THE JOURNAL OF THE TIBET SOCIETY

Editor
Elliot Sperling
Indiana University, Bloomington

Assistant Editors
Daniel Martin, Michael Walter
Indiana University, Bloomington

Editorial Consultants

C.I. Beckwith
Indiana University, Bloomington

A.M. Blondeau
Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Paris

J. Bosson
University of California, Berkeley

E.K. Dargyay
University of Calgary, Calgary

Y. Imaeda
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris

J.W. de Jong
The Australian National University, Canberra

P. Kværne
Universitetet i Oslo, Oslo

A.W. Macdonald
Université de Paris X, Nanterre

K. Mimaki
Kyoto Daigaku, Kyoto

J.L. Panglung
Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Munich

L. Petech
Università di Roma, Rome

D.S. Ruegg
University of Washington, Seattle

E. Steinkellner
Universität Wien, Vienna

P. Tsering
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, Bonn

H. Uebach
Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Munich

G. Uray
Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, Budapest

A. Wayman
Columbia University, New York

THE TIBET SOCIETY

The Tibet Society, Inc., founded in 1967, is a non-profit organization with an international membership, dedicated to the study and preservation of Tibetan civilization. The Tibet Society publishes, in addition to The Journal of the Tibet Society, the semi-annual Tibet Society Bulletin, with a circulation of 900, and the series Occasional Papers of the Tibet Society.

Membership in the Tibet Society (which includes subscriptions to all Tibet Society publications) is open to all applicants, for $20.00 a year ($10.00 for students), payable by cheque (in U.S. dollars) or international money-order. Subscription to The Journal of the Tibet Society alone is $20.00 a year.

Please address all inquiries concerning membership or subscriptions to the Tibet Society, Inc., P.O. Box 1968, Bloomington, Indiana 47402, USA.

Manuscripts for publication, books for review, and all correspondence regarding editorial matters should be sent to The Editor, The Journal of the Tibet Society, 157 Goodbody Hall, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana 47405, USA.
THE JOURNAL OF THE TIBET SOCIETY

Volume 5    1985

CONTENTS

Editorial ........................................................................ 3

Articles
Michael Broido (Oxford), Padma Dkar-po on Integration as
Ground, Path and Goal ................................................. 5
Eva K. Dargyay (Calgary), The White and Red Rong-btsan of
Matho Monastery (Ladakh) ........................................ 55

Brief Communications
Todd Gibson (Bloomington), Dgra-lha: A Re-examination ..... 67
Jeffrey Hopkins (Charlottesville), Reply to Alex Wayman’s
Review of The Yoga of Tibet ........................................... 71

Book Reviews
J. Chalon, Le lumineux destin d’Alexandra David Néel
(Braham Norwick) ......................................................... 97
W. Friedl, Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft und materielle Kultur in
Zanskar (Ladakh)
(Eva K. Dargyay) ......................................................... 98
D.P. and J.A. Jackson, Tibetan Thangka Painting: Methods and
Materials
(Françoise Pommaret-Imaeda and Yoshiro Imaeda) .......... 100
J. Kolmaš, ed., Chinese Studies on Tibetan Culture
(Elliot Sperling) ......................................................... 102
P. Kværne, Tibet: Bon Religion
(Daniel Martin) ......................................................... 103
Li Jicheng, The Realm of Tibetan Buddhism
(Todd Gibson) ......................................................... 104
F. Michael, Rule by Incarnation: Tibetan Buddhism and its Role in
Society and State
(Geoffrey Samuel) ..................................................... 105
M. Nowak, Tibetan Refugees
(P. Christian Klieger) ................................................ 107
D. Schuh, Grundlagen tibetischer Siegelkunde, eine Untersuchung
über tibetische Siegelsaufschriften in ’Phags-pa Schrift
(Luciano Petech) ....................................................... 110

The Tibet Society
Minutes of the 1985 Meeting ........................................ 119
Financial Report ...................................................... 120
EDITORIAL

The creation of a new publication, especially when it is meant to be a forum for a relatively new field, is a difficult proposition. The survival and continued growth of such a publication is equally hard. It is therefore with a great deal of pleasure and gratitude that the Tibet Society and The Journal of the Tibet Society acknowledge their debt to our former editor, Christopher I. Beckwith. It was his dedication to the idea that the Tibet Society rightly ought to sponsor the publication of a scholarly journal devoted to Tibetan Studies that brought the Journal into existence. So too, it was his diligence and conscientious work that kept the Journal going.

Readers may well remember the editorial in our last volume, wherein Chris noted his own satisfaction with the success of the Journal and his desire to hand over the editorship after five years of work on it. While all of us at the Tibet Society were reluctant to let a successful and creative editor go, we can only respect Chris' desire to devote more of his energies to research labors. We are still fortunate, however, to have his cooperation and input as he remains with us in a new capacity as editorial consultant.

Perhaps the best recognition of Chris Beckwith's achievements with the Journal is contained in our acknowledgement that the standards and goals which Chris set for the Journal remain our standards and goals. The Journal of the Tibet Society will continue striving to be an open forum for scholarly and scientific work in the field of Tibetan Studies.

E.S.
II.I: Yuganaddha (‘integration) in general

That *yuganaddha* (Tibetan *zung-'jug*) is one of the most important technical terms of the vajrayāna is a platitude which needs no comment from me; one need only look at the writings of Prof. H. V. Guenther or of Prof. Alex Wayman. At the same time it is hardly possible to think that this word has been adequately explained by either of these distinguished authors or by anyone else. It is clear that the use of this word by different Tibetan writers varies; as in Part I, the treatment here will be restricted to Padma Dkar-po. However, Padma Dkar-po himself has criticized various earlier Tibetan authors in this area, and we will be able to bring some of the differences which he discusses into sharp focus.

Both Guenther and Wayman have used a great variety of English renderings for *yuganaddha*. In Guenther we find e.g. “unity”, “unity of opposites”, “union of opposites”, “unitive Being”, “togetherness”, “coupled together”, “harmoniously blended”, “harmonious juxtaposition”, “coincide”, and “coincidence”. Given the overriding importance of this term for Guenther, he is careless about his use of these words to represent the views of different authors; for instance it is *Padma Dkar-po* (and not the Bka’-brgyud-pas in general) who *in criticizing* Tsong-kha-pa, attributes to him, as I will show below, a view of *yuganaddha* which might be interpreted as “harmonious juxtaposition”, a phrase, however, which does not fit the attributed passage very well. Most of Guenther’s other renderings of *yuganaddha* represent either Padma Dkar-po’s view (as he understands it) or Indian authors, such as Nāropa, whose views Padma Dkar-po accepted.

In Wayman’s writings we find e.g. “pair united”, “pair combined”, “pair-wise united”, “combined together”, and “coupling”. On the whole these renderings represent (confusedly, as we

---

*This is the second of two papers appearing in successive issues of the Journal of the Tibet Society, the first being called *Padma Dkar-po on tantra as ground, path and goal*. In the present paper, references to “Part I” are to this earlier paper.*
will see) a "lexical" approach to the notion of translation, but insofar as they represent the view of a specific author, it is Tsong-kha-pa (and, in LW, his pupil Mkhas-grub-rje).

In the introduction to his translation of the hagiography of Bu-ston,20 Prof. D. Seyfort Ruegg has several times translated zung-'jug by "integration", representing the views of various Sa-skya and Dge-lugs authors whom he quotes at some length. For reasons given below I feel that this word is a happy compromise between various Tibetan views of zung-'jug, and so I will sometimes use "integration" as a cipher for yuganaddha or zung-'jug.

Methodologically, Seyfort Ruegg (and perhaps Wayman) is committed to a "lexical" notion of translation, in which one English word is used uniformly to translate one foreign word. Guenther seems to dislike this approach, though it is not clear to me what he wants to put in its place. In any case the lexical approach hardly constitutes a method of translation, since it tells us nothing about which word to use uniformly for each foreign word. When interpreting, I shall concentrate, on the whole, on sentences, without worrying overmuch about uniformity;21 but when focussing attention on single words such as yuganaddha I shall follow Gilbert Ryle’s recommendation to consider carefully their logical grammar: features such as the syntactic type (whether noun, verb, predicate with 1,2,3 . . . places, &c.). Ryle also emphasized the semantic categories of words with which a word may be combined, and though his notion of category is perhaps not clear enough to provide a basis for solving philosophical problems22 it is still of heuristic value in demarcating specific philological ones. As Ryle showed in English, these modest considerations may not tell us the meaning of a word, whatever that is, but at least they may prevent us from making mistakes.

Padma Dkar-po’s own "etymology" of yuganaddha23 may be rendered thus: "yuga means ‘joined’ and naddha means ‘non-dual’, and so yuganaddha is said to be "integration".24 The phrase "and so" (de’i phyir) is tongue-in-cheek. The syllable-by-syllable analysis is not meant to be literal, but merely to give the right result.25

The full form of the Tibetan zung-'jug is found quite frequently, and is zung-du 'jug-pa. The syntax of this full phrase gives us an important part of its meaning. 'Jug-pa is in general a verb or a verbal noun (Skt. vrt-, vytti) and here is a verbal adjective (modifying a noun to yield another noun). Zung-du just modifies this verbal adjective (yielding another). (Of course the semantics do not follow this simple course; it is partly for this reason that Padma Dkar-po’s nirukta must be so non-literal — see note 25 — and also that lexical translation into English runs into problems.) Also yuga or zung acts syntactically as a two place predicate (two things are joined). The logical grammar described so far may
be summed up in the schema:

\[(X,Y) \text{zung-du 'jug-pa'i} \quad Z\]  

(1)

where of course the semantics will impose restrictions on what can fill the three places here labeled with variables X, Y, Z. In Tibetan the two-variable slot \((X,Y)\) is usually filled by some phrase denoting two things, either in the explicit form \(X \text{ dang } Y\) (X and Y e.g., \(\text{thabs dang shes-rab}\)), yielding from (1) the schema

\[X \text{ dang } Y \text{ zung-du 'jug-pa'i} \quad Z\]  

(2)

or by contraction of such a phrase (e.g. \(\text{thabs-shes}, \) corresponding more closely to the Sanskrit \(\text{praṇāpāya}\); or by a phrase of some other form but similar function (e.g. \(\text{bden-gnyis}, \) Skt. \(\text{satyadvaya}\)). Most of these features are found in the phrase

\[\text{bden-pa gnyis-ga gnyis-su mi-phyed-pa zung-'jug-gi tinge-'dzin}\]  

(3)

which may perhaps be translated "the samādhi which *integrates the two satyas inseparably". This concludes the summary of the syntax of \(\text{zung- 'jug}\).27

On its semantics according to the schemata (1) and (2), the first thing is to say something about the semantic character of what may replace X, Y and Z. Now Z is normally omitted, but when it appears, the word substituted is almost always, as in (3), \(\text{ting-nge- 'dzin}\) (Skt. \(\text{samādhi}\)). I believe that any appearance whatever of \(\text{zung- 'jug}\) or \(\text{zung-du 'jug-pa}\) (at least in the kind of context considered in this paper) is to be taken as an ellipsis of \(\text{zung-du 'jug-pa'i tinge- 'dzin}\) (Skt. \(\text{yuganaddhasamādhi}\)). In particular we see quite often the phrase

\[\text{zung-gi ting-pa} \quad (\text{yuganaddhakrama})\]  

(4)

which according to Padma Dkar-po28 is short for

\[\text{zung- 'jug-gi tinge-'dzin-gyi rim-pa} \quad (\text{yuganaddhasamādhihikrama}).\]  

(5)

The expansion of (4) into (5) is not special to the yuganaddhakrama; he describes all six (sic) stages of the Pañcakrama as \(\text{ting-nge-'dzin}\).29 Similarly, Padma Dkar-po's most detailed discussion of \(\text{yuganaddha}\), that in the \(\text{gzhung- 'grel}\),30 opens with the following verse from the Vajramālā:

/\text{phyag-rgya chen-po'i dngos-grub che}/ /\text{zung-du 'jug-pa'i tinge-'dzin-gyis}/  
/\text{rnam-retog med-par zhung-nas ni}/ /\text{thob-pa 'di-la the-thos-med}/

which means roughly: "If one enters into non-discursiveness by means of \(\text{yuganaddha-samādhi}, \) without a doubt one will obtain the great siddhi of mahāmudra." Another standard phrase is \(\text{zung-du 'jug-pa'i sku}\) where again the standard contexts31 make it clear that a samādhi is intended."32
The claim, then, is that yuganaddha (zung-’jug) is a technical term used in Buddhist (and especially vajrayāna\textsuperscript{35}) soteriology; a samādhi, a state of mind. As far as I know there is no colloquial use competing with this technical use. From this point of view the problem of finding a suitable translation is quite different from that of translating terms like rlung (vāyu).\textsuperscript{34}

Now we turn to the main remaining feature of the schemata (1), (2), namely the two variables $X$ and $Y$, that is, the two items joined or *integrated in yuganaddha. Padma Dkar-po has pointed out several times that in this respect the terms zung-’jug and lhan-skyes (sahaja) are very similar.\textsuperscript{35} In both cases the fundamental feature is the inseparability of the two items so related; this feature is already present in the example (3). A further point upon which Padma Dkar-po not only insisted but contrasted his view with that of others is that this inseparability is non-contingent (ma-bcos-pa\textsuperscript{36}). However, it seems that this non-contingency applies only to certain zung-’jug pairs, viz. those which are also lhan-skyes, i.e. “born together”, roughly the “positive” type discussed below; these are the most interesting and controversial cases. Sahaja (lhan-skyes) is a two-place relational attribute, saying of the two terms that they are born together or arise or emerge together, rather than separately.\textsuperscript{38} There is no one term with which it stands in a privileged relationship (as does zung-’jug with ting-nges-’dzin), and this difference emphasizes the extent to which lhan-skyes is a purely relational attribute, in contrast to the way zung-’jug stands for a kind of individual in the broadest sense (viz. a kind of state of mind).

Next we can ask: is there just one yuganaddha-samādhi, of which the different types listed in the standard sources (see below) are merely different aspects? Or are there several different such samādhi? The texts give no clear answer to this question. A possible line of attack is this: we may look at the possible ways of individuating a thing such as a samādhi. These will provide us with possible criteria on the basis of which individual yuganaddha-samādhis might potentially be individuated. Then we can look at the actual ways in which yuganaddha is described in the texts, and see whether the differences in these modes of description can be related in any way to those possible criteria. Two kinds of criteria suggest themselves. First, there are purely physical criteria, such as are used to distinguish between more familiar states of mind, such as sleep-states (frequency of the dominant electromagnetic mode active in the brain, movements of the eyeballs, &c.). It seems perfectly plausible to suppose that some of the different types of dhyāna and samādhi distinguished in Abhidharma texts and elsewhere might be individuated in this way. But when we review the different descriptive phrases used of yuganaddha, as I will do later, it begins to seem very implausible that they could be correlated with such physical criteria. (Still, I have no reason to dismiss it as impossible.) Second, one
might try to use dispositional criteria. Such-and-such a kind of samādhi will dispose the subject to behave in such-and-such ways. . . . The only criteria of this kind, relevant to yuganaddha, which I can think of are those related to the powers and activities of the buddha and perhaps of bodhisattvas on the highest levels. It is not clear to me that there are any genuinely empirical distinctions in this area, but suppose there are. It seems most unlikely (say from Padma Dkar-po’s own descriptions) that these will be clearly related to the different pairs of yuganaddha items listed in the Yuganadhakrama, or to Birupa’s snang-stong/gsal-stong/bde-stong/ rig-stong. It might seem somewhat more plausible that such criteria might be related to the šaikṣa/ašaikṣa (slob-pa’i/mi-slob-pa’i) distinction in yuganaddha. But, as we see in the next paragraph, there is independent textual evidence that these two form a continuum of similar states. Accordingly, from now on I shall tentatively assume that we are dealing with one basic yuganaddha, perhaps in slightly varying forms or aspects, and not with a family of different ones, related by some family resemblance. Should this tentative assumption prove mistaken, it will not be difficult to reformulate most of the remaining arguments.

According to Padma-Dkar-po, šaikṣayuganaddha is the period from the understanding of the radiant light until ultimacy, and corresponds to the distinction of the bhāvanāmārga (sgom-lam), during which one cultivates satya (already) freshly seen. Its counterpart ašaikṣayuganaddha is just the buddha-level or ultimacy, about which nothing more need or perhaps can be said. But these are not two different yuganaddha; rather the šaikṣa stage is already the real thing, as far as it goes, and he criticizes the views of those who construct an artificial šaikṣayuganaddha (see below).

The term yuganaddha has a long history in India in connection with non-tantric Buddhist meditation, both in the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna. We find dhāyana and samādhi used almost interchangeably, Tibetan often using ting-nge ’dzin for both. Šamatha (zhi-gnas, mental quiescence) and vipāśyanā (lhaṅ-mthong, insight) are first practiced separately and later joined together: yuganaddha, Tib. zung ’brel or zung-du ’brel-ba, and not zung ‘jug. They are associated with one-pointedness (ekāgratā, rise-gcig) of mind. In Tibet all these terms are prominent in non-tantric mahāmudra meditation (see note 45) and as such are frequently discussed by Padma Dkar-po, who was famous for his expert descriptions in this area. Some details:

(a) Poussin (ADK vol. V, p. 131, n.2) gives references to the Pali literature with the spelling yuganandha, about which he is unhappy, e.g. samatha-vipassane rāhāvandi bhāveti, &c. He translates with “attelé”. He also gives refs. to BCA, Sikṣ., MSL &c.

(b) Vaibhāṣika texts such as Saṅghabhadrā’s Abhidharmakośa-kārikā-sāstra-bhāṣya (Sde-dge Bstan’ gyur, Mgon-pa, vol. kha 95b1), and the
Abhidharmadipā (author unknown, ed. Jaini) do mention one-pointedness (ekāgratā) where one would expect it, viz. at the beginning of chapter VIII (resp. 265a5 and p. 404) but without reference to yuganaddha.

(c) Abhidharmakāśa VIII.1c runs: samāpattiḥ śubhaikāryam (/snyoms- ’jug dge-ba rtsé-gec-pal/). Vasubandhu comments: . . . / sa hi śamatha-vipaśyanābhāyāṃ yuganaddha-vāhītvād drṣṭadharmaṇukhāvāhā uktaḥ (de ni zhi-gnas dang lhag-mthong zung-du 'brel-bar ngang-gis 'byung-ba'i phyir mthong-ba'i chos-la bde-bar gnas-pa dang/ lam sla-ba zhes gsungs-pas: Sde-dge khyu 66b4, quoted by Padma-dkar-po, Mṇgon-mdzod 152b4). According to the Vāyākyā, this is a sūtra passage. The normal sense of vāhin is “conveying along” &c., and Poussin has accordingly rendered yuganaddhavāhin (in a longer phrase taken from the Vāyākyā, Shastri ed. vol. 4 p. 1128) by “attelés au joug”. However, the Tibetan in the ADK passage is ngang-gis 'byung-ba (spontaneously generated, cf Jāschke s.v. ngang), and this is in broad conformity with the sense “causing, producing, effecting” for vāhin (Monier-Williams, s.v.). So it is clear that Poussin’s colloquial translation receives little support from the Tibetan. But every other occurrence of yuganaddha mentioned in paras. (a)-(g) is technical, relating to the śamatha-vipaśyanā combination.

(d) Mahāyānasūtrālankāra XIV.9ab runs: yuganaddhasa vijñeyo mārgaṇaṁ viṇḍitaṁ punah /: /zung-du 'brel-ba'i lam ni de/ /bṣdoms-pa yin-par shes-par-byal/, and Vasubandhu’s comment on this group of verses includes: śamatha manaskāraḥ / vipaśyanā manaskāraḥ / yuganaddha manaskāraḥ / (confirming the feeling associated with the word ekāgratā that we are not yet near the goal). Sthiramati in his Sūtrālankāra-वर्त्ती-भाष्य (Sde-dge Bstan-gyur, Sems-tsam, vols. mi-tsi) comments on this verse (mi, 266a6):

“At the time when śamatha and vipaśyanā have not yet been joined together (zung-du ma-'brel-ba'i dus-na) they are *based (dmigs-pa; ālambana in verse 10b) separately. Śamatha is *based on words and letters, while vipaśyanā is *based on (their) artha. But when they are joined together (zung-du 'brel-ba) there is no separate *basis of words and artha, the two are merged (bsdu-nas) and śamatha and vipaśyanā are unified (mgo mnyam-du 'brel-te), and the path based on this is called the path of śamatha-vipaśyanā-yuganaddha. By this means, yuganaddha-manaskāra is taught.”

(Here, dmigs-pa = ālambana is not adequately represented by *based, *basis, but this complex problem cannot be dealt with here. Yuganaddha = zung-du 'brel-ba throughout.)

(e) Bodhicaryāvatāra VIII.4a runs: śamathena vipaśyanā suyuktaḥ, and the Pañjika comments: śamathaḥ cittaikāgratā-lakṣaṇaḥ samādhiḥ . . . vipaśyanā yathābhūta-tattva-pariṣāna-svabhāva praṇāḥ / tayā suyuktaḥ / yuganaddha-vāhi-mārga-yogena kurute kleśānām vināśaṁ . . . in full conformity with (c), (d).
(f) A single example from Padma Dkar-po must suffice. At Rnal-'byor bzhi'i mdzub-tshugs 6a3 (i.e. in the rtse-gcig, ekāgratā section) he contrasts zhi-lhag zung-'brel with zhi-lhag zung-'jug. Thus: zhi-lhag zung-'brel-du bshad-pa'i lhag-mthong ni lhag-mthong gi don-spyi yin-la/ zhi-lhag zung-'jug-gi zhi-gnas kyang/ 'di'i skabs-kyi zhi-gnas ma-yin-no/. The contrast is just what is suggested in the rest of paras (a)-(g) in relation to this article as a whole.

(g) Summary: in translating yuganaddha (especially in a non-tantric context) the Tibetans distinguished between zung-'jug (the goal, and with little or no manaskāra) and zung-'brel (joining or combination, not the goal, connected with ekāgratā and manaskāra and virtually always used of the samatha/vipaśyanā combination). Both words are used almost exclusively of meditational states, of samādhī or its close relative dhyāna.

Though zung-'jug is mainly a term of the vajrayāna, it also has a use in non-tantric mahāyāna rather as does mahāmudrā. With regard to early Tibetan madhyamaka, in the oral tradition I have heard it said that Pa-tshab Lotsawa, Rngog Blo-ldan Shes-rab, Phyā-pa Chos-kyi Sengge and others spoke a good deal of bden-gnyis zung-'jug and that it was as a reaction against the over-emphasis on this connection between the two satya in his own time that Tsong-kha-pa was moved to write the very detailed separate treatment found in his Rigs-pa'i rgya-mtsho and Dgongs-pa rab-gsal, against which Mi-bskyod Rdo-rje and other Bka'-brgyud-pas and others later protested. Although Mi-bskyod Rdo-rje does not seem to use the phrase bden-gnyis zung-'jug in the Dwags-brgyud grub-pa'i shing-rta his account of the history of Tibetan madhyamaka is broadly comparable with this one, which however I am not in a position to verify. Padma Dkar-po’s summary of the tradition runs thus:

Concerning the difference between sūtra and mantra, Rgyal-dbang-rje has said that the former is concerned largely with analysis and the method of negation, while the latter is concerned with establishing something positive. Accordingly the old translators of the lakṣaṇa (yāna) said that zung-'jug is simply non-duality, as though (its substrate) did not exist; while when translating the mantras they generally indicated two existing things as (connected in) yuganaddha or sahaja-jñāna.

Padma Dkar-po himself, while broadly following Rgyal-dbang-rje’s remarks, diverges somewhat from the view attributed to the earlier translators. In his vajrayāna works he uses yuganaddha pairs found both in the Pañcakrama (see below) and in the tradition of Birupa (snang-stong &c., see above). The Pañcakrama pairs are of both positive and negative type. Now in his sūtra (i.e. not vajrayāna) works, Padma Dkar-po typically considers zung-'jug pairs of the types which appear
as positive in the Pañcakrama; these even play the main role.\textsuperscript{48} (Later when we consider the ground/path/goal division in yuganaddha this positive/negative distinction will come to seem less fundamental than it does in these remarks. This is consistent with Padma Dkar-po’s unwillingness to make a general distinction of lta-ba (viewpoint) between sūtras and mantras.)

II.2: Yuganaddha as ground, path and goal

\textit{II.2.1: Preliminary survey}

In Part I we sketched and quoted Padma Dkar-po’s own summary of the cig-car-ba’s ground, path and goal in general, as he gives it in the Gzhung-'grel. In the previous section, II.1, we gave his view of yuganaddha in general, using a variety of sources and arguments. Now we bring the two together. As a preliminary we may note that in addition to yuganaddha, Padma Dkar-po has divided various other non-dual conceptual categories\textsuperscript{49} by using the ground/path/goal scheme: mahāmudrā (phyag-rgya chen-po),\textsuperscript{50} the radiant light (prabhāsvara, od-gsal),\textsuperscript{51} and the middle (way, i.e. madhyamaka, dbu-ma).\textsuperscript{52} While a full treatment of the ground/path/goal scheme would therefore include accounts of all these matters,\textsuperscript{53} yuganaddha is perhaps the most fundamental, and we confine attention to the others to the notes.

