kha-pa than for Padma Dkar-po. They reflect precisely the emphasis on analysis as against a holistic view, on the pratiloma as against the anuloma, on the father against the mother tantra, of which it might be excessive to say that they run right through Tsong-kha-pa’s way of thinking, but which certainly seem to inform his style of exposition.

Two aspects of Padma Dkar-po’s view of *yuganaddha* should be seen in relation to his discussion of Tsong-kha-pa. First, there is the primacy of the combination over its terms (or rather the claim that *yuganaddha* is not just a combination of terms). Second, there are proper and improper ways of combining the terms. Really these two cannot be cleanly separated. When one still thinks mainly in terms of combining two things, there is *śāikṣayuganaddha*. When the question of combining two terms no longer arises because they are seen and known as aspects of a single situation, there is *aśāikṣayuganaddha*. But these two also cannot be cleanly separated, for two reasons. First, as already mentioned, *śāikṣayuganaddha* already is the real thing, as far as it goes; and second, if the mode of combination is wrong we do not even have *śāikṣayuganaddha*, we just have a mistake. To put it another way, *śāikṣa* is *aśāikṣa*, only seen in the father-tantra way, while *aśāikṣa* is *śāikṣa*, seen in the mother-tantra way. As so often, the mistake is to treat a relational difference or a difference in points of view as a difference of two distinct items. When one reads Padma Dkar-po’s discus-
sion of Tsong-kha-pa, one tends to be more impressed by his points about the modes of combination because there are more of them and they are more detailed and seem easier to grasp; but the point about the father-tantra is there explicitly\textsuperscript{110} and indeed without it the details do not make sense.

Let us consider some of these details for the case of svādhiṣṭhāna/prabhāṣvara. Padma Dkar-po’s own view, given in the Gzhung-'grel, is found above, under path-yuganaddha. He uses the description in terms of depth and clarity in a similar way in at least five other places\textsuperscript{111} (twice quoting Nāropa, in fact from the Sekoddeśatikā, and once in the Vimalaprabhā; apparently this line of thought comes from the Kālacakra-tantra). In all these materials Padma Dkar-po is unrelenting in his insistence that the two elements cannot be separated.\textsuperscript{112} But he says that Tsong-kha-pa, after quoting the verse, says that the illusory body which is samvṛti and svādhiṣṭhāna, and the radiant light which is paramārtha are two halves, and when these are inseparably merged (’dus-pa), that level is called zung-’jug.\textsuperscript{113} Padma Dkar-po’s own phrase for what happens is “not two in (its) nature” (gnyis-su med-pa’i rgyan-bzhin\textsuperscript{114}). These examples illustrate what I called the difference in point of view, the difference between the father- and mother-tantra styles of explanation.

Now for some of the specific differences on the mode of combination. Tsong-kha-pa continues by saying that since zung-’jug cannot be understood unless the two halves have been understood, he will go on to explain them (I omit this). Now in the abhisambodhikrama there is no illusory body, while in the svādhiṣṭhānakrama there is no radiant light.\textsuperscript{115} It is because these appear alternately that there is no yuganaddha\textsuperscript{116} (and because of this it would be irrelevant to take the previous remark as being about the practices rather than what appears in them). But when the forward (anuloma) and backward (pratiloma) processes of going in and out of the radiant light go on at the same time,\textsuperscript{117} so that the essence (ngo-bo; rūpa?) of the two is (are?) inseparable\textsuperscript{118} there is yuganaddha.

We know by now that Padma Dkar-po will see this whole approach as misconceived: far from zung-’jug not being understood until the two halves are understood, they cannot be understood except in relation to it. But now I want to concentrate on what he has to say about the mode of combination. Zung-’jug. Padma Dkar-po says,\textsuperscript{119} is not simply the merging, according to the method of the father-tantra, of two different items like the two horns of an ox. In any case, these two items are too dissimilar to merge in the way suggested by the analogy. They are even mutually repugnant; for since samāhita (mnyam-bzhag) is, on this view, without appearances, there can be no samvṛti in it,\textsuperscript{120} and vice-versa. Similarly, if aśaikṣayuganaddha arose through complete purification by entering the radiant light by means of pīṇḍagraha and anubheda,
then samvrti-satya, being impure, could not belong to it (and there is a contradiction).\textsuperscript{121} So for Padma Dkar-po, the mode of combination (in this class of cases) is not the merging of two quite different (even repugnant) items; the two items have to suit one another, as it were. In this case he ensures this by demanding that samvrti-satya (of which the svadhi\textbar st\textbar hats\textbar h\textbar anakrama is a particular case) contains purified appearances,\textsuperscript{122} rather than impure ones, as with Tsong-kha-pa. (In the language of Part I, samvrti-satya is part of dngos-po\'i gnas-lugs). Again, for Padma Dkar-po, param\textbar rtha-satya contains purified appearances\textsuperscript{123} rather than being merely empty of content. We see here Padma Dkar-po combining something like the three levels of satya used by Bh\textbar aviveka\textsuperscript{124} (i.e. samvrti and par\textbar y\textbar a\textbar ya- and nispar\textbar y\textbar a\textbar ya-param\textbar rtha) with the three levels used by Candrakirti (samvrti-m\textbar \textbar tra, and samvrti- and param\textbar rtha-satya).\textsuperscript{125}

The point that the *integrated items have to suit one another in the first place illustrates again the overriding importance for Padma Dkar-po of the combination over its constituents. Also the notion of yuganaddha does not seem to contain within itself any single or unified notion of a mode of combination; the different pairs are combined together in different ways (to give the right kind of result, as it were). (This point tends to be masked by the concentration of attention on the two satya and their instances.) Each of these points shows separately that for Padma Dkar-po there is no such thing as yuganaddha considered mainly as a relational concept (in abstraction from its other elements). The various pairs, considered merely as related, do not in their being related have anything more in common than their merely being related; and of course this is not enough to form even the basis of the notion of yuganaddha as the goal of Vajray\textbar a\textbar na. This point is apt to be obscured by the importance of the constituents, in the cases usually discussed (sam\textbar s\textbar ara/ni\textbar rope\textbar na, the two satya, the illusory body and the radiant light). One goes along with the vague idea, encouraged by the current translations and perhaps by Tsong-kha-pa's treatment, that these things only have to be seen as related in the right way, and the task is completed. But a glance at some of the other cases (r\textbar \textbar a\textbar ga/ar\textbar a\textbar ga, pin\textbar d\textbar ago\textbar ra/anubheda &c.) is enough to see that this is an illusion, that the different "relationships" have nothing in common and that the nub of the idea must be somewhere quite different. I suggested that Tsong-kha-pa's treatment encourages the illusion, but I am far from certain that he himself succumbed to it; the encouragement comes from his reliance on the father-tantras. This is of course Padma Dkar-po's very first point (cf. note 119); it should not be allowed to detract from the sharpness of his criticisms about the mode of combination.
Perhaps the time has come to say briefly why I prefer Seyfort Ruegg's choice of "integration" over all the other suggested translations of yuganaddha, zung-'jug. "Integration" seems to cover well the "merging" (dus-pa) attributed to Tsong-kha-pa; and for Padma Dkarpo, "Integration-samādhi" seems to be the right kind of metaphor to convey the idea behind zung-'jug-gi ting-nge-'dzin, as he used this phrase. Integration is a kind of action (in the broadest possible sense); "integration-samādhi" suggests a samādhi in which various different kinds of viewpoint are, well, integrated; and I think this metaphor is about the best we can expect. (Because it is a metaphor, and not one naturally suggested by our own cultural context, I like to keep the asterisk: *integration.*) This paper has not dealt with the Sa-skya view of zung-'jug; but I suspect it will be covered by the proposal, as being somewhere in between the two views just mentioned.126

Earlier I mentioned that "pair-combined" &c. might perhaps also be intended to be read as metaphors. Well, perhaps they might. But I think it is clear by now that the suggestive power of this and similar phrases will not accomplish anything presently relevant which is not accomplished by their literal meaning.127

* * * * * * *

At the end of section II.2.1, I suggested that the application to the notion of yoganaddha of the ideas of Part I might be expected to take two forms. First, yoganaddha is itself the goal; and second, being divided into ground, path and goal, it might be expected to illustrate this division as discussed in general in Part I.

