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EDITORIAL

It is now four years since the *Journal of the Tibet Society* commenced publication. The *Journal* has several hundred subscribers worldwide, and remains the sole Western scholarly periodical devoted exclusively to the field of Tibetology. One may conclude that the *Journal* is an excellent vehicle for publication of high quality Tibetological scholarship. Moreover, since the *Journal* has finally developed a routine that ensures fairly expeditious printing and publication, at the time of writing there is no backlog, beyond some material already accepted for the next issue. The editor would therefore like to invite all scholars working in the field to send us their manuscripts to be considered for publication in these pages. In particular, we solicit the submission of Brief Communications—short scholarly notes or discussion of articles or book reviews published here. Tibetology is a very young field, and desperately needs more dialogue among scholars devoted to it.

The *Journal* has thus passed the test of all new scholarly periodicals, namely surviving the first two or three years. Also with the publication of the present issue, this editor has fulfilled his promise to the officers of the Society who, in 1979, gave him the mandate to turn the *Tibet Society Bulletin* into a scholarly journal. After five years of editing, it is time to pass the torch on to another. The present writer would like to thank all of the authors, book reviewers, editorial consultants, and—last but not least—associate editors, who have given of their valuable time and talent, and have helped to make the *Journal* a success.

C.I.B.
Articles

PADMA DKAR-PO ON TANTRA AS GROUND, PATH AND GOAL*

Michael M. Broido

1.1 Introduction

_The locus classicus_ for Tibetan discussion of the word “tandra” is Guhyasamājatantra XVIII.33-34.1 The verses run:

\[
\text{prabandham tantam ākhyātam tat prabandham tridhā bhavet} / \text{ādharah prakṛtiścaiva asamḥārya prabhedaśah} / / 33 // \\
\text{prakṛtiśakṛṭhetur asamḥāryayaphalam tathā} / \text{ādharastutupāyaśca trīhastantrārthasaṁgrahah} / / 34 //
\]

These verses say that tantra (rgyud) is continuity (prabandha; Tibetan usually rgyun-chags, but see notes 17, 23). This continuity is threefold (tridhā, ram-pa-gsum); it has three aspects (ākṛti, ram-pa; cf. ākāra), described by two alternative sets of terms, thus:

- its nature (prakṛti, rang-bzhin) is cause (hetu, rgyu);
- its foundation (ādharā, gzhi) is means (ṭupāya, thabs);
- it is inalienable (asamḥārya, mi-phrog-pa); its effect or goal (phala,bras-bu).

Tibetans often call these simply “the three tantras” (rgyud gsum) and identify them with the ground, path and goal mentioned in my title (gzhi, lam, bras-bu). This paper, Part I, is about Padma Dkar-po’s view of this connection in general, while Part II will review the application of these notions of ground, path and goal and their connection to “integration” (yuganaddha, zung-jug).

• • •

Both in India and Tibet the most common way to expose one’s doctrine on any subject was to comment on an authoritative earlier work. (This fact alone accounts for the importance of hermeneutics—the theory of interpretation of texts—in these cultures.) Of course the process of commentary has to begin somewhere, and the word _śāstra_ (bstan-bcos) was used especially of those independent texts which were not commentaries on older

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* This is the first of two papers which will appear in successive issues of this journal; the second will be called “Integration (Yuganaddha, zung-jug).” In the present paper, references to “Part II” will be to this second paper.
texts. Not any (independent) text (abhidhāna, rirol-byed) can count as a sāstra; there must be at least a content (abhidheya, brjod-bya), a specific purpose (prayojana, dgos-pa, a more general or distant purpose (prayojana-prayojana, dgos-pa'i dgos-pa or nying-dgos) and a connection between all of these (sambandha, 'brel-ba). The Buddhist tantras were considered to be sāstras in this precise sense, and in the introductions to important commentaries such as the Vimalaprabhā (on Kalacakrā or the Vajragarbhaīkā (on Hevajra), we find these five items listed and their application to the work under discussion specified. The tantras also pose special problems of interpretation (especially the Guhyasamāja, which hardly mentions the completion stage) and so a special literature grew up on the hermeneutics of the tantras, and was known in Tibet as “methods of explanation (of the tantras)”, (rgyu-mtsho bshad-thabs). Perhaps one of the reasons for the weakness of Western attempts to set out what is to be understood by “tantra” is the almost complete neglect of such Indian and Tibetan ideas on interpretation."