Table 1 contains a list of all the pairs of items which appear in the verses of the ’bras-bu skye-ba’i rim-pa (goal) section of the Gzhung, *integrated in yuganaddha. Without exception, all these verses are taken from the Yuganaddhakrama (col. 2); and of course all receive commentary in the Gzhung-'grel (col. 3). With the letters N and P in column 4 I have attempted to distinguish whether the verse asserts the absence of some pair of things discursively discriminated (negative type) or the presence of some kind of unity of two things (positive type). This classification is based entirely on the words (e.g. ekatvam, one-ness) found in the verses themselves and describing the relational aspect of each separate case of yuganaddha; the Sanskrit words (as printed by Poussin) are given in column 5. The classification seems at first glance to correspond to that sketched by Padma Dkar-po in the remarks quoted at the end of the previous section. Unfortunately it seems impossible to introduce a single clear and uniform distinction on the basis of these analyses. Basically this is because two things differ (or are the same) only under a description. For instance, one is tempted to take the first pair, samsāra/nirvāṇa, as negative because the idea is to give up this dualistic conception (kalpana-dvaya-varjana, rtog-pa gnyis-po spangs-pa). But when we have done this, we are of course not left with just nothing; we are left with the world as it always was before the samsāra/nirvāṇa descrip-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PAIR</th>
<th>YK</th>
<th>gzhung-'grel</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>samāsāra/nirvāṇa</td>
<td>YK 2</td>
<td>370b4</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>kalpana-dvaya-varjana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>klesa/bodhi</td>
<td>YK 3</td>
<td>371a5</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>ekabhāva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sākāra/nirākāra</td>
<td>YK 4</td>
<td>371b4</td>
<td>N?</td>
<td>abhinnatā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grāhyā/grāhaka</td>
<td>YK 5</td>
<td>ibid.</td>
<td>P?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### path section

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PAIR</th>
<th>YK</th>
<th>gzhung-'grel</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>utpattikrama/utpannakrama</td>
<td>YK 20</td>
<td>372a3</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>ekatvaṃ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pindagrāha/anubheda</td>
<td>YK 12</td>
<td>372b1</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>samantād</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>svādhīśṭhāna/prabhāsvara</td>
<td>YK 11</td>
<td>372b4</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>samājām</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rāga/arāga</td>
<td>YK 18</td>
<td>373a1</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>virnimuktaḥ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>praṭīpāya</td>
<td>YK 8</td>
<td>373a4</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>samāpattyā, samāsataḥ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>śūnyatā/karuna</td>
<td>YK 7</td>
<td>373b2</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>aikyam</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### goal section

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PAIR</th>
<th>YK</th>
<th>gzhung-'grel</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>upadhi/anupadhi-śesam</td>
<td>YK 9</td>
<td>374a3</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>kalpanā nāsti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pugdalanaiaṁṛṛtyā/dharmanaiaṁṛṛtyā</td>
<td>YK 10</td>
<td>374b1</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>kalpanāya viviktatvaṇa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>śāścata/succheda</td>
<td>YK 6</td>
<td>374b5</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>prabhāya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>saṁvṛti/paramārtha</td>
<td>YK 13</td>
<td>375a5</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>samnīlanāṃ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>smṛti/asmrṛti</td>
<td>YK 17</td>
<td>375b6</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>nirmuktaḥ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>suptaḥ/prabuddha</td>
<td>YK 15</td>
<td>376b4</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>dvaya varjitam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kārya/kāraṇa</td>
<td>YK 19</td>
<td>377a2</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>abhinnaṃ svabhāvataḥ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>samādhāna/asamādhāna</td>
<td>YK 16</td>
<td>377a5</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>nāsti</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The imposition was imposed upon it, and it seems difficult to see how this can be generally and clearly distinguished from what happens in the “positive” cases. Similarly I have marked the fourth pair (grāhaya/grāhaka, object/subject) as positive because the verse describes them as non-different (abhinna, mi-phyped); but actually what is claimed to be non-different is not these things but the particular state of mind (buddhi, blo) relating (to) them in yuganaddha. In fact virtually any one of the pairs can be seen (sometimes with a little effort) as positive if one concentrates on the things referred to or mentioned or described, and negative if one concentrates on the descriptions. This shift of perspective can easily be experienced with the two examples just discussed. A case which one might think difficult to see as either positive or negative in this sense is that of the two satya; but there is no doubt that Padma Dkar-po thought it could be seen either way, as I have shown at some length elsewhere. A case which commonsense takes as ‘obviously’ negative is
rāga/arāga: how can opposites refer to the same thing? But this is precisely the mistake (leading to the nonsense of "unity of opposites," &c.). Of course desire and its opposite are not the same. But the paramāndra in which (according to the verse) both are absent ("negative version") is simply a state without either ("positive version"). There is nothing to distinguish the two versions other than what part of the description you concentrate on. (A lot of mysticism boils down to confusions of this kind.55) A case which commonsense takes as "obviously" positive is prajñā/upāya. Is it not obvious that in the buddha-mind (or whatever) prajñā and upāya are both present, in some sense? Of course; but (as in the rāga/arāga case), in order to see this case negatively one need only note that in general prajñā and upāya are not the same at all and that by insisting "prajñā, prajñā" one only drives out upāya, &c., so that the right kind of prajñā can arise only when we withhold the description, as the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras never weary of insisting; this is the negative version.56 The conclusion is clear: if the positive/negative distinction between the different pairs of things *integrated in yuganaddha has any significance at all, each case must be seen as regarded from some quite narrowly restricted point of view. If anything general can be said about these points of view, now is the time; unfortunately I have very little.57

It was suggested earlier that there seems to be little hope of distinguishing different kinds of yuganaddha on the basis of the different pairs (say, as characterized in the different verses). We can now see more clearly why this is, at least in individual cases. Consider again the first verse (Table 1) on samsāra/nirvāna. First take it negatively: we are required to distinguish some kind of samādhi solely on the basis of the absence of the notions of samsāra and nirvāna (say as against another kind individuated on the basis of the absence of the notions of rāga and arāga). It seems difficult to see how to do this; one is almost tempted to say: it is easy to see that it is impossible. Similarly on the positive interpretation of the samsāra/nirvāna verse: it is understood that "samsāra" and "nirvāna" describe the same world (as it were) and on this basis alone we are to distinguish some samādhi. It seems clearly impossible. It is not only that the characterization is much too slender; it seems to be of the wrong sort altogether. Similar remarks apply to taking the positive and negative interpretations together. Of course it is possible that a distinction may be set up when one or both of these interpretations is supplemented by some other information; but to claim this is to give up any claim to characterize anything on the basis of the verses. In any case, it seems pointless to pursue this possibility in relation to Padma Dkar-po, since nothing in his comments on these verses suggests anything remotely resembling a verse-by-verse distinction of this kind.

It seems that the usefulness of the positive/negative distinction among the pairs of *integrated items is likely to be fairly restricted. So we can perhaps sympathize with Padma Dkar-po's evident lack of in-
terest in pursuing systematically this distinction which he inherited from Rgyal-dbang-rje and from the earlier translators. If nevertheless we accept the limitation, we may record, as in Table 1, what seems, from the relevant point of view, to be the positive/negative character of each pair. When we do this, we notice something fairly striking. The ground section consists of pairs which seem easy to interpret either way, and the given interpretations are mixed up. The pairs of the path section are all positive except for rāga/arāga (I will try to explain the anomaly later). The goal section is virtually all negative apart from the important case of the two satya; but this is not surprising when we reflect that they generalize many of the items found in the path section.

Do the materials recorded in Table 1 suggest any other distinction between the ground, path and goal divisions? Two further points seem worth recording. First, the path verses do concern various parts of the path2 which are to be *integrated; this is especially clear with the first four. Second, there seems to be no such ground of distinction between the verses of the ground and goal divisions; this is strikingly illustrated by Padma Dkar-po’s use of the yuganaddha of the two satya both as the goal (in the Gzhung-’grel) and as the ground (in the Nges-don grub-pa’i shing-rtas).

So far in this subsection we have been considering the possible divisions of the yuganaddha section into ground, path and goal, or rather the possible sense behind the division given in the Gzhung-’grel. During this procedure we have taken for granted the position given to this section in the Gzhung-’grel as a whole, viz. that of the goal (strictly: graded emergence of the goal) of the path1 of the cig-car-ba, taken as a whole. Now we may recall what was hinted at in the introduction to Part I, viz. that the distinction or contrast suggested by these two remarks is not as clear as one might suppose. That is: the cig-car-ba has his ground, path2 and goal (viz. dngos-po’i gnas-lugs, lam2 and ‘bras-bu skye-ba’i rim-pa), and this goal section is further divided into ground, path and goal; and it is not at all clear that this second ground, path and goal are different from the first set, even though on a crude set-theoretic or bibliographical basis it would seem that they must be. I now want to set aside these set-theoretical and bibliographic considerations and review briefly how the subject matter of the goal1 (’bras-bu skye-ba’i rim-pa) in fact fits in with that of some of the earlier sections of the Gzhung-’grel.

When one examines the subject-matter at all carefully, it becomes clear that the topic of zung-’jug can easily be fitted into several places in the Gzhung-’grel besides the one it actually occupies. (The following observations can be clarified by using Appendix B.) In the ground section, zung-’jug could come under lus dngos-po’i gnas-lugs (especially in the section called mgon-par byang-chub-par gyur-pa’i rim-pa, 30b1); or it could come under sems dngos-po’i gnas-lugs, either in parallel with the
whole of the existing section, or as part of the subsection 'bras-bu phyag-rgya chen-po mgon-du 'gyur-ba, 128b3 ff. In the path section, it could come under virtually any of the eight main sections of the rdo-rje-rim (completion stage), viz. gtum-mo, las-kyi phyag-rgya &c. Guenther has rightly observed that the radiant light is the climax of the path. That doctrine, as we saw earlier,58 is itself divided into ground, path and goal; and the goal section, as set out in the Gzhung-'grel,59 is particularly closely related to the topic of zung-'jug. Now it is quite clear why Padma Dkar-po, in spite of all these considerations, put the goal section of the Gzhung-'grel where he did (viz. as the goal of the entire cig-car-ba section) and gave it the title which he did give it ('bras-bu skye-ba'i rim-pa). In both cases, the matter is decided already in the text upon which he is commenting, viz. the bka yang-dag-pa'i tshad-ma.60 The point of my observations is not that he ought to have put it somewhere else. It is rather that the structure of his materials and argumentation would have allowed him to have it in several different places; and this fact is consistent with the view that the different gzhi are all aspects of the same ground, the different 'bras-bu of the same goal, &c. It is much more difficult to reconcile the fact in question with the view that the different 'bras-bu sections are about different goals. And to this extent, that fact supports the first of these views against the second.61 Some further detail on this point will be presented below.

Since the 'bras-bu skye-ba'i rim-pa section of the Gzhung-'grel is quite complex, it would be tedious to pursue explicitly the parallels between it and the goal division of the radiant light section. But it may be worth setting out the parallel between the latter and what may be regarded as a summary of the former, viz. the zung-'jug section of the Rim-Ingar 'khrid-pa'62 After different introductory remarks, both passages give a short account63 of the mode of rising out of the radiant light64 including identical summaries of the "reversed"65 passage through the four lights, supported by identical quotations from the Caryāmelāpaka-pradīpa.66 The Rim-Ingar 'khrid-pa account then concludes with a summary of how this process differs for the cig-car-ba, thod-rgal-ba and rimgyis-pa67. The account under the radiant light concludes68 with a more detailed version of how this happens for the cig-car-ba, most of which occurs again in different bits of the 'bras-bu skye-ba'i rim-pa section, though not in detail; the reader can work this out for himself.69

Other than what has been said, I know of no general principles which clearly or explicitly underlie the division of the goal section of the Gzhung-'grel into its own ground, path and goal. It remains therefore to set down what is found in these three divisions. To do so will be, in a sense, to confront what was done in Part I with its proposed application to yuganaddha. The general discussion of the present subsection suggests that this application will take two different forms. In the first form, yuganaddha either is, or is closely related to, the goal as
set out in general terms in Part I. That there is such an application seems too obvious to need detailed argument, and I shall take what follows as an illustration of this application, regarded as already known to exist. But this is of course not the application for which most of the general discussion of this subsection has been the preparation. Rather, it has been preparation for the application, to the separate ground, path and goal divisions of the yuganaddha section, of the ground, path and goal notions in general; and here it is far from obvious or explicit that such an application is intended, apart from the rather indirect evidence already presented. It therefore seems best not to assume or to take for granted that there is such an application, but simply to present a selection of materials, in the hope that the suggestion may be found illuminating by the reader (as I personally feel it is illuminating). Thus Part I provides a set of notions which may well underlie the threefold division of the yuganaddha section, and Parts I and II may seem mutually illuminated by the idea of this application. Like so many other proposals made by scholars working in this and related fields, the value of the suggestion is perhaps best assessed in terms of its capacity to bring order to the complex materials under discussion.

II.2.2: SOME MATERIALS ON YUGANADDHA AS GROUND, PATH AND GOAL

The reader may find Table 1 a helpful summary of the main verses in the goal section of the Gzhung, and the following subsections will contain brief accounts of Padma Dkar-po’s comments on a selection of these verses. Textual extracts in Tibetan, corresponding roughly to these accounts, are given in Appendix C.

II.2.2.1: GROUND-YUGANADDHA

Saṃsāra/nirvāṇa (‘khor-ba, myang-’das)

After defining these terms, Padma Dkar-po says that when the discursiveness (spros-pa) which holds saṃsāra and nirvāṇa to be different has been abandoned, then no matter how one properly (yang-dag-par) analyses the samādhī of him who does this properly, since the artificial imposition of duality is broken up these things become one, and so one speaks of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa as *integrated.

The talk of two things becoming one is found already in the verse (see Appendix C: dngos-po gcig gyur-pa, ekībhāvah) and derives from a confusion between two things and two descriptions of a thing. In other
contexts Padma Dkar-po advises abandoning the conflation of these subsumed in the notion of a don spyi.

**Kleśa/bodhi (nyon-mongs, byang-chub)**

When the essence of kleśa is cognised, by that very fact it becomes thoroughly illuminated and this is bodhi. When they are inseparable, like water and ice, kleśa is made the path and this is called srid-zhi zung-'jug.

Of course Padma Dkar-po’s remark applies only to the cig-car-ba.70

**Grāhya/grāhaka (gsung-ba, 'dzin-pa)**71

To claim that there is a substance (dngos-po) involves the judgement (rtog-pa) that it has qualities (rnam-pa-dang-bcas-pa); to claim that there is no substance (dngos-med) is to base it on emptiness. These errors occur through taking what is to be seen (bla-byas) as an object (gsung-ba) and what sees it (lta-byed) as a subject ('dzin-pa). When one rises beyond these errors into the sphere of pratyātmādhigamajñāna (so-so rang-rig-pa'i ye-shes), the object (yul) which is appearance rises as gangs from the sphere of the void, and the owner of the object (yul-can) understands rnam-shes (vijnana) as rang-rig-pa'i ye-shes, and one speaks of snang-stong zung-'jug and rnam-shes dang ye-shes zung-'jug.72

II.2.2.2: PATH-YUGANADDHA

**Utpattikrama/utpannakrama (bskyed-rim, rdzogs-rim)**

When non-dual awareness occurs at the time of the utpattikrama,73 it has the same pure taste as the awareness of the diety in its own unborn incessancy (gangs), and this making the two stages non-dual is called their *integration.

**Pinḍagraha/anubheda (ril-por 'dzin-pa, rjes-su gzhig-pa)**

To destroy74 the illusory body75 all at once is pinḍagraha; to destroy vessel and contents76 separately is anubheda. To enter the void, to stay in the radiant light, and to rise from it as the pure and illusory (body) in this way is all done to bring about the rising of the radiant light, and since when this is done there is no movement away from the gshis,77 the sphere of the radiant light, there is snang-stong zung-'jug.

**Svādhīṣṭhāna/prabhāśvara (bdag byin-brlabs, 'od-gsal)**

When the depth of mind as a feature78 is not made manifest by anything (else)79 it is abhisambodhi. What is fit to be the example for all clarity is the svādhīṣṭhāna-diety. When that clarity generates it-
self unhindered from that depth, and that depth enlightens that clarity, there is gsal-stong zung-’jug.80

Prajñopāya (thabs dang shes-rab)
Here upāya is the white dharma of charity &c. while prajñā stands for prajñāpāramitā. To abide in any great realization which acts by grasping all the other pāramitās with an essenceless prajñā is prajñopañayayuganaddha.81

Śūnyatā/karunā (stong-nyid, snying-rje)
The object or the basis is the sixteen voidnesses, and the subject or what is based on the former is the sixteen compassions. When one knows the path on which subject and object or basis and what is based on it are indivisible, one enters upon action out of desire &c., and this is called Śūnyatakarunayuganaddha. By this desire one cultivates the opposite of the path of action out of great desire, and so it is called a buddhagocara.

II.2.2.3: GOAL-YUGANADDHA

Śāśvatocchāda (rtag-pa dang chad-pa)
To view (things as) existent is eternalism; to view things as non-existent is nihilism. By whatever word(s) one gets rid of all attachment to the extremes (mtha) of existence, non-existence, and lack of either of these, one consecrates the madhyamaka path in which one does not fall into any extremes, and the wise know this as the yuganaddhakrama itself. Any other explanation of “lack of extremes” which really contains attachment to some extreme represents a failure to understand the character of yuganaddha.

Samvṛti/paramārtha (kun-rdzob, don-dam)
This case is discussed at great length in my paper (1983a).

Supta/prabuddha (gnyid, gnyid sad-pa)
Here “sleep” (gnyid) means the stage of un-knowing, while to wake up (gnyid sad-pa) means a one-sided knowing. The state of neither sleep nor waking is that where one has unequivocally and permanently risen up (sangs-pa) from this sleep of un-knowing. It is like a lotus flower upon which a bird sits (?) as if upon a broad (rgyas-pa) field, and so an awareness which cognises everything cognisable is called broad. When these two are “integrated (zung-du ’jug-pa) there is buddhahood (sangs-rygas).

Kārya/kāraṇa (bya-ba, byed-pa)
Since this yuganaddha82 is the essence (bdag-nyid) of all the good of others, action and agent are inseparable.
II.3 Yuganaddha revisited

One may well feel that the account of *yuganaddha* given so far is lacking in something. Part I dealt with ground, path and goal in general, illustrating the great importance, for Padma-Dkar-po, of the notion of *dnogs-po’i gnas-lugs*. So far, Part II has presented a variety of facts about *yuganaddha* and some of Padma Dkar-po’s explanations of the Gzhung verses on it, without, one might feel, really saying what it is; and in another sense, the notions of ground, path and goal have perhaps been plausibly applied to *something*, but one is not quite sure what. (This is at any rate my personal reaction to the account in the Gzhung-’grel.)

Really, we still need a general account of *yuganaddha*. Now, in addition to three accounts divided into ground, path and goal in the way we have seen, Padma Dkar-po has given several general accounts, but they are too brief and cryptic for a reader who does not already have some partial grasp of his idea of *yuganaddha*, such as is provided by the materials already surveyed; these illustrate the general accounts, which in their turn enable us to see what lies behind the more specific ones. In this section I will extract from the general accounts, especially the one in the *Phyag-chen gan-mdzod*, a synthetic general account which I hope will fill the gap. Padma Dkar-po is a quite a-historicist writer, in that he hardly ever defines his position on anything by refuting the views of earlier writers (as, say, Tsong-kha-pa so often does); but on difficult matters like this one he has sometimes clarified his views by contrasting them with those of others. Later I will show him doing this; to start off with, it seems a good idea to mimic the procedure by saying a few things about what his notion of *yuganaddha* is not, especially in relation to some of the proposed translations mentioned in section II.1.

There seems to be nothing mystical about *yuganaddha*, and the materials surveyed give no reason to translate it by “the union of opposites” (Guenther). For instance, *rāgārāgayuganaddha*, far from being the union of *rāga* and its opposite *arāga*, is something lacking in both. Nor is *yuganaddha* a logical relationship such as “coincidence” (Guenther). (It is almost too obvious to be worth saying that it is not a matter of logic that action and agent are *integrated in *yuganaddha*. And even if “coincidence” is not taken as a logical term, it is really obvious that it cannot, other than metaphorically, to cases such as *rāga*/ *arāga* and *pudgalanairātmyā/dharmanairātmyā*. Similarly for “identity”.) Again, *yuganaddha* is supposed to transcend various specific dualities, and perhaps all dualities whatever, but that does not mean that it is something transcendent in the sense of being beyond experience. In particular, it does not seem at all like Kant’s “intelligible intuition”.
It may be worth examining a little more closely the claim that *yuganaddha* is part of experience. First, it is not claimed that it is a part of ordinary everyday experience (for no *samādhi* is). Second, the claim is not that it constitutes some kind of (necessary? Kantian?) *ground* of experience. Thirdly, the claim is not that it is some fundamental kind of experience from which all others are *derivative* in some sense. The status of *yuganaddha* as experience begins with the observation, much too neglected by everybody writing on the subject, that it is a *samādhi* (II.1). No claim is made that this *samādhi* is totally without concepts; but what is important to see now is that even a *samādhi* which was totally lacking in concepts would not thereby be removed from experience, any more than a similar dream would be. Such a dream might perhaps be seen by us as an *uninteresting* part of experience, because not connected with the rest in the right ways. But Buddhists do not see this lack of connection as making such experiences uninteresting, indeed the very opposite (hence the interest in dream as one of the six topics of Nāropa and in other ways). The claim, then, is that Padma Dkar-po’s notion of *yuganaddha* is consistent with our interpreting it as a kind of experience, a *samādhi* experienced perhaps under unusual conditions of meditation, *abhiṣeka* &c. or by unusually gifted people, but in no way *radically* different from other experiences enjoyed by perfectly ordinary people.

Guenther has frequently used the word “unity” for *yuganaddha* (see note 3); the points made in the last few paragraphs are sufficient reason for rejecting it as a quasi-literal translation, but I find it not without appeal as a metaphor (cf. note 90). What is this appeal based on? Attempts to expand it into such phrases as “unity of experience” and “experience of unity” seem to lead to nothing. I think some kind of case might be made out for it if it were made clear that it is a metaphor; Guenther never does this. But even then, its appeal seems to be mainly a matter of its vague suggestion of a combination of mysticism and logic; and since we now have good reasons for rejecting each of these as irrelevant, we may feel able to reject the combination.

Earlier we noted that Wayman’s translations of *yuganaddha* are all based on the idea of combining two things together. Though to some degree this is intended to reflect the view of Tsong-kha-pa, it does not reflect any difference in the Tibetan phrases *zung-du ’jug-pa* and *zung-du ’brel-ba* used to translate *yuganaddha*. Phrases like “pair combined” and “pair united” might qualify as literal translations of *zung-du ’brel-ba* but hardly of *zung-du ’jug-pa*. Neither the Sanskrit *yuganaddha* nor the Tibetan *zung-du ’jug-pa* is a colloquial expression with an obvious natural sense, and the analysis into *yuga* + *naddha* and into *zung-du* + *’jug-pa* yields nothing literal because in both cases the second component has no “natural” sense related to these translations (viz. “pair combined,” &c.). (Just this fact is reflected in Padma Dkar-po’s own ac-
count of the analysis, given in II.1 above.) So really the suggestion that Wayman’s translations are literal will not stand up to serious analysis and can itself be no more than metaphorical. Let us ignore for the moment the possibility that these translations are themselves metaphorical. If we do so, their value must be seen as resting not on any analysis of the words yuganaddha and zung-’jug, but rather on the degree to which these words as wholes are as a matter of fact used in the sense of “pair combined”, &c. Now on the negative interpretation of the verses, such a claim would be simply ridiculous; it can rest only on the positive interpretation; and this involves us with all the difficulties that arise from the easy shift between the two styles of interpretation, to which attention was drawn in section II.2.1. But with this (serious) reservation, the claim is not without merit; it works moderately well (as far as the verses are concerned) for most of the path section (see Table 1) and also for the important case of the two satya. To say this is not to say that it gives the complete sense of the word yuganaddha as used here (for instance it omits the samādhi element) but it does at least give a central element. It turns out, however, that this element is more central for Tsong-kha-pa than it is for Padma Dkar-po.

So far we have not exploited the striking fact (see Table 1) that most of the important Gzhung verses on yuganaddha come from the Pañcakrama. Now in the Gzhung-’grel and his other works on bsre-’pho, Padma Dkar-po makes much use of notions from the Guhyasamāja cycle, especially in relation to the structuring of the various practices. He also makes much of the idea that the five krama, the four mudra, and the sādāŋgyaṅa give rise to alternative structures for what are essentially the same repertoires of sampannakrama practices in the Guhyasamāja, Hevajra, Cakraśaṃvara, Kālacakra and other tantras. So it is perhaps surprising that he interprets the yuganaddha verses not in the style of the father class of tantras (of which the Guhyasamāja is the chief) but in the style of the mother class. Before going on to the details of this, it is important to be clear that the difference has nothing to do with yuganaddha being samādhi or not; for instance the description of it as samādhi which opens the ’bras-bu skye-ba’i rim-pa section of the Gzhung-’grel is in a verse from the Vajramāla, a father-tantra (indeed, an ākhyā-tantra of Guhyasamāja). Even so, says Padma Dkar-po, the full sense of yuganaddha is not revealed in the father-tantras. More generally, the Gzhung receives the name Dākinī-upadeśa (Mkha-’gro-ma’i man-ngag) because it is the dākinīs who, in the mother-tantra, establish fully yet briefly what is hidden in the father-tantras. This remark is supported by a verse from the Dākārṇavatāntara (belonging to the mother class) running, “Confidence in the father-tantras comes from understanding the mother-tantras.” Accordingly Padma Dkar-po treats the yuganaddha verses as mother-tantra, whereas Tsong-kha-pa, taking them from the Pañcakrama, of course treats them as father-tantra.
Thus we may expect a difference between the two authors in their styles of interpretation. In order to understand what to expect, we need to know that the differences do not stem merely from general disagreement about the distinction between the father and mother tantras; this point needs careful consideration because prima facie their views do seem to be rather different and because Tsong-kha-pa’s views have not been well-handled in the literature.

Bu-ston and Padma Dkar-po concentrate mainly on listing the various distinctions that are found in the tantras themselves. Bu-ston thought that there are three kinds of Anuttarayogatantras (father, mother, and non-dual), a view he inherited from the Sa-skya school. Padma Dkar-po follows Tsong-kha-pa in holding that there are only two (father and mother). Tsong-kha-pa’s attack on the earlier authors is directed mainly at this view of three classes, but at the same time he sought to replace the rather unclear collection of distinctions given by Bu-ston with a single general rule which would apply even to the doubtful cases and would provide a criterion for the clearer ones. Tsong-kha-pa sought this rule at the point of greatest interest, which also happens to be the point which concerns us, viz. the structure of the sampannakrama. (He is amusingly sarcastic on the uselessness of a rule based, say, on differences in the number of heads and arms of the dieties.) He states the rule and summarizes the argument behind it as follows:

"The explanation of the well-established opinion on the distinction of the anuttarayogatantras as prajñā and upāya, as given in the Vajrapaṇjāratantra &c.

"How indeed should one distinguish them as father and mother tantras? Though it is generally held that they are to be distinguished through their utpattikrama cycle, really the difference is mainly one of the sampannakrama. If we take bliss and emptiness (bde-stong) as means and insight (thabs-shes, upāya and prajñā) respectively, individual tantras cannot be distinguished; all must be called non-dual as above.

In the present context this distinction cannot be maintained, either generally or in detail. For in what are accepted by everybody as mother-tantras, such as Hevajra, mainly bliss is taught, but not in the Guhyasamājā &c., so there would be the absurdity that the Hevajra would be a father- and the Guhyasamājā a mother-tantra.

"Thus as far as the distinction of upāya-tantra and prajñā-tantra by means of the sampannakrama goes, prajñā must mean paramārtha-mahāsukha-jnāṇā, while upāya must mean saṃvṛti-māyādeha. Of these points, the first is about the mother-tantras and is found in the 13th chapter of the Vajrapaṇjāra:

'Prajñāpāramitā as means is called yogini;
Entry into tatvo by union (with) mahāmudra
Is called yogini-tantra.'"
Tsong-kha-pa then explains in more detail how this verse is to be understood in terms of the descent and ascent of bodhicitta, &c. This brilliant and thoroughly convincing piece of analysis is ruined by Mkhhas-grub-rje\textsuperscript{103} by the omission of most of the important points and the general vagueness and equivocation in what remains. (Given this unpromising material, it is not surprising that Lessing and Wayman’s translation is incomprehensible; but they make matters worse by their indifference to the meanings of the technical terms.) Now Tsong-kha-pa’s analysis is brilliant; but it leads straight to the conclusion desired by Padma Dkar-po, namely that the rule is intelligible only if the terms \textit{prajñā} and \textit{upāya} are taken in the mother-tantra sense, standing respectively for bliss and emptiness. For Padma Dkar-po this last point is very natural, since he regards the basic emptiness not as \textit{svabhāva-sūnyatā} but as \textit{sarvākāra-vacanapeta-sūnyatā} which is \textit{samvṛti-satya} (not paramārtha as with the Jo-nang-pas) and is means (\textit{upāya}) and which describes the diety, just as in the first line of the verse. \textit{Paramārtha} here is great bliss. Padma Dkar-po follows Bu-ston in his statement of the \textit{sampannakrama} distinction:\textsuperscript{104}

“\textit{The mother-tantras show entry into \textit{tattva} by the union (\textit{sbyor-bas}) of \textit{prajñāpāramitā-upāya} in \textit{mahāmudrā}. The father-tantras mainly show the \textit{svādhīṣṭhānakrama} and \textit{abhisambodhikrama}.”}

The first of these remarks reflects the language of the \textit{Vajrapañjara} verse (which they and everybody else quote) while the second comes from a verse from the \textit{Dākārnava\textit{tantra}} which is also quoted by everybody. Of course Bu-ston and Padma Dkar-po list many other modes of distinction which are not accepted by Tsong-kha-pa, but these are irrelevant here; it is obvious from Padma Dkar-po’s discussion in the \textit{Phyag-chen\textsuperscript{105} gan-mdzod} that it was this particular point about the \textit{sampannakrama} that he had in mind when describing Tsong-kha-pa’s treatment as \textit{pha’i lugs}, and not the others. Padma Dkar-po also appears to follow Bu-ston in describing the distinctions between father- and mother-tantras as provisional (\textit{drang-don, neyārtha}) whereas ultimately or really (\textit{nges-don-du}) all the anuttarayogatantras are non-du-al as between \textit{prajñā} and \textit{upāya}. Tsong-kha-pa does not make this point. But this appearance of difference is an illusion, since Padma Dkar-po’s use of these terms differs from that of Bu-ston and Tsong-kha-pa somewhat.\textsuperscript{106} All Padma Dkar-po means is that the more advanced person will understand the ultimate purpose (\textit{mthar-thug-gi don}) without all this explanation, while the somewhat less advanced person needs to supplement the father-tantra with the mother-tantra, as explained above. (The least advanced person cannot go further than what the father-tantras strictly and literally say, and part of Padma Dkar-po’s complaint is that Tsong-kha-pa does not appear to offer more than this.)\textsuperscript{107}
Roughly speaking, then, the two authors agreed that the father-tantras concentrate more on the separate stages of the *sampannakrama* practices, while the mother-tantras tend to prefer a more unified or holistic approach. Hence the phrase "fully yet briefly" (*tshig nyungsngus zhib-mor*) mentioned a few paragraphs ago in connection with the phrase Đakini-upadeśa. And now, taking the last few paragraphs together, we can see part of what, in Padma Dkar-po’s view, lies behind his differences with Tsong-kha-pa over *yuganaddha*. For Padma Dkar-po, the notion of *yuganaddha* is to be understood in a unified or holistic way, the analysis into pairs and their modes of combination being secondary and relatively unimportant. For Tsong-kha-pa the notion is one of combination, the constituents being as it were primary and their combination, as a product of those constituents, secondary. More generally, for Padma Dkar-po what is primary is the buddha-knowledge (*sangs-rgyas-kyi ye-shes*) or sāraṇajñāna (*lhan-cig skies-pa'i ye-shes*). This corresponds roughly to the anuloma (*lugs 'byung-ba*) approach. For Tsong-kha-pa (as Padma Dkar-po sees him) what is primary are the components, say the two *satya* or the two *krama*, and it is only when these are known separately (cf. YK13) that they can then be combined in *yuganaddha*. This corresponds roughly to the pratiloma (*lugs ldog-pa*) approach.