There are plenty of illustrations of the first form of application. One example: the radiant light is the climax of the path, and its path-section describes the meditation techniques of pinḍagraha and anubheda (rila- 'dzin and rjes-gzhi). In the path-division of yoganaddha we again find these two techniques, about which the verse says that when they, together with the three phases of entering, staying in and rising from the radiant light, become identical, there is yoganaddha; and we saw Padma Dkar-po explain this by saying that they become identical inasmuch as there is no movement away from the radiant light. Thus the specific techniques described as part of the radiant light doctrine have as their specific goal or culmination what is described under the same heading in yoganaddha. Similar remarks can be made about other aspects of yoganaddha, as correlated with the culmination or the goal of other parts of the path.

The example mentioned also illustrates the second form of application. For pinḍagraha/anubheda is (part of) yoganaddha as the path, and this is the culmination of what is described under the radiant light as
the path (in both senses of this phrase). Similarly, when all the other things which fall under the two satya have been “integrated, nothing more remains to be done and the goal has been attained, and so the yuganaddha of the two satya as the goal in general coincides with the goal of the various path-parts of yuganaddha (falling themselves, of course, under the satya). It is easy to give more illustrations of this theme.

These two different ways of looking at pindagraha/anubheda can be summarized in a rather slogan-like way thus: The culmination of the path is the path-aspect of the culmination. And along these lines we can see the two applications to yuganaddha of the ground/path/goal distinction as reflecting a single vision in two different ways.

* * * * * * *

When stripped of the accretions imposed upon them by Western authors, the doctrines discussed in this paper emerge as rational (though not rationalistic) and sensible (though not commonsensical). I think this becomes clearer when we look at the sources of the remaining obfuscities. One very fundamental thing not explained here is the notion of a non-discursive cognition or knowledge (nirvikalpajñāna, nam-par mi-rtsig-pa’i ye-shes), upon which depend Padma Dkar-po’s conception of paramārttha-satya and of dngos-po’i gras-legs and also that part of the radiant light doctrine needed for our present purposes. Another thing which remains obscure is how it comes about that a person who has attained yuganaddha then goes on to all the siddhi of mahāmudra, including all the buddha’s powers and qualities, especially the ethically important power of effortless (lhun-grub) action &c. However only the connection of yuganaddha with buddhahood depends on these siddhi, not the notion of yuganaddha itself. In my view the complete notion of buddhahood does have something transcendent about it (cf. tathāgata) but whatever it is, it is to be explained in terms of yuganaddha and not vice-versa, at least as far as Padma Dkar-po is concerned. More important, both nirvikalpajñāna and the buddha’s powers and qualities form an integral part of the Mahāyāna as a whole; neither they nor any obscurity or mysteriousness in them have anything specific to do with Tibetan thought or with the tantras. Apart from whatever support he draws from these two general features of the Mahāyāna, then, Padma Dkar-po’s accounts of tantra as continuity, of the three tantras of ground, path and goal, and of yuganaddha, seem rational enough. And their difficulties, such as they are, can be considered independently of the obscurities, much greater in my view, of the six topics of Nāropa, the cosmological aspects of the doctrine, the (perhaps psychological) doctrine of manomānyākāya, and many other matters.
Because of these further obscurities, it may be too early to suggest that Tibetan thought in general and Vajrayāna thought in general may not have quite that special degree of obscurity and mysteriousness which they often seem to have in Western accounts. Be that as it may, here I have shown how to understand some of the leading conceptions of one of Tibet's most important Vajrayāna writers as little more obscure or mysterious than certain well-known features of the whole Mahāyāna.

*** *** ***

[For Appendix A, see Part I]

*** *** ***
M. BROIDO

APPENDIX B

PADMA DKAR-PO'S BSRE-'PHO WORKS:
OUTLINE OF THE SA-BCAD

gang 'jug-pa rten-gyi gang-zag, 8a4::5a5

gang-du 'jug-pa'i lam-la gnyis
cig-car-du 'jug-pa'i lam-la gnyis
bsdus-pa'i don, 10b5::6a2 (given in Appendix A)
mgon-par rtogs-pa gstan-la dbab-pa-la gsum

dngos-po'i gnas-lugs-la gnyis
lus dngos-po'i gnas-lugs-la gnyis
rags-rim-nas ngos-bzung", 14b1::7b5
phra-rim gstan-la dbab-pa-la bzhi
lus ji-ttar grub-pa'i tshul, 24b1::c.8a3
rtsa dngos-po'i gnas-lugs, 45a6::10b1
rlung dngos-po'i gnas-lugs, 74a3::11b5
byang-sems dngos-po'i gnas-lugs, 97b4::13a4
sems dngos-po'i gnas-lugs-la gsum
gzhi phyag-rgya chen-po gstan-la dbab, 115a2::14b1
lam phyag-rgya chen-po nyams-su blang, 120a4::15a3
bras-bu phyag-rgya chen-po mgon-du 'gyur-ba, 128b3::15b3

lam-la gnyis
smin-byed-kyi dbang, 129b6::16a6
grol-bar byed-pa'i lam-la gnyis
rim gnyis bsgom-tshul spyir-bshad", 142a6::17a6
mgon-par rtogs-pa so-sor gstan-la dbab-pa-la gnyis
bskyed-rim, 147b4:16a4
dzogs-rim-la-gnyis
mdor-bstan", 164a2::19a3
rgyas-bshad-la brgyad
gtum-mo lam-gyi gzhi-ma, 179b6::20a6
las-rgya lam-gyi 'bogs-don, 278b2::x
sgyu-lus lam-gyi srog-zhing, 310a6::77a5
rmi-lam lam-gyi drod-tshad, 324b1::87b4
'od-gsal lam-gyi snying-po, 331a1::94b6
bar-do lam-gyi blo-chod, 345b6::108a4
'rho-ba lam-gyi bsun-ma, 360b6::119b3
grong 'jug lam-gyi 'thud-ma, 368a4::133b3
bras-bu skye-ba'i rim-pa-la gsum
ita-ba rnam-dag zung-'jug-gi ting-nde-'dzin bslab-tshul-la gsum
gzhi zung-'jug rtogs-tshul, 370a5::136a4
lam zung-'jug bsgom-tshul, 372a3::136b3
bras-bu zung-'jug 'char-tshul, 374a3::137a1
gsom-pa rnam-dag zung-'jug-gi ting-nde-'dzin bslab-tshul, x::137b4
spyod-pa rnam-dag zung-'jug-gi ting-nde-'dzin bslab-tshul-la gnyis
chags-can-gyi spyod-pa, x::138b1
chags-bral-gyi spyod-pa, x::139b5
rim-gyis 'jug-pa'i lam, 378b3::x
References: 8a4::5a5 means gzhung-'grel 8a4, khrid-yig 5a5; x = absent

(The sections marked * contain especially useful summaries of the reasons why the sections following them are organized as shown here.)