As its title suggests, this article does not offer an historical account of the development of the basic ideas of tantra (I believe that we are not yet in a position to undertake such an account). However Padma Dkar-po's views on interpretation are not always explicit, and to see what is going on we will quote and briefly review some other Tibetan comments on these fundamental verses of Guhyasamājatantra.

Within the field of bshad-thabs (methods of explanation), Sa-skya-pa Bsdod-nams Rtsi-mo (1142-82) was one who drew carefully the distinction between explanation of the words (tshig, rirol-byed) and of the content (don, brjod-bya). With regard to the first, the principal methods of the Sa-skya school are drawn from the “six instructions” (gdams ngag drug); with regard to the second, though the six instructions remain important, the three tantras are the main method. He divides the three tantras into the method itself and its application to the analysis of the tantras. Under the method itself he first quotes the two Guhyasamāja verses and then says (I summarize quite crudely) that tantra as cause is the teaching which shows sentient beings what nirvāna is by pointing out to them the nature of the skandhas, dhātu and ayatanas and of their own body, speech and mind. Tantra as means includes abhiṣeka as the path of ripening, and the stages of generation and completion as the path of freedom. Tantra as effect or goal includes the samādhi of understanding (rtsogs-pa'i tshig-ngo-dzin) through which the buddhakāya and buddhajñāna become manifest. His application to the analysis of the tantras contains the remark that when one uses the “three tantras” the content of the text is to be described so that it can be internalized and realized (see note 7), in contrast with the tshig-don and yi-ge'i don methods of the “six instructions” which deal with the words. Sgam-po-pa Bcia-shis Nram-rgyal (1512-87) similarly deals with the “three tantras” under bshad-thabs and applies them to the content, though in the “outer” style of analysis (spyi'i nram-bzhag).10 Near the beginning of his Sgron-gsal mchan-'grel on the Pradipodyotana, Tsong-kha-pa quotes the same GST verses and comments:11

The literal meaning (sgra-don) of tantra is continuity. In the verse, “nature” means the nature of the jewel-like adept (sgrub-pa-po, sādhaka); this is tantra as cause. “Foundation” means tantra as means, the four-part sva-sādhanā in two stages. The goal is to enter the unlocalized nirvāna as Vajradhara12 or as the yuganaddhakāya, these being inalienable. This is Nāropa’s explanation of the threefold division of tantra itself,13 while Ratnakaraśānti and Abhayakaragupta explain causal tantra as the dharmatā of mind.

He calls all this the content (brjod-bya) of the tantra15 which by implication is contrasted with the following explanation of the text by means of the “seven ornaments”.16 Though continuity (prabandha,17 twice) is conspicuous in the GST verse, the texts so far quoted are equally conspicuous in their failure to say what it is. (Why is it continuity which is threefold, &c.?) Bu-ston Rin chen-grub (1290-1364) gives a slightly longer account in which continuity is more prominent. After quoting the verses he says:18

According to these verses the word ‘tantra’ thus introduced means ‘much connected, bound, continuous.’ This is three: tantra as cause, as means, and as effect or goal.

He then gives two explanations, each involving all three aspects; it seems that the first explanation is mainly from the viewpoint of continuity as the ground while the second is mainly from the viewpoint of the path.