Now we can see why the translations of *yuganaddha* proposed by Wayman are so much less unsatisfactory for Tsong-kha-pa than for Padma Dkar-po. They reflect precisely the emphasis on analysis as against a holistic view, on the pratiloma as against the anuloma, on the father against the mother tantra, of which it might be excessive to say that they run right through Tsong-kha-pa’s way of thinking, but which certainly seem to inform his style of exposition.

Two aspects of Padma Dkar-po’s view of *yuganaddha* should be seen in relation to his discussion of Tsong-kha-pa. First, there is the primacy of the combination over its terms (or rather the claim that *yuganaddha* is not just a combination of terms). Second, there are proper and improper ways of combining the terms. Really these two cannot be cleanly separated. When one still thinks mainly in terms of combining two things, there is *sāikṣayuganaddha*. When the question of combining two terms no longer arises because they are seen and known as aspects of a single situation, there is *aśaikṣayuganaddha*. But these two also cannot be cleanly separated, for two reasons. First, as already mentioned, *sāikṣayuganaddha* already is the real thing, as far as it goes; and second, if the mode of combination is wrong we do not even have *sāikṣayuganaddha*, we just have a mistake. To put it another way, *sāikṣa* is *aśaikṣa*, only seen in the father-tantra way, while *aśaikṣa* is *sāikṣa*, seen in the mother-tantra way. As so often, the mistake is to treat a relational difference or a difference in points of view as a difference of two distinct items. When one reads Padma Dkar-po’s discus-
sion of Tsong-kha-pa, one tends to be more impressed by his points about the modes of combination because there are more of them and they are more detailed and seem easier to grasp; but the point about the father-tantra is there explicitly\(^\text{110}\) and indeed without it the details do not make sense.

Let us consider some of these details for the case of svādhīṣṭhāna/prabhāsvara. Padma Dkar-po’s own view, given in the Gzhung-grel, is found above, under path-yuganaddha. He uses the description in terms of depth and clarity in a similar way in at least five other places\(^\text{111}\) (twice quoting Nāropa, in fact from the Sekoddeśatiśā, and once in the Vimalaprabhā; apparently this line of thought comes from the Kālacakra-tantra). In all these materials Padma Dkar-po is unrelenting in his insistence that the two elements cannot be separated.\(^\text{112}\) But he says that Tsong-kha-pa, after quoting the verse, says that the illusory body which is samvṛti and svādhīṣṭhāna, and the radiant light which is paramārtha are two halves, and when these are inseparably merged (‘dus-pa), that level is called zung ‘jug.\(^\text{113}\) Padma Dkar-po’s own phrase for what happens is “not two in (its) nature” (gnyis-su med-pa’i rang-bzhin\(^\text{114}\)). These examples illustrate what I called the difference in point of view, the difference between the father- and mother-tantra styles of explanation.

Now for some of the specific differences on the mode of combination. Tsong-kha-pa continues by saying that since zung ‘jug cannot be understood unless the two halves have been understood, he will go on to explain them (I omit this). Now in the abhisambodhikrama there is no illusory body, while in the svādhīṣṭhānakrama there is no radiant light.\(^\text{115}\) It is because these appear alternately that there is no yuganaddha\(^\text{116}\) (and because of this it would be irrelevant to take the previous remark as being about the practices rather than what appears in them). But when the forward (anuloma) and backward (pratiloma) processes of going in and out of the radiant light go on at the same time,\(^\text{117}\) so that the essence (ngo-bo; rūpa?) of the two is (are?) inseparable\(^\text{118}\) there is yuganaddha.

We know by now that Padma Dkar-po will see this whole approach as misconceived: far from zung ‘jug not being understood until the two halves are understood, they cannot be understood except in relation to it. But now I want to concentrate on what he has to say about the mode of combination. Zung ‘jug, Padma Dkar-po says,\(^\text{119}\) is not simply the merging, according to the method of the father-tantra, of two different items like the two horns of an ox. In any case, these two items are too dissimilar to merge in the way suggested by the analogy. They are even mutually repugnant; for since samāhita (mnyam-bzhag) is, on this view, without appearances, there can be no samvṛti in it,\(^\text{120}\) and vice-versa. Similarly, if aśaiksāyuganaddha arose through complete purification by entering the radiant light by means of piṇḍagraha and anubheda,
then samvrti-satya, being impure, could not belong to it (and there is a contradiction).\textsuperscript{121} So for Padma Dkar-po, the mode of combination (in this class of cases) is not the merging of two quite different (even repugnant) items; the two items have to suit one another, as it were. In this case he ensures this by demanding that samvrti-satya (of which the svādhiṣṭhānakrama is a particular case) contains purified appearances,\textsuperscript{122} rather than impure ones, as with Tsong-kha-pa. (In the language of Part I, samvrti-satya is part of dngos-po'i gnas-lugs). Again, for Padma Dkar-po, paramārtha-satya contains purified appearances\textsuperscript{123} rather than being merely empty of content. We see here Padma Dkar-po combining something like the three levels of satya used by Bhāvaviveka\textsuperscript{124} (i.e. samvrti and paryāya- and nisparāya-paramārtha) with the three levels used by Candrakīrti (samvrti-mātra, and samvrti- and paramārtha-satya).\textsuperscript{125}

The point that the *integrated items have to suit one another in the first place illustrates again the overriding importance for Padma Dkar-po of the combination over its constituents. Also the notion of yuganaddha does not seem to contain within itself any single or unified notion of a mode of combination; the different pairs are combined together in different ways (to give the right kind of result, as it were). (This point tends to be masked by the concentration of attention on the two satya and their instances.) Each of these points shows separately that for Padma Dkar-po there is no such thing as yuganaddha considered mainly as a relational concept (in abstraction from its other elements). The various pairs, considered merely as related, do not in their being related have anything more in common than their merely being related; and of course this is not enough to form even the basis of the notion of yuganaddha as the goal of Vajrayāna. This point is apt to be obscured by the importance of the constituents, in the cases usually discussed (samsāra/nirvāṇa, the two satya, the illusory body and the radiant light). One goes along with the vague idea, encouraged by the current translations and perhaps by Tsong-kha-pa’s treatment, that these things only have to be seen as related in the right way, and the task is completed. But a glance at some of the other cases (rāga/arāga, piṇḍagraha/anubheda &c.) is enough to see that this is an illusion, that the different “relationships” have nothing in common and that the nub of the idea must be somewhere quite different. I suggested that Tsong-kha-pa’s treatment encourages the illusion, but I am far from certain that he himself succumbed to it; the encouragement comes from his reliance on the father-tantras. This is of course Padma Dkar-po’s very first point (cf. note 119); it should not be allowed to detract from the sharpness of his criticisms about the mode of combination.
Perhaps the time has come to say briefly why I prefer Seyfort Ruegg’s choice of “integration” over all the other suggested translations of \textit{yuganaddha}, \textit{zung-	extasciitilde{}jug}. “Integration” seems to cover well the “merging” (\textit{dus-pa}) attributed to Tsong-kha-pa; and for Padma Dkar-po, “Integration-\textit{sam\textasciitilde{}dhi}” seems to be the right kind of metaphor to convey the idea behind \textit{zung-	extasciitilde{}jug-gi ting-nge-	extasciitilde{}dzin}, as he used this phrase. Integration is a kind of action (in the broadest possible sense); “integration-\textit{sam\textasciitilde{}dhi}” suggests a \textit{sam\textasciitilde{}dhi} in which various different kinds of viewpoint are, well, integrated; and I think this metaphor is about the best we can expect. (Because it \textit{is} a metaphor, and not one naturally suggested by our own cultural context, I like to keep the asterisk: *integration.) This paper has not dealt with the Sa-skya view of \textit{zung-	extasciitilde{}jug}; but I suspect it will be covered by the proposal, as being somewhere in between the two views just mentioned.\textsuperscript{126}

Earlier I mentioned that “pair-combined” \&c. might perhaps also be intended to be read as metaphors. Well, perhaps they might. But I think it is clear by now that the suggestive power of this and similar phrases will not accomplish anything presently relevant which is not accomplished by their literal meaning.\textsuperscript{127}

* * * * * * * * * * 

At the end of section II.2.1, I suggested that the application to the notion of \textit{yuganaddha} of the ideas of Part I might be expected to take two forms. First, \textit{yuganaddha} is itself the goal; and second, being divided into ground, path and goal, it might be expected to illustrate this division as discussed in general in Part I.

There are plenty of illustrations of the first form of application. One example: the radiant light is the climax of the path, and its path-\textit{section} describes the meditation techniques of \textit{pindagraha} and \textit{anubheda} (\textit{ril-	extasciitilde{}dzin} and \textit{rjes-gzhig}). In the path-division of \textit{yuganaddha} we again find these two techniques, about which the verse says that when they, together with the three phases of entering, staying in and rising from the radiant light, become identical, there is \textit{yuganaddha}; and we saw Padma Dkar-po explain this by saying that they become identical inasmuch as there is no movement away from the radiant light. Thus the \textit{specific} techniques described as part of the radiant light doctrine have as their \textit{specific} goal or culmination what is described under the same heading in \textit{yuganaddha}. Similar remarks can be made about other aspects of \textit{yuganaddha}, as correlated with the culmination or the goal of other parts of the path.

The example mentioned also illustrates the second form of application. For \textit{pindagraha/anubheda} is (part of) \textit{yuganaddha as the path}, and this is the culmination of what is described under the radiant light as
the path (in both senses of this phrase). Similarly, when all the other things which fall under the two satya have been *integrated, nothing more remains to be done and the goal has been attained, and so the yuganaddha of the two satya as the goal in general coincides with the goal of the various path-parts of yuganaddha (falling themselves, of course, under the satya). It is easy to give more illustrations of this theme.

These two different ways of looking at pinḍagraha/anubheda can be summarized in a rather slogan-like way thus: The culmination of the path is the path-aspect of the culmination. And along these lines we can see the two applications to yuganaddha of the ground/path/goal distinction as reflecting a single vision in two different ways.

* * * * * * * *

When stripped of the accretions imposed upon them by Western authors, the doctrines discussed in this paper emerge as rational (though not rationalistic) and sensible (though not commonsensical). I think this becomes clearer when we look at the sources of the remaining obscurities. One very fundamental thing not explained here is the notion of a non-discursive cognition or knowledge (nirvikałpajñāna, nrm-pa mi-rto-g-pa'i ye-shes), upon which depend Padma Dkar-po's conception of paramārtha-satya and of dngos-po'i gnas-lugs and also that part of the radiant light doctrine needed for our present purposes.\(^{128}\) Another thing which remains obscure is how it comes about that a person who has attained yuganaddha then goes on to all the siddhi of mahāmudra, including all the buddha's powers and qualities, especially the ethically important power of effortless (lhun-grub) action &c. However only the connection of yuganaddha with buddhahood depends on these siddhi, not the notion of yuganaddha itself. In my view the complete notion of buddhahood does have something transcendental about it (cf. tathāgata) but whatever it is, it is to be explained in terms of yuganaddha and not vice-versa, at least as far as Padma Dkar-po is concerned. More important, both nirvikałpajñāna and the buddha's powers and qualities form an integral part of the Mahāyāna as a whole; neither they nor any obscurity or mysteriousness in them have anything specific to do with Tibetan thought or with the tantras. Apart from whatever support he draws from these two general features of the Mahāyāna, then, Padma Dkar-po's accounts of tantra as continuity, of the three tantras of ground, path and goal, and of yuganaddha, seem rational enough. And their difficulties, such as they are, can be considered independently of the obscurities, much greater in my view, of the six topics of Nāropa, the cosmological aspects of the doctrine,\(^{129}\) the (perhaps psychological) doctrine of manomāyākāya, and many other matters.
Because of these further obscurities, it may be too early to suggest that Tibetan thought *in general* and Vajrayāna thought *in general* may not have quite that special degree of obscurity and mysteriousness which they often seem to have in Western accounts. Be that as it may, here I have shown how to understand some of the leading conceptions of one of Tibet’s most important Vajrayāna writers as little *more* obscure or mysterious than certain well-known features of the whole Mahāyāna.

*** *** ***

[For Appendix A, see Part I]

*** *** ***
APPENDIX B

PADMA DKAR-PO’S BSRE-PHO WORKS:
OUTLINE OF THE SA-BCAD

gang 'jug-pa rten-gyi gang-zag, 8a4::5a5
gang-du 'jug-pa'i lam-la gnyis
cig-car-du 'jug-pa'i lam-la gnyis
bsdus-pa'i don, 10b5::6a2 (given in Appendix A)
mngon-par rtogs-pa gtan-la dbab-pa-la gsum
dngos-po'i gnas-lugs-la gnyis
lus dngos-po'i gnas-lugs-la gnyis
rags-rim-nas ngos-bzung*, 14b1::7b5
phra-rim gtan-la dbab-pa-la bzhi
lus ji-ltar grub-pa'i tshul, 24b1::c.8a3
rtsa dngos-po'i gnas-lugs, 45a6::10b1
rlung dngos-po'i gnas-lugs, 74a3::11b5
byang-sems dngos-po'i gnas-lugs, 97b4::13a4
sems dngos-po'i gnas-lugs-la gsum
gzhi phyag-rgya chen-po gtan-la dbab, 115a2::14b1
lam phyag-rgya chen-po nyams-su blang, 120a4::15a3
'bras-bu phyag-rgya chen-po mngon-du 'gyur-ba, 128b3::15b3

lam-la gnyis
smin-byed-kyi dbang, 129b6::16a6
grol-bar byed-pa'i lam-la gnyis
rim gnyis bsgom-tshul spyir-bshad*, 142a6::17a6
mngon-par rtogs-pa so-sor gtan-la dbab-pa-la gnyis
bskyed-rim, 147b4:18a4
rdzogs-rim-la-gnyis
mdor-bstan*, 164a2::19a3
rgyas-bshad-la brgyad
gtum-mo lam-gyi gzhI-ma, 179b6::20a6
las-rgya lam-gyi 'bogs-don, 278b2::x
sgyu-lus lam-gyi srog-zhing, 310a6::77a5
rmi-lam lam-gyi drod-tshad, 324b1::87b4
'od-gsal lam-gyi snying-po, 331a1::94b6
bar-do lam-gyi blo-chod, 345b6::108a4
'pho-ba lam-gyi bsun-ma, 360b6::119b3
grong-'jug lam-gyi 'thud-ma, 368a4::133b3
'bras-bu skye-ba'ba'i rim-pa-la gsum
lta-ba rnam-dag zung-'jug-gi ting-nge-'dzin bslab-tshul-la gsum
gzhi zung-'jug rtogs-tshul, 370a5::136a4
lam zung-'jug bsgom-tshul, 372a3::136b3
'bras-bu zung-'jug 'char-tshul, 374a3::137a1
sgom-pa rnam-dag zung-'jug-gi ting-nge-'dzin bslab-tshul, x::137b4
spyod-pa rnam-dag zung-'jug-gi ting-nge-'dzin bslab-tshul-la gnyis
chags-can-gyi spyod-pa, x::138b1
chags-bral-gyi spyod-pa, x::139b5
rim-gyis 'jug-pa'i lam, 378b3::x
APPENDIX C

SOME VERSES ON YUGANADDHA, WITH EXTRACTS FROM PADMA Dkar-po’S COMMENTS ON THEM.

The verses are headed by the Sanskrit words used in Table 1 and in sec. II.2.2. Each heading is followed by the verse itself (as Padma Dkar-po quotes it from the Gzhung), and then, following the ligature *, an extract from Padma Dkar-po’s commentary (cf. II.2.2).

Bibliographic information may be found in Table 1.

Samsāra/nirvāṇa

(The sections marked * contain especially useful summaries of the reasons why the sections following them are organized as shown here.)
Kleśa/bodhi

Grāhya/grāhaka [and sākāra/nirākāra]
Utpattikrama/uptpannakrama

བོས་པའི་དོན་དོན་གཞི་གཞི་པི་། འཇིག་དང་ཤེས་བོ་
པོ་ཞིས་པར། རིགས་པའི་དུས་ཐིག་བུ་། རི་མ་
ཞེས་པ་དང་བཟའ་ན། འཇིག་དོན་དོན་གཞི་
ནོ། རིགས་པའི་དོན་དོན་གཞི་གཞི་པི་།
Svādhiṣṭāna/prabhāsvara

Pīṇḍagraha/anubheda

M. BROIDO
Prajñopāya

སོ་བས་སེམས་དཔའ་མཐེན་པར། ། སོ་བས་

དམ་པོ་གཞི་བཞག་པ་མ་ཞིག་པ་དེ། ། སོ་བས་

རྒྱལ་མི་དེ་བུ་དུས་པར་བརྙན། ། སོ་བས་

སོགས་བཞིན་བཞིན་ཟིང་ཟིང་། སོ་བས་བཞིན་བཞིན་

དམ་པོ་གཞི་བཞག་པ་སོ་བས་པར་བཞིན་བཞིན་

བཞག་པ་མ་ཞིག་པ་དེ། ། སོ་བས་

གཞི་བཞིན་བཞིན་ཟིང་ཟིང་། སོ་བས་བཞིན་བཞིན་

དམ་པོ་གཞི་བཞག་པ་སོ་བས་པར་བཞིན་བཞིན་

བཞག་པ་མ་ཞིག་པ་དེ། ། སོ་བས་

གཞི་བཞིན་བཞིན་ཟིང་ཟིང་། སོ་བས་བཞིན་བཞིན་

དམ་པོ་གཞི་བཞག་པ་སོ་བས་པར་བཞིན་བཞིན་

བཞག་པ་མ་ཞིག་པ་དེ། ། སོ་བས་
Śūnyatā/karuṇā

M. BROIDO 37

कृतं जीवं दृष्टि विज्ञायते । विज्ञायते भवं नृत्येऽपि।
हृदया ैश्वर्यविद्यामर्भते । विज्ञायते।
सवस्तविषयामयो विज्ञायते । विज्ञायते।

कथा कृतं जीवं भवस्वयमविद्यते । विज्ञायते भवं नृत्येऽपि।
पुष्पमात्रां जनो जनो विद्यते । विज्ञायते।
विज्ञायते विषयामिश्रणरूपः ॥ कल्याणः
श्रेणिविज्ञायते भवं नृत्येऽपि। विज्ञायते।

ध्यानं करं जीवं विद्यते । विज्ञायते भवं नृत्येऽपि।
विज्ञायते ज्ञातं ज्ञातं विद्यते । विज्ञायते।
प्रेमसंगमं श्रवणं सुन्दरं विद्यते ॥ कल्याणः

Śāsvatoccheda
Samvṛti/paramārtha

萨係芒目捷立吉 qual'gyaltshen 巴利文 Garubābha

"蔽聞法炬信力即能說成 punctum punctum

經由無量善根之因能成相应之果法螺"
Supta/prabuddha

Kārya/kāraṇa
INDIAN WORKS

ADK: Abhidharmakośa
BCA: Bodhicaryāvatāra
BCAP: Panjîka on BCA by Prajñākaramati, ed. Vaidya
GST: Guhyasamājatantra, ed. Bagchi
HT: Hevajra-tantra, ed. and trans. Snellgrove
MMV: Madhyamakāvatāra
MSL: Mahāyānasūtra-laṅkāra
PK: Pañcakrama, ed. Poussin
PPD: Pradīpoddyotana, sde-dge
Śiks.: Śikṣasamuccaya
(For Tilopa’s Āha-pramāṇa samyag-nāma dākinī-upadeśa, see Gzhung under Padma Dkar-po in the Tibetan section.)

TIBETAN WORKS

(The works are grouped by author. The full title, where given, is prefaced by a sobriquet or short title in italics, by which the work is identified in the footnotes. The different Rgyud-sde spyi’i rnam-gzhag are also identified there by author.)

Dol-po Shes-rab Rgyal-mtshan
Ri-chos nges-don rgya-mtsho
Rgyud bla-ma’i grel-pa Legs-bshad nyi-ma’i od-zer
Bu-ston
Gsang-dus bshad-thabs: Gsang-ba ’dus-pa’i rgyud-’grel-gyi bshad-thabs-kyi yan-lag gsang-ba’i sgo-’byed, gsung-’bum vol. 8
Pradīpoddyotana-ṭikā, ibid.
Rim-Inga’i dmar-khrid, vol. 9
Rgyud-sde spyi’i rnam-bzhag rgyud-sde Gsang-ba gsal-byed, ibid.
Tsong-kha-pa (from the 18-vol. bka-’bum)
Sngags-rim chen-mo, vol. ga
Sgron-gsal mchan-’grel, vol. nga
Sgron-gsal dka-gnas-kyi Mtha’-’gcod rin-chen myu-gu, vol. ca
Rim-Inga rab-gsal sgron-me, vol. ja
Mkhas-grub-rje
Rgyud-sde spyi’i rnam-gzhag, Tibetan text in LW
Mi-bskyod Rdo-rje

Dwags-brgyud grub-pa'i shing-rlta, dbu-ma-la 'jug-pa'i rnam-bshad dpal-lidan Dus-gsum mkhyen-pa'i zhal-lung

Sgam-po-pa Bkra-shis Rnam-rgyal
Nor-bu'i od-zer: Gsang-sngags rdo-rje theg-pa'i spyi-don mdor-bsdus-pa
Nyi-ma'i od-zer: Dpal Kye'i rdo-rje rgyud-kyi rgyal-po legs-par bshad-pa

Padma Dkar-po (except where otherwise stated references are to the 24-vol. reproduction of the Gnam-brug Par-ma)
Tshad-ma 'Jam-pa'i dgongs-ryyan, vol. 1
Tshad-ma rigs-pa'i snying-po, vol. 1
Gsan-yig: Bka'-brgyud-kyi bka'-bum gsal-bu-rnams-kyi gsan-yig, vol. 4
Mngon-mdzod: Chos-mngon mdzod-kyi bshad-pa 'grel-pa'i lugs, vol. 8
Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rlta: Dbu-ma'i gzung-lugs gsum gsal-bar byed-pa, vol. 8
Rgyud-sde spyi'i rnam-bshag Mkhas-pa'i yid-'phrog, vol. 11
Dus-'khor gsan-mdzod: Mchog-po'i sangs-rgyas rnams-par phy-va gsal-ba thams-cad bshad-pa'i mdzod, vol. 13
'Khor-lo sdom-pa'i rnam-bshad: Dpal 'Khor-lo sdom-pa'i rgyud-kyi rnam-par bshad-pa mkha'-gro dga-ba rgyud-sde'i snying-po, vol. 14
Yid-'phrog: Dpal Kye rdo-rje'i spyi-don grub-pa'i yid-'phrog, vol. 15
Gsan-'dus rgyan: Gsang-ba 'dus-pa'i rgyan zhes-by-a-ba Mar-lugs thun-mong ma-yin-pa'i bshad-pa, vol. 16
Phyag-chen gan-mdzod: Phyag-rgya chen-po man-ngag-gi bshad-sbyar rgyal-ba'i gan-mdzod, vol. 21
Rnal-'byor bzhi'i mdzub-tshugs: Rnal-'byor bzhi'i bshad-pa don-dam mdzub-tshugs-su bstan-pa, vol. 21

Bsre-'pho
Gzung: Bka yang-dag-pa'i tshad-ma mkha'-gro-ma'i man-ngag by Tilopa (cf. Indian section); references are to the version in Rare Bka'-brgyud-pa texts from Himachal Pradesh. (Also in Gdams-ngag mdzod, vol. 7.)
Gzung-'grel: Jo-bo Naro-pa'i khyad-chos bsre-'pho'i gzung-'grel rdo-rje 'chang-gi dgongs-pa gsal-bar byed-pa, Rtsib-ri ed.
Khrid-yig: Jo-bo Naro-pa'i khyad-chos bsre-'pho'i khrid rdo-rje'i theg-par bgrod-pa'i shing-rlta chen-po, Rtsib-ri ed.
Lam-bsdu: collection of short works entitled after its first member: Bsre-'pho lam-dbyeu-bsdu, Rtsib-ri ed. 
Rim-Inga 'khrid-pa: Rim-pa Ingar 'khrid-pa rnal-'byor pha'i rgyud-kyi snying-po bsdus-pa, found in Lam-bsdu
(Apart from the Gzhung all these Bsre-'pho works are found also in the Gnam-brug Par-ma, vols. 22-3.)
Kong-sprul Blo-gros Mtha'-yas
Rgyud-bla'i rnam-'grel: Rgyud bla-ma'i snying-po'i don-gyi bshad-srol dang sbyar-ba'i rnam-'grel phyir mi-ldog-pa'i sengge'i nga-ro

WESTERN WORKS

M. M. Broido (1979): The term dangs-po'i gnas-lugs as used in Padma Dkar-po’s Gzhung-'grel (in Aris (1981) )
M. M. Broido (1983a): Padma Dkar-po on the two satyas (JIABS, 1985 no. 2 pp. 7-56)
(Y) H. V. Guenther: Yoganaddha (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Skt. Ser., 1969)
(TVL) H. V. Guenther: The tantric view of life (Berkeley and London: Shambala, 1972)
(Pers) H. V. Guenther: Tibetan buddhism in Western perspective (Emeryville: Dharma publishing, 1977)
(LW) F. D. Lessing and A. Wayman: Introduction to the Buddhist Tantric systems (Second ed.; Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978)
(BLI) D. Seyfort Ruegg: The life of Bu Ston Rin Po Che (Rome: ISMEO, 1966)
(W) A. Wayman: The Buddhist Tantras (New York: Samuel Weiser, 1973)
(YG) A. Wayman: Yoga of the Guhyasamājatantra (Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1977)
NOTES

1. Though Guenther (Pers. 101) draws attention to the different views of Tsong-kha-pa and the Bka'-brgyud-pas, he mentions only Padma Dkar-po among the latter (and this only elsewhere).

2. On the particular issue of bden-gnyis zung-'jug (yuganaddha of the two satya) and its special cases svādhiṣṭhāna/prabhāśvara &c.. Padma Dkar-po has reviewed Tsong-kha-pa’s views at some length at Phyang-chen gan-mdzod 155a6 ff. See below and Broido (1983a). This passage seems to form the basis for Guenther’s remarks mentioned in note 1. See below also for Padma Dkar-po’s view of the difference between zung-'jug in the sūtras and the tantras. (On Padma Dkar-po and other Bka’-brgyud-pas on the sūtra/tantra distinction in general, see again my paper (1983a).)

3. RS 29, Y 206-7 (many times), Pers. 55, 72, 73

4. Y 138

5. Y 161

6. TVL 109

7. TVL 17

8. Y 135

9. Y 206

10. Pers 101

11. Pers 75

12. Pers 72, 78, 98, 101, 109

13. Phyang-chen gan-mdzod, 155a6 ff. The passage is introduced by Padma Dkar-po with the words Bisong-kha-pa chen-pos, which may mean either a question from, or the attribution of an opinion to, Tsong-kha-pa. I have not been able to find this long passage in Tsong-kha-pa’s works on the Guhyasamāja cycle, and on stylistic grounds too it seems likely to be Padma Dkar-po’s own summary of what he saw as Tsong-kha-pa’s view. I also think that Guenther is mistaken if he does indeed think that the view expressed in this passage can be adequately represented by “harmonious juxtaposition”; see below.

14. Pers 101 note 42

15. W 40, 129; YG 152, 153, 167, 228, 284, 312

16. LW 266-7

17. YG 172

18. LW 199

19. LW 320, 325; YG 179

20. BU 62-4

21. I try to observe the uniformity rule and to retain the structure of Tibetan sentences, but without regarding these as matters of principle.