APPENDIX C

SOME VERSES ON YUGANADDHA, WITH EXTRACTS FROM PADMA Dkar-po’S COMMENTS ON THEM.

The verses are headed by the Sanskrit words used in Table 1 and in sec. II.2.2. Each heading is followed by the verse itself (as Padma Dkar-po quotes it from the Gzhung), and then, following the ligature  ç , an extract from Padma Dkar-po’s commentary (cf. II.2.2).

Bibliographic information may be found in Table 1.

Saṃsāra/nirvāṇa

[The text is not clearly visible due to the quality of the image, but it appears to be a verse from the Gzhung.]
Kleśa/bodhi

गृहित्य नाशायांत्य स्वाध्यायं नासित्यं यम निरित्यं

नेत्रचार्य अतिशय अन्तर्न्यथ चार्यं चिन्तयं

ज्ञेयसंस्कृतं विशेषादनं चार्यं चिन्तयं

तत्सकायं निष्कामाय च चार्यं चिन्तयं

ज्ञेयसंस्कृतं विशेषादनं च चार्यं चिन्तयं

गृहित्य नाशायांत्य स्वाध्यायं नासित्यं यम निरित्यं

Grāhya/grāhaka [and sākāra/nirākāra]

गृहित्य नाशायांत्य स्वाध्यायं नासित्यं यम निरित्यं

निष्कामाय विशेषादनं च चार्यं चिन्तयं

ज्ञेयसंस्कृतं विशेषादनं च चार्यं चिन्तयं

अन्तिमं भावादं च च चार्यं चिन्तयं
Utpattikrama/utpannakrama

"བྱིན་པའི་ཐེག་པ་ལེན་པ་ཐོན་པ་ལྟར་བྱོས་རྒྱུ་མེད་པ་ལེན་པ་ལྟར་བྱོས་རྒྱུ་མེད་པ་ལེན་པ་ལྟར་བྱོས་རྒྱུ་མེད་པ་ལེན་པ་ལྟར་བྱོས་རྒྱུ་མེད་པ་ལེན་པ་ལྟར་བྱོས་རྒྱུ་མེད་པ་ལེན་པ་ལྟར་བྱོས་རྒྱུ་མེད་པ་ལེན་པ་ལྟར་བྱོས་རྒྱུ་མེད་པ་ལེན་པ་ལྟར་བྱོས་རྒྱུ་མེད་པ་ལེན་པ་ལྟར་བྱོས་རྒྱུ་མེད་པ་ལེན་པ་ལྟར་བྱོས་རྒྱུ་མེད་པ་ལེན་པ་ལྟར་བྱོས་རྒྱུ་མེད་པ་ལེན་པ་ལྟར་བྱོས་རྒྱུ་མེད་པ་ལེན་པ་ལྟར་བྱོས་རྒྱུ་མེད་པ་ལེན་པ་ལྟར་བྱོས་རྒྱུ་མེད་པ་ལེན་པ་ལྟར་བྱོས་རྒྱུ་མེད་པ་ལེན་པ་ལྟར་བྱོས་རྒྱུ་མེད་པ་ལེན་པ་ལྟར་བྱོས་རྒྱུ་མེད་པ་ལེན་པ་ལྟར་བྱོས་རྒྱུ་མེད་པ་ལེན་པ་ལྟར་བྱོས་རྒྱུ་མེད་པ་ལེན་པ་ལྟར་བྱོས་རྒྱུ་མེད་པ་ལེན་པ་ལྟར་བྱོས་རྒྱུ་མེད་པ་ལེན་པ་ལྟར་བྱོས་རྒྱུ་མེད་པ་ལེན་པ་ལྟར་བྱོས་རྒྱུ་མེད་པ་ལེན་པ་ལྟར་བྱོས་རྒྱུ་མེད་པ་ལེན་པ་ལྟར་བྱོས་རྒྱུ་མེད་པ་ལེན་པ་ལྟར་བྱོས་རྒྱུ་མེད་པ་ལེན་པ་ལྟར་བྱོས་རྒྱུ་མེད་པ་ལེན་པ་ལྟར་བྱོས་རྒྱུ་མེད་པ་ལེན་པ་ལྟར་བྱོས་རྒྱུ་མེད་པ་ལེན་པ་ལྟར་བྱོས་རྒྱུ་མེད་པ་ལེན་པ་ལྟར་བྱོས་རྒྱུ་མེད་པ་ལེན་པ་ལྟར་བྱོས་རྒྱུ་མེད་པ་ལེན

M. BROIDO

Piṇḍagṛaha/anubheda

Svādhiṣṭhāna/prabhāṣvara
Prajñopāya

ढག་ज्ञान को विद्या तत्त्वावधानम् | यथार्थतः

मनुष्य में ज्ञान उभिष्टम् | सत्यर्थसत्योऽविनाशतः

अनुभवी योगी यस्य | स्वाधीनेन सभोगः

अपितूर्द्धवर्जनः यस्य | स्वाधीनेन सभोगः

विज्ञान विज्ञानम् यस्य | स्वाधीनेन सभोगः

ध्यानात्मकः ज्ञानसंगतः सदाः प्रसन्नार्थिभिः

ध्यानात्मकः ज्ञानसंगतः सदाः प्रसन्नार्थिभिः
Sūnyatā/karuṇā

Śāsvatoccheda
Saṃvṛti/paramārtha
Supta/prabuddha

चिन्तनाणम् कालाणी श्रीमल्लकाणाश्रीयाः
श्रीमाणी चिन्तनाणम् कालाणी इति
कालाणीयाः श्रीमाणीयाः श्रीमाणीयाः
कालाणीयाः श्रीमाणीयाः

Kārya/kāraṇa

तस्मां चिन्तनाणम् श्रीमल्लकाणाश्रीयाः
श्रीमल्लकाणाश्रीयाः इति दोह्वास
कालाणीयाः इति कालाणीयाः
कालाणीयाः इति कालाणीयाः
कालाणीयाः इति कालाणीयाः
INDIAN WORKS

ADK: Abhidharmakośa
BCA: Bodhicaryāvatāra
BCAP: Pañjika on BCA by Prajñākaramati, ed. Vaidya
GST: Guhyasamājatantra, ed. Bagchi
HT: Hevajra-tantra, ed. and trans. Snellgrove
MMV: Madhyamakāvatāra
MSL: Mahāyānasūtraṃśa
PK: Pañcarakṣa, ed. Poussin
PPD: Pradipoddyotana, sde-dge
Śīṣ.: Śikṣasamuccaya
(For Tilopa’s Āha-pramāṇa samyag-nāma dākinī-upadeśa, see Gzhung under Padma Dkar-po in the Tibetan section.)

TIBETAN WORKS

(The works are grouped by author. The full title, where given, is prefaced by a sobriquet or short title in italics, by which the work is identified in the footnotes. The different Rgyud-sde spyi'i rnam-gzhag are also identified there by author.)