First, the Vajraśekhara says:19 ‘Tantra is said to be continuous, and samsāra is assigned to tantra.’ This is the aspect of the man of samsāra (khor-ba-po). By ‘nature’ the verse means that the nature of things (gnas-lugs) is from the beginning that of the radiant light and that it abides continually and eternally, and this is tantra. Since however mind is also by nature radiant light from the beginning, when it is covered by obscuring defilements which do not really exist, one speaks of samsāra. Now, the stage where there are no obscurations at all is that of the buddha. Since it is the cause of lacking obscurations it is tantra as cause. The means by which one is freed from obscurations is tantra as means. The ultimate of renunciation and understanding in which there is no obscuration at all is tantra as goal or effect. [Here two illustrating quotations are omitted.] Secondly, the main part of tantra as means is the stage of completion, whose preliminaries are the stage of generation, abhiṣeka, and their helpers, the vows and commitments. These are called
the foundation (ādhāra) since they are the ultimate conditions, accompanied by actions,32 which bring about the setting-up and stability of the goal or effect, just as the earth is the foundation for the establishment of a sprout (from a seed). Once limitless adventitious defilements have been given up, this tantra-as-cause cannot be alienated by obscurations accompanied by karmic traces (viśama). The ultimate, unconquerable renunciation and understanding is tantra as goal, since it always preserves its continuity.

Like Tsong-kha-pa, Bu-ston continues by contrasting these three tantras as the content, with the tantra as a text explained by means of the seven ornaments.

The passages quoted so far follow the verses in taking the three tantras as cause, means and goal/effect; they do not go on to make an explicit correlation with ground/path/goal (gzhi/lam/bras-bu) though no doubt this is implied. Nor do they resolve the ambiguity of phala, bras-bu between “effect” and “goal.” For while effect is what is naturally contrasted with cause, what is described under this heading looks more like a goal. The remaining writers introduce the ground/path/goal trio right from the beginning, and since in this trio there is no cause I shall translate “bras-bu by “goal”—though as we will see there are still some reasons for keeping “effect.” Ādhāra does seem to mean “foundation” and of course correlates with “path” (not “ground,” gzhi) in the new trio. Now we go on to Kong-sprul’s account (probably based on Padma Dkar-po’s) which illustrates the point made in note 1, since the verse text is greatly altered.33 For instance it no longer speaks of continuity (rgyud-chags) but of connection (“brel-bu”). However, Kong-sprul considers both:

The whole meaning of the anuttarayogatantras is subsumed under ground, path and goal. However these three are connected and abide continuously like a stream (read rgyun for rgyud) of water. Prakṛttitantra is tantra as cause and is called gzhi dngos-po’i gnas-lugs; ādhāra-tantra is tantra as means and is called a graded path; and inalienable tantra is called tantra as goal: this is the triad of ground, path and goal. Thus inseparable body-mind is tantra as ground, the inseparable generation and completion stages are tantra as path, and the inseparable buddhabodies are called tantra as goal. The purity of inseparable body-mind or awareness is cause since this is the similarity behind the type of the perfect buddhas, and is tantra because it is the unchanging connection and continuity between a sentient being and a buddha. The stages of generation and completion are means since, on account of their substance or lineage, they illuminate the ultimate buddhas, and are tantra because they are connected with the abhiṣeka, the vows and the commitments, which are connected with the two graded paths, which are connected to the two buddha-bodies. Of these two tantras the first is the grasping cause and the second is the cooperating condition (of buddhahood), and though both are unclear, they become clear; but they do not arise after previously being non-existent. Tantra as cause is purified by tantra as means, and their

becoming unobscured and manifest is tantra as goal: for like the sky this cannot be alienated by any cause from its firmness and continuity.

Most of the difficulties in this passage will become clear when Padma Dkar-po’s treatment is considered; however Kong-sprul’s own treatment already provides good reasons for translating the new gzhi (connected with tantra as cause) by “ground”. We have seen Kong-sprul gloss this gzhi with dngos-po’i gnas-lugs: in fact Kong-sprul and Padma Dkar-po both correlate the trios mentioned already with another, viz. dngos-po’i gnas-lugs/lam/bras-bu skye-ba’i rim-pa which, as we will see, derives from Tilopa. In Kong-sprul’s treatment this feature is fairly peripheral, but in Padma Dkar-po’s it is important. The Tibetan of Padma Dkar-po’s treatment is given in full in Appendix A, but before we go on to consider it (1.2-3) we must discuss more carefully the situations to which it is intended to apply.