23. Gzhung-'grel 370a5
24. Ibid.: yuga zung/ naddha ni gnyis ma-yin-pa ste/ de'i phyir, zung-'jug zhes btags-so/

25. This nges-tshig ("etymology", nirukta) is a good example of the kind of sgra ji-bzhin ma-yin-pa (non-literal, na-yathārata) interpretation which Padma Dkar-po calls yi-ge and which is typically used for forming such "etymologies" for awkward Sanskrit words. For the yi-ge style of interpretation and its three modes, see Broido (1983b) and references given there.

26. Lam-bsdu 161a5

27. The phrase zung-du 'jug-pa and the schemata (1), (2) are syntactically ambiguous: is the phrase zung-du 'jug-pa to be taken as irreducible or as (nom. + postp.) + verbal adj.? I have resolved this question ad hoc by reducing the phrase, but only because this course leads to a clearer exposition. My general logico-grammatical intuitions are in favour of reduction, while my intuitions about this particular phrase are that is is irreducible; but these latter intuitions are surely semantic rather than syntactic. Its syntactic structure does seem to be the reduced one, but argument on this point would have to rest on syntactic analysis of its components in other contexts, such as is hardly possible here. "Use" arguments point towards irreducibility (partly because of the prevalence of the short form zung-'jug and the absence of significant variations of the long form zung-du 'jug-pa, suggesting that the syntactic details suppressed in the short form are not worked hard when the word is used). Unfortunately "use" is not very sensitive to the syntax/semantics distinction.

28. Lam-bsdu 161a5, see (3), which is followed there by zung-'jug rim-pa shes-par-gyur zhes bstan-te/ bden-pa gnyis gnyis-su-med-pa shin-tu yang-dag-pa'i bdag-nyid-can-gyi ting-nge-'dzin yin-pas zung-'jug-go/. The Skt. in (5) is mine. Three equally clear examples of the phrase zung-'jug-gi ting-nge-'dzin can be found in the headings of the lta-bai/gsom-pa/spyod-pa divisions of the 'bras-bu skye-ba'i rim-pa in the khrid-yig, as given in Appendix B.

29. The six are the utpattikrama (bskyed-rim, Lam-bsdu 153b1) together with the usual five stages of the sampannakrama (rdzogs-rim), Lam-bsdu 155a6, 157a2, 158b6, 160a5, 161a5. For Padma Dkar-po's views on the names, number and numbering of the krama, see Gsang-'dus-rgyan, 16a3.

30. Gzhung-'grel 370a5


32. Especially the word so-sor rang-gis rig-par-bya, Skt. pratyātmād-higamya &c./ bden-pa gnyis gnyis-su med-pa'i rang-bzhin 'di-nyid zung-du
‘jug-pa zhes brjod-de/ . . . so-sor rang-gis rig-par-byā’o/ (ibid., cf. also (3) in the text, and Gzhung-’grel 344b5).

33. On the Mahāyāna/Vajrayāna or sūtra/tantra distinction, cf. note 2.
34. See Part I, where the word thig-le (bindu) presents a similar problem.
35. See e.g. Phyag-chen gan-mdzod 49b4 ff., Rnal-’byor bzhi’i mdzub-tshugs 13b. These passages are translated and discussed at length, and the first quoted, in Broido (1983a), especially from the point of elucidating how the term lhan-skyes applies to the two satya.
36. Skt. akṛtrima, akṛtaka. In the case of the two satya Padma Dkar-po and Mi-bskyod Rdo-rje seem to have taken both zung-’jug and lhan-skyes to imply that it is nonsense to speak of either one appearing and functioning separately. They criticize Tsong-kha-pa, Bo-dong-pa and the Jo-nang-pas for establishing relationships which are merely contingent (all this is dealt with at length in Broido (1983a)). However there does seem to be one case where Padma Dkar-po does what he complains of in these other authors. Gzhung-’grel 375a3: “When the sight of things as they are is obscured because accompanied by vikalpa, one speaks of samvärti-satya or of reality obscured; this is the time when purification by the radiant light has not occurred.” The Tibetan runs:

rnam-par-rtog-pa-dang-bcas-pa dngos-po’i de-kho-na-nyid mthong-ba-la
sgrib-pa-na kun-rdzob-kyi bden-pa-am yang-dag sgrib zhes kyang bya-la/
’od-gsal-gyis sbyang-ba ma-byas-pa’i skabs-so/

Padma Dkar-po seems to have slipped here, since for him samvärti-satya normally is purified. Perhaps the remark refers to the citattaviśuddhikrama (cf. point II in sec. I.3). An impure samvärti cannot take part in yuganaddha (see note 121).
38. Lhan-skyes may also be applied to single nouns (e.g. ye-shes, dga’-ba &c., also names of deities) which describe the combinations of the things born together.
39. Rigs Skt. kula, varna &c. See Part I.
40. Slob-pa’i zung-’jug
41. Slob-pa’i zung-’jug ni ’od-gsal rtogs-nas mthar phyin-gyi bar-gyi skad-de/ bden-pa gsar-du mthong-nas de-la goms-par-bya-ba sgom-lam phye-ba lta-bu (Gan-mdzod 157b4)
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid. 31a2: see Part I, note 33
44. The uses of zung-’brel noted in (a)-(g) are of course non-tantric, but I can see no reason why this word might not find uses in the tantras also. The zung-’brel/zung-’jug difference appears on the face of it to cut across the sūtra/mantra difference.
45. On the basis on his Bka’-gdams experience, Sgam-po-pa introduced into the Bka’-brgyud tradition the view that mahâmudra can be attained in non-tantric mahâyâna. This view was criticized by Sa-skya Panḍita, but these criticisms have been rejected by ‘Gos Gzhan-nu-
dpal. The controversy forms an important strand in the Phyag-chen gan-mdzod, see also Broido (1983a).

46. Phyag-chen gan-mdzod 32b3 (discussion of this point continues until 35b6).

47. Rgyal-dbang-rje is the name usually used by Padma Dkar-po for (Mi-pham) Kun-dga’ Dpal-byor (1423-78), the second of the line of ‘Brug-pa incarnations of which Padma Dkar-po was the fourth. He collected together the doctrines of the ‘Brug-pa tradition, which had become scattered among the lineages descending from the first ‘Brug-pa, Gtsang-pa Rgya-ras Ye-shes Rdo-rje (1161-1211). The biographies of these personalities may be found in the Blue Annals. Rgyal-dbang-rje had a gift for aphorism, and Padma Dkar-po often quotes his pithy formulations of key points of ‘Brug-pa doctrine.

48. For instance, the three main headings of the sa-bcads of the Nges-don grub-pa’i shing-rta say (see note 52) that in this method of setting up madhyamaka, the ground is the yuganaddha of the two satya, the path is the yuganaddha of prajñā and upāya, and the goal is the yuganaddha of the two buddhakāyas (dharma- and rūpa-). For the first two of these see Table 1. Now it seems obvious enough that all three pairs are concerned with something which continues to exist as *integration, but the contrast with such negative-looking pairs such as rāga/arāga & grāhya/grāhaka which have merely to be given up (Table 1) is not as clear as it may seem. More analysis of the structure of the Nges-don grub-pa’i shing-rta is found in Broido (1983a, esp. Appendix C). The bden-gnyis zung-jug section of this work uses the same Vajrayāna terms (gshis, gdangs, gnas-lugs &c.) and ideas (e.g. inseparability of ground, path and goal, 66b2) as other, clearer treatments discussed in this article. Its use of the madhyamaka notion of the equivalence of śūnyatā and pratītyasamutpāda is worth noting and is pursued further in the thabs-shes zung-jug section, 68a3.

49. I mean a concept of something non-dual, not the incoherent “non-dual concept” of something. Concepts make distinctions, it is what they are for. Tsong-kha-pa has recognised this in relation to the similar non-dual category tattva (de-kho-na-nyid) in his Rigs-pa’i rgya-mtsho, 244a4, where he points out that one has to know what a word means before one can reflect on whether one understands that for which is stands. As Guenther has remarked, Padma Dkar-po too (Phyag-chen gan-mdzod 32a2, 33b4) stressed the importance of words and letters for conveying tattva: Pers. 38-9, note 4. At the end of this note, Guenther suggests that these Indian and Tibetan writers modelled knowing on seeing, holding that language “draws attention”. (But I am unhappy about the comparison of Saraha with Wittgenstein.)

50. See Appendix B under sens dngos-po’i gnas-lugs

51. Gzung-’grel 331a4, Khrid-yig 94b6. Padma Dkar-po’s very pithy summary (mdor-bstan) of the stages (skabs) of ground, path and goal in
this case (Gzhung-'grel ibid.) has been translated by Guenther (N 90) and apart from some oddities with the technical terms he conveys well the gist of Padma Dkar-po's remarks. I hope soon to publish a detailed account of this (radiant light) section of the Gzhung-'grel.

52. See note 48. The headings from the Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta are:

\[
gzhi\; dbu-ma\; bden-gnyis\; zung-'jug-tu\; thag-bcad\\
lam\; dbu-ma\; thabs-shes\; zung-'jug-tu\; nyams-su\; blang-ba\\
'bras-bu\; dbu-ma\; sku-gnyis\; zung-'jug-tu\; mgon-du\; bya-ba;\\
\]

they are discussed briefly in Broido (1983a) (which is mainly about the gzhi section).

53. Mahāmudra is probably the most comprehensive and historically resonant of these terms; madhyamaka is the one which has most roots in the kind of analysis with which our own culture makes us familiar, while the radiant light is perhaps the most culturally unfamiliar. At least for Padma Dkar-po, yuganaddha is the most fundamental of them, and this is my reason for treating it, and not the others, in detail here.

54. See the section of Broido (1983a) on the distinction between gnas-lugs phyag-chen and 'khrul-lugs phyag-chen The line of argument given here works most easily for the samsāra/nirvāna case.

55. For a somewhat more systematic reflection on tensions of this kind, see the concluding remarks of this article.

56. The Heart (hrdaya) sūtra and the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras in general are full of this kind of negation, of course.

57. A possible starting-point in this. Our verses appear in the Gzhung as well as in YK, and so they receive commentary in the Gzhung-'grel, the exact places being given in Table 1. In each case, Padma Dkar-po sketches the point of view from which (in his view) the verse, with the listed description, is to be taken. But even though this material is relatively short (c. 7 foll.), only very detailed study, such as cannot be recorded here, would enable us to draw conclusions of the required generality; a mere impression is of little interest.

58. Cf. note 51.

59. Gzhung-'grel 343a3 ff; see note 62.

60. Both these points are expressed in the famous verse from the Gzhung, quoted in the second paragraph of the section "Reconstruction of Padma Dkar-po's argument" in Part I. The goal section of the Gzhung also opens with the line /'bras-bu skye-ba'i rim-pa ni/ (Gzhung 8a1, Gzhung-'grel 370a5). Here the word ni ("as for . . .") does not distinguish between a title and some other kind of term referring to a section of subject-matter, but Padma Dkar-po uses the phrase /'bras-bu skye-ba'i rim-pa explicitly as his heading several times, e.g. Gzhung-'grel 14b1, 370a4.

61. As noted earlier, other arguments of this kind are available based on the relations of the subject-matter of the Gzhung-'grel with other
writings of Padma Dkar-po on topics divided by the scheme ground/path/goal (rgyud-gsum). See notes 50-53.

62. Compare Gzhung-'grel 340a3 ff. with Lam-bsdu 161a5ff.; cf. similar parallels between the path division in the radiant light section of the Gzhung-'grel and the mgon-byang section of the Rim-lngar 'khrid-pa (Lam-bsdu 160a5).

63. Gzhung-'grel 340a6, Lam-bsdu 161b1
64. 'Od-gsal-las l dang-ba'i tshuI. Gzhung-'grel ibid. (The Rim-lngar contains fewer headings, sources of quotations &c.) In the Gzhung (64) we find 'phar-ba for l dang-ba in the verse as quoted in the Gzhung-'grel; these words are no doubt alternatives for Skt. utthāna.

65. Gzhung-'grel 340b3, Lam-bsdu 161b3
66. Ibid. b4, b6
67. Lam-bsdu 162a4. These three points are dealt with also in the Gzhung-'grel, but this does not support the present argument.

68. Gzhung-'grel 341a3
69. Especially the very final part of the radiant light treatment (mthar-thug-pa'i 'bras-bu, 344b1) is similar to the very final part of the 'bras-bu skye-ba'i rim-pa treatment (377b5) and also to the goal section of the Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta (cf. notes 50, 54).

70. Gzhung-'grel 9b1 ff. (comment on the verse quoted in Part I, note 23).

71. Some of the technical terms in this summary are explained in Broido (1983a)
72. These two zung-'jug are still to be distinguished in some way not clear to me. Padma Dkar-po does not seem to be identifying bita-bya with lta-byed, concentrating on the error of taking them as gzung-ba and 'dzin-pa, i.e. (presumably) as ontologically separate.

73. Bskyed-rim, the stage of generating the deities and the rest of the visualization. Non-dual awareness is normally the province of the stage of completion (uppanakrama in the verse, but the form sampanna-krama is perhaps more common; Tib. always rdzogs-rim).

74. Gzhig-pa: the process by which the visualization is made smaller and smaller until it dissolves into the void or the radiant light.

75. Sgyu-lus, māyādeha; here the visualization of oneself as the deity and the world as a maṇḍala, regarded as a whole.

76. Snod-bcud; here snod (vessel) stands for the visualization of the world as a maṇḍala, and bcud (contents) for that of oneself as the deity.

77. For gshis see e.g. Pers 56-8; Broido (1983a). The notion of gshis contains several tensions; really it is the capacity for paramārtha-satya but Padma Dkar-po (and Guenther, following him) often identify the two. Further it is not clear whether gshis is subjective or inheres in objects. There is a similar difficulty over the word ngo-bo (rūpa) as used, e.g. of paramārtha-satya, in such important madhyamaka loci as MMV VI.23 and its bhāṣya. If as often seems the case gshis and ngo-bo inhere in
objects, we have the incoherent notion of an objective correlate for pure subjectivity. In any case Guenther is certainly right about the close parallel between gshis and ngo-bo.

78. *Sems-kyi gnas-lugs*, short for *sems dangs-po'i gnas-lugs*. For the contrast between this feature-universal and the sortal universal *yid* (*ma-nas*), see Broido (1979). It is precisely this feature-aspect which is exploited whenever the depth-clarity metaphor is brought into play (cf. note 112 and Part I, note 51).

79. The radiant light is self-perceived (cf. Part I, note 53; also n. 77 above).

80. I have not been able to follow the pattern (if there is one) behind Padma Dkar-po’s references to *snag-stong zung-'jug*, *gsal-stong zung-'jug* &c. in these passages of commentary to verses in which the terms do not occur. Padma Dkar-po differed from what he regarded as the orthodox Sa-skya and Bka-brgyud view of these four kinds of *yuganaddha* (*Phyag-chen gan-mdzod*, 52a2, 52b2, 54a5, 55a4 gives his view of the four).

81. *Prajñopāyayuganaddha* is the path of *madhyamaka*, according to the *Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta* (see notes 48 and 52). This very short treatment in the *Gzung-'grel* is consistent with the use of the term *Prajñopāyayuganaddha* in either sūtra or mantra contexts. This consistency is a typical sign of the use (in the latter contexts) of a father-tantra terminology; cf. notes 101-107 below.

82. *Zung-'jug de-nyid*. It cannot mean this particular *yuganaddha* (as distinct from others explained in other verses) on pain of circularity. The remark is an inference from the general character of the good of others to a particular aspect of this good as connected with action and agent. Needless to say this inseparability of action and agent is one of the most common themes both of ethical discussion (e.g. in the sūtras) and of analysis (e.g. in *madhyamaka* works). Padma Dkar-po takes it for granted that his readers are familiar with all this material, supporting the quoted remark merely with a verse from BCA.

83. The central importance of the notion of *dngos-po'i gnas-lugs* for Padma Dkar-po’s thought is argued on its own merits in Broido (1979).

84. *Gzung-'grel* and *Khrid-yig*: see Appendix B; *Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta*; notes 48 and 52.

85. E.g. *Lam-bsdu* 161a5, reviewed above; *Phyag-chen gan-mdzod* 155a6 ff, for which see below and Broido (1983a).

86. It may be worth trying to deflect some impatient reactions to this proposal. Why do I not simply give Padma Dkar-po’s own account? But what can this mean, other than printing the Tibetan texts? Any suggestion that one can translate these without extensive discussion of the technical terms can only rest on a confusion. Again, why do I not just say what Padma Dkar-po’s conception of *yuganaddha* was? If read very informally, this is just what I will do. But if read more formally, as a de-
mand to isolate an identifiable "conception" attributable to Padma Dkar-po on the basis of some kind of evidence, then it suffers from the long-standing confusion which Quine has christened "the 'idea' idea".

87. The word "mystical" might itself be thought to be in need of explanation. I mean for instance the idea of an idea which contains logical contradictions, but is not thereby rendered empty; or of an experience of something to which can be strictly and literally ascribed contradictory attributes, &c.

88. Cf. notes 4,5

89. Cf. notes 11, 12. Similarly for his "identity" (e.g. N 116).

90. Since the question of metaphors in translation will come up again, it may be worthwhile trying to say something general about it. In word-by-word translation, the criterion of accuracy is the linguistic function of each word in its context (what Grice has called its utterer's meaning). Metaphors function by suggestion. If the foreign word is a metaphor, we may try to find an English one with the same suggestive power. But if there are great cultural differences, no such word may exist. In any case a literal translation may be irrelevant, as lacking the right suggestive power as regards the audience for whom the translation is intended. (Because of this argument I support Guenther's complaints about the literal translation of words like vāyu (rlung) and bindu (thig-le) by "wind" and "drop" in their technical uses, and his attempts to replace these English words by words which would literally (in English) convey something relevant (e.g. motility, creative potentiality).) If the foreign word is not a metaphor, we may still need one in English if there exists no literal equivalent. So it seems there can be no general argument against the use of metaphors in translation. But there may be particular arguments. A particular metaphor may simply have the wrong suggestive power. Or the cultural context in English may simply not make it clear to us that a metaphorical use is intended (or which metaphorical use). All my specific complaints about metaphors as translations in this paper are examples of one of these two sorts of objection.

91. This is my main objection to Guenther's translation of yuganaddha by such phrases as "unitive Being" (cf. note 6). It is the same as the objection to the translation of dngos-po'i gnas-lugs by "the concrete fact of Being" which is discussed in Part I, note 50.

92. It is well-known that Kant's intelligible intuition is similar to yogipratyakṣa (rnal-'byor mngon-sum). Padma Dkar-po seems to have had little use for the latter. Of course he talks a great deal about yoga (rnal-'byor) (but cf. Part I note 76), about pratyakṣa and about what Guenther, rightly in my view, has called "intuitive understanding" (mngon-sum-du rtags-pa). But I see no reason to think that this mngon-sum is what is discussed in pramāṇa texts (similar to Kant's "intuition"). We must remember that the normal meaning of the Sanskrit word pratyakṣa is
"perception", and that Dignāga's claim that this is without concepts (kalpanāpodha) was a great departure from this normal meaning. In his own pramāṇa works, Padma Dkar-po held that the formalized pramāṇa of Dignāga and Dharmakirti is purely conventional (kun-tu tha-snyad-pa'i tshad-ma; this he contrasts with "real" or "proper" pramāṇa which is much more like what is discussed in this paper (don-dam tshad-ma; see his tshad-ma 'jam-pa'i dgongs-rgyan, 4b1 ff., and tshad-ma rigs-pa'i snying-po, 4b5 ff.).

93. In Part I we saw Padma Dkar-po saying that dngos-po'i gnas-lugs is the ground of samsāra and nirvāṇa and the ground upon which the path rests. These claims are soteriological, and have nothing to do with Kantian a priori or metaphysical claims to ground experience.

94. Neither yuganaddha nor dngos-po'i gnas-lugs have anything to do with sense-data or sense-datum theories. Confusions in this area may arise from the conflation of mngon-sum (as Padma Dkar-po uses the term) with the pratyaksa of Indian pramāṇa works (see note 92).

95. An important technical term connected with this line of thought is tha-mal-gyi shes-pa, lit. "ordinary cognition"; as I show (1983a), Padma Dkar-po's own view of this term comes to the similar "natural cognition". Guenther's "primordial knowledge" (Pers 77) perhaps reflects confusion of tha-mal (common) with tha-ma (poor, inferior; last), especially in the phrase thog-ma dang tha-ma.

96. As is well-known, confusion between unity of experience and experience of unity has a long and disastrous history in Western thought (e.g. P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, p. 162).

97. See notes 15-19.

98. Tsong-kha-pa's view of yuganaddha will be considered below (mainly through Padma Dkar-po's eyes).

99. Even in cases such as the two satya and svādhiṣṭhāna/prabhāsvara, the treatment of the Pañcakrama itself is not adequately conveyed by "pair combined" &c. for reasons argued in Broido (1983a); but for present purposes these points may be regarded as refinements.

100. Gzhung-'grel 7b2.


dgos-so/
de yang bde-stong-gi thabs-shes-la ltos-nas thabs-shes re-re-ba'i rgyud-du mi-
'jog-par gnyis-med-kyi rgyud-du 'jog-pa sngar bshad-pa ltar yin-la/ de-la
bltos-nas ni shas-che-chung-gi sgo-nas kyang gzhag-tu mi-rung-ste/ Kye-rdor-
sogs ma'i rgyud-las bde-ba shas-cher bstan-pa ltar 'Dus-pa-las ma-gsungs-pas/
Kye-rdor pha-rgyud dang 'Dus-pa ma-rgyud-du gzhag dgos-pa-i skyon-du
'gyur-ba'i phyir-ro/
/des-na rdzogs-rim-gyi sgo-nas thabs-shes so-so'i rgyud-du gsungs-pa'i thabs-
shes ni shes-rab don-dam bde-ba-chen-po'i ye-shes dang/ thabs kun rdzob sgyu-
ma'i sku'o/
de la dang-po'i sgo-nas rnal-'byor-ma'i rgyud-du 'jog-pa ni Gur-gyi le'u bcu-
gsum-pa-las/ . . . . 
/shes-rab pha-rol-phyin-pa'i thabs/ /di ni rnal-'byor-mar brjod-do/
/phyag-rgya chen-po rab-sbyor-bas/ /gang-phyir de-nyid-la 'jug-pa/
/rnal-'byor ma-yi rgyud ces-byas/
103. LW 260-3 (nothing presently relevant is found in the rdzogs-rim
section of Mkhals-grub-rje's discussion of earlier views, p. 254). The
account of the rang-lugs is slightly better in Pa-chen Bsod-nams Grags-
pa's Rgyud sde spyi'i rnam-bzhag skal-bzang-gi yid-'phrog, but much of the
point still escapes the reader because the gzhan-lugs is almost omitted.
104. Rdzogs-rim-gyi khyad-par ni/ shes-rab-kyi pha-rol-tu phyin-pa'i thabs
phyag-rgya chen-mo-la sbyor-bas de-kho-na-nyid-la 'jug-pa ston-pa ma-rgyud/
rang-byin-brlab dang mngon-par-byang-chub-pa'i rim-pa gtso-bor ston-pa pha-
rgyud-de/
This entire remark occurs in Bu-ston at least twice (Rin-po-che mdzes
rgyan, 281a2; Gsang-ba gsal-byed, 127b4), and also identically apart from
the reversal of the two clauses in Bkra-shis Rnam-rgyal's Nor-bu'i od-
zer, 14a5. However there is a variant which replaces phyag-rgya chen-mo
with rgya chen-po (sic); this occurs in Bu-ston's Gsang-'dus bshad-thabs,
22a1, and is repeated exactly in Padma Dkar-po's Rgyud-sde spyi'i rnam-
bzhag, 34b2. The variant does not seem to make sense; and since the
Vajrapaṇījara verse (which is quoted in all texts, see note 102) contains the
line /phyag-rgya chen-po rab sbyor-bas/ without variation, I have ac-
tcepted the quoted version for Padma Dkar-po too.
105. Padma Dkar-po, Rgyud-sde spyi'i rnam-bzhag 32b5, 35a6; the latter
(nīṭārtha) quotes the well-known GST verse on this topic which is also
quoted for similar reasons by Mkhals-grub-rje and the others.
106. The use of the terms drang-don (neyārtha) and nges-don (nīṭārtha) in
the tantras is quite different from its use in the sūtras. Their use by Bu-
ston, Tsong-kha-pa and Padma Dkar-po is discussed, especially in re-
lation to the tantras, in (1983b).
107. For reasons of this kind it would be desirable to give a detailed ac-
count of the dispute about the classification of the anuttarayogatan-
tras in which, among other things, the bshad-thabs terms were treated
with the care their importance deserves (they do not receive this care in
Lessing and Wayman). I hope to present such an account soon elsewhere.

108. *utpalās* or *abhisaṃbodhi*-

krama, as the case may be.

109. Much criticism of Tsong-kha-pa by Bka-brgyud-pa authors such as Padma Dkar-po and Karmapa Mi-bskyod Rdo-rje is related in some way to this set of issues, often expressed as the claim that various pairs of notions are (as Tsong-kha-pa explains them) not properly *lhan-cig skyes-pa* (sahaja, born together).

110. *Phyag-chen gan-mdzod* 156b2, ‘di pa’i lugs-la/ . . . (comment on the immediately preceding quotation or explanation attributed to Tsong-kha-pa (n. 13)).

111. *Gzhung-'grel* 115a4, 116a2, 332b1; *Yid-'phrog* 17b6.

112. On the inseparability of depth and clarity in this context, we have: tha-dad-du ‘byed mi-shes-pa twice (Gzhung-'grel 116a4, 332b3); tha-
dad phye yang ya-bral-du phye-ba nam-yang mi-srid-pas (Yid-'phrog 18a2); gnyis-pa med-pa (from the Vimalaprabhā, see Part I note 51); de gnyis mtsan-nyid tha-dad-du phye yang ngo-bo-nyid ni geig yin-no (Gzhung-'grel 119a4). The last passage is especially interesting because of its analysis in terms of *sahaja*. The illusory body is present throughout the abhisambodhikrama (*Gan-mdzod* 157a5). Even in the *svādhīṣṭānākrama*, the agent of purification is the radiant light (*Pañcakrama* II.5-6, V.26, V.30, quoted *Gan-mdzod* ibid.). Similarly, the illusory body is self-purified (criticism of the Bo-dong-pa position, *Gan-mdzod* 157b6), and similarly in terms of sealing (ibid. 39a4). In addition to all this, *svādhīṣṭāna* and *prabhāsvāra* are instances of the two *satya*, on whose inseparability Padma Dkar-po is just as insistent (see my (1983a)).

113. *De gang-la dbyer-med-par* ‘dus-pa’i go-‘phang ni zung-’jug-go (*Gan-
mdzod* 115b2; an almost identical remark also at 156b1).

114. Used twice of the two *satya* in contexts related to the present, both times in the same remark taken from the Sekoddesātiṇā: bden-pa gnyis gnyis-su med-pa’i rang-bzhin ‘di-nyid zung-’jug-pa zhes brjod-dol/ *Gan-
mdzod* 36a2 and Gzhung-'grel 345a1.