Dol-po Shes-rab Rgyal-mtshan
   Ri-chos nges-don rgya-mtsho
   Rgyud bla-ma'i grel-pa Legs-bshad nyi-ma'i od-zer
Bu-ston
   Gsang-'dus bshad-thabs: Gsang-ba 'dus-pa'i rgyud-'grel-gyi
   bshad-thabs-kyi yan-lag gsang-ba'i sgo-'byed, gsung-'bum vol. 8
   Pradipoddyotana-tikā, ibid.
   Rim-Inga'i dmar-khrig, vol. 9
   Rgyud-sde spyi'i rnam-bzhag rgyud-sde Gsang-ba gsal-byed, ibid.
   Tsong-kha-pa (from the 18-vol. bka'-bum)
   Snags-rim chen-mo, vol. ga
   Sgron-gsal mchan-'grel, vol. nga
   Sgron-gsal dka-gnas-kyi Mtha'-gcod rin-chen myu-gu, vol. ca
   Rim-Inga rab-gsal sgron-me, vol. ja
Mkhas-grub-rgyud-sde spyi'i rnam-gzhag, Tibetan text in LW
Mi-bskyod Rdo-rje

*Dangs-brgyud grub-pa'i shing-rta, dbu-ma-la 'jug-pa'i rnams-bshad dpal-ladan Dus-gsum mkhyen-pa'i zhal-lung*

Sgam-po-pa Bkra-shis Rnam-rgyal

*Nor-bu'i od-zer: Gsang-sngags rdo-rje theg-pa'i spyi-don mdor-bsdus-pa*

*Nyi-ma'i od-zer: Dpal Kye'i rdo-rje rgyud-kyi rgyal-po legs-par bshad-pa*

Padma Dkar-po (except where otherwise stated references are to the 24-vol. reproduction of the Gnam-brug Par-ma)

*Tshad-ma 'Jam-pa'i dgongs-rgyan, vol. 1*

*Tshad-ma rigs-pa'i snying-po, vol. 1*

Gsans-yig: Bka'-brgyud-kyi bka-'bum gsil-bu-rnams-kyi gsan-yig, vol. 4

Mngon-mdzod: Chos-mngon mdzod-kyi bshad-pa 'grel-pa'i lugs, vol. 8

Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rgyas: Dbus-ma'i gzhung-lugs gsum gsal-bar byed-pa, vol. 8

Rgyud-sde spyi'i rnam-bzhag Mkhas-pa'i yid-'phrog, vol. 11

Dus-khor gsang-mdzod: Mchog-gi dang-po'i sangs-rgyas rnam-par phye-ba gsang-ba thams-cad bshad-pa'i mdzod, vol. 13

'Khor-lo sdom-pa'i rnam-bshad: Dpal 'Khor-lo sdom-pa'i rgyud-kyi rnam-par bshad-pa mkha'-gro dga-ba rgyud-sde'i snying-po, vol. 14

Yid-'phrog: Dpal Kye rdo-rje'i spyi-don grub-pa'i yid-'phrog, vol. 15

Gsangs-dus rgyan: Gsang-ba 'dus-pa'i rgyan zhes-byab-Ma-thun-mong ma-yin-pa'i bshad-pa, vol. 16

Phyag-chen gan-mdzod: Phyag-rgya chen-po man-ngag-gi bshad-sbyar rgyal-ba'i gan-mdzod, vol. 21

Rnal-byor bzhis mdzud-tshugs: Rnal-byor bzhis'i bshad-pa don-dam mdzud-tshugs-su bstan-pa, vol. 21

Bsre'-pho

Gzhung: Bka yang-dag-pa'i tshad-ma mkha'-gro-ma'i man-ngag by Tilopa (cf. Indian section); references are to the version in *Rare Bka'-brgyud-pa texts from Himachal Pradesh.* (Also in Gdams-ngag mdzod, vol. 7.)

Gzhung-'grel: Jo-bo Naro-pa'i khyad-chos bsre-'pho'i gzhung-'grel rdo-rje 'chang-gi dgongs-pa gsal-bar byed-pa, Rtsib-ri ed.

Khrid-yig: Jo-bo Naro-pa'i khyad-chos bsre-'pho'i khrid rdo-rje'i theg-par bgrod-pa'i shing-rta chen-po, Rtsib-ri ed.
THE JOURNAL OF THE TIBET SOCIETY

_Lam-bsdu:_ collection of short works entitled after its first member: Bsre-'pho lam-dbye-bsdu, Rtsib-ri ed.
_Rim-nga 'khrid-pa:_ Rim-pa Ingar 'khrid-pa rnal-'byor pha'i rgyud-kyi snying-po bsdu-s-pa, found in _Lam-bsdu_
(Apart from the _Gzhung_ all these Bsre-'pho works are found also in the Gnam-'brug Par-ma, vols. 22-3.)

Kong-sprul Blo-gros Mtha'-yas
_Rgyud-bla'i rnam-'grel:_ Rgyud bla-ma'i snying-po'i don-gyi bshad-srol dang sbyar-ba'i rnam-'grel phyir mi-ldog-pa'i sengghe'i nga-ro

WESTERN WORKS


M. M. Broido (1979): The term _ngos-po'i gnas-lugs_ as used in Padma Dkar-po's _Gzhung-'grel_ (in _Aris_ (1981))

M. M. Broido (1983a): Padma Dkar-po on the two satyas (JIABS, 1985 no. 2 pp. 7-56)


(Y) H. V. Guenther: Yukanaddha (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Skt. Ser., 1969)

(TVL) H. V. Guenther: The tantric view of life (Berkeley and London: Shambala, 1972)

(Pers) H. V. Guenther: Tibetan buddhism in Western perspective (Emergville: Dharma publishing, 1977)

(LW) F. D. Lessing and A. Wayman: Introduction to the Buddhist Tantric systems (Second ed.; Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978)

(BL) D. Seyfort Ruegg: The life of Bu Ston Rin Po Che (Rome: ISMEO, 1966)


(W) A. Wayman: The Buddhist Tantras (New York: Samuel Weiser, 1973)

(YG) A. Wayman: Yoga of the Guhyasamājatantra (Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1977)

P. M. Williams (1979): Tsong-kha-pa on _kun-rdo zb bden-pa_ (in _Aris_ (1981)).
NOTES

1. Though Guenther (Pers. 101) draws attention to the different views of Tsong-kha-pa and the Bka’-brgyud-pas, he mentions only Padma Dkar-po among the latter (and this only elsewhere).

2. On the particular issue of *bden-gnyis zung-'jug* (yuganaddha of the two *satya*) and its special cases *svādhiśṭāna/prabhāśvara* &c., Padma Dkar-po has reviewed Tsong-kha-pa’s views at some length at *Phyag-chen gan-mdzod* 155a6 ff. See below and Broido (1983a). This passage seems to form the basis for Guenther’s remarks mentioned in note 1. See below also for Padma Dkar-po’s view of the difference between *zung-'jug* in the sūtras and the tantras. (On Padma Dkar-po and other Bka’-brgyud-pas on the sūtra/tantra distinction in general, see again my paper (1983a)).

3. RS 29, Y 206-7 (many times), Pers. 55, 72, 73

4. Y 138

5. Y 161

6. TVL 109

7. TVL 17

8. Y 135

9. Y 206

10. Pers 101

11. Pers 75

12. Pers 72, 78, 98, 101, 109

13. *Phyag-chen gan-mdzod*, 155a6 ff. The passage is introduced by Padma Dkar-po with the words *Btsong-kha-pa chen-pos*, which may mean either a question from, or the attribution of an opinion to, Tsong-kha-pa. I have not been able to find this long passage in Tsong-kha-pa’s works on the Guhyasamāja cycle, and on stylistic grounds too it seems likely to be Padma Dkar-po’s own summary of what he saw as Tsong-kha-pa’s view. I also think that Guenther is mistaken if he does indeed think that the view expressed in this passage can be adequately represented by “harmonious juxtaposition”; see below.

14. Pers 101 note 42

15. W 40, 129; YG 152, 153, 167, 228, 284, 312

16. LW 266-7

17. YG 172

18. LW 199

19. LW 320, 325; YG 179

20. BU 62-4

21. I try to observe the uniformity rule and to retain the structure of Tibetan sentences, but without regarding these as matters of principle.