Texts entitled rgyud-sde spnyi’i rnam-bzhang are concerned mainly with the outer (spnyi) analysis or division (rnam-bzhang) of the tantrapitaka (rgyud-sde) section of the buddha-utterance. Padma Dkar-po’s work of this kind, subtitled “which seduces the minds of the learned,” begins with a general discussion34 not involving the word “tantra;” as the opening remark of Kong-sprul’s treatment reminds us, serious discussion of this word is often confined to the narrower context of the anuttarayogatantras. In this context Padma Dkar-po (like Kong-sprul) frequently glosses “ground” (gzhi) with dngos-po’i gnas-lugs35 which for him is a technical term meaning, at least very roughly, “things taken in non-dual cognition.”36 Here and elsewhere37 it seems that for Padma Dkar-po the normal starting-point of analysis is the cognitive condition of the ārya or the buddha, rather than of the ordinary person, the prthagjana or the sems-can. We will see that not even everybody who practices the anuttarayogatantras has access to this cognitive condition.

Guenter has made a comparison of Padma Dkar-po with Jaspers, in which dngos-po’i gnas-lugs is somehow connected with “Being-in-itself,” which he glosses as “the transcendent totality of man.” This comparison38 prefaces one of his translations of Padma Dkar-po’s summary. He says that Being-in-itself has an affinity with Existent, but the comparison is useless unless we know more about this affinity. Nor do we learn what Tibetan term or notion he is comparing with Jaspers’ Dasein. His claim that “there is a considerable similarity between Buddhist Tantrism and Western existentialist thought?” remains pristinely empty, at least for this reader. Though dngos-po’i gnas-lugs may transcend certain dualities it remains, as far as I can see, within experience: that is not to say that it is an object of experience or that it is part of ordinary everyday experience. To say that something is (or is a part or aspect of) an experience other than what we normally enjoy is quite different from claiming that it is beyond experience.
Padma Dkar-po was no doubt both a historian and a mystic, but as a thinker he is both comparatively ahistorical and down-to-earth, concerned with the place, time and condition of those around him. A comparison with existentialism might perhaps be grounded on some common concern with value, but I know of no attempt by Guenther to spell out such a comparison, even in the most vague and nominal way. 39

In order to understand Padma Dkar-po it may be more helpful to recall Karl Potter's typology of Indian philosophies. His main distinction is between "speculative" and "path" philosophy. This distinction is grounded in the claim that the main concern of Indian philosophy is bondage and freedom and the path between the two. Whatever the merits of the general claim, it certainly applies to Padma Dkar-po. Whereas the path philosopher is one whose main concern is to say what the path is, the speculative philosopher tries to establish such a path or paths. Potter distinguishes between those who try to demonstrate that there exists a causal chain of stages leading from bondage to freedom from those who, to the extent that they are interested in speculation at all, deny that such causal chains exist. He calls Nāgārjuna a leap philosopher, as one of the latter class; 40 and I think that Padma Dkar-po partly falls in this class since, though he has a good deal to say about the stages by which the goal is reached ('bras-bu skye-ba'i rim-pa) he has little that is systematic to say about how the prthagjana becomes an ārya. 41 In any case, his concern is much more to say what the path is than to show that it is a path: and in this respect too he is like other Mādhyamikas since Nāgārjuna himself, for Mādhyamikas deny that any reductive account can be given of causation, and so for them nothing can constitute a demonstration that any chain of states is a causal chain. So when he says that something is a cause or a condition of buddhahood (as Kong-sprul did in the passage quoted) we must refrain from any expectation (if we have one) that he will justify this claim, otherwise than in a purely descriptive way.