117. Ibid. 156a5: gnyis dus mnyam ‘byung-zhing

118. Ibid. 156b1; cf. also note 112.

119. Ibid. 156b2: ‘di’i pa’i lugs-la/ glang-la rwa-co lta-bu gnyis zung-’jug-
go/

120. Ibid. 156b4

121. Ibid. 156b5: de yang ril-‘dzin rjes-gzhig-gis ‘od-gsal-bar yang bcyug-pas
mthar dag-pa-na mi-slob-pa’i zung-’jug ‘byung-bar gsungs-pas/ kun-rdzos kyi
bden-pa de ma-dag de-srid mi-slob-pa’i zung-’jug ma byung; cf. Mkhas-
grub-rje (LW 326-7): de-nas ma-dag-pa’i sgyu-lus de-nyid ril’-dzin dang rjes-
gzhig-gi bsam-gtan gnyis-kyis. . . .
122. This topic is dealt with in more detail in Broido (1983a).
123. Phyag-chen gan-mdzod 157a5: mnyam-gzhag-tu snang-ba dag-pa
124. Padma Dkar-po identifies paryāya-paramārtha (rnam-grangs-pa’i
don-dam) with a purified sambhūtī (see discussion in Broido, 1983a and
1983b), and says here that it is the mere tearing of the veil of ignorance
and contains but a little paramārtha (Gan-mdzod, 157a2).
125. Candrakīrti’s distinction between sambhūtī-satyā and sambhūtī-mātra
was developed, somewhat differently in each case, by Tsong-kha-pa
(see Williams (1979) ) and by Padma Dkar-po (Nges-don grub-pa’i shing-
rtṣa 36b6).
126. Cf. for instance the passages quoted by Seyfort Ruegg, BU 62-4
(but cf. also note 80).
127. This suggestive power is not needed for zung’-brel (see section
II.1).
128. For present purposes all we need to know about the radiant light
is that it is self-cognising and paramārtha-satyā. Cf. notes 77, 79.
129. See Appendix B under lus ji-ltar grub-pa’i tshul.
THE WHITE AND RED RONG-BTSAN OF MATHO MONASTERY (LADAKH)

Eva K. Dargyay

The present contribution will discuss the legends, rituals, and ceremonies related to a pair of oracle gods (the White and Red Rong-btsan) in Ladakh. These facts will be correlated with data derived from textual studies, information obtained from some Ladakhis, and on-site observations with the purpose of recovering some data relevant to the history of the Tibetan conquest of Ladakh.1

First, a description will be given of Matho monastery as situated in the countryside, its sacred buildings, and the activities related to the oracle gods. Secondly, other Tibetan sources which mention the oracle gods will be examined. Finally, other evidence pertinent to them and their history will be introduced. In the conclusion I shall attempt to synthesize the diverse data and set them in relationship to each other.

MATHO MONASTERY AND THE RONG-BTSAN DKAR-DMAR

Mang-spro (Ladakhis pronounce the name as "Matho") monastery is built on a commanding hill overlooking the desert-like southern shore of the Indus river, ca. 16 miles southeast of Leh, Ladakh’s capital. In contrast to the southern shore, the northern shore has fertile land used for agriculture. Within many miles of the monastery there is no other human settlement. Despite the barren and arid nature of its environment, the area at the foot of the hill abounds in water. Beneath many boulders water oozes out and meanders through patches of luscious meadows — a rare sight in Ladakh. Although obviously fertile, the land is not used for agriculture.

Walking up to the monastery, which hovered above me like a castle in the air, I enjoyed the various shades of yellow, brown, and red that characterize the Ladakhi landscape. The monastery is build on the flat top of a moraine stretching north from the Zanskar Range toward the Indus. The assembly hall (’du khang), the Kanjur temple (so called because it houses the Buddhist canon in Tibetan), and the chapel of the protective gods (mgon khang) are spaced around a central courtyard which is set off against the cliff with a stone wall that is sometimes integrated into the walls of the buildings. Except for the chapel of the protective gods, the buildings have undergone some recent renovations. This may have resulted in the loss of some ancient art work, but it has given the monastery a pleasant, well-groomed appearance. I also found a class of novices sitting under the portico of the assembly hall
and memorizing some Buddhist texts as part of their basic education. This, along with other facts, gave me the impression that the monastery was under efficient leadership.

At the time, the chapel of the protective gods was of utmost interest to me as I hoped to find there some evidence regarding the development of Ladakhi culture which would supplement the scarce information on the subject in Tibetan historiographical texts. When I requested permission from the acting abbot (the actual abbot is supposed to have died during the Chinese conquest of Tibet where he had been staying in order to further his education) to visit the chapel, he told me that women are not allowed to enter it. But he generously agreed that I may peek through the door without setting my foot into the chapel. I saw a windowless room with images of the two oracle gods, the White and Red Rong-btsan, looming in the dark at the opposite wall. In the centre was a wooden pillar crudely hewn from a log, which was draped with white ceremonial scarves (kathag). Ancient weapons (bows, arrows, spears, etc.) were hanging from pegs. I was told that these weapons belong to the White and Red Rong-btsan. The floor was covered with grain brought there right after the harvest, where it remains until the following spring, when a part of it is used as seed for the fields of the Ladakh king. The rest is filled into “treasure vases” (gter bum) which are commonly found in the lha tho, little shrines devoted to the ancestral and village gods.

The White and Red Rong-btsan animate the chapel, as well as a hermitage build higher up in the mountains. They take possession of two monks during the celebration of the Ladakhi New Year, a festive season known in Ladakhi as naghrang. The preparations which lead up to the trance and possession take up most of the year. Luding Mkhan Rinpoche, the acting abbot, spent much time explaining these elaborate preparations to me. Every five years the two monks who will serve as oracles are elected from among the monastic congregation. Slips with names of the monks are put in a bowl which is slowly whirled until two rolled up slips fall out. The monks whose names are on these paper slips are chosen to act as the Rong-btsan’s oracles for the coming five years. Usually the selection of the oracles is scheduled for the 15th day of the tenth month according to the Tibetan calendar. This date coincides approximately with the winter solstice, which is the beginning of the New Year in many places of Ladakh. During the procedure of selecting the oracles the majority of the monks perform the Mahākāla pūjā.

To develop their spiritual ability, the two chosen oracles have to undergo a one-year retreat during which time they live at an isolated place not too far from the main monastery. During this period they propitiate Hevajra, one of the main tantric deities of the Sa-skya tradi-
tion. Part of the oracles' spiritual training program is repeatedly to offer sacrificial cakes (gtor ma) to the various Protectors of the Doctrine. Beginning with the 14th day of the eleventh month, the oracles have to remain in strict isolation, exclusively devoted to their meditations which focus on Hevajra and the Rong-btsan gods. During this retreat they have to observe several regulations governing their ritual purity — including a weekly bath and ablutions with scented water, which are performed by the tantric master of the monastery (rdo rje slob dpon). This strict retreat is terminated on the 10th day of the first month and the monks then return to the main monastery after a year in isolation. When they enter their own rooms after so many months of living in the hermitage, they immediately fall into a trance and the White and Red Rong-btsan enter their bodies.

At this moment, the human personality of the two chosen oracle monks vanishes and their bodies serve as "support" for the two Rong-btsan who seize the monastery and rule it for a month. Embodied in the two oracle monks, the Rong-btsan first visit the monastery's main temple and then the Mahakala chapel. While the two monks are still in a trance, the Rong-btsan allow people to address them and submit questions, which they then answer. When approaching another Mahakala chapel, the Rong-btsan will take a seat on the platform in front of the shrine room. They address the assembled crowds and predict various events which will occur in Ladakh during the following year. From the crowd the Rong-btsan select four men to bring seven huge piles of juniper shrubs from Hemi Shukpachen (the place name indicates that juniper profusely grows there), a place in the interior valley. The boughs will be used to redecorate the chapel of the Rong-btsan. The four men receive the gods' blessings and gzungs bdud (sacred threads) for their individual protection. When the four men are sent off, the Rong-btsan withdraw from the oracle monks.

On the next day, the eleventh, the Rong-btsan again enter the oracle monks' bodies while the latter stay in their rooms. In a trance, the monks leave their rooms and visit the assembly hall and chapels. Later they receive spiritual and secular dignitaries in an audience. The oracle gods give their old clothes and other personal articles as a token of their appreciation to the officials who, in turn, donate new clothes and other gifts to the oracle gods. During the next two days, i.e., the 12th and 13th of the first month, the gods again enter the monks' bodies and respond to various questions from the public by forecasting future events.

On the 14th and 15th days, the entire ceremony is culminated. On the 14th, both oracle monks carefully prepare themselves for the gods' entry into their bodies. At this time the congregation of monks chants a text which evokes the vision of the Rong-btsan. The monks participate in making the Rong-btsan manifest by meditating on the gods emerg-
ing from their heart with a flood of light. At this moment the gods become manifest in the oracle monks and they join in a religious mask dance (cham) in the courtyard of the monastery. Mahâkâla, his entourage, and two deer (portrayal in masks) participate in the dance, along with the Rong-btsan celebrates a special ritual. During the ceremonies the Rong-btsan occasionally hurry over the walls and roofs of the monastery, drawing their weapons against the devotees as a sign of their divine grace. According to M. Brauen, the oracles have an iron cross attached to their backs, because this alleviates the painful penetration of the gods into the oracles' bodies. Every movement of the Rong-btsan is loaded with ominous significance pointing at future events related to crops, livestock, and the general prosperity of the Ladakhi people.

On the following day, the 15th of the first month, the monks bathe and then the four previously appointed men paint a wrathful face on the monks' chests and backs. It is believed that during possession the oracle monks see by means of the eyes of the face painted upon their chests. At this moment the oracle monks change their attire from that suitable for a rgyal po (spirits who have the appearance of a king) to that suitable for a tantric one. Over a loincloth they put on a tiger skin. They are adorned with an apron of bones, which is part of the traditional tantric costume, and with many charm boxes offered to them in the past by a Ladakhi queen. Their heads are covered with a cloth bag which has only an opening at the nose; its top is decorated with hair, ribbons, and ceremonial scarfs. Both oracle monks hold a small drum and a gandi, a piece of wood used to summon the monks, in their hands. As before, an iron cross is attached to their backs. After an ablution offered to the Rong-btsan the two oracle monks, who have already entered into trance, receive the upper garment of Rdo-rje dpal-bzang, the founder of the monastery. They hold the cloth above their heads and enter the main temple. It is said that in ancient times the oracles flew to the temple while holding on to the cloth. In the temple they receive the blessings of the Vajra master, and then they proceed on their inspection tour through the monastery and its sacred premises. Along their route hundreds of people flock, eager to catch a sight of the oracle monks or to ask them about the future. People faithfully offer locally brewed beer as well as incense to the Rong-btsan, who walk along the hill on which the monastery is built. After returning to the monastery court they run over walls, roofs, and railings, although their heads are still covered with the cloth mask they are said never to fall or stumble. Back in the courtyard, they throw roasted barley flour in the four directions to learn in which part of the country the harvest will be good. Finally they invoke a prosperous future for the Buddha Doctrine. At this moment the oracle monks withdraw from their trance and recover gradually.
The last performance of the Rong-btsan oracle monks occurs on the 8th day of the second month (since the 15th day of the first month they have not entered into a trance). Early in the morning the monastery of Hemis and the Ladakhi king, now residing at Stok, send horses and servants to Matho. The oracle monks take a bath, perform their morning prayers, and leave the monastery on horseback. At a certain place along the way (which leads to the upper part of the valley where the Rong-btsan’s original shrine, built from juniper boughs, is) the monks fall again into a trance. In the shrine is a “treasure vase” (pter bum) which contains samples of grain. The Rong-btsan oracle monks examine the grain and then predict whether or not the harvest in the coming year will be good. Later the Rong-btsan gods leave the bodies of their oracles and get absorbed into the juniper boughs. That concludes the oracles’ activity for that year. The two monks retreat to their hermitage and prepare themselves for the next appearance of the Rong-btsan.

THE RONG-BTSAN IN TIBETAN LITERATURE

The Rong-btsan have the attribute dkar dmar, white and red, or kha ba dkar po, which means “white like snow.” Under these or similar names the Rong-btsan appear in a number of Tibetan texts. Nebesky-Wojkowitz mentions in his monumental work Oracles and Demons of Tibet Rong-btsan Gang (“Rong-btsan the Glacier”), a mountain god belonging to a group of 21 “lay disciples” (dge bsnyen) whose names usually incorporate parts of the place names associated with their residences. For instance, the god Jo-mo Gangs is residing in the mountain Jo-mo Lha-ri, also known as Jo-mo Gangs-dkar, which Westerners prefer to call Mt. Everest. Thus, the White and Red Rong-btsan supposedly resided in a country (“Rong”) and were associated with a locality known as kha ba dkar po.

A country with the name Rong is documented in several sources. It is primarily mentioned in the Gesar epic in varying contexts. R.A. Stein surmises some relationship with Stag-rong, but it is difficult to locate the country Rong from the information in the gesar Epic. Various indications support the opinion that it was related to the district of Lta’u. Several figures in the epic are either born in Rong or their proper names incorporate the syllable rong, which usually means that the person’s activity was centered at that place. There is, for instance, the petty ruler Rong-tsha’i Khra rgan, Gesar’s elder brother and an incarnation of the mahāsiddha Kukuripa. Others whose names include the place name Rong are Rong-sras Lha-rgod ’bum-lu and Stag-rong Rong-tsha.

Outside the Epic there is a chief of the Rong tribe documented as living in 1089. Reportedly he was married to a princess from Kuchea, the
well-known oasis state located at the northern branch of the Silk Road.\textsuperscript{12}

From these sources, scanty as they may be, we may nevertheless conclude that the Rong-btsan were originally residing in the country of Rong, somewhere far off in eastern Tibet.

The next problem to solve is whether there exists a mountain with the attribute "white red" (dkar dmar) or "white like snow" (kha ba dkar po). A mountain with the name Kha-ba dkar-po is mentioned in a manuscript of the Gesar Epic housed in G. Tucci's collection of Tibetan manuscripts. In the colophon it is said that the author, a patron of the Sa-skya School, travelled to Kha-ba dkar-po where he stayed for some time.\textsuperscript{13} In the Bacton Collection there is a manuscript with the title The Merit of Circumambulating the Kha-ba dkar-po (Kha ba dkar po'i bskor ra gyi pha yon).\textsuperscript{14} This text describes the mountain commonly known as Kha-ba dkar-po as a sacred abode of the Btsan\textsuperscript{15} and the wildlife living on the mountain sides as the Btsan's livestock. For this reason the animals are spared from being hunted. But the wise will know the mountain as being essentially a Cakrāsāṃvara mandala, a symbolic representation of the numinous. From the perspective of the history of religions, we may conclude that the author of the text tries to incorporate into Buddhism a cult which, until then, had been outside of it. This mountain must have been a well-known sacred site, as it is mentioned in the Description of Sacred Sites (Gnas yig) by Rang-byung rdo-rje, the third Karma-pa hierarch, and in the Route Description (Lam yig) by Karma Pakshi.\textsuperscript{16} R.A. Stein identifies the mountain Kha-ba dkar-po with Dokerla, located not far from the Yu-nan border in the old country of Rong Tsa-ba-rong.\textsuperscript{17}

When we correlate textual evidence with empirical observations, we are puzzled by the fact that two oracle gods are residing in Ladakh, the furthermore western outpost of Tibetan civilization, while a number of texts document their existence in the furthermore eastern part of Tibet. We have to ask ourselves: are we dealing with two different sets of gods who — due to some odd coincidence — share the same name and attributes? Or, can we justifiably assume a relationship between the Btsan living on the mountain Kha-ba dkar-po in the country of Rong and the Rong-btsan Kha-ba dkar-po worshipped in Ladakh?

In the remarks that follow I shall refer to several facts which may serve as a bridge between the Btsan of Rong and the Rong-btsan of Ladakh. Above all we have to ask who was the founder of Matho monastery. His name is given as Rdo-rje dpal-bzang, but nothing so far is known of him, except for a single reference in Mi-pham's Collected Works.\textsuperscript{18} There Mi-pham mentions Rdo-rje dpal-bzang, also known as Smad Dbang-phug, a name which explicitly shows that he was a native of the "lowland," i.e., Eastern Tibet, where the mountain Kha-ba dkar-
po and the country of Rong are. Furthermore, Mi-pham relates Rdo-rje dpal-bzang to Rab-rgyas, a native from Western Tibet, thus indicating that the founder of Matho monastery had indeed some contacts with people from Western Tibet before he set out on his journey to Ladakh. Moreover, one page before mentioning Rdo-rje dpal-bzang, Mi-pham refers to Bzhad-pa rdo-rje, a famous yogi of Zanskar (southern Ladakh) who shares this name with Gesar.¹⁹ This is another indication of Rdo-rje dpal-bzang-po’s Ladakh connections. Later we shall see that there are further traces of the Rong-btsan’s movement across Tibet.

OTHER EVIDENCE PERTINENT TO THE WHITE AND RED RONG-BTSAN

This part of my contribution will provide further evidence of the significance of the Rong-btsan within the traditional fabric of Ladakhi civilization, and will combine the evidence which we have examined so far in order to construe a plausible hypothesis.

The paramount importance of the Rong-btsan decreased to some extent after the Ladakh monarchy lost its power to the Sikh ruler of Jammu in 1842, who was then succeeded by the Sultan of Kashmir and ultimately by the British Raj. Many ceremonies enforcing the king’s responsibility for the country and its inhabitants’ prosperity lost their relevance after the king was no longer the center of secular and sacred power. Nevertheless, certain traits and elements associated with these ceremonies survived. In the description of the Rong-btsan’s chapel I said that the floor is covered with grain which remains there until the next spring, at which time part of it is used as seed for the king’s fields. Lha-dbang dar-rgyas, the current priest of the royal family, disclosed that the king would consult the Rong-btsan to find out what the prospects for the harvest were. He also said that the grain to fill the “treasure vases” in the royal lha tho were taken from the grain in the Matho chapel. My informant assured me that there had been many more ceremonies and rituals which strengthened the bond between the Rong-btsan and the king. Some of them may even suggest that the Rong-btsan functioned as protectors of the king, but at present, Lhadbang dar-rgyas said, things are in a state of disorder and decay: the king is a boy without power and the country is controlled by foreigners.

This intimate relationship between the Rong-btsan and the king seems to emulate the intimate relationship between a king and his court priest. From my studies of the Zanskar pha spun (ancestral clans) and their pha lha (ancestral gods), I have learned that wandering yogis and tantrics were frequently accompanied by their tutelary deities when travelling through Tibetan lands. When the yogi was invited by
a ruler to become his court priest he usually enthroned his tutelary deity near his new residence. According to Luding Mkhan Rinpoche, the acting abbot of Matho monastery, this is exactly what happened when Rdo-rje dpal-bzang-po wandered through the upper Indus valley, about 500 years ago. The Rong-btsan were travelling along with him. Their fierce nature required that a place far from human settlement be found for them. The southern shore of the Indus was an ideal location — remote, yet close enough to the capital so that one could reach it in a day. Furthermore, the location chosen as the future residence of the Rong-btsan was already recognized as a sacred place. This is evidenced through my discovery of a stone carrying graffiti of an Ibex on one side and of the Buddhist mantra Om mani padme hum on the other side. The Ibex, a kind of big horn mountain sheep, is regarded as sacred animal in Ladakh; for example substitutes in dough are offered during the funeral rites and the New Year celebration; graffiti of Ibex are found near Alchi and at many other sacred places of Ladakh. Many Ladakhis pointed out to me that the graffiti identify sacred places which are haunted by ghosts and spirits. In order to please the sometimes moody spirits, people engraved stupas or Buddhist mantras on the same rock. When the Rong-btsan were still at the mountain Kha-ba dkar-po in southeast Tibet, they had wild animals there as their livestock. Thus, the place chosen for them on the shore of the Indus suited them well, as it was a sanctuary of the sacred Ibex.

The Rong-btsan left traces when they crossed Tibet. They are mentioned as guardian gods of Spo-bo, and are worshipped by the Tamang in Nepal. These are only a few incidentally known cases, but I assume that references to the Rong-btsan may be found in a variety of contexts.

CONCLUSION

Let me summarize the various references to the Rong-btsan:
1. Various statements in the Gesar Epic relate the country and tribe of Rong to Gesar and his family.
2. In, or nearby, the country Rong today in the Kham-Amdo border area, is the sacred mountain Kha-ba dkar-po, an abode of the Btsan.
3. A monk Rdo-rje dpal-bzang, a native of eastern Tibet, was in contact with natives of western Tibet, when he propagated the Gesar Epic.
4. Ladakh is another center where the Gesar Epic flourished.
5. The Rong-btsan who have the title Kha-ba dkar-po, "white like snow," reside at the Matho monastery in Ladakh, which was founded by Rdo-rje dpal-bzang-po who is said to have come from eastern Tibet. The Rong-btsan travelled with him to Ladakh.
6. Because of their fierce character, Rdo-rje dpal-bzang-po had to relocate the Rong-btsan at an isolated place; a formerly sacred site was found to be suitable.

7. Rdo-rje dpal-bzang-po became the court priest of the Ladakhi king and the Rong-btsan became the king’s protectors, (as the king was, in a certain way, a representative of Gesar).

These facts may be interpreted in the following way. In the country of Rong in Eastern Tibet, the monk and tantric master Rdo-rje dpal-bzang was a devotee of the Btsan, who resided there on the sacred mountain Kha-ba dkar-po. The spiritual climate of the place at that time was shaped by the worship of mountain gods and the imagery of the Gesar Epic, although I am still unsure as to how much this involves the Epic. At the moment it is difficult to specify the nature of the Rong-btsan’s relationship with the Gesar Epic. Later, Rdo-rje dpal-bzang met with natives from Ladakh before he set out on his own journey to the far west of the Tibetan world. His bonds with the Btsan gods from the sacred mountain Kha-ba dkar-po were so strong that the gods accompanied him to Ladakh. Rdo-rje dpal-bzang was of some service there to the Ladakh king who invited him to stay. He found a new abode for “his” Rong-btsan at a remote site with an established religious reputation, i.e., Matho, where sacred animals, Ibex, haunted the mountain slopes. The Btsan regained some of their domestic animals which they had lost when they moved to the west. Near the Rong-btsan’s shrine Rdo-rje dpal-bzang build a monastery and entrusted the worship of his beloved Rong-btsan to the future monastic community.

It is not certain when Rdo-rje dpal-bzang travelled to Ladakh because a date is not indicated by any textual source. Considering the general situation, however, we may assume that he travelled there after the 15th century. In the liturgical text of the Rong-btsan, the sangha of Sa-skya and Ngor is mentioned. Evam Chos-ldan, the great Ngor monastery, was founded by Kun-dga bzang-po, who lived from 1382-1444. It was only during the following years that the Ngor tradition spread to other territories. This supports the view of the local tradition which holds that Matho was founded about the late 15th century.

In this account of relations between gods and kings several religious phenomena are interwoven. There are mountain gods, who are intimately associated with the land as well as with the yogi who evokes them and transforms himself into their personalities. There is the geographical relocation of people and gods and the fact that, at their new home, the gods rebuild their ominous relationship with the king, who epitomizes fertility and prosperity. Each religious phenomenon taken individually does not disclose anything remarkable, but when put together they tell a coherent story of gods epitomizing the fertile land
with its abundant wildlife whose supreme guardian and lord is the king.

It seems that as long as the Rong-btsan stayed in southeastern Tibet they were linked with Gesar. I am inclined to speculate that Gesar was the king with whom the gods were associated. Later, when the gods had been moved to Ladakh it well suited them to find in the Ladakh king a descendant of Gesar. Despite their physical move to another locality, the gods predict the most crucial seasonal events: the right time for seeding, the quality of the harvest, and the state of health of men and livestock. Locality and king changed because of the historical journey of a Buddhist yogi who had a special relationship with the Btsan. In other words, historical, individual, and other arbitrary facts overrule the structural ones in the first instance. But then the structural elements gain momentum and shape the new environment in a way that matches the original one. Historical development and innate structure are not mutually exclusive, but supplementary.

NOTES

1. I visited Matho monastery in July 1978 during an expedition to Ladakh and Zanskar as part of the Ladakh Project financed through the Stiftung Volkswagenwerk, Hannover, Germany, and co-sponsored by the University of Munich, Germany.


5. So they are called in the text which is recited during the oracle gods’ annual appearance and which I shall publish elsewhere.


8. R.A. Stein, *Recherches*, p. 188.
14. Professor R.A. Stein generously provided me with a copy of this text for which I am much indebted.
15. The Btsan are gods closely associated with the cult of rulers, chieftains, and kings. They ride on different mounts (horses, mules, goats, camels, yaks, etc.) through clouds and in thunderstorms. Through blood sacrifices, or appropriate substitutes, they are appeased so that they do not harm humanity.
16. Professor Stein brought these texts to my attention, but unfortunately, both are unavailable to me.
Brief Communications

DGRA-LHA: A RE-EXAMINATION

Todd Gibson

Fathoming the inner life of a pre-literate culture is a risky undertaking. Since the advent of reading and writing itself cannot but change the way a people regards itself and the world around it, relying wholly on a culture’s literary sources can become a little like searching for an article lost in darkness under a streetlamp because there is more light there. The investigator also carries his own load of cultural baggage that may be difficult to shed. This note will nevertheless discuss a very old Tibetan term, and try to show how its significance may have altered over time.

*Dgra-lha* is a term used to designate one of the many classes of divinities found in Tibetan religion. Broken down into parts meaning “enemy” and “god”, it refers to deities whose main function is said to be the destruction of the enemies of their worshippers. Conversation with modern Tibetans of religious education often elicits this understanding of the term, which Western scholarship in the main has accepted.¹ Most scholars have no found grounds for any differentiation between the present concept of the *dgra-lha* and possible earlier meanings; Tucci, in fact, sees the “enemy god” as part of the “heritage of the primeval traditions of a hunter and warrior society”.²

There are, however, two elements of this view that suggest a closer examination is in order. First there is the obvious, but almost universally overlooked³ anomaly of calling a deity that is alleged to protect against enemies an “enemy god”, instead of employing for example *skyong-lha* or *srung-lha* (protector god or guardian god), either of which would be more in keeping with Tibetan usage. The second point is that some sources⁴ suggest that *dgra-lha* or *srung-lha* is, in the colloquial language, commonly if not always pronounced “dabla”. This might indicate that the second component of the term was originally *bla* rather than *lha*. While the latter is a term which can, if sometimes inadequately, be translated as “god” or “deity”, the former is not nearly so simple. Probably no definition of such a basic but nebulous word is valid in all cases, but such dictionary meanings as “soul”, “vitality”, and “spirit” can be kept in mind.

A casual observer might suppose that the iconography of the *dgra-lha* bears out the “enemy (defeating) god” interpretation of the term, since these entities are usually portrayed as being extremely martial, even ferocious. Nebesky-Wojkowitz, however, has described⁵ several female
deities, peaceful in both representation and ascribed function, that are classified with the *dgra-lha*, so evidently at the time of their inclusion in the pantheon ferocity was not a prerequisite. Tucci has noted how the iconographic representation of Jambhala, the god of wealth, altered as his cult spread from India through Central Asia where, under what Tucci interprets as Chinese-Turkic influence, he gained increasingly martial characteristics. There is no reason to suppose that an early Tibetan conception of the *dgra-lha* might not have undergone a similar metamorphosis.

The increasing amount of material from the Bon tradition that is becoming available has in many instances been able to provide an alternative viewpoint to the commonplaces of Tibetan scholarship. Relevant to this investigation, too, one point of interest is immediately apparent: in Bon works, the *dgra-lha* term is consistently written *sgra-bla*.

That this is not a mere corruption can be seen in the *Gsas-mkhar-rin-po-che*, which in a liturgy that repeatedly refers to the “queen of the *sgra-bla*” also names the female counterpart of Gesar as “*dgra-dul-ma*”.

Not only is this *sgra-bla* spelling more in line with the colloquial pronunciation, it also makes possible an entirely new range of meanings. Couple *sgra* (“sound, voice, noise”) with *bla*, and the term might be read, for example, “sound-soul” or “voice-spirit”. Literary evidence supporting this reading against the other in books that deal exclusively with the *sgra-bla* admittedly seems scanty, but this may be a case of the literature coming into being after the primary meaning of an oral tradition has been lost. In Snellgrove and Namdak’s *Nine Ways of Bon*, the term occurs in a variety of contexts. Although one passage claims that the *sgra-bla* “must be worshipped as an aid for subduing hateful foes”, there are also such phrases as “the clairvoyance of the *sgra bla* of primordial knowing”, in which a mere “enemy god” will not suffice. Martin has remarked, in editing another Bon text, on a so-called “Gateway Language” which stems from “the *sgra-bla* of the good aeon”; here at least the element of language seems to more closely relate to the *sgra* spelling.

The traditional explanations of the *dgra-lha* often mention the deity as appearing in another capacity as one of the “five original gods” (*go-ba’i lha-inga*). These figures are said to be born with man and to accompany him through life. Interestingly, they are thought to occupy specific places in or around the human body. Although the locations of some of the *’go-ba’i lha-inga* seem to vary with the sources, all agree that the *dgra-lha* abides on the right shoulder. This *dgra-lha* first appears in the legendary era of Tibet’s first kings. The well-known story of the early king Dri-gum tells how, for some reason not satisfactorily explained, he challenged his stable hand Lo-ngnam to a duel to the death. Through a combination of circumstances, Dri-gum was prevailed upon to wear animal skins on his shoulders and wave a sword
above his head when he confronted the stable hand. But wearing the pelts, says the tale, offended Dri-gum’s lha which deserted him, and waving the sword he cut his rope to Heaven. Thus when Lo-ngam killed him, his corpse remained on the earth. Read bla for lha here, and the story becomes more coherent — even today bla’-gugs rituals are performed for those who have lost their bla, a condition which can lead to queer behavior, depression, and even death. It should also be noted that the dgra-lha was chased away from the right shoulder of Dri-gum by a piece of animal carrion — unexpected behavior in a martial “enemy god”.