23. *Gzhung-'grel* 370a5
24. Ibid.: yuga zung/ naddha ni gnyis ma-yin-pa ste/ de'i phyir, zung-'jug zhes btags-so/

25. This nges-tshig (“etymology”, nirukta) is a good example of the kind of sgra ji-bzhin ma-yin-pa (non-literal, na-yathārta) interpretation which Padma Dkar-po calls yi-ge and which is typically used for forming such “etymologies” for awkward Sanskrit words. For the yi-ge style of interpretation and its three modes, see Broido (1983b) and references given there.

26. Lam-bsdu 161a5

27. The phrase zung-du 'jug-pa and the schemata (1), (2) are syntactically ambiguous: is the phrase zung-du 'jug-pa to be taken as irreducible or as (nom. + postp.) + verbal adj.? I have resolved this question ad hoc by reducing the phrase, but only because this course leads to a clearer exposition. My general logico-grammatical intuitions are in favour of reduction, while my intuitions about this particular phrase are that is is irreducible; but these latter intuitions are surely semantic rather than syntactic. Its syntactic structure does seem to be the reduced one, but argument on this point would have to rest on syntactic analysis of its components in other contexts, such as is hardly possible here. “Use” arguments point towards irreducibility (partly because of the prevalence of the short form zung-'jug and the absence of significant variations of the long form zung-du 'jug-pa, suggesting that the syntactic details suppressed in the short form are not worked hard when the word is used). Unfortunately “use” is not very sensitive to the syntax/semantics distinction.

28. Lam-bsdu 161a5, see (3), which is followed there by zung-'jug rim-pa shes-par-'gyur zhes bstan-te/ bden-pa gnyis gnyis-su-med-pa shin-tu yang-dag-pa'i bdag-nid-can-gyi ting-nge-'dzin yin-pas zung-'jug-go/. The Skt. in (5) is mine. Three equally clear examples of the phrase zung-'jug-gi ting-nge-'dzin can be found in the headings of the 1ta-ba/sgom-pa/spyod-pa divisions of the 'bras-bu skye-ba'i rim-pa in the khrid-yig, as given in Appendix B.

29. The six are the utpattikrama (bskyed-rim, Lam-bsdu 153b1) together with the usual five stages of the sampannakrama (rādzogs-rim), Lam-bsdu 155a6, 157a2, 158b6, 160a5, 161a5. For Padma Dkar-po’s views on the names, number and numbering of the krama, see Gsang-'dus-rgyan, 16a3.

30. Gzhung-’grel 370a5


32. Especially the word so-sor rang-gis rig-par-bya, Skt. pratyātmādhiṣṭāmya &c./ bden-pa gnyis gnyis-su med-pa’i rang-bzhin ‘di-nid zung-du
jug-pa zhes brjod-de/ . . . so-sor rang-gis rig-par-bya’o/ (ibid., cf. also (3)
in the text, and Gzhung’-grel 344b5).
33. On the Mahāyāna/Vajrayāna or sūtra/tantra distinction, cf. note 2.
34. See Part I, where the word thig-le (bindu) presents a similar prob-
lem.
35. See e.g. Phyag-chen gan-mdzod 49b4 ff., Rnal-bkor bzhi’i mdzub-
shugs 13b. These passages are translated and discussed at length, and the
first quoted, in Broido (1983a), especially from the point of elucida-
ting how the term lhan-skyes applies to the two satya.
36. Skt. akṛtimā, akṛtaka. In the case of the two satya Padma Dkar-po
and Mi-bskyod Rdo-rje seem to have taken both zung-jug and lhan-
skyes to imply that it is nonsense to speak of either one appearing and
functioning separately. They criticize Tsong-kha-pa, Bo-dong-pa and
the Jo-rang-pa for establishing relationships which are merely con-
gent (all this is dealt with at length in Broido (1983a)). However there
does seem to be one case where Padma Dkar-po does what he com-
plains of in these other authors. Gzhung’-grel 375a3: “When the sight of
things as they are is obscured because accompanied by vikalpa, one
speaks of samāyati-satya or of reality obscured; this is the time when purifi-
cation by the radiant light has not occurred.” The Tibetan runs:
nam-par-rtog-pa-dang-bcas-pa dugos-po’i de-kho-na-njyd mthong-ba-la
sgrub-pa-na kun-rdoz-kyi bden-pa-am yang-dag sgrub zhes kyang bya-la/
‘od-mdal-gyi sbyang-ba ma-byas-pa’i skabs-so/
Padma Dkar-po seems to have slipped here, since for him samāyati-satya
normally is purified. Perhaps the remark refers to the cittaśraddhākrama
(cf. point II in sec. I.3). An impure samāyati cannot take part in
yuganaddha (see note 121).
38. Lhan-skyes may also be applied to single nouns (e.g. ye-shes, dga’-
ba &c., also names of deities) which describe the combinations of the
things born together.
39. Rigs Skt. kula, varna &c. See Part I.
40. Slob-pa’i zung-jug
41. Slob-pa’i zung’jug ni ’od-mdal rtogs-nas mthar phyin-gyi bar-gyi skad-
del bden-pa gser-du mthong-nas de-la goins-par-bya-ba sgom-lam phyed-ba ita-
bu (Gan-mdzod 157b4)
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid. 31a2: see Part I, note 33
44. The uses of zung-brel noted in (a)-(g) are of course non-tantric,
but I can see no reason why this word might not find uses in the
tantras also. The zung-brel/zung’jug difference appears on the face of it
to cut across the sūtra/mantra difference.
45. On the basis on his Bka’-gdams experience, Sgam-po-pa intro-
duced into the Bka’-brgyud tradition the view that mahāmudra can be
attained in non-tantric mahāyāna. This view was criticized by Sa-skya
Panḍita, but these criticisms have been rejected by ’Gos Gzhon-nu-
dpal. The controversy forms an important strand in the *Phyag-chen gnam-mdzod*, see also Broido (1983a).

46. *Phyag-chen gnam-mdzod* 32b3 (discussion of this point continues until 35b6).

47. *Rgyal-dbang-rje* is the name usually used by Padma Dkar-po for (Mi-pham) Kun-dga’ Dpal-byor (1423-78), the second of the line of ‘Brug-pa incarnations of which Padma Dkar-po was the fourth. He collected together the doctrines of the ‘Brug-pa tradition, which had become scattered among the lineages descending from the first ‘Brug-pa, Gtsang-pa Rgya-ras Ye-shes Rdo-rgyal (1161-1211). The biographies of these personalities may be found in the *Blue Annals*. Rgyal-dbang-rje had a gift for aphorism, and Padma Dkar-po often quotes his pithy formulations of key points of ‘Brug-pa doctrine.

48. For instance, the three main headings of the *sa-skad* of the *Nges-don grub-pa’i shing-rta* say (see note 52) that in this method of setting up madhyamaka, the ground is the *yuganaddha* of the two *satya*, the path is the *yu ganaddha* of *prajña* and *upāya*, and the goal is the *yu ganaddha* of the two *buddhakāyas* (*dharma* and *rūpa*). For the first two of these see Table 1. Now it seems obvious enough that all three pairs are concerned with something which continues to exist as *integration*, but the contrast with such negative-looking pairs such as *rūpa/*arāga & *grāhyā/*grāhaka which have merely to be given up (Table 1) is not as clear as it may seem. More analysis of the structure of the *Nges-don grub-pa’i shing-rta* is found in Broido (1983a, esp. Appendix C). The *bden-gnyis zung-'jug* section of this work uses the same Vajrayāna terms (*gshis*, *glangs*, *gnas-lugs* etc.) and ideas (e.g. inseparability of ground, path and goal, 66b2) as other, clearer treatments discussed in this article. Its use of the madhyamaka notion of the equivalence of *śunyatā* and *pratīyamaitipāda* is worth noting and is pursued further in the *thubs-shes zung-'jug* section, 68a3.