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Padma Dkar-po's great synthesis of Vajrayāna is called Jo-bo Nāropa'i khyad-chos bsre'-pho'i gzhung-grel rdo-ri'-chang-gi dgongs-pa gsal-bar byed-pa. Here the phrase gzhung-grel refers to the literary form, which is that of a commentary ("grel-pa") upon the lines of a root-text (gzhung) printed with it, viz. Tilopa's Bka' yang-dag-pa'i tshad-ma zhes-bya-ba mkha'-gro-ma'i man-ngag (i.e. the dākinis' instruction called 'commandment of real knowledge'; this last phrase is in contrast with the merely conventional [uyavahāra] pramāṇa to be found in the text-books). In Padma Dkar-po's own title, the first part means "the special teaching of the Lord Nāropa, the bsre'-pho (cycle)." Here bsre'-pho is probably short for bsre-ba dang pho-ba dang grong-jug, the division of the practices of the upāyamārga into three cycles: under bsre-ba (attunement) come the inner heat, karmamudrā, the illusory body, dream, the radiant light, and the intermediate state(s); transference (pho-ba) and resurrection (grong-jug) each have their own cycle. The last part of Padma Dkar-po's title is ornamental and means "clarifying the intentions of Vajradhara"; dgongs-pa (Skt. often abhiprātya) may mean "intention" generally or may mean what is implied by words not meant to be taken literally. 42 Following Padma Dkar-po's own use, this work will be called gzhung-grel for short. The discussion of its main themes opens with the distinction between two kinds of person, the cig-car-ba and the rim-gyis-pa. The cig-car-ba has accumulated a great deal of merit, is usually an ārya practicing the anuttarayogatantras, is suitable to receive the entire teaching at once, and has moments of insight (darsana, mthong-ba) which are compared with the sun shining through clouds; it is this insight which is called dngos-po'i gnas-legs, it forms the ground upon which his path rests and, as far as it goes, does not differ from the cognition of a perfect buddha. By contrast, the rim-gyis-pa has less merit, does not receive the whole teaching at once, and does not have these moments of insight. He may still be an ārya and practice the anuttarayogatantras, but for him there is a different structuring of the upāyamārga. He will not attain buddhahood in this lifetime, but may do so from the intermediate state between death and rebirth. Since he does not have full insight he cannot take his own defilements as the path. It seems difficult to see how such a person could be on the darsanamārga, but Padma Dkar-po does not seem to explain this. In any case, the cig-car-ba/rim-gyis-pa distinction is not one of stages (avyastha, gnas-skabs) such as that of the prthagjana, ārya and buddha (also an important distinction for Padma Dkar-po). He recognized a third, intermediate personality type, the thod-rnal-ba; roughly speaking, the three-fold distinction is for mahāmudrā while the twofold one is for the upāyamārga. 43 Mahāmudrā is related in some ways to rdzogs-chen, 44 which is so important for the Rnying-payas, and, as Guenther has pointed out, 45 the rdzogs-chen tradition connected with Klōng-chen-pa Dri-med 'Od-zer (1303-63) 46 also recognized a similar distinction, in which the "quick" type is called khrugs-chos-pa. 47

With this group of traditions we may contrast a second group in which this kind of distinction was neglected. Kong-sprul, writing in the Kar-ma Bka'-bgyud tradition, seems to have considered almost everybody to be a cig-car-ba. 48 Sa-skya Pāṇḍita, 49 Bu-ston, and Tsong-kha-pa seem to have thought that everybody progresses along a graded path throughout. In terms of Potter's model, bondage and liberation are different; if not, what is the point of dharma? (And even behaviorally it seems clear that people in India and Tibet treat those whom they see as liberated quite differently from others.) Nobody in Tibet has succeeded in carrying out Potter's project of constructing a satisfactory causal sequence leading from bondage to liberation; everybody has a break somewhere. Klōng-chen-pa and Padma Dkar-po have a break connected with the first moment of in-
sight, the entry onto the dārśanamārga (for some), and thereafter maintain continual progress to (and not merely towards) the goal, really because the essential feature of the goal is already present (in Padma Dkar-po’s technical language, precisely this claim is made by saying that saṃvṛti-satya is the upādānākhetu of yuganaddha). In the second group of traditions, including Kong-sprul (sic) and also Padma Dkar-po’s rim-gyis-pa, the goal either remains something transcendental (perhaps like one of Kant’s regulatory ideas) or is attained in a mysterious way after death. Apart from the last feature, the distinction is perhaps parallel to that found in Ch’an and commented upon by Suzuki and others.