To sum up, a few characteristics towards a revised conception of the dgra-lha can be enumerated. First, the ferociousness of the later dgra-lha was not necessarily included in the original term, and influence from Tibet’s northern neighbors was likely at least a contributing factor to it. Next, the sgra-bla spelling used in the Bon texts is consistent with the pronunciation, and thus could be an earlier rendering more closely approximating the meaning of the term, though the available literary evidence is inconclusive. Finally, from the earliest time that the sgra-bla is mentioned in a work having a historical context it has a physical location, on the right shoulder. Is there any evidence in Tibetan culture for a “voice-spirit” or source of language in that part of the human body?

Recall the figure of Milarepa, the famous poet-saint of the Kagyu school, who is depicted cupping his hand to his right ear as if listening. Stein says of this gesture that “it is characteristic, not only of Milarepa and other saints, but of the epic hero, when identified with the bard, or when receiving information from the gods.” In other words the gesture indicates the source of the saint’s or the poet’s inspiration. This source was none other than the sgra-bla, originally a figure perhaps comparable to the Greek muses, a “voice” separate from the poet (or in earlier times perhaps the king), an audible manifestation of his vital spirit that he was dependent on for advice and inspiration.

Stein has repeatedly remarked, in his book on the Tibetan epic and its bards, on the close connection between the bard and the sgra-bla, but the deities he discusses are definitely of the warrior type, and the whole relationship falls into the complex nexus that also includes kings and sacred mountains. Of note, however, is that Gesar, the main hero of the epic, was probably imported to Tibet at the time of Tibet’s military expansion; it does not seem at all illogical that an individual vital spirit, so important in village or nomadic life, should be exteriorized into a fierce protective warrior god during the time Tibet was undergoing military and political organization on a scale previously unknown.

The view of the sgra-bla presented here has ramifications beyond the correction of an old spelling of a minor deity’s name. It obviously challenges a belief still strong, if not prevailing, that the “folk stratum” of Tibetan religion has remained largely the same from the earliest times
through the introduction of Bon and Chos to the present, and might provide a starting point for study of the shift from the autochthonous religion to these imports. It is clearly related to the history of oracles in Tibet, and might help shed light on their functioning. It could provide another clue to the mystery of Dri-gum, which has been considered a watershed both in the Tibetan tradition and by scholars on its outside. Perhaps most interesting, it shows how one element of the Tibetan religious world had its roots neither in imported beliefs and rituals, nor in a superstitious and fearful worship of the phenomenal world, but rather in what seems to be a simple empirical evaluation of man’s place in the cosmos that may parallel those found in other societies.

NOTES

3. Snellgrove (p. 258 n. 20) notes that “the meaning of ‘enemy god’ for a divinity whose protection one expects, seems rather unsatisfactory.”
7. Stein (1959) p. 575: Vaiśravaṇa is of a “type iconographique propré a Khotan et a Tun-Huang, type qui a des affinités iranniennes, a aussi fourni aux Tibétaines le modèle du Dieu de la Guerre par excellence, le dGra-lha.” Waddell, in his uneven but occasionally informative work (p. 375), points out the resemblance of the dgra-lha to the Chinese Kwan Te, and Kawaguchi (p. 550) goes so far as to identify Gesar, the arch dgra-lha, with Kwan Te.
8. Sgra-bla-spyang-zhon, Gsas-mkhar-rin-po-che, Sgra-bla'i-rgyal-mo'i-bskang-ba; also, Snellgrove 258 n. 20.
10. Snellgrove pp. 25,33.
11. Martin p. 11
12. Parenthetically, among the retinue of Pehar, as described in the Sgsum (p. 22), a Gelugpa work, the “king of speech” is named dgra-lha-skyes-gcig. Thus the only member of the pentad whose function is related to language is classed with the dgra-lha.
13. Haahr cites Dpa'-bo-gtug-lag (p. 143) and the Rgyal-rabs-gsal-ba'i-me-long (p. 148); Nebesky-Wojkowitz cites Klong-rdol Bla-ma (p. 264).
14. It seems just as likely, if not more so, that the bla would be said to occupy a position on the body as a lha, especially in view of the fact that
the lha originally occupied the upper strata (cf. Hoffmann p. 94), while there are frequent references in Tibetan folklore to bla-rdo-s, bla-shing-s etc. where someone’s vital spirit rests. Also relevant to this point, Shirokogoroff (p. 51) believes the Tungus concept of soul or vital spirit to be more basic than their various deity-spirits. Shirokogoroff also records a belief that the “soul” is multifaceted (p. 52), a balance of several aspects; perhaps the ‘go-ba’i-lha (bla) reflects something similar. Obviously the present writer disagrees with his assumption that such beliefs represent degraded Buddhist concepts.

16. Especially since animal skins are frequently found among the offerings (spyan-gzigs) in latter-day mgon-khangs dedicated to the fierce deities.


18. I refer the reader who feels his credulity stretched by this suggestion to Julian Jaynes’s work, which presents a coherent and logical description of the mentation of ancient man in which such auditory guides played a leading role.


WORKS CONSULTED


REPLY TO ALEX WAYMAN’S REVIEW OF
THE YOGA OF TIBET

Jeffrey Hopkins

In reviewing my *The Yoga of Tibet* (*Journal of the Tibet Society*, vol. 3, 1983, pp. 60-63), Professor Alex Wayman attempts in an acerbic way to demolish any credibility of my translation. At best, his supercilious tone might be fitting if his points were correct, but what happens if his argument is not borne out? Let us consider his points one by one.

Wayman uses innuendo, misrepresentation, non-admission of ambiguity, false declaration, and mis-readings of Tibetan to attack the work. He begins with mild innuendo, suggesting that I somehow made up the designations “Parts Two and Three” (p. 43) for the two sections translated in this volume. Wayman says:

The second (pp. 43-203) is a translation by Jeffrey Hopkins of portions of the *Sṅags rim chen mo* which he labels “2,” calling it “Action Tantra,” and “3,” calling it “Performance Tantra.” (p.61)

Why does Wayman say “which he labels” as if I created the section divisions? Did he not read my “Translator’s Note” at the very beginning of the book (p.vii) which identifies the two parts translated here as “the second and third parts of Tsong-kha pa’s *Great Exposition of Secret Mantra*”? Did he not read Tsong-kha-pa’s own conclusion to the section on Action Tantra (p. 179) where he says, “The second section . . . is concluded,” and to the section on Performance Tantra (p.203), where he says, “The third section . . . is concluded”?

Wayman then objects to my translations of the terms *kriyātantra* (*bya ba’i rgyud*) and *caryātantra* (*spyod pa’i rgyud*) as “Action Tantra” and “Performance Tantra” respectively, raising the question:

Is there not also ‘action’ and ‘performance’ in both of them? The translator does not even admit to demurring over the words, as though there might have been some difficulty. (p. 61)

Of course, there is this ambiguity, and, as Wayman should have known, the point was raised in volume one in *Tantra in Tibet* by the Dalai Lama (p. 75):

In Action Tantra external activities predominate. In Performance Tantra external activities and internal yoga are performed equally.

and by Tsong-kha-pa (p. 162):

Those who resort to a great many external activities in order to actualize these two yogas are trainees of Action Tantras. Those who balance
their external activities and internal meditative stabilization without 
using very many activities are trainees of Performance Tantras.

Hence, Performance Tantra does involve external activities or actions 
but not as much as Action Tantra does. Wayman’s attempt to avoid the 
problem by not translating the terms and simply using the Sanskrit is 
no solution at all. It merely hides the problem from those who do not 
know Sanskrit, while for those who do know Sanskrit, the question 
can still be posed, “Does caryātantra not involve kriyā?”

Next, Wayman attempts to correct my translation of brtul zhugs bzang 
po khyod la bshad as “explains these pledges to you — a good system of 
conduct,” to “explains to you, O goodly avowed one.” He declares 
that brtul zhugs bzang po is vocative, but since it has no case ending it-
self, it can, in this context, be either nominative, vocative, or dative. As 
a nominative, it would be appositive to dam tshig ‘di dag which precedes 
it; as a vocative, it would have the same reference as khyod but not be 
governed by the dative ending la; and as a dative, it would be gov-
erned by la. The situation is admittedly ambiguous. Although strictly 
Tibetan syntax, as opposed to translation from Sanskrit, would favor 
the latter two readings, my guess is that, given that it is a translation 
from Sanskrit, it is nominative, serving as object of the verb, and I have 
translated it accordingly.

In my rendering of slar sdu pa yi tshig gis non, Wayman does rightly 
correct my mistranslation of non as “augmented” to “should restrain.”

with the word of withdrawal” for Tib. slar sdu pa yi tshig gis non. But 
slar sdu pa, occurring various times, similarly misunderstood, is a 
grammatical term meaning ‘reiteration;’ and non is a weak imperative 
of a verb meaning to ‘restrain;’ hence, “One should restrain by way of 
the repeated words.”

However, the style and content of his remarks are vintage Wayman — 
supercilious, partly right, but mostly wrong. He begins by saying “in 
fact, its Chap. V,” thereby supplying the reference of the citation from 
the Vairocanābhisaṃbodhi. His innuendo is that the citation needs to be 
supplied; however, my note 195 at the head of the citation gives the ex-
act volume, page, and line reference in the tantra! Then, quarrelling 
with my translation of slar sdu pa as “withdrawal,” he makes a totally 
unfounded declaration that the term means “repeated” because, accord-
ing to him, it is a grammatical term meaning “reiteration.” First, if 
Wayman is talking about Tibetan grammar, slar bsdu (with the prefix ba 
and without the suffix da) is indeed a grammatical term, but it refers to 
the Tibetan equivalent of a period, a full stop (or comma coming at the 
end of a quote in a sentence that continues). As Tibet’s foremost gram-
marian, Si-tu, says: 1

Since the relevant subject of discussion or words are concluded by just
it, it is called “a term concluding [any] furtherance” (slar bsdu’i sgra) or
“terminating term” (rdzogs tshig). [a]

In slar bsdu the term slar means “again,” like Wayman’s “reiteration”,
but Wayman has disregarded bsdu which means “collect”; hence, a lit-
eral reading of slar bsdu is something like “wrapping up anything fur-
ther”. Simply put, these endings are terminators; slar bsdu, even as a
grammatical term, does not mean reiteration as Wayman claims.

Second, Buddhaguhya, the foremost commentator on the Vairocanā-
bhisambodhi, himself defines slar bsdu pa as meaning withdrawal in his
Commentary on the “Concentration Continuation” (bsam gtan phyi ma rim
par phye ba rgya cher bshad pa, dhyānottarapaṭalaṭika. 2

[The Concentration Continuation] says, “Having again retracted [liter-
ally, bound] the mind through withdrawal.” The drawing back again
of the unequiposed mind, moving as it likes back and forth to whatso-
ever [objects] by way of the eyes and so forth, in the manner of with-
drawing the winds of the entire body and the placement [of it] inside
one’s own body is withdrawal (slar sdud pa). [Thus, the above phrase
from the tantra] means, “Having through that withdrawal bound and
contracted [the mind] and directed [it] inside”. [b]

Buddhaguhya clearly defines slar sdud pa as the “drawing back again
of the unequiposed mind” and the “the placement [of it] inside one’s
own body” 3. This meaning of slar sdud pa as meditative withdrawal of
the mind from sense objects is similar to the meaning of the grammati-
cal term slar bsdu as a full stop; in the context of meditation, it is a stop-
page of external distraction and “drawing back” inside. Wayman’s
“correction” of the translation of slar sdud pa from “withdrawal” to “re-
iteration” is ridiculous.

Third, Tsong-kha-pa, obviously relying on Buddhaguhya, gives a
similar explanation, translated in The Yoga of Tibet (p. 145): 4

Furthermore, the non-equiposed mind operating as usual should
again be withdrawn and retracted . . .”[c]

Wayman (p. 61 bottom) criticizes me for using Tsong-kha-pa’s expositions that follow verses to get at their meaning, but it can be seen from
Buddhaguhya’s exegesis given above that (1) Tsong-kha-pa’s explana-
tion is specifically aimed at explicating slar sdud pa, (2) it is, therefore,
completely justified to use it to get at the meaning of the term, and
(3) Wayman’s rendering of the term as “reiteration”, again, is totally
wrong. Wayman’s misunderstanding of the term has led him to think
that Tsong-kha-pa’s explanation is not even concerned with explicat-
ing it!
Wayman is right, however, that non means “restrain” (or, even better, “suppressed”), and not “augment” as I translated it (mistaking it for snon). Wayman declares that non is imperative, but it could be the past participle since non is the form used for all three tenses as well as the imperative (nond for the past and imperative being written usually as just non) and since a sequence of practices is being indicated. Thus, I would amend my translation of the above passage to “Suppressed with the word of withdrawal”. A tip of the hat to the reviewer is warranted.

Next in the review, Wayman surmises that the translators of the Vairocanābhisaṃbodhi did not notice that the Sanskrit term aksara was used with two meanings, one as “unchanging” (mi ’gyur ba) and the other as “letter” (yi ge). He says:

The translators of the V-A-T mistakenly translated both by yi ge, whereas those of the Concentration Continuation got it right. (p. 61)

However, it is clear from the Tibetan translation of Buddhaguhya’s Commentary On The “Vairocanābhisaṃbodhi Tantra” (Rnam par snang mdzad mngon par rdzogs par byang chub pa’i rgyud chen po’i ’grel pa, Vairocanābhisaṃbodhivikurudhiṣṭhānamahā-tantraṇārtti) that the translator of this text, the Tibetan Ska ba dpal brtsegs — who, along with the Indian Śilendrabodhi, translated the Vairocanābhisaṃbodhi Tantra — and the revisor, the Tibetan Gzhon nu dpal, chose to retain the translation as yi ge despite being aware of the dual meaning. For the Commentary says:  

“Letter” (yi ge) is a word [meaning] “immutable” (mi ’gyur ba). Furthermore, what are they? Concerning that, letters are said to be of two types — “sounds and minds of enlightenment”. Concerning that, sounds are the forms of mantra letters. They are called “immutable” (mi ’gyur ba) because they do not change (mi ’gyur ba) from the nature of indicating the release of conventional and ultimate deities. . . . The mind of enlightenment is to be taken as a moon disc; the mind of enlightenment which has the nature of thusness is blessed [to appear] as a moon disc because it is implanted with the seal (phyag rgya, mudrā) of the mind of enlightenment as a moon disc. The mind of enlightenment is called “immutable” (mi ’gyur ba) because it does not change (mi ’gyur ba) from having consideration of the nature of emptiness as without the aspects of apprehended object and apprehending subject, etc., since it is thoroughly established as non-erroneous.

From this passage in which the two types of yi ge are each described, with reasons, as being mi ’gyur ba (“immutable”), it is clear that the translators knew that aksara is to be applied in its meaning as “immutable” both to the sounds and to the mind of enlightenment appearing as a moon disc. Undoubtedly, they retained yi ge as what they considered
to be the most cogent single translation for the general passage. Hence, Wayman’s criticism that “The translators of the V-A-T mistakenly translated both by yi ge’” (p. 61) is unfounded; rather, he has not understood the translators’ conscious technique of maintaining a single translation equivalent so that the play on the meanings of the original could be appreciated.

The rest of the review (pp. 62-3), more than half of the piece, is an embarrassingly inept attempt by the reviewer to seal his argument about my incompetence by re- translating a fourteen line passage. First, Wayman criticizes my translation of sgon du bsnyen pa as “prior approximation”, calling it a “crude expression”, his preferred translation being “preliminary service”. However, as the Dalai Lama says in his introduction (p. 19), bsnyen pa has the meaning of nge ba, “approaching” or “coming closer” in the sense that through performing deity yoga one is coming closer to the state of the deity:

For both supreme and common feats deity yoga is necessary, the initial process being called ‘approximation’ because through imagining the deity one is approaching closer to it.

I echo this explanation in my supplement (p. 208):

The initial period of deity yoga is called prior approximation because one is accustoming to a deity through becoming closer and closer to its state . . .

Wayman’s translation of bsnyen pa as “preliminary service” suggests service to or propitiation of a deity, but it is clear from the tradition that this is not the meaning in the context of cultivating deity yoga.

Next, Wayman cites three and a half stanzas — he mistakenly calls them “2 1/2” (p. 62) — from the Vairocanaṁbhisambodhi. Based on misreading these three and a half stanzas, Wayman first criticizes me for linking the mundane and supramundane yogas with yogas with signs and without signs respectively, in a bracketed addition to the translation, and then he cites the tantra passage. Wayman says:

Then he gives Tsōn-kha-pa’s division into mundane and supramundane and adds in brackets, “which are other names for the yogas with and without signs.” This directly contradicts the cited scripture . . .

However, Wayman makes the basic mistake of strangely putting the first line of the third stanza with the preceding two stanzas. Had he followed out the note at the beginning of this passage in which I make reference to Buddhaguhya’s citing only the last six lines — the third stanza and the final two lines — in his Condensation, Wayman would have seen that Buddhaguhya treats the last six lines as a unit in a section which he himself describes as explaining the “meditative stabilization of signlessness (mtshan ma med pa’i ting nge ‘dzin)’’, and that hence
it is perfectly suitable that in brackets in my translation I linked supra-
mundane yoga and yoga without signs.7

It is clear from Buddhaguhya’s explanation and citation of these lines
that the first line of the third stanza — yid kyi ’jig rtén ’das zhes bya “that
called the mentally supramundane” — clearly does not refer to the
yogas of the external and internal four-branched repetitions described
in the first two stanzas as Wayman would have it. Had Wayman seen
this, he would not have made the error of absurdly identifying the
supramundane as the external four-branched repetition (or “outward
praxis” as he calls it) and of absurdly identifying the internal four-
branched repetition (his “inward praxis”) as something beyond even
the supramundane yoga.8 The external and internal four-branched
repetitions are sub-divisions of the mundane yoga, the yoga with
signs.

Wayman’s rendering of Tsong-kha-pa’s brief comment on the pas-
sage[6] is also embarrassingly inept. Tsong-kha-pa corrects the notion
that “supramundane” here refers to a consciousness in the continuum
of a Superior (’phags pa, āryan) directly realizing emptiness, such a
misunderstanding being based on the fact that the term
“supramundane” is usually associated with the path of seeing and
above. He makes the profound and penetrating point that “supra-
mundane” here has a wider meaning in that it encompasses a con-
sciousness that has the aspect of selflessness — any consciousness re-
alizing emptiness — whether it be conceptual or direct or a conscious-
ness conjoined with it in the sense that the ascertainment factor (nges
cha) realizes emptiness but the appearance aspect (snang cha) appears in
the form of a deity. In other words, the supramundane yoga does not
have to be devoid of appearance as a deity. As Tsong-kha-pa himself
says on the previous page:9

Yoga without signs refers to deity meditation and repetition involving
meditation on emptiness and does not refer to meditation on empti-
ness alone. If yoga without signs did refer to just meditation on empti-
ness, it would be necessary to assert that one could be fully enlight-
ened through emptiness yoga alone since the Vairocanābhisaṃbodhi
Tantra says that both feats can be achieved through the signless.10

Not realizing that Tsong-kha-pa’s remark after the disputed passage is
making the same point, Wayman fails to see that supramundane yoga
and yoga without signs are the same at least in this sense. Wayman
mis-renders the Tibetan cited above as:

The supramundane of this passage does not mean the non-flux
(anāsravana) of a noble person’s stream of consciousness, but is his self-
lessness character and the yoga associated with it.

Wayman has botched the passage. For, (1) zag med, rather than refer-
ring to "non-flux", refers to a non-contaminated consciousness of meditative equipoise on emptiness. (2) Similarly, bdag med pa'i rnam pa can refers to a consciousness having the aspect of, that is to say, realizing, emptiness and not to the yogi's own "selflessness character"; Wayman simply disregards the particle can ("that which has"). Wayman displays an appalling lack of familiarity with standard technical vocabulary.

With what Buddhaguhya's explanation shows to be a wrong perspective on the passage and a lack of appreciation for technical vocabulary and basic grammar, Wayman finds my insertion of many bracketed expressions to be "a substitute for understanding and communicating the author's passage". Here is my rendering:

The supramundane in this passage does not refer to a non-contaminated [wisdom consciousness] in the continuum of a Superior [directly realizing emptiness] but is [a consciousness] having the aspect of selflessness [that is, realizing emptiness conceptually or directly] or a yoga conjoined with that [in which the wisdom consciousness itself manifests in form].

Wayman's attempt at correction turns into a dismal display of his own inability either to read Tibetan grammar or to appreciate the basic points being made, nevermind the nuances of Buddhaguhya's and Tsong-kha-pa's commentaries.

Finally, a point that Wayman makes near the beginning of his review, about my mode of procedure, raises a basic question about his own. Though he accurately cites a remark from the "Translator's Note" about my working in collaboration with Tibetan scholars on Part II of the book (comprised by the translation of the sections on Action and Performance Tantras in Tsong-kha-pa's text), he superimposes a meaning that causes me to wonder about his motives:

Hopkins hopes to demonstrate the correctness of the translation by a remarkable statement in "Translator's Note": "Part II was orally retranslated into Tibetan for Lati Rinbochay for the sake of correction and verification, and a complete commentary on the same was received from Denma Lochö Rinbochay." This is a direct challenge to any reviewer that a criticism of the translation is a disrespect to the learned Tibetan lamas whose precious advice he utilized at every step. Of course, such an attitude goes with regarding the text being translated as something holy. (p. 61)

Since I speak only of orally retranslating into Tibetan my English translation for a lama and of receiving teachings on Tsong-kha-pa's exposition from another lama, it is very odd that Wayman finds this to be a "direct challenge" to a reviewer such that I am claiming holy authority for my translation. Since it is patently absurd that merely mentioning
those who collaborated on interpreting the text involved an invocation of sacred authority, Wayman’s reaction suggests that he is making an excuse for his not consulting Tibetan scholars in his own work. (This recalls his highly defensive and acerbic response to Professor Geshe Sopa’s accurate review article, “Some Comments on Tsong kha pa’s Lam rim chen mo and Professor Wayman’s Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real”, in which he shows his sensitivity about not consulting with indigenous scholars.)\textsuperscript{11} My own opinion is that a translator should utilize all available resources and when highly trained scholars of a religious and philosophical tradition are available for consultation as to meaning and context, a translator would be foolish not to do so if at all possible. Does Professor Wayman mean to suggest that a preferable translation would be done without awareness of the text as it is understood in the tradition of its origin? Is his method more scientific or perhaps even more pure because it draws only on his own readings? Could his method be deemed successful given the inaccuracies that abound in his review? Rather than attacking me for utilizing available sources, Wayman might more appropriately explain his preference for incomplete research, the results of which are obvious from his review.
NOTES

1. In his Explanation of “The Thirty” and “Usage of Gender”, Special Treatise on the Thorough Application of the Language of the Snowy Country, Beautiful Pearl Necklace of the Wise (Yul gangs can pa’i brda yang dag par sbyor ba’i bstan bcos kyi bye brag sum cu pa dang rtags kyi ‘jug pa’i gzhung gi rnam par bshad pa mkhas pa’i mgul rgyan mu tig phreng mdzes), (Dharmsala, n.d.), 16.13.

2. P3495, vol. 78, 74.5.2.

3. For Buddhaghuya’s explanation of slar sdad pa as “withdrawing vitality (or currents of energy)” (srog slar sdad pa) see the citation from his Condensation of the “Vairocanābhisambodhi Tantra” (Rnam par snang mdzad mngon par rdzogs par byang chub pa’i rgyud kyi bs dus pa’i don, Vairochanābhisambodhitantraprīḍārtha) in n.7; also, for his explanation of slar sdad pa as “withdrawal from the branches of external repetition to internal repetition” (phyi rol kyi bzlas pa’i yan lag las nang gi yan lag tu bsdu ba), see n.8. In all of these, slar sādā pa means “withdrawal”.

4. Great Exposition of Secret Mantra: The Stages of the Path to a Conqueror and Pervasive Master, a Great Vajradhāra: Revealing All Secret Topics (Sngags rim chen mo/ rgyal ba khyab bdag rdo rje ‘chang chen po’i lam gyi rim pa gsang ba kun gyi gnad rnam par phyel ba), (Dharmsala: Shes rig par khang, 1969), 55b.6.

5. P3490, vol. 77, 284.4.8-284.5.5. In the Dharma Press edition, this is the Rnam par snang mdzad mngon par rdzogs par byang chub pa’i rgyud kyi tshig ‘grel, vol. 59, text 2663A, and the specific passage is 1432.5-1433.1.

6. Sngags rim chen mo, 67a.5. There are minor differences with the tantra as given in the Peking edition (P126, vol.5, 256.2.7) where line four reads bla med pa’o; line seven reads bshubs te bzlas brjod bde ba’i mchog; and line ten reads bsdud.

In English, the passage is:

I have explained [the yoga] having four branches
With external and internal application.
This is the unsurpassed worldly imagination;
Suppressed with the word of withdrawal,
The mind which has accorded with the deity
Is taught as the supreme
Of whispered repetitions,
Having imagination [of conventional phenomena].

For the ‘mentally supramundane’
Withdrawal [from the external branches of repetition to the internal] and so forth are completely abandoned.
[Oneself and deity] are made undifferentiable in [terms of their empty] nature
Through a mind creating oneness with the deity
And not conceiving of difference.
In no other way is [supramundane repetition] to be done.

The rendering here differs from that in The Yoga Of Tibet (p. 187) in that “augmented” has been changed to “suppressed” as per Wayman’s correction; “having apprehension” has been changed to “having imagination [of conventional phenomenal]” for clarity; what were the first seven lines are now eight in order to accord with the line number in the text; “mentally supramundane” has been put in quotes; and bracketed additions of “form” and “physical” have been deleted (see n.8).

Wayman’s rendition (p. 63) is radically different:

I have explained the four members [i.e., in Tibetan yi ge, mi ’gyur ba, gzi, and second gzi] by outward and inward praxis. Besides, one should restrain by way of repeated words the incomparable mundane one possessed of apprehension (of outward object). I teach that the mind which is consistent with the deity has the best whispered recitation, and is possessed of apprehension (of the deity object), (so) called the “supramundane mind.” (The inward praxis) avoids the repetition, and so on; acts as one with the deity and does not conceive a difference. The indissoluble nature is to be made by the mind. There is no other way to make it.

For my criticism of Wayman’s translation, see the remainder of the article and the accompanying notes.
7. P3486, vol.77, 106.4.2-104.4.8[6] In English, as taken from The Yoga of Tibet, pp. 197, 199, and 187):

The stages of the yoga for achieving repetition by way of familiarizing with the meditative stabilization of signlessness which has the character of the Truth Body of your own deity are as follows: As before, you should for a while actualise all the factors of the four branches of repetition and so forth, etc., and then analyse the imagined colour, shape, and so on of your deity who is non-dual with yourself, breaking them down into many* particles. Or it is also suitable to do this by way of the reasoning of its [i.e., the divine body] not having been produced from the start and its not being produced, or by way of the reasoning [that is, technique] of withdrawing vitality [wind or currents of energy] [(srog sla’r sdud pa)] through the yoga of turning your mind inside, or by way of not taking the appearance [of colour and shape]** to mind. In accordance with that realisation actualise mere self-knowledge of the mind, without [dualistic] appearance, free from your own divine form body, and repeat mentally whatever your knowledge mantra is. To indicate that, [the Vairocanabhisaṃbodhi Tantra says:]

For the ‘mentally supramundane’
Withdrawal [from the external branches of repetition to the internal]*** and so forth are completely abandoned.
[Oneself and the deity] are made undifferentiable in [terms of their empty] nature
Through a mind creating oneness with the deity
And not conceiving of difference.
In no other way is [supramundane repetition] to be done.

This is the prior approximation of practitioners.

Buddhaguhya explains the meditative stabilization of signlessness and then cites these six lines in isolation, thereby explicitly linking the meditative stabilization of signlessness and the "mentally supramundane" repetition.