49. I mean a concept of something non-dual, not the incoherent “non-dual concept” of something. Concepts make distinctions, it is what they are for. Tsong-kha-pa has recognised this in relation to the similar non-dual category *tattva* (de-kho-na-nyid) in his *Rigs-pa’i rgya-mtsho*, 244a4, where he points out that one has to know what a word means before one can reflect on whether one understands that for which it stands. As Guenther has remarked, Padma Dkar-po too (*Phyag-chen gnam-mdzod* 32a2, 33b4) stressed the importance of words and letters for conveying *tattva*: Pers. 38-9, note 4. At the end of this note, Guenther suggests that these Indian and Tibetan writers modelled knowing on seeing, holding that language “draws attention”. (But I am unhappy about the comparison of Saraha with Wittgenstein.)

50. See Appendix B under *sems dngos-po’i gnas-lugs*

51. *Gzhung-grel* 331a4, *Khrid-yig* 94b6. Padma Dkar-po’s very pithy summary (*mdor-lstan*) of the stages (*skabs*) of ground, path and goal in
this case (Gzhung-'grel ibid.) has been translated by Guenther (N 90) and apart from some oddities with the technical terms he conveys well the gist of Padma Dkar-po’s remarks. I hope soon to publish a detailed account of this (radiant light) section of the Gzhung-'grel.

52. See note 48. The headings from the Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta are:

gezhi dbu-ma bden-gnyis zung-'jug-tu thag-bead
lam dbu-ma thubs-shes zung-'jug-tu nyams-su blang-ba
bras-bu dbu-ma skya-gnyis zung-'jug-tu mgon-du bya-ba;

they are discussed briefly in Broido (1983a) (which is mainly about the gezhi section).

53. Mahāmudrā is probably the most comprehensive and historically resonant of these terms; madhyamaka is the one which has most roots in the kind of analysis with which our own culture makes us familiar, while the radiant light is perhaps the most culturally unfamiliar. At least for Padma Dkar-po, yuganaddha is the most fundamental of them, and this is my reason for treating it, and not the others, in detail here.

54. See the section of Broido (1983a) on the distinction between gnas-lugs phyag-chen and ‘khrul-lugs phyag-chen. The line of argument given here works most easily for the saṃsāra/nirvāṇa case.

55. For a somewhat more systematic reflection on tensions of this kind, see the concluding remarks of this article.

56. The Heart (hrdaya) sūtra and the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras in general are full of this kind of negation, of course.

57. A possible starting-point in this. Our verses appear in the Gzhung as well as in YK, and so they receive commentary in the Gzhung-'grel, the exact places being given in Table 1. In each case, Padma Dkar-po sketches the point of view from which (in his view) the verse, with the listed description, is to be taken. But even though this material is relatively short (c. 7 foll.), only very detailed study, such as cannot be recorded here, would enable us to draw conclusions of the required generality; a mere impression is of little interest.

58. Cf. note 51.

59. Gzhung-'grel 343a3 ff; see note 62.

60. Both these points are expressed in the famous verse from the Gzhung, quoted in the second paragraph of the section “Reconstruction of Padma Dkar-po’s argument” in Part I. The goal section of the Gzhung also opens with the line ‘bras-bu skye-ba’i rim-pa ni’ (Gzhung 8a1, Gzhung-'grel 370a5). Here the word ni (“as for . . .”) does not distinguish between a title and some other kind of term referring to a section of subject-matter, but Padma Dkar-po uses the phrase ‘bras-bu skye-ba’i rim-pa explicitly as his heading several times, e.g. Gzhung-'grel 14b1, 370a4.

61. As noted earlier, other arguments of this kind are available based on the relations of the subject-matter of the Gzhung-'grel with other
writings of Padma Dkar-po on topics divided by the scheme ground/path/goal (rgyud-gsum). See notes 50-53.
62. Compare Gzhung-'grel 340a3 ff. with Lam-bsdu 161a5ff.; cf. similar parallels between the path division in the radiant light section of the Gzhung-'grel and the mngon-byang section of the Rim-lingar ‘khrid-pa (Lam-bsdu 160a5).
63. Gzhung-'grel 340a6, Lam-bsdu 161b1
64. 'Od-gsal-las lding-ba'i tshu-l. Gzhung-'grel ibid. (The Rim-lingar contains fewer headings, sources of quotations &c.) In the Gzhung (6a4) we find 'phar-ba for lding-ba in the verse as quoted in the Gzhung-'grel; these words are no doubt alternatives for Skt. utthāna.
65. Gzhung-'grel 340b3, Lam-bsdu 161b3
66. Ibid. b4, b6
67. Lam-bsdu 162a4. These three points are dealt with also in the Gzhung-'grel, but this does not support the present argument.
68. Gzhung-'grel 341a3
69. Especially the very final part of the radiant light treatment (mthar-thug-pa'i 'bras-bu, 344b1) is similar to the very final part of the 'bras-bu skye-ba'i rim-pa treatment (377b5) and also to the goal section of the Ngag-don grub-pa'i shing-rla (cf. notes 50, 54).
70. Gzhung-'grel 9b1 ff. (comment on the verse quoted in Part I, note 23).
71. Some of the technical terms in this summary are explained in Broido (1983a).
72. These two zung-'jug are still to be distinguished in some way not clear to me. Padma Dkar-po does not seem to be identifying bta-byed, concentrating on the error of taking them as gzung-ba and 'dzin-pa, i.e. (presumably) as ontologically separate.
73. Bskyed-rim, the stage of generating the deities and the rest of the visualization. Non-dual awareness is normally the province of the stage of completion (utpamnakrama in the verse, but the form sampamnakrama is perhaps more common; Tīb. always rdzogs-rim).
74. Gzhig-pa: the process by which the visualization is made smaller and smaller until it dissolves into the void or the radiant light.
75. Sgyu-lus, māyādeha; here the visualization of oneself as the deity and the world as a mandala, regarded as a whole.
76. Snod-bcu; here snod (vessel) stands for the visualization of the world as a mandala, and bcu (contents) for that of oneself as the deity.
77. For gshis see e.g. Pers 56-8; Broido (1983a). The notion of gshis contains several tensions; really it is the capacity for paramārtha-satya but Padma Dkar-po (and Guenther, following him) often identify the two. Further it is not clear whether gshis is subjective or inheres in objects. There is a similar difficulty over the word ngo-bo (rūpa) as used, e.g. of paramārtha-satya, in such important madhyamaka loci as MMV VI.23 and its bhasya. If as often seems the case gshis and ngo-bo inhere in
objects, we have the incoherent notion of an objective correlate for pure subjectivity. In any case Guenther is certainly right about the close parallel between gshis and ngo-bo.

78. *Sems-kyi gnas-lugs*, short for *sems dngos-po'i gnas-lugs*. For the contrast between this feature-universal and the sortal universal yid (ma-nas), see Broïdo (1979). It is precisely this feature-aspect which is exploited whenever the depth-clarity metaphor is brought into play (cf. note 112 and Part I, note 51).

79. The radiant light is self-perceived (cf. Part I, note 53; also n. 77 above).

80. I have not been able to follow the pattern (if there is one) behind Padma Dkar-po’s references to snag-stong zung-’jug, gsal-stong zung-’jug &c. in these passages of commentary to verses in which the terms do not occur. Padma Dkar-po differed from what he regarded as the orthodox Sa-skya and Bka-gnyen view of these four kinds of yuganaddha (*Phyag-chen gan-mdzod*, 52a2, 52b2, 54a5, 55a4 gives his view of the four).