Can one see any general feature of the thought of Padma Dkar-po and Klong-chen-pa which might, as it were, ground the importance it attached to distinguishing the fast type from the slow? The notion of a buddha is not an observational one. It is partly grounded in various cognitive and epistemic concepts (such as the right knowledge, samyagītiṇā, of the Lankāvatāra). For Padma Dkar-po the cognitive concept is dngos-po’s gnas-lugs; this represents for him the standard of what is to count as proper knowledge. It does not matter particularly whether it is called buddha-knowledge or not (and cf. note 27), just as the sūtras say that buddhas appear or not, the dharmaḥ of dharmas continues unchanged and provides the path to liberation. According to this line of thought, the person who (even though sometimes and imperfectly) exercises a correct cognition is able to recognize his own remaining confusions and cure them, while another person cannot. What will be the path for the first type of person will be poison for the second, and vice-versa. As to the question whether there are people who possess such a cognition to a sufficient degree, Padma Dkar-po regards it as simply a matter of fact that there are, since he mentions well-known persons as cig-car-ba or thod-rgal-ba in several places. We may perhaps feel that this analysis has not removed all the obscurity surrounding the distinction, but I think enough has been done to make it at least plausible that Padma Dkar-po did not need to see it as a problem.

The rest of this article will be concerned only with the cig-car-ba. (The special features of the thod-rgal-ba have been treated elsewhere. For the present purposes, directly or indirectly related to the upāyā-mārga, he may be regarded as a rim-gyis-pa.) Within the oeuvre of Padma Dkar-po this choice is natural, since his writing about the cig-car-ba is (or seems to us) clearer and more intelligible than that about the rim-gyis-pa. But there is a further point, perhaps particularly relevant to the interpretation of these texts in the West, rather than in the cultural context for which they were written. The path of the cig-car-ba does not normally extend beyond one lifetime and does not force us to decide what we are to understand by the doctrine of reincarnation; and this is just as well, since the coherence and intelligibility of the latter doctrine seem to be a matter of dispute in the West.  

Padma Dkar-po divides the subject-matter of the gzhung-grel into two (see Appendix B): the person who is to be introduced (’jug-pa) and the path (lam) into which s/he is to be introduced. Here ‘path’ is to be understood in the broadest and most general sense; more on this below. The part about the person makes the cig-car-ba/rim-gyis-pa distinction just reviewed. Naturally, the part about the path is divided into their two paths. To refine what was said in the last paragraph: the cig-car-ba’s path is the main topic of both the gzhung-grel and this article. This path is itself divided into ground, path and goal. ‘Path‘ here seems to have the same sense in both cases; the reference changes, not because there are two items (two paths) in the world, as it were, but rather the same thing as viewed in a different aspect (ngos). Later on some parts of this path are themselves divided into ground, path and goal (see Appendix B). Though Padma Dkar-po does not say so explicitly, it seems to me that there are not a multiplicity of grounds, paths and goals. It seems much more plausible that the same ground, path and goal are being viewed in different ways (some evidence will be presented for this belief). Indeed ground, path and goal are themselves aspects of a single whole, rather than separate things, as Kong-sprul has noted and Padma Dkar-po (and Prof. Guenther) observe.

Still, it will do no harm to introduce a notation to distinguish these possibly different (though not separate) paths; at worst, redundancy will result. Let us say that the path is divided into ground, path, and goal. As is well-known (Appendix B) the path is itself divided into two phases, the path of ripening (smin-lam, vaipāki-kārga) mainly concerned with abhiseka, and the path of freedom (grol-lam) which contains the standard practices of the upāyā-mārga. The term grol-lam is not especially characteristic of the upāyā-mārga; it refers rather to mahāmudrā, which forms part of the ground. The stage of generation (bskyed-rim) is taken in common for all these practices: they are distinguished at the stage of completion (rdo-rigs-rim): the inner heat (gtum-mo), karmamudrā (las-rgya), the illusory body (snyig-lugs), dream (rdzom-lam), the radiant light (od-gsal), the intermediate state(s) (ba-lo), transference (pho-ba), and resurrection (grong-jug). The divisions of the goal section will be discussed in Part II. The division of the ground section into lugs dngos-po’s gnas-lugs and sams dngos-po’s gnos-lugs (and their various subdivisions) are very important but need not occupy us here. All these points are seen much more clearly with the aid of a sa-bcad such as that given in Appendix B. The sa-bcad of course tells us in the first place the structure of the text (and often its most interesting features are seen best by omitting the finer subdivisions). If the writer is in control of his material, the structure of the text will reveal something of the structure of his thought; I have certainly found this to be so with Padma.