*The Peking edition, 106.4.4, does not read "many" (*du mar) whereas the Dharmasala edition does on 70a.2 but does not on 70b.6.
**Brackets added to the translation as it appears in *The Yoga Of Tibet.*
***For the bracketed addition, see Buddhaguhya’s other explanation as given in n.8.

8. Buddhaguhya is just as explicit on this point in his other commentary. In commenting on the entire passage, he cites the first eight lines and the last six lines as two separate units, saying that they explain the mundane and supramundane repetitions respectively (P3490, vol.77 286.1.3-286.2.5; Dharma, vol. 59, text 2663A, 1438.4-1439.5):

[The passage beginning with] "I have explained [the yoga] having four branches/ With external and internal application" through to "Is taught as the supreme of whispered repetitions" says that — from between the brief indications earlier of those that have the nature of the ultimate and the conventional — the four branches of conventional repetition, that is to say, three external branches and one internal branch, which I have explained, are worldly repetition and furthermore are supreme among repetitions involving imagination.

"Suppressed by the word of withdrawal" is as [explained] earlier. "The mind which has accorded with the deity" says that the mind is to observe [imagine, or apprehend] this one-pointedly.

[The passage beginning with] "For the 'mentally supramundane'" through to "In no other way is [supramundane repetition] to be done" comments in detail on the ultimate repetition explained earlier. In that, "Withdrawal [from external branches of repetition to the internal] and so forth are completely abandoned" says that since the supramundane repetition does not observe [imagine, or apprehend] the nature of a thoroughly impure deity, there is no withdrawal from the branches of external repetition to internal repetition.

"Oneness with the deity['s form']" says that the form of the deity and one's own form are taken as one. "And not conceiving of difference" says that since it is possible for different forms to operate in one place, the taking of the two — the deity and oneself — to be one is not such but is to take the two — the deity and oneself — to be non-different. Also, since it is possible for the non-difference of the two — the deity and oneself — to be in physical nature, in order to dispel [that possibility, the text] says, "are made undifferentiable in [terms of their empty] nature through the
mind.” It is not that [their] form and so forth are to be made into one; rather, both minds are to be made undifferentiable in the nature of emptiness.

“In no other way is [supramundane repetition] to be done” says that the supramundane repetition is not to be done in a way other than like this. In brief, observing [imagining, or apprehending] the suchness of the sounds that are one’s essence [mantra], one breaks down one’s own form in emptiness and thereupon realizes that just as one’s own form [is understood] as emptiness, so all phenomena also are the same in [their] nature of emptiness. Since, in that way, all phenomena are undifferentiable in [their] nature of emptiness, one realizes that the natures of oneself and of the deity also are undifferentiable in the character of emptiness and thereupon staying in one-pointed meditative stabilization on emptiness, one mentally makes repetition.[b]

Wayman bases his interpretation of the three-and-a-half-stanza passage from the tantra on his mistaken placement of the first line of the third stanza (yid kyi 'jig rt'en 'das zhes bya) with the previous stanza. He mistakenly concludes that even the first two stanzas are concerned with the “mentally supramundane”. He also mistakenly sees those two stanzas as limited to discussing the “outward praxis”, i.e., the external four-branched repetition, whereas they are concerned with both the external and internal four-branched repetitions. Buddhaguhya’s statement “‘For the ‘mentally supramundane’” through to ‘In no other way is [supramundane repetition] to be done’ comments in detail on the ultimate repetition explained earlier,” leaves no room for Wayman’s interpretation, for Buddhaguhya’s statement indicates that the last stanza and a half are concerned solely with ultimate or supramundane repetition and not with the “inward praxis” or internal four-branched repetition as Wayman would have it. Since Buddhaguhya clearly sees the first line of the third stanza as introducing the topic of the third stanza and the first two lines of the fourth stanza, Wayman’s interpretation “that both the mundane and the supramundane yoga is subject to ‘flux’ (āsrava)” falls to the ground.

In the above passage, Buddhaguhya mentions an earlier explanation of “Suppressed by the word of withdrawal”, but I have not been able to find such in this text. Wayman reports (p. 61) that “Buddhaguhya’s commentary for Chap. V of the scripture was lost”, and the fifth chapter is where the earlier commentary would most likely have been.

Also, the meaning of yid gnyis pa (P3490, vol. 77, 286.2.2 and Dharma, text 2663A, vol. 59, 1439.3) which I have translated as “both minds” most likely refers to the mind of the deity and the mind of the meditator, since, as Buddhaguhya says in his Condensation (P3486, vol. 77, 106.4.2) this meditation is concerned with the “Truth Body of one’s own deity” (rang gi lha chos kyi sku). Buddhaguhya’s explanation of this in his Condensation (106.4.2-5), cited earlier in this article, makes it clear
that the non-difference is in terms of the "mere self-knowing mind" (sens rang rig pa tsam).

In accordance with Buddhaghuya's explanation, my translation of the passage from the tantra in The Yoga of Tibet, p. 187 would be improved by eliminating the bracketed additions of "form" and "physical". It is clear from Buddhaghuya's Condensation, cited earlier in the article, that initially the yogi identifies physically with the deity, then breaks down that divine body into non-appearance, whereupon a mental oneness is created.

When Buddhaghuya speaks of "the four branches of conventional repetition, that is to say, three external branches and one internal branch", he appears to be making a condensation of the more usual mode of four branches each for external and internal repetition. He has abbreviated the total of eight branches into three for external repetition and one for internal repetition; Wayman's failure to understand this has led to many errors in his interpretation.

9. The Yoga of Tibet, p. 186, which translated the original Tibetan (Dharamsala: Shes rig par khang, 1969, 67a.2). Since the Vairocanabhisaambodhi Tantra itself (see the next note) says that both feats — the common feats and the supreme feat of Buddhahood — can be attained through signless yoga, it follows that if signless yoga were merely meditation on emptiness, one could, absurdly, attain Buddhahood merely through meditation on emptiness.

The sentence beginning on the bottom of page 185 in The Yoga of Tibet and ending on line five of page 186 ("Yoga without signs... actually realizing it.") is the typesetter's combination of the previous and following sentences and should be deleted.


The first of those [yoga with signs] is deity yoga not conjoined with [realization of] emptiness, and the second [signless yoga] is to be taken as deity yoga conjoined with [realization of] emptiness but is not to be taken as meditating just on emptiness. For, it is said that one is not fully enlightened through having meditated just on emptiness and that through the yoga without signs both feats are achieved.[i]

Based on a corrupt text (see the Guru Deva printing of the Lhasa edition, nya 562.5, and Lessing and Wayman, p. 206) that reads dngos grub gnyis ka mi 'grub par, Ferdinand D. Lessing and Alex Wayman translate the last clause in their Mkhhas Grub Rje's Fundamentals of the Buddhist Tantras, p. 207, as, "it is explained that one does not accomplish both siddhis by means of the Yoga without images." Such would contradict
not only Tsong-kha-pa’s text but also the *Vairocanābhisambodhi Tantra* which Tsong-kha-pa cites (66b.7 of the Dharmsala edition, p. 185 of *The Yoga of Tibet*):

The excellent Conquerors assert that feats
Having signs [arise] through that with signs.
Through abiding in the signless
That having signs can also be achieved.
Hence, you should rely in all
Respects on the signless.\[^{k}\]

The word “also” in the fourth line indicates that not only can signless feats be achieved through signless yoga but also those with signs can. Hence, Mkhas-grub’s point is that since signless yoga is not just meditation on emptiness, both feats — both common feats and the supreme feat of Buddhahood or both Form Bodies and a Truth Body — can be achieved through it.

That Lessing’s and Wayman’s text is corrupt is clear from Tsong-kha-pa’s text, given in the previous note and confirmed by the Lha-sa old Zhol edition, reprinted by Guru Deva, New Delhi, 1978, ga 159.5.

Feats having signs are identified in *The Yoga of Tibet* in an annotation (p. 185) as “Form Bodies” in accordance with the Dalai Lama’s commentary (see p. 37) but can also be identified as common feats as was done by Lochö Rinbochay.

11. See Geshe Sopa, “Some Comments on Tsong kha pa’s *Lam rim chen mo* and Professor Wayman’s *Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real*”; “Alex Wayman Replies to Geshe Sopa”, and “Geshe Sopa Replies to Alex Wayman”, *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies*, 3 (1980), pp. 68-92, and 98-100. See specifically p. 93.
[a] གི་ལོ་བོད་ཀྱི་དབང་ཕྲྲིད་ནུས་ཁོངས་གྱི་ཤིང་སྤྱར་ཉིད་གྱིས་བསྟན་པ་ཤིང་།

[b] སྤྱིན་བོད་ལི་ཕྱི་བོད་དང་་ཡིས་འགྲེལ་བ་ཐོབ་བྱ་དེ།
མ་པ་བོད་དང་་པོ་དུ་ཕྲུག་གི་དྲོན་པ་དུ་སློབ་པའི་བོད་ལི་བོད་ལི་གྲོགས་པ་ཞིང་།
མི་ཐོས་པ་ོ་ཟློང་ཉིད་གྱི་བོད་ལི་བོད་ལི་གྲོགས་པ་ཞིང་།

[c] བོད་པ་བོད་ལི་བོད་ལི་གྲོགས་པ་ཞིང་སྣང་།
དབང་ཕྲྲིད་འབྲེལ་བ་ཐོབ་བྱ་དེ་ཐོས་པ་ོ་ཟློང་ཉིད་གྱིས་
[d]

གི་གིས་གནང་བཞིན་མི་འབྲུག་མ་ལེགས་པར་གྱི་ངའི་
བཞིན་ཐབས་དེ་གཞན་གཞི་གླས་དྲང་བ་བོད།

ཤེས་སུ་ཤིང་དང་དེ་འབྲི་བཞིན་དེ་བོད།

ཞིབ་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་བཞིན་ལེགས་དུ་མི་འབྲུག་བཞིན་དུ་མི་
མི་རྒྱ་ལེགས་པོ་ ... ལུང་ཁ་འཱིར་སེམས་པའི་
དགོས་འབྲོས་པའི་དོན་ཁོ་ནི རྒྱུ་བཞིན་དེ་བོད།

དོན་ཁོ་ནི རྒྱུ་བཞིན་དེ་བོད།

སེམས་བཞིན་གཏང་ལམ་བཞིན་དོན་ཁོ་ནི ལུང་ཁ་

སེམས་བཞིན་གཏང་ལམ་བཞིན་དོན་ཁོ་ནི ལུང་ཁ་

སེམས་པའི་མི་འབྲུག་མ་ལེགས་ཞི་དི་མཐོང་པར་

ཕྲེད་མ་བཞིན་པ་བཞིན་དེ་བོད།

དེ་འབྲི་བཞིན་དེ་བོད།

དེ་འབྲི་བཞིན་དེ་བོད།

དེ་འབྲི་བཞིན་དེ་བོད།

དེ་འབྲི་བཞིན་དེ་བོད།

དེ་འབྲི་བཞིན་དེ་བོད།

དེ་འབྲི་བཞིན་དེ་བོད།

དེ་འབྲི་བཞིན་དེ་བོད།

དེ་འབྲི་བཞིན་དེ་བོད།

དེ་འབྲི་བཞིན་དེ་བོད།

དེ་འབྲི་བཞིན་དེ་བོད།
[e] དོན་དང་ཉི་དོན་བཞི་ནས་བཙན་བཞི་ཡི་དག་
ད་པོ་ནི། གཞི་དོན་ཤིང་བཞི་ནི། སྨིང་གཉེན་
གྲོ་མེད་ལ། བོན་ཤྱི་བཞི་དོན་བཞི་ནི། དྲེ་སྦྱོང་
ནས་གཞི་དོན་བཞི་ནི། དྲེ་སྦྱོང་པོ་བཞིའི་དཔོན་པར་
མཆོག་ལོ། སྨིང་གཉེན་བཞི་བཞི་ནི། དྲེ་སྦྱོང་
ནས་གཞི་དོན་བཞི་ནི། དྲེ་སྦྱོང་བཞིའི་དཔོན་པར་
མཆོག་ལོ། བོན་ཤྱི་བཞི་དོན་བཞི་ནི། དྲེ་སྦྱོང་
ནས་གཞི་དོན་བཞི་ནི། དྲེ་སྦྱོང་པོ་བཞིའི་
དཔོན་པར་མཆོག་ལོ། ।

[f] གཞི་དོན་ཤིང་བཞི་ནི། བཙན་བཞི་ཡི་དག་
ད་པོ་ནི། གཞི་དོན་ཤིང་བཞི་ནི། བཙན་བཞི་ཡི་
དག་དང་པོ་བཞིའི་

deliberate transcription
[ other version, as in the text of the article, reads:]

[ other version:]

[h]

[ other version: ]
བས་གཞི་གདན་གྱི་བདེན་བརྟན་ཕྲོད་པར་བཞི་
དེ་[reading སི་ཟོ་ for སི་ཟོ་ in accordance with Dharma 1439.2]

བས་གཞི་གདན་གྱི་བདེན་བརྟན་ཕྲོད་པར་
དེ་[reading ིི་ for ིི་ in accordance with Dharma 1439.2]

དེ་གཞི་བས་གཞི་འབོད་བརྩན་གྱི་
[Dharma 1439.3 reads བྱུ་ན་] རང་བེན་རྒུ་ཞིང་། རིས་
ལོ་ཞི་བཞི་དེ་བྱུགས་པ་བསམ་བཟོད་ནས་
དེ་མི་འི་བཞི་བཞི་བཞི་བཞི་བཞི་བཞི་བཞི་
དེ་མི་འི་བཞི་བཞི་བཞི་བཞི་བཞི་
དེ་མི་འི་བཞི་བཞི་བཞི་བཞི་བཞི་
དེ་མི་འི་བཞི་བཞི་བཞི་བཞི་
དེ་མི་འི་བཞི་བཞི་
དེ་མི་འི་བཞི་
དེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི་

dེ་མི་འི།
青海省卡若区拉孜乡

[1] 青海省卡若区拉孜乡

[2] 青海省卡若区拉孜乡
བོད་ཡིག་ནི་ོ་ངོ་ཚུ་ལ་མཚམས་པ་མི་གྱུར།
ོ་ངོ་ཚུ་ལ་མཚམས་པ་མི་གྱུར། མཚན་མ་
མི་གྱུར་མཁྱེན་པ་འདོད་དཔལ་མིག་ལོག་རབ་
བོད་ཡིག་ནི་ོ་ངོ་ཚུ་ལ་མཚམས་པ་མི་གྱུར།

[k]
མཚན་མར་བཅོམས་བར་དབྱེ་བཀོད།
དབྱེ་བཀོད་དཔལ་མིག་ལོག་རབ་
མཚན་མིང་དཀར་པ་མི་གྱུར།
མཚན་མིང་དཀར་པ་མི་གྱུར།
དབྱེ་བཀོད་དཔལ་མིག་ལོག་རབ་
མཚན་མིང་དཀར་པ་མི་གྱུར།
Book Reviews


Finally a full length, clearly authoritative biography of Alexandra David-Neel has been published. It is by Jean Chalon, issued by the Librairie Academique Perrin in France. It was composed with the help of Marie-Madeleine Peyronnet. She was with Alexandra David-Neel for the last 10 years of her life. Peyronnet still lives in Samten Dzong, the place David-Neel built with earnings from her publications.

Alexandra David-Neel is the most interesting of the past generation of western Tibetanists. Though she died in 1969, almost 101 years old, her books are still published world-wide. Her audience is surely greater than that of any other Tibetanist. While primarily a popular writer, her basic information is earthy and has been directly observed. She is not, as are some other writers for a wide audience, painful to read for those who have direct knowledge of Tibet. Nor are her publications just for the coffee table.

The book gives an intimate view of her life. One learns about her still unpublished material. One also learns about her early liaison with Jean Haustont, with whom she lived for several years just before the turn of the century, and continued to see prior to and after her marriage. Jean Haustont opened a music school in Nanking in 1912. That was shortly after Alexandra herself had left on her 1911-1924 soujourn in Asia.

While one may regret that biographies of Tibetanists are not written by Tibetanists, this biography does give some indication of her studies and other details not to be found in her own books. One learns about her relationship with Elisee Reclus and Sylvain Levi. There is interesting information on her relationships with a variety of cultists, orientalists, Tibetan scholars and those politically involved with Tibetan affairs. One learns of her psychological reactions as others, such as Giuseppe Tucci, began to overlap into what she considered her domain of serious popularization. One does not leave this biography with quite the same feeling of missing out on just the information pertinent to Tibetan studies that one has, for example, with the biography of William Woodville Rockhill by Paul A. Varg.

Despite the book's almost 500 pages, it reads with unabated verve. That is possibly because Jean Chalon cites Alexandra's own words and descriptions for many of the concepts and events with which she was involved. There is only one serious lack in the book. The bibliography merely cites her books, and not the long list of articles which Alexandra David-Neel wrote on a gamut of topics throughout her long life. Her
English articles in the Asia Magazine, for example, show that she was politically more perceptive than many whose academic reputations seem not to have suffered from their often erroneous views. Possibly her strength was her realization of the power wielded by illusions over realities.

*Brahm Norwick
New York City*


The object of this publication is the documentation of the material culture of Zanskar (Southern Ladakh) within the context of social institutions and traditions that have been subject to the impact of modernity for the last few years. The author expects far reaching changes in these areas over the coming years, and therefore sees his work as a contribution toward preserving a waning phase of Himalayan and Tibetan civilization. The findings are based on the author’s observations made during his stays in Zanskar in 1977 and 1979, where he lived for most of the time in Zangla, a petty kingdom located in the northern part of Zanskar. Several people from Zanskar and a monk from Leh served as informants who interpreted to Friedl what he had observed.

In a brief introduction, Friedl talks about the methods he opted for, his informants, and the publications on Tibetan civilization in general and the West Himalayan in particular that are available and known to him. The second chapter, less than five pages in length, describes the landscape, climate, and history of the region. The third deals with the societal organizations; the fourth with “house and agriculture”; the last with the traditional crafts practiced by Zanskaris. In his conclusion Friedl points to the recently established elementary school as the motor of change, but also at the increasing traffic and commerce which brought an end to Zanskar’s traditional isolation. Of great value are 78 drawings illustrating the various tools and techniques for manufacturing the material goods essential for a traditional lifestyle in Zanskar. A few photographs enhance the visual appeal of the book.

To document a waning phase of a little known civilization is always a welcome contribution to scholarship, regardless of the actual quality of a publication. But aside from these merits Friedl’s book is marred by a number of faults. The most severe impediment is that he has obviously no knowledge of Tibetan. Thus, most of the Tibetan terms he uses to identify numerous objects are misunderstood or misspelled common Tibetan words, and not characteristic terms. For instance, Friedl gives *ago* for “elder brother, elder brother-in-law, elder brother of one’s
wife” and *agu* for “father’s elder brother” (both p.11), but fails to recognize that both “terms” are nothing but the common Tibetan word ‘*a khu* which usually refers to one’s paternal uncle. The result is confusing as a reader not knowledgeable in Tibetan will think there is a difference between *agu* and *ago* where there is none. Twenty years ago, Snellgrove had already pointed out that anthropologists working among Tibetan-speaking groups are well advised to learn literary Tibetan, at least to some extent, so that they will avoid the most severe of such distortions.¹ Later this was repeated by M. Goldstein and others.

This lack of Tibetological knowledge affects other parts of Friedl’s book too. With regard to script and literature among the Zanskaris, Friedl remarks that “the people of the investigated area do possess their own script and literature, but very little has remained. It is the Tibetan script and literature.” He obviously omitted to look into the shrine rooms of Zanskari families which are filled with dozens of precious manuscripts some several centuries old, and he seems unaware of the amount of Tibetan literature available to us. His representation of about 900 years of Ladakhi history is more than inadequate (on less than one page), in particular as the publications of L. Petech and D. Schuh were released before Friedl’s book was printed. But there are also methodological flaws in the book, such as when Friedl says “no relative” of a family with a newly born child is permitted to cross a water course or come close to a *lha tho*, whereas only members of the same *pha spun* (kind of clan) are required to observe this rule.

Misunderstandings, based on a deficient appreciation for traditional Tibetan and Buddhist civilization, abound on every page. For instance, on p. 7f Friedl observes that the nuns of Chomo-Ling (which means “nuns’ convent”) care mainly for the king, but also fulfill some religious functions, “as much as they are permitted to do so as nuns”. Anyone with some knowledge of Buddhism will know that aside from a few minor exceptions, nuns and monks have equal rights and duties according to the *vinaya*. What Friedl observed, i.e. the obvious inequality of nuns and monks in Zangla, is typical for Ladakh, but not for Tibetan civilization in general.

Once in a while a patronizing tone affects the writing, for instance, when the crown prince of Zangla is labeled “verwestlicht” (westernized). Furthermore, the joy of reading this work is severely hampered by numerous typos, the general negligence with which the typescript was prepared, and the clumsy style employed. To sum up, it is sad that this worthwhile project, including all the work carried out by the author as well as his endurance of enormous hardships, is obscured by so many deficiencies.

Eva K. Dargyay
University of Calgary


As the title precisely indicates, this book deals with the methods and materials of thangka painting, which is most probably the best known and most appreciated form of Tibetan art in the West. Until now, however, the main interest in studies of thangkas focused on the subjects expressed by them: their iconography. Little attention has been paid to the material and technical aspects of this art. Under these circumstances, this book is a most welcome contribution and fills a gap in our knowledge.

The first chapter ("The Artistic Wealth of Old Tibet") places thangka painters amongst the other craftsmen and defines the material and spiritual background of their work. From the second chapter onwards the authors follow the "six steps" required to create a thangka. The "six steps" are depicted in eleven chapters:
1. Preparation of the painting surface (Chap. Two),
2. Establishment of a design on that surface by means of a sketch or transfer (Chap. Three: "Composition"; Four: "Sketching and the Theory of Iconometry"; Five: "Iconometric Practice and Further Techniques of Sketching"),
4. Shading (Chap. Ten),
5. Outlining (Chap. Eleven), and
6. Finishing touches (Chap. Twelve: "Finishing Details").

In each chapter the relevant techniques are described step by step in a very pedagogic way and are illustrated by precise and neat drawings as well as by reproductions (regrettably all in black and white) of thangkas. Some pictures show the thangkas "in situ" in Tibet and the painters at work, thus giving a lively touch to the subject. Each chapter is followed by an abundant corpus of notes, most of them referring to original Tibetan treatises on the subject. The description of the materials and techniques is minute and very detailed, but it is never tedious because of the lively first hand information the authors pass on to the reader. They deal not only with the past tradition but also with its present state, relating how the painters are coping with new materials in their countries of adoption.

What is really remarkable in this book is a rare and harmonious blend of the authors' literary knowledge of the subject, acquired
through the reading of numerous original Tibetan texts (hitherto unexplored) on one hand, and on the other, the first hand knowledge of the methods and materials which they learned from many thangka painters (the names of some twenty artists who helped the authors while preparing this study are listed in the preface, p.1).

(It is not out of place to mention here one of the co-authors' previous works which can be read with much benefit as a more "literary" complement to the present study: Thubten Legshay Gyatsho, *Gateway to the Temple* (Tr. by David P. Jackson). *Bibliotheca Himalayica*, Series III, Volume 12, Kathmandu, 1979. In particular, "The origin of the art of painting and sculpting images" and "Body proportions of the sacred figures", pp.55-72.

In the text, all the Tibetan technical terms are given in italics between brackets and they are properly explained and translated into English. This arrangement, which is quite thoughtful and shows at the same time the authors' mastery of the subject, makes the book easily readable for anyone interested in the subject without, however, requiring prior knowledge of the Tibetan language. All the technical terms are gathered together at the end of the book in an extremely useful glossary which gives each term its literary spelling, approximate pronunciation and definition. The other appendices include a study of iconometry through Tibetan sources (Appendix A: "Iconometric Controversies and Sources"), a page on how to obtain the right pigments if one is interested in painting oneself (Appendix B: "Resources"), and examples of the most frequent motifs and symbols (Appendix C: "Motifs and Symbols drawn by Robert Beer"). In this respect, we can add two recent Tibetan works: *A New Approach to the Practice of Tibetan Art*, compiled and published by Jamyang, Mussoorie, 1982, and *Principles of Tibetan Art* (2 vols) by Gege Lama, a master painter of the Karma Gardri school (Darjeeling, 1983).

The Jacksons' extensive knowledge which is presented here is valuable and useful for the student of thangka painting and the 'amateur', as well as for the Tibetologist. For the student, the book can be used as a manual which can complement, but of course not replace, a teacher. For the 'amateur', it is an extensive and handy introduction to this form of art. Finally, for the Tibetologist it is an authoritative reference book on the subject and further, because of the numerous notes and the wide range of topics covered, it also helps him or her in developing a better understanding of Tibetan culture.

The authors deserve high praise for having produced a book of quality which represents the sum of what is presently known on the materials and methods of thangka painting. By virtue of the amount and ac-
The accuracy of the information presented in it, this study will remain as an authority for all future students of thangka art.

François Pommaret-Imaeda & Yoshiro Imaeda
Thimphu/Paris


The reader might be deceived somewhat by the title of this volume. It is not a collection of diverse essays by Chinese Tibetologists, but rather a complete reprinting of the K'ang-Tsang yen-chiu yüeh-k' an ("Hsi-k'ang — Tibet Research Monthly"), the first journal ever brought out that was exclusively devoted to the field of Tibetan Studies. The K'ang-Tsang yen-chiu yüeh-k' an was published in Szechwan between 1946 and 1949, and during its brief period of publication was an extremely important forum for Tibetological activity in China. Among the names of the authors who published in the journal one will find those of some rather well-known Tibetanists active in the Republican era such as Jen Nai-ch’iang and Liu Li-ch’ien; among the topics covered one finds areas as diverse as Tibetan literature and Tibetan ethnology. Of particular interest is the attention given in a number of the articles to the region of Kham (i.e., the Republican province of Hsi-K’ang). Taken together, the republication of the entire run of the K’ang-Tsang yen-chiu yüeh-k’ an is a fitting reminder that Tibetan Studies was an active field in China well before the present period.

The contents of this volume have already been made public: Dr. Kolmaš published a very detailed introduction as well as author, title, and subject indices for the entire run of the K’ang-Tsang yen-chiu yüeh-k’an in The Journal of the Tibet Society, vol. 1 (1981). The introduction and indices are included in the volume under review as well; however, the reader may have some difficulty in locating this volume, for the publishers appear to have brought out only a limited number of them. This is a pity, for there are a number of articles that are not simply curios from an earlier era of Tibetological activity, but useful studies. Nevertheless, we may be grateful that the volume will at least be available in a number of libraries; that much could not have been said for the K’ang-Tsang yen-chiu yüeh-k’an until now.

The K’ang-Tsang yen-chiu yüeh-k’an was put out entirely in Chinese. The quality of printing (at least in so far as we may judge on the basis of the copies acquired by Dr. Kolmaš) was uneven, and this is reflected in its reproduction in the present volume. However, having examined at first hand Dr. Kolmaš’ original copies, I can state that the reprinting
has been skillfully done. There are many places in the original copies where thin paper, light printing, or excessive ink has made the text difficult to read. The general legibility of most of the reprinted text is therefore surprising. We may note too that the present volume reprints two pages of the journal on each of its own pages.

Chinese as a language for primary and secondary research in the field of Tibetan Studies is coming to be used more and more widely. This republication of the entire run of the *K'ang-Tsang yen-chiu yüeh-k'an* is therefore all the more welcome. Perhaps this increasing use of Chinese by Tibetologists will spark a further reprinting (in a larger quantity) of the present volume.

Elliot Sperling
Indiana University


Every small addition to the literature on the largest of Tibet’s minority religions is welcome, but doubly so when the addition is accomplished by pairing the leading perfectionist in scholarly publishing with the research talents of Per Kvaerne, one of those elite few professionals who could, if they wished, claim the title of ‘Bonologist.’ Bon religion is a phenomenon that frustrates easy categorizations. Is it Buddhist or non-Buddhist? Does it hold an unbroken lineage from the pre-Buddhist religion(s) of Tibetan yore? Was it imported from China, the Tarim Basin or Persia and, if so, was it Buddhist(-ic) before or after its introduction to Tibet? All these are difficult questions, leading Tibetans to only partial or half-satisfying answers. Enlightenment will dawn, if it will dawn at all, only when many avenues of approach have been explored and tested and detailed studies, both philological and ethnological, utilizing the largest possible range of sources, have been brought to publication.