81. *Prajñāpāramitā*-yuganaddha is the path of madhyamaka, according to the Nges-don grub-pa’i shing-rta (see notes 48 and 52). This very short treatment in the Gzhung-’grel is consistent with the use of the term *Prajñāpāramitā*-yuganaddha in either sūtra or mantra contexts. This consistency is a typical sign of the use (in the latter contexts) of a father-tantra terminology; cf. notes 101-107 below.

82. Zung-’jug de-myid. It cannot mean this particular yuganaddha (as distinct from others explained in other verses) on pain of circularity. The remark is an inference from the general character of the good of others to a particular aspect of this good as connected with action and agent. Needless to say this inseparability of action and agent is one of the most common themes both of ethical discussion (e.g., in the sūtras) and of analysis (e.g., in madhyamaka works). Padma Dkar-po takes it for granted that his readers are familiar with all this material, supporting the quoted remark merely with a verse from BCA.

83. The central importance of the notion of dngos-po’i gnas-lugs for Padma Dkar-po’s thought is argued on its own merits in Broïdo (1979).

84. Gzhung-’grel and Khrid-yig: see Appendix B; Nges-don grub-pa’i shing-rta; notes 48 and 52.

85. E.g. Lam-bsdun 161a5, reviewed above; *Phyag-chen gan-mdzod* 155a6 ff, for which see below and Broïdo (1983a).

86. It may be worth trying to deflect some impatient reactions to this proposal. Why do I not simply give Padma Dkar-po’s own account? But what can this mean, other than printing the Tibetan texts? Any suggestion that one can translate these without extensive discussion of the technical terms can only rest on a confusion. Again, why do I not just say what Padma Dkar-po’s conception of yuganaddha was? If read very informally, this is just what I will do. But if read more formally, as a de-
mand to isolate an identifiable "conception" attributable to Padma Dkar-po on the basis of some kind of evidence, then it suffers from the long-standing confusion which Quine has christened "the 'idea' idea".

87. The word "mystical" might itself be thought to be in need of explanation. I mean for instance the idea of an idea which contains logical contradictions, but is not thereby rendered empty; or of an experience of something to which can be strictly and literally ascribed contradictory attributes, &c.

88. Cf. notes 4, 5

89. Cf. notes 11, 12. Similarly for his "identity" (e.g. N 116).

90. Since the question of metaphors in translation will come up again, it may be worthwhile trying to say something general about it. In word-by-word translation, the criterion of accuracy is the linguistic function of each word in its context (what Grice has called its utterer's meaning). Metaphors function by suggestion. If the foreign word is a metaphor, we may try to find an English one with the same suggestive power. But if there are great cultural differences, no such word may exist. In any case a literal translation may be irrelevant, as lacking the right suggestive power as regards the audience for whom the translation is intended. (Because of this argument I support Guenther's complaints about the literal translation of words like vāyu (rlung) and bindu (thig-le) by "wind" and "drop" in their technical uses, and his attempts to replace these English words by words which would literally (in English) convey something relevant (e.g. motility, creative potentiality).) If the foreign word is not a metaphor, we may still need one in English if there exists no literal equivalent. So it seems there can be no general argument against the use of metaphors in translation. But there may be particular arguments. A particular metaphor may simply have the wrong suggestive power. Or the cultural context in English may simply not make it clear to us that a metaphorical use is intended (or which metaphorical use). All my specific complaints about metaphors as translations in this paper are examples of one of these two sorts of objection.

91. This is my main objection to Guenther's translation of yuganaddha by such phrases as "unitive Being" (cf. note 6). It is the same as the objection to the translation of dngos-po'i gnas-lugs by "the concrete fact of Being" which is discussed in Part I, note 50.

92. It is well-known that Kant's intelligible intuition is similar to yogipratyakṣa (rtal-'byor mngon-sum). Padma Dkar-po seems to have had little use for the latter. Of course he talks about yoga (rtal-'byor) (but cf. Part I note 76), about pratyakṣa and about what Guenther, rightly in my view, has called "intuitive understanding" (mngon-sum-du rtogs-pa). But I see no reason to think that this mngon-sum is what is discussed in pramāṇa texts (similar to Kant's "intuition"). We must remember that the normal meaning of the Sanskrit word pratyakṣa is
“perception”, and that Dignāga’s claim that this is without concepts (kalpanapoḍha) was a great departure from this normal meaning. In his own pramāṇa works, Padma Dkar-po held that the formalized pramāṇa of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti is purely conventional (kun-tu tha-snyad-pa’i tshad-ma); this he contrasts with “real” or “proper” pramāṇa which is much more like what is discussed in this paper (don-dam tshad-ma; see his tshad-ma ‘jam-pa’i dgos-rgyan, 4b1 ff., and tshad-ma rigs-pa’i snying-po, 4b5 ff.).

93. In Part I we saw Padma Dkar-po saying that dngos-po’i gnas-lugs is the ground of sansāra and nirvāṇa and the ground upon which the path rests. These claims are soteriological, and have nothing to do with Kantian a priori or metaphysical claims to ground experience.

94. Neither yuganaddha nor dngos-po’i gnas-lugs have anything to do with sense-data or sense-datum theories. Confusions in this area may arise from the conflation of mngon-sum (as Padma Dkar-po uses the term) with the pratyakṣa of Indian pramāṇa works (see note 92).

95. An important technical term connected with this line of thought is tha-mal-gyi shes-pa, lit. “ordinary cognition”; as I show (1983a), Padma Dkar-po’s own view of this term comes to the similar “natural cognition”. Guenther’s “primordial knowledge” (Pers 77) perhaps reflects confusion of tha-mal (common) with tha-ma (poor, inferior; last), especially in the phrase thog-ma dang tha-ma.

96. As is well-known, confusion between unity of experience and experience of unity has a long and disastrous history in Western thought (e.g. P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, p. 162).

97. See notes 15-19.

98. Tsong-kha-pa’s view of yuganaddha will be considered below (mainly through Padma Dkar-po’s eyes). 

99. Even in cases such as the two satya and svādhiṣṭhāna/prabhāśvara, the treatment in the Pañcakrama itself is not adequately conveyed by “pair combined” &c. for reasons argued in Broido (1983a); but for present purposes these points may be regarded as refinements.