The rim-gyis-pa’s path is not thus divided into ground, path and goal, but has a structure related to the five stages of the Pañcakrama.  

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43 My thanks to David接入内容的用户，确保内容的准确性和相关性。
In what sense do these heterogeneous lists of items form paths? As far as I can see, there is no reason to think of them as forming a single unit of some kind. Each path is simply a collection of methods, the explanation and practice of which no doubt descend from Nāropa, and which can conveniently be carried out on different occasions (gnas-skabs). Many distinct methods of mahāmudrā, and each of the different techniques of the upāya-mārga just listed, may by themselves lead to the goal; in this sense they are independent of one another, but it can still be convenient to combine them in various ways. An explanation of what the individual techniques consist of is beyond the scope of this paper; so, therefore, is an account of how they may be combined.

Returning now to the full path1 of the cig-car-ba, we are to enquire into the relation between ground, path2 and goal as different aspects of tantra, continuity. And now we see the point of continuity: it unifies the discrete states of development. As Kong-sprul and Bu-ston have hinted and Padma Dkar-po will explain more fully, the continuity is provided by the unchanging awareness of dngos-po'i gnas-lugs, having the nature of the radiant light and remaining the same throughout all the stages of progress from that of a sentient being to that of a buddha. Guenther’s misunderstanding of the key sentence10 in which Padma Dkar-po expresses this point is one of the reasons why his accounts of this topic, in spite of the many useful points which they make, remain so obscure to this reader.

1.2 Padma Dkar-po’s summary on ground, path & goal for the cig-car-ba

It is called dngos-po'i gnas-lugs because it is the nature (rangs-bzhin, prakrti) of everything, or the way everything is (gnas-tshul), from forms (tāṇa) to the cognition of all modes (ākāra).39 Since it abides continuously like the unchanging sky (during a person’s progress) from sentient being to buddha41 it is called tantra as nature.39 Since this nature abides as a self-established39 radiant light and is unobscured44 from the beginning by the defilement of karmic traces it is called suchness, and this has many synonyms such as ‘cause-Vajradhara,’ ‘ground-mahāmudrā,’ ‘born-together by nature,’ ‘original buddha,’ dhātuvajratagārthā &c. If in itself45 it were not the radiant light, it could not become stainless, just like coals when washed.44 For this reason, Maitreyapa has said ‘Though sentient beings are encased in defilement, this does not inhere from the beginning. So it is said that from the beginning, the nature of mind is stainless.’37

Although in this way48 it does not transcend48 this nature,46 it is established as indestructible thig-le41 through its appearances and its determinate transformations by which it becomes the ground42 of ji-snyed-pa43 things such as the skandhas, dhātus and ayātanas of impure samsāra and also, when these are purified of obscuration,45 of the inexhaustible patterning46 (of one’s life) as the body, speech and mind of a tathāgata, and so it is called “type”46 or “all-characteristics”46 or “all-faculties.”46 As the Hevajra-tantra says,”43 ‘There is not one sentient being who is not a buddha.’ And the Dhammadhātustotra: Through purifying the cause of samsāra there is nirvāna, the dharmakāya. And in the Vajrakīrti, “Tantra is said to be continuous, and samsāra is assigned to tantra. “Later” means “beyond,” and nirvāna is the later tantra.”