The book under review fulfills my own best-case scenario for a workable and ultimately, I think, a most fruitful approach. That is to leave to one side all the clashing categorical monoliths that presume some functionalistically unified system overlaid by an over-imperative word “Bon.” The best point of departure is in the present, in particular aspects of traditions going under the word “Bon” as they occur in particular instances of practice. The structurally opposite alternative would comprise a series of variations on the theme of the quest for the historical Lord Shenrab. There is no harm in trying, perhaps, but the prospects for answers that will prove themselves over the long term appear dim at best.
The work is divided into four chapters. The first is a general discussion of Bonpo identity. Here there are many echoes of the author's previous writings. This chapter may, in fact, be thought of as a summary of those writings. The second chapter undertakes to find an etymology for Bonpo rituals for the dead in Tibetan imperial history and in the *Gzer-myig*, one of the rediscovered biographies of Lord Shenrab. The third chapter briefly describes the setting for the particular instance of practice observed by the author. The last and most substantial chapter describes the funerary ritual with its iconographic details (as illustrated in the plates) while closely following the Tibetan text. The text of this book might be called the perfect marriage of philology with anthropology (both working better when they work together) and the photographs, if the metaphor is not yet overloaded, would be their wedding album.

The plates alone make this book a good acquisition for every research library and Tibetological collection, but the highly informed commentary by Per Kvaerne make it into a sourcebook of permanent reference value. Still, I may wish to question the wisdom of placing place IIa at the beginning of the section of plates even though the "human sacrifice" portrayed there is more than adequately accounted for in the text (pp. 9-10) simply because casual browsers may (and do) get the impression that human sacrifice is (or has been) an important component of Bon religion. In other words, its prominent presence in the book would seem to fuel unduly the same sectarian paranoias that Kvaerne has so admirably defused here and in previous articles. Aside from the switched picture captions to plates XLVIIa and XLVIIb, one looks in vain for the "errors and imperfections which remain" promised in the Foreword. This is a book for all those sentient beings who will ever give the Bon religion their serious attention, and my wish is that they will do more than just browse through the pictures.

Dan Martin
Indiana University

Li Jicheng, *The Realm of Tibetan Buddhism* (San Francisco, China Books and Periodicals, 1985), 224 pp., 159 color plates.

This volume attempts, in the words of the publisher, to outline the "origin, development, canonical texts, meditative practices, and, in particular, the works of art related to Tibetan Esoteric Buddhism."

First, it must be said that the book is definitely of great aesthetic interest. It contains photographs of superb quality, attractively presented and entirely in color, of Tibetan art, and is not simply another collection of thangkas and bronzes — exemplary works in the categories of
stone and wood carving, clay molding, and ritual objects also appear. The paintings and statuary that are shown include some unusual works, such as a bronze lotus with petals that open into a deity’s mandala (from Sakya monastery, pp. 84, 85), embroidered thangkas of Vajrakilaya (p. 99) and Šamvara (p. 67), beautifully detailed frescoes of lokapalas and dharmapalas from Drepung (pp. 160-165), and a painting of Guru Rinpoche as rainbow body (p. 27). There are as well photographs of a few major monasteries and of religious services.

The presentation of the text, however, does not match that of the art. One cannot help but notice numerous annoying misprints, which unfortunately detract from the work as a whole. There are misspellings of Tibetan words (by any system of transliteration), and an inexplicable shift back and forth between Tibetan transliteration and pseudo-Pinyin renderings of Tibetan names (king “Śrong-btsan Śgam-po”, but “Ramoqé” temple, for example).

From the standpoint of content, the text will reveal little to those familiar with any of the other surveys of Tibetan Buddhism. Much of what the author asserts (such as claiming the provenance of erotocentric Tantra to lie in Šaktism) is considered uncertain among western scholars. Minor mistakes abound. These are too numerous to catalog, but two typical errors may be mentioned: referring to the “completion” or “consummation” stage of contemplative practice as utpannakrama rather than sampannakrama, and relating that the Sakya hierarch Phagpa “commissioned by the emperor Shi Zu . . . formulated the new Mongolian language.” Scholars can easily read through such slips, but the tyro should beware of relying on the book as a source of authoritative information.

Attempting to write an introduction to Tibetan Buddhism that is simultaneously balanced, thorough, and accurate is undeniably a difficult task; most such attempts, beginning with Waddell’s, have been liberally perfumed with their authors’ biases, and this volume is no exception. If, however, one accepts the book as an attractive and moderately informative presentation of Tibetan religious art, then it is a success. Indeed, the remarkable photographs may make it the finest of its kind.

Todd Gibson
Indiana University


Franz Michael is a professor emeritus at George Washington University with a background in Far Eastern studies but, it seems, little ac-
quaintance with Tibet or with Tibetan Buddhism prior to writing this book. He did, however, have a clear purpose in mind, deriving from his interpretation of Max Weber's work on rationalization and bureaucratization. Michael wishes to portray traditional Tibet as a successful example of a Weberian bureaucratic state which, unlike modern Western examples, unifies religion and politics.

There is no doubt that this view corresponds to a certain degree with the official ideology of the Lhasa government (chos srid guyis ldan, etc.). It is also certainly true that Tibet had what could, in general terms, be called a bureaucracy. To assume, as Michael does, that Tibet was an effectively centralized bureaucratic state on the Weberian model is to go much further, and in my view at least much too far (cf. my "Tibet as a Stateless Society," *Journal of Asian Studies*, 41 (1982), 215-29). The problem is not that Michael takes one side in the debate, but that he is not even aware that there is a debate, and consequently interprets whatever he sees within the centralized model.

These deficiencies unfortunately have serious results. The opening chapters provide a superficial and occasionally confused account of Buddhism and of Tibetan history. The body of the book, an account of the Tibetan system of government concentrating on the first half of the 20th century, is more seriously flawed. While Michael's list of informants and assistants covers a wide range of Tibetans in India and the U.S., it is heavily slanted towards the Lhasans aristocracy and the Gelukpa establishment, and these people provided Michael with precisely the data he needed to support his views.

The result is a one-sided and naively Lhasa-centric view of Tibetan affairs. The Tibetan system of government, for Michael, is the rule of the Dalai Lamas from Lhasa. Other sources of power and authority are systematically minimized — in this respect, the book is almost a mirror image of C.W. Cassinelli and R.B. Ekvall's *A Tibetan Principality* (Cornell, 1969) with its one-sided emphasis on Sakya as against Lhasa. Ironically, Cassinelli and Ekvall's book is not even in Michael's bibliography, which is notable for its omissions (it includes none of Melvyn Goldstein's articles on Central Tibetan politics, for example). For Michael, the Tibetan aristocracy had been totally converted into civil servants (p. 45).

More critically, the decentralized and non-hierarchical elements within Tibetan society are largely ignored. In identifying "Tibetan government" with the Dalai Lama's administration, Michael both writes out of his account the significant proportion of the Tibetan population which was not in any sense under the control of Lhasa (much of Kham and Amdo, the Tibetans in present-day Nepal, etc.) and implies that Lhasa control was everywhere as immediate and direct as in the villages around Lhasa itself.
Yet, as Michael admits in a passage which contrasts notably with the general tone of the book, "the role of government in Tibet was very limited," there were "only perhaps five hundred to seven hundred officials for about three million people," and "[m]ost affairs were handled locally — within the communities, the villages, and the camps — chiefly by local headmen with more or less popular participation" (pp. 59-60).

The role of the "local headmen" reflects Michael's apparent inability to see politics and government except in terms of the handing down of decisions by authority. However, the general implication of this passage, that the Lhasa administration, for all its undoubted significance, was in no way parallel to the centralized government of an effective bureaucratic state, is surely correct, and undermines the thesis presented in the book as a whole.

It is difficult to recommend this book as a general text on the Tibetan system of government, particularly for those who are new to the subject. A good book on Tibetan government would be welcome, but Rule by Incarnation in no way fulfills that role. Yet it would be a pity to dismiss it altogether, since it does contain a variety of useful information about the functioning of the Dalai Lama's administration, much of it not readily available elsewhere. The book has a series of appendices containing translations by Lobsang Lhalungpa of such assorted items as Srong btsan sgam po's 16 principles, the "Last Testament" of the 13th Dalai Lama, two monastic charters and the well-known prayer to Mañjuśrī. There are also some pleasant photographs.

Geoffrey Samuel
University of Newcastle, NSW


To rephrase the sentiments expressed by Agehannanda Bharati,1 Nowak's publication of the results of her 1977 fieldwork in Dharamsala has been eagerly anticipated. Her work as expressed in Tibetan Refugees is representative of the growing interest in the study of the process of culture change, particularly cultural persistence, among anthropologists. As such it is a refreshing departure from the preoccupation of many recent Tibetologists and their publishers who have taken a static, "all-or-nothing" view of contemporary Tibetan culture. Such works often leave the reader with the notion that refugee culture is an anomalous phenomenon, a residue of a fossilized culture destined to perish under the impetus of the 20th century. This genre of writing is akin to the older 'assimilation' model in anthropology which drew upon the
theme that groups in a contact situation only had two possible choices: assimilation or conflict.

In contrast, Tibetan Refugees is suggestive of a welcome movement away from the too-frequent exposés of the more sensational aspects of Tibetan culture. Nowak convinces the reader that the Tibetan refugee community is quite alive, struggling to find meaning through the often contradictory circumstances of wishing to remain ethnically distinct while facing the necessity of interaction with a modern, non-Tibetan world.

In this symbolic study, Nowak attempts to discover some of the root metaphors which suggest Tibetan cultural identity, and how these symbols have undergone change as the result of pressures of statelessness within India. According to the author, a key to understanding this process is the notion of 'liminality' generated by the political ambiguities of refugee status. Liminality defines a context from which new cultural strategies and innovations may be created, ones which may perhaps be more adaptable to novel circumstances. This liminal theme is heightened by the author's skillful interweaving of the sentiment of her own marginal position (an anthropological participant/observer, a single woman in India, and a Polish/American in the U.S.) with that of many young, alienated Tibetan refugees who strive to establish self-identity in a pluralistic context. Nowak contends that Tibetan cultural identity is maintained by the utilization of ambiguous symbols, ones which can easily be manipulated to redefine meaning in a changing social environment. The paramount symbol in this context is the Dalai Lama, who while representing both sacred and temporal aspects of Tibetan life, symbolizes a newly evolving metaphor of 'self-affirmation' (rang-btsan).

Nowak draws heavily from the theories of symbolic anthropologist Victor Turner and his predecessor, van Gennup, to describe a process by which new categories of meaning are ascribed to an existing social structure. Characteristic of this process are the stages of separation, liminality, and re-integration. In the refugee situation, separation (Nowak uses 'distanciation') has been accomplished through the actual displacement of Tibetans from their motherland. This crisis has resulted in a general social unease leading to the characteristic gray world of liminality.

While Nowak notes that she has extrapolated Turner's theories out of the ritual context from which they were originally derived, Turner himself has shown that this is valid for the analysis of culture change provided other factors appropriate to the liminal state are in operation. Failure to address these 'other factors' results in a weakening of the author's otherwise convincing argument. One such factor characteristic of liminal states is communitas, a Goffmanesque 'leveling' of social sta-
tuses which accompanies the disintegration of the old social structure. *Communitas* is itself a highly unstable state of affairs — whatever cultural innovation acquired in liminality is often quickly reabsorbed by the impetus of the pre-existing structure, albeit with certain change. The reader might find it difficult to find periods of *communitas* corresponding to the Tibetan diaspora. If the Tibetans are liminal by fact of the dissolution of their traditional social structure, then according to Turner, one would have expected periodic egalitarian *communitas* in the refugee communities. Similarly, is proximal dissociation by itself sufficient cause for general liminality among Tibetan refugees? In this sense, Nowak’s analysis seems more characteristic of the old assimilation model of culture change.

What is particularly striking about the Tibetan refugee situation in northern India is not how they have changed, but how they have been remarkably resistant to these pressures. There appears to have been a very conscious effort by the Tibetan government-in-exile, from the onset, to preserve paramount Tibetan social institutions — especially the relationship between the laity and the clergy. The continuation of the patron/priest (*yon-mchod*) relationship may be the strongest factor in the continuing maintenance of Tibetan ethnic identity. It has been the template of Tibetan society, delineating a structure of statuses and roles, adjudicating the appropriateness of the performance of actors within this framework. The concern for the continuation of this traditional system was a high priority for the Tibetan refugee leaders, one which can clearly be seen in the efforts towards preserving important monastic lineages. Even the seemingly novel re-orientation of the patronage system to foreign Buddhist benefactors through an infrastructure of monastic outposts in the West is within Tibetan historical experience (e.g. Mongol, Manchu, and Chinese patronage).

Nowak’s primary focus is perhaps her greatest strength — the changes within the younger Tibetan refugee generation. To this group marginality may certainly be ascribed, and the process of recombination, re-analysis of traditional values, and innovation characteristic of liminality can be seen more clearly than in older segments of refugee society. Yet one wonders about the uniqueness of this phenomenon when compared to adolescent groups around the world. It remains to be seen if these innovations will be incorporated into traditional Tibetan culture or if they will be merely deflected by the weight of twelve centuries of Tibetan cultural heritage.

What Nowak has expressed most clearly is that an active dialogue is progressing in Dharamsala between conservative elements of Tibetan culture and the innovative reactions to novel circumstances expressed by some elements of Tibetan society. In the context of Tibetan studies, *Tibetan Refugees* is a healthy departure from both the staid kinship dia-
grams of the anthropologist and the religious esoterica of other researchers.

P. Christian Klieger
University of Hawaii


Sometimes one feels acutely the need for a thorough systematization of a long-neglected special field, in order to obtain a secure basis for further research. The work by Dr. (now Professor) D. Schuh can lay justified claim to fulfill one such wish, being the first scholarly and complete study of Tibetan seals after the old, disjointed and obsolete notes published by A.H. Francke, L.A. Waddell and E.H. Walsh in the *JRAS* for 1910, 1911 and 1915.

In a long introduction the author describes and explains all the seals available to him, with an adequate apparatus of reproductions, reconstructions and translations. He gives also, basing himself on first-hand information collected from old officials of the Dalai Lama government, an outline of the methods and working of the Tibetan chanceries. The seals serve for authentication, and no document is deemed valid without the impression of a seal. Every higher authority (Dalai Lamas, Panchen Lamas, other great incarnates, the regents, the council of ministers) possessed one, which was stamped on the documents with red or (for lower instances) black ink. The author carefully analyzes the square script employed on the seals, which is practically the same as the 'Phags-pa alphabet of 1269/70; in the case of seals granted by the Chinese emperor, Chinese, Manchu and Mongolian scripts are also employed.

The main portion of the work exemplifies the practical use of the seals at hand of thirty-one documents, each of them reproduced, transcribed, translated and commented upon; actually, the book can also be utilized as a manual of Tibetan diplomatic usage. A series of appendices contain nine additional documents, the most interesting of them being a short rescript issued by 'Phags-pa to the Sa-skya officials, dated the year of the Hare, which is almost certainly 1267; it belonged to the Bsam-gtan-ling monastery near Kirong. The only slightly disturbing feature is that neither the personal name nor the official title of 'Phags-pa are given. However, its authenticity is placed beyond any reasonable doubt both by its worn out and old appearance and (what is more
important) by the inner evidence of its formulae, which are exactly the same as those employed in the 14th century documents found at Zhvalu and published by the late Professor G. Tucci.

A bibliography of the relevant works, Tibetan and Western, and an index of persons and place names concludes the book.

The following remarks on points of detail are intended to supplement the rich information supplied by Professor Schuh.

P. 6 – Seal E3b is found also on a document issued by the Seventh Dalai Lama to the Italian missionaries, reproduced in L. Petech, Missioniari Italiani nel Tibet e nel Nepal, Rome 1952-1956, vol. IV, opposite p. 210. It is curious to note that even Professor Schuh was unable to find another instance of the use of, and of course to explain, the mysterious seal found on a document issued by Pho-lha-nas to the missionaries in 1741; up to now it has defied every attempt at decipherment.

P. 8 – Seal E4, with Chinese and Tibetan characters, bears the words “Seal of the Sixth Dalai Lama;” a Tibetan work, however, maintains that it should be attributed to the Seventh Dalai Lama. There is no contradiction in this. At first the Chinese, having withdrawn recognition from the Sixth Dalai Lama Tshangs-dbyangs-rgya-mtsho, and having accepted the deposition by the Dzungars of Lha-bzang Khan’s puppet, upon their enthronement of Blo-bzang-bskal-bzang-rgya-mtsho in 1720 simplified the issue by giving him the ordinal Sixth. This was of course in flat contradiction with the Tibetan numeration, and later the Peking government tacitly dropped their point. Theoretically, this particular seal could belong: 1) to the rightful Sixth, 2) to Lha-bzang’s puppet, and 3) to the Seventh in his early years.

P. 27 – Seal F, of the Smin-grol Nomin Khan, shows the title ta’i gab shri; this seems to be a rather odd corruption of the Chinese ta kuo-shih.

P. 63 - Che-chen Hong-tha’i-ji (also on pp. 77, 105, 171) is normally the title of the Urga incarnate, the Maidari Qutuqtu or Jebtsun Damba Qutuqtu. Am-nyer-po-che is the Amne Machen range in Amdo and ʼDam-po-rong could be the Dam-ma’i-nang valley. See J.F. Rock, The Amnye Ma-chhen range and adjacent regions, Rome 1956.

P. 114 – These monastic estates in Gu-ge can be identified, as they were visited by G. Tucci in 1933. Ma-yang is the Miang of the maps. At Ri (Richoba of the maps) there is a monastery still depending from Tholing. Sar-sga is probably Sarang, with a small half-ruined dgon-pa depending from Tho-ling. See G. Tucci, Cronaca della missione scientifica Tucci nel Tibet Orientale (1933), Rome 1934, pp. 175-183, 357-363, 363-366.

P. 330 – The monastery of ʼBar-rtan in Ldan-ma is listed in the Vaidūrya-ser-po (Lokesh Chandra edition, p. 258), but little information was available to its author. At the end of the 17th century the convent contained forty monks.

Luciano Petech
Rome
Addendum

The following Tibetan text should have been appended to the review by Dan Martin which appeared in *The Journal of the Tibet Society*, vol. 4 (1984), pp. 83-92. Please note that the passage of the review on page 92 which reads, “divergent reading yi-ge-bzhi-pa in line 12”, should now read: divergent reading yi-ge-bzhi-pa in line 15.
30 གིས་ གིས་བདེ་བས་དྲུག་པར་སིང་ ིིང་། རི་བཟོ་བྱ་གཞི་ཕྱི་ལི་།
35 གིས་པོ་གཞི་ཕྱི་ལི་། བཅུ་བའི་ཤིང་སྐབས་བི་། དེ་དེ་
40 བཟོ་བྱ་གཞི་ཕྱི་ལི་། སྐབས་དཔག་ཕྲག་པོ་། རི་བཟོ་བྱ་གཞི་ཕྱི་ལི་།
། རི་བཟོ་བྱ་གཞི་ཕྱི་ལི་། རི་བཟོ་བྱ་གཞི་ཕྱི་ལི་། རི་བཟོ་བྱ་གཞི་ཕྱི་ལི་།
45 སྦྱེ་ ཞིན་ཅིང་བབར་ཕྱིན་ཏིང་ཞེས་ རྒྱ་འཇིག་མི་
མི་དུག་ནང་བོར་བཞི་ དུས་ནང་བར་བོར་བཞི་
དཔོན་མོངས་། ཞིན་ཅིང་ི་བྱས་ཤེས་ རྒྱས་
དུང་ཕྱི་བྱི་ཐོབ་སྙམ་བྱིས་། ཞིན་འཇིག་དུས་
དམཆོད་ངོ་། རྒྱི་ཡི་ཕྱིས་མ་འབྲོད་

50 བོ་བོ། གྲུབ་གཙོ་བོ་བཞི་འབུད་ གྲོ་ལྡན། དུ་དཔོན་མོངས་
དཔོན་དབྱིངས་པ་དང་། དེ་དཔོན་དབྱིངས་
དཔོན་ཐོབ་བཞི། དེ་དཔོན་དམིགས་ལོ་བཞི། དེ་
དུག་ནང་བོར་བཞི། འཇིག་དུས་དམིགས་
མཁྱེན་། འཇིག་དུས་བསྟེན་དེ། འཇིག་

55 རྒྱུ་གནས་མི་སྐྱེས་བྱེད་ དུས་དཔོན་པར་
དབང་ཡག་པོ་དཔོན་ རྒྱུ་གནས་མི་སྐྱེས་
བྱེད། རྒྱུ་གནས་མི་སྐྱེས་བྱེད་ རྒྱུ་
གནས་མི་སྐྱེས་བྱེད། རྒྱུ་གནས་མི་སྐྱེས་
བྱེད། རྒྱུ་གནས་མི་སྐྱེས་བྱེད་ རྒྱུ་

60 ཕྱབ་ཤིང་བཞི་ཐོབ་མོས་ རྒྱོག་དབང་ལ།
CRITICAL APPARATUS

1. ལེགས་: ལེགས་ BD || 2. མི་: མི་ B || 4. མིན་: མིན་ C || 7. སྤྱ་: སྤྱ་ C || 8. བོད་: བོད་ B ||
9. བོད་: བོད་ A བོད་ BCD ||
10. བུད་: བུད་ ABCD || 11. རྒྱལ་: རྒྱལ་ ABCD ||
15. རྒྱལ་: རྒྱལ་ ABCD ||
16. འཕུལ་: འཕུལ་ ABCD || 20. འཕུལ་: འཕུལ་ ABCD ||
24. འཕུལ་: འཕུལ་ ABCD || 25. འཕུལ་: འཕུལ་ ABCD ||
26. རྒྱལ་: རྒྱལ་ B ||
28. རྒྱལ་: རྒྱལ་ C || 33. རྒྱལ་: རྒྱལ་ C ||
34. རྒྱལ་: རྒྱལ་ BCD ||
The Tibet Society

MINUTES

The Tibet Society's
Annual Membership Meeting
March 22, 1985

Salon 4, Franklin Plaza Hotel, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
March 22, 1985

The meeting was called to order at 4:35 p.m. by Christopher I. Beckwith. Twenty members were in attendance. Robert G. Service was appointed secretary for the meeting and Denys Voaden was asked to count the ballots cast in the Board of Directors election. It was announced that copies of the 1984 annual meeting minutes were available for inspection.

Dr. Beckwith gave a summary report on the financial status of the Society showing a cash balance of some $2,748.00 in the checking account. He explained that the major expense of the Society was the publication of the Journal.

In his capacity as editor, Dr. Beckwith gave the publications report. Volume 3 of the Journal is in blue line stage and work has begun on Volume 4. It is hoped that it will be ready during the autumn. Dr. Beckwith noted that Volume 3 contains several book reviews. The Society still hopes to publish G.N. Roerich's Tibetan Language and Vostrikov's Tibetan Historical Literature when funds become available.

In a brief overview of activities during 1984, Dr. Beckwith noted that the Society joined with the Tibetan Cultural Center in Bloomington to hold Losar celebrations and sponsor a talk by John Avedon, author of In Exile From The Land Of Snows. The Society continues to gain international recognition. In the future the proceedings from Bloomington's Csoma de Körös conference will be published by the Tibet Society. There are 322 members, of whom 88 (27%) live abroad, and 139 institutional members.

In the discussion which followed, Professor Norbu questioned whether a dues increase might not be necessary to help offset publication costs. Dr. Gombojab Hangin suggested that increasing membership might be a better way to obtain more revenue. It was suggested that the Society might exchange advertisements with such periodicals as Tibetan Review and the Vajradhatu Sun. Dr. Beckwith responded that while there was a policy against ads in the Journal, they are carried in the Newsletter. Further ideas for increasing the visibility of the Society
with an aim to gaining new members were activities in conjunction with the Asia Society and targeting the Tibetan community.

Following this discussion, De. Voaden announced that Christopher I. Beckwith, Elliot Sperling and Alex Wayman had been elected to the Board of Directors.

The meeting was adjourned at 5:05 p.m.

Robert G. Service
Secretary pro tempore

The Tibet Society, Inc.

FINANCIAL REPORT

January – December, 1984

Balance (Dec. 31, 1984) ........................................ $ 2,748.14
Deposits ......................................................... 5,355.85
The Mac Arthur Foundation .................................... 5,000.00
Interest: Checking Account ................................... 290.46
Certificate of Deposit .......................................... 233.20
Savings Account #1 ........................................... 752.34
Savings Account #2 ........................................... 1,978.94
Special Account ................................................ 1,376.97

Total ............................................................... $17,735.90

Expenditures
Bank Expenses .................................................. $ 37.25
Books .......................................................... 56.03
Donations: Transfer ........................................... 340.00
  KTD Monastery ................................................. 10.00
Filing Fee – Secretary of State ............................. 10.00
Office Supplies ................................................ 89.45
Postal ........................................................... 635.43
Postal Box Rent ................................................ 53.00
Printing: Maxi ................................................. 691.96
  Journal ......................................................... 3,542.80
  T.S. Brochure ................................................ 67.75
Misc ........................................................... 71.20
2 Certificate of Deposit ................................... 4,000.00

Total Expenses ................................................. $ 9,604.87

Balance in Checking (Dec. 31, 1985) ....................... $ 8,131.03

Note: Beginning March 1, 1985 all Monroe County Bank accounts were combined and deposited in the Bloomington National Bank.
The *Journal of the Tibet Society* is a scholarly periodical devoted to all areas of research on Tibet and regions influenced by Tibetan culture, including the arts, astronomy, geography, history, linguistics, medicine, philosophy, religion, the social sciences, and other subjects. Publication in the *Journal* is open to scholars of all countries. The languages of the *Journal* are English, French, German, and Tibetan. The editor welcomes the submission of articles, brief communications, and books for review, which deal with Tibet or the Tibetan cultural realm.

Tibetan may be transliterated by contributors in accordance with any of the standard scientific transliteration systems generally accepted. The following rules must be observed, however:

1) Absolute consistency must be maintained, except when quoting previous writers' works, in which case the system found in the quoted original must be retained in the quotation.

2) If any capitalization is necessary, only the *first* letter of any word may be capitalized, e.g. Dpal-lidan, and not DPal-lidan, the exception being that in words beginning (in transliteration) with a non-alphabetic diacritical mark—such as the apostrophe—the following letter is to be capitalized, e.g. 'Jam-dpal.

3) The type font currently available to us includes the following diacritical marks and special letters: ' " ' ć ķ Ľ Ľă. (A complete Greek font is also available.) It is therefore desirable for all transliteration, whatever the system, to restrict itself accordingly.

Transcription of other commonly used languages with non-Latin scripts is to be done according to the following systems:

**Arabic:** ʼb t th j (or ǧ) ḥ kh d dh r z s sh s ṭ ṭ z ’ gh f q k l m n h w y.

The article should always be transcribed al- (or Al-), and diphthongs should employ u and i (instead of u and i) as second elements.

**Chinese:** The Wade-Giles system.


**Mongol:** The system found in N. Poppe, *Grammar of Written Mongolian*, Wiesbaden, 1954.

**Russian:** a b v g d e zh z i y k l m n o p r s t u f k h t s ch sh shch ’i ’è yu ya.

**Sanskrit:** The system adopted by the 10th International Congress of Orientalists (Geneva, 1894).

Manuscripts should be typed on white bond paper, *double-spaced*, with *wide* margins on *all* sides. Notes must also be typed *double-spaced*, consecutively numbered, on a separate page or pages at the end of the manuscripts (not at the bottom of the page). Please submit a neat, finished, manuscript. The *original* copy should be submitted. Authors must retain at least one copy of their manuscript. It is necessary that all errors be corrected on the galleys, which should be returned immediately.

All quoted passages of Tibetan more than a few words in length must be noted in the article text with a number (such as a line-reference to the original source) in square brackets—e.g.: [8,1]—and then written or typed out in Tibetan print-style script (*dbucan*) on a *separate* page or pages. These passages will be printed in Tibetan at the end of the article. In other words, the original Tibetan of long quoted passages will not appear in transliteration in the body or notes of an article, but will appear in Tibetan script alone, at the end of the article. (For examples, please see the articles by H. Uebach and A. Wayman in Volume I. The same method is to be followed for citations of Chinese words or of Japanese words containing ideograms, which unless very well known should generally be provided. For an example, please see the article by J. Kolmaš in Volume I. For certain kinds of studies, this procedure may not be feasible, in which case exceptions might be made.)