100. Gzhung’grel 7b2.


drops-so/
\(\text{de yang} \text{ bde-stong} = \text{thabs-shes-la} \text{ lhos-nas} \text{ thabs-shes} \text{ re-re-ba'} = \text{rgyud-du} \text{ mi-}
\text{jog-par} \text{ gnyis-med-kyi} \text{ rgyud-du} \text{'jog-pa} \text{ sngar} \text{ bshad-pa} \text{ lhar} \text{ yin-la} \text{ de-la}
\text{ lhos-nas} \text{ ni} \text{ shas-che-chung-kyi} \text{ sgo-nas} \text{ kyung} \text{ gzha-gyug-tu} \text{ mi-rung-ste} \text{ Kye-rdor-
sogs ma'} = \text{rgyud-las} \text{ bde-ba} \text{ shas-cher} \text{ bstan-pa} \text{ lhar} \text{ Dus-pa-las} \text{ ma-gsungs-pa} \text{ Kye-rdor}
\text{ pha-rgyud} \text{ dang} \text{Dus-pa} ma-rgyud-du \text{ gzha-gyug} \text{ drops-pa} = \text{skyon-du}
\text{gyur-ba'} = \text{phyir-ro} /
\text{des-na} \text{ rdzogs-rim-kyi} \text{ sgo-nas} \text{ thabs-shes so-so'} = \text{rgyud-du} \text{ gsungs-pa'} = \text{thabs-
shes} = \text{shes-rab} \text{ don-dam} \text{ bde-ba-ch’en-po'} = \text{ye-shes} = \text{dang} \text{ thabs kun} \text{ rdzob} \text{ sgyu-
ma'} = \text{sku} = \text{0}/
\text{de la dang-po'} = \text{sgo-nas} \text{ rnal’-byor-ma'} = \text{rgyud-du} \text{'jog-pa} ni \text{Gur-gyi} le’u \text{ bzu-
gsum-pa-las/} . . . .
\text{shes-rab} \text{ pha-rol-phyin-pa’i} \text{ thabs}/ \text{di ni rnal’-byor-mar brjod-do}/
\text{phyag-rgya} \text{ chen-po} \text{ rab-shyon-bas}/ \text{gang-phyir} \text{ de-nyid-la} \text{’jug-pa}/
\text{rnal’-byor ma-yi} \text{ rgyud ces-bya}/

103. LW 260-3 (nothing presently relevant is found in the rdzogs-rim section of Mkhas-grub-rje’s discussion of earlier views, p. 254). The account of the rang-lugs is slightly better in Pa’-chen Bsod-nams Grags-pa’s Rgyud sde spyi’i rnam-bzhang skal-bzang-gi yid-phrog, but much of the point still escapes the reader because the gzhan-lugs is almost omitted.
rgyud-de/

This entire remark occurs in Bu-ston at least twice (Rim-po-che mdzes rgyan, 281a2; Gsang-ba gsal-bya’ed, 127b4), and also identically apart from the reversal of the two clauses in Bkra-shis Rnam-rgyal’s Nor-bu’i od-
zer, 14a5. However there is a variant which replaces phyag-rgya chen-mo with rgya chen-po (sic); this occurs in Bu-ston’s Gsang-dus bshad-thabs, 22a1, and is repeated exactly in Padma Dkar-po’s Rgyud-sde spyi’i rnam-
bzhang, 34b2. The variant does not seem to make sense; and since the Vajrapāñjara verse (which is quoted in all texts, see note 102) contains the line /phyag-rgya chen-po rab shyor-bas/ without variation, I have ac-
cepted the quoted version for Padma Dkar-po too.
105. Padma Dkar-po, Rgyud-sde spyi’i rnam-bzhang 32b5, 35a6; the latter (nitartha) quotes the well-known GST verse on this topic which is also quoted for similar reasons by Mkhas-grub-rje and the others.
106. The use of the terms drang-don (neyārtha) and nges-don (nitartha) in the tantras is quite different from its use in the sūtras. Their use by Bu-
ston, Tsong-kha-pa and Padma Dkar-po is discussed, especially in relation to the tantras, in (1983b).
107. For reasons of this kind it would be desirable to give a detailed ac-
count of the dispute about the classification of the anuttarayogatanan-
tras in which, among other things, the bshad-thabs terms were treated
with the care their importance deserves (they do not receive this care in
Lessing and Wayman). I hope to present such an account soon elsewhere.

108. utpatikramasampannakrama or svādhīṣṭhānakrama/abhisambodhikrama, as the case may be.

109. Much criticism of Tsong-kha-pa by Bka-brgyud-pa authors such as Padma Dkar-po and Karma-pa Mi-bskyod Rdo-rje is related in some way to this set of issues, often expressed as the claim that various pairs of notions are (as Tsong-kha-pa explains them) not properly lhan-cig bskyes-pa (sahaja, born together).

110. Phyang-chen gan-mdzod 156b2, ‘di pa'i lugs-la/ . . . (comment on the immediately preceding quotation or explanation attributed to Tsong-kha-pa (n. 13).

111. Gzhung-'grel 115a4, 116a2, 332b1; Yid-'phrog 17b6.

112. On the inseparability of depth and clarity in this context, we have: tha-dad-du byed mi-shes-pa twice (Gzhung-'grel 116a4, 332b3); tha-dad phye yang ya-bral-du phye-ba nam-yang mi-srid-pas (Yid-'phrog 18a2); gnyis-pa med-pa (from the Vimalaprabha, see Part 1 note 51); de gnyis mishan-yid tha-dad-du phye yang ngo-bo-nyid ni gcig yin-no (Gzhung-'grel 119a4). The last passage is especially interesting because of its analysis in terms of sahaja. The illusory body is present throughout the abhisambodhikrama (Gan-mdzod 157a5). Even in the svādhīṣṭhānakrama, the agent of purification is the radiant light (Pañcakrama II.5-6, V.26, V.30, quoted Gan-mdzod ibid.) Similarly, the illusory body is self-purified (criticism of the Bo-dong-pa position, Gan-mdzod 157b6), and similarly in terms of sealing (ibid. 39a4). In addition to all this, svādhīṣṭhāna and prabhāṣāra are instances of the two satya, on whose inseparability Padma Dkar-po is just as insistent (see my (1983a)).

113. De gang-la dbyer-med-par 'dus-pa'i go-phang ni zung-'jug-go (Gan-mdzod 115b2; an almost identical remark also at 156b1).

114. Used twice of the two satya in contexts related to the present, both times in the same remark taken from the Sekoddeṣṭikā: bden-pa gnyis gnyis-su med-pa'i rang-bzhin 'di-nyid zung-'jug-pa zhes brjod-dol: Gan-mdzod 36a2 and Gzhung-'grel 345a1.


116. Gan-mdzod ibid: res jogs-tu gyur-ba'i phyir zung-'jug med-dol/

117. Ibid. 156a5: gnyis dus mnyam 'byung-zhing

118. Ibid. 156b1; cf. also note 112.

119. Ibid. 156b2: 'di'i pa'i lugs-la/ glang-la rwa-co lta-bu gnyis zung-'jug-go/

120. Ibid. 156b4

121. Ibid. 156b5: de yang ril-'dzin rjes-gzhig-gis 'od-gsal-bar yang bcug-pa mthar dag-pa-na mi-slob-pa'i zung-'jug 'byung-bar gsungs-pas/ kun-rdzob kyi bden-pa de ma-dag de-srid mi-slob-pa'i zung-'jug ma byung; cf. Mkhas-
grub-rje (LW 326-7): de-nas ma-dag-pa'i sgyu-lus de-nyid ril-'dzin dang rjes-gzhig-gi bsam-gtan gnyis-kyis. . . .
122. This topic is dealt with in more detail in Broido (1983a).
123. Phyang-chen gan-mdzod 157a5: mnyam-gzhang-tu snang-ba dag-pa
124. Padma Dkar-po identifies paryāya-paramārtha (rnam-grangs-pa'i don-dam) with a purified samvrti (see discussion in Broido, 1983a and 1983b), and says here that it is the mere tearing of the veil of ignorance and contains but a little paramārtha (Gan-mdzod, 157a2).
125. Candrakīrti’s distinction between samvrti-satya and samvrti-mātra was developed, somewhat differently in each case, by Tsong-kha-pa (see Williams (1979) ) and by Padma Dkar-po (Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta 36b6).
126. Cf. for instance the passages quoted by Seyfort Ruegg, BU 62-4 (but cf. also note 80).
127. This suggestive power is not needed for zung-'brel (see section II.1).
128. For present purposes all we need to know about the radiant light is that it is self-cognising and paramārtha-satya. Cf. notes 77, 79.
129. See Appendix B under lus ji-lar grub-pa'i tshul.