In his svāvrtti to the Pramāṇavartika, Dharmakīrti has explained “type” as similarity: it is the similarity of different things,70 as has been said many times. So a worldly person says that this or that thing is of this or that type because there is a similarity, and so he assigns it a name, just as families are named.71 Since this (tattva or dngos-po'i gnas-lugs) is the grasping cause72 of buddhahood, the Mahāsiddha Lavapa’s remark that tantra as cause is a person who accomplishes that which is difficult to attain13 must be taken to mean that this is the person’s subtle self. Nāropa has sometimes said that such a person is like a precious jewel,14 and just as such a person is said to belong to the “definite” type15 of (those who achieve great realization, it) must be the subtle self which from the beginning belongs to this “definite” type.77 The coarse person may be called a coarse self: fools see the skandhas &c. and take them for a subject78 since for them79 there is nothing to be taken for a person80 apart from the perceived81 skandhas &c. Thus the Madhyamakāvatāra (VI.124) says “Since nothing outside the skandhas can be shown to be a subject . . . .” But no difference is observed between the person and the skandhas. How then does the idea of a person arise when the skandhas are perceived? A person is imputed82 on the basis of the skandhas. The same work says (MMV VI.138-9): The Muni has shown that the self (bdag) depends on the six dhātus earth, water, fire, wind, space and consciousness, on contact with the eye and other senses, and on the grasping83 of dharmas by mind and mental events.84

The coarse self is called the inferior person,85 the subtle (self) is called the great person.86 Here one may wonder whether, in speaking of a subtle self, there is not some similarity with the views of the Hindus.87 This is not the case. Although the subtle person88 is here called a ”self,” if it is intuitively understood89 as in the intuitive understanding of citta-viśukta,89 this understanding is the best possible antitheto the Hindu view of a self.89

In the Mahāyānasamgraha, Asanga says that on the path of an ordinary person89 one does not see the ālaya, but once one has attained the bhūmis one sees it in prṛthabalabhaṅga.91 And in the Bṛham-skṣṣyog-gris tathā it is claimed that when satya is not seen, there is no understanding of viṣṇu-dhātus. This must mean (dngos-pa ste) that one does not see in the manner established as indestructible90 by the wind (rājva) of illusion90 which is beyond transformation(s),9 since this is the field of perception90 for those āryas who have attained the bhūmis.90 So the Rdo-rje phreng-ba90 says: ‘In the three worlds there is nothing other than my life to become the essence.’90 Through the wind of illusion the three worlds appear like visions in a dream.’
We speak of a path because one has to travel on the basis of the means of ripening\(^{102}\) and freedom\(^ {103}\) just within this stainless gnas-lugs: and it is a graded path because there is a continuity from the stage of accumulation right up to the vajra-level. This (gnas-lugs) is also the ground on which all qualities grow and rest, and so we speak of tantra as ground: and since it is also the cooperating condition (saḥakāri-pratyaṇa) of rising into buddhahood, we speak of tantra as means.\(^ {104}\) The goal is to become Vajradhara, the source of benefit for others, untainted by adventitious dellemens arising from causes and conditions.\(^ {105}\) As long as there remain sentient beings (limitless) like the sky, the (process of) enlightenment will continue without interruption. This is a graded emergence, and so we speak of the goal arising in stages or of tantra as goal.\(^ {106}\) Since it overcomes obstacles by means of the (very) dellemens of samsara,\(^ {107}\) and since, even though it is as if one had entered a nirvāṇa in which cognition was interrupted, there is a continuing concern with the needs of others, it is called inalienable tantra.\(^ {108}\)

Thus the Guhyasamāja-uttaratantra (XVIII.33-4) says: Tantra is said to be continuity, and this is threefold: its foundation, its nature and its inalienableness. Here “nature” is cause, “foundation” is means, and “inalienableness” is the goal; these three summarize the meaning of tantra. But why does the explanation in terms of dngos-po'i gnas-lugs &c. apply only to the path, of the person of sharp senses? Does it not also apply to the path of the rim-gyis-pa (But) the non-dual cognition of specific things (las dngos-po'i gnas-lugs\(^ {109}\) ), which is wholly comprehended by the two satyas, fully brings about purposes without limit: and the manifest joy in the best goal of Sukhavati is the cig-car-ba.

I.3 Reconstruction of an argument from Padma Dkar-po's summary

Our next aim is to extract and lay bare the general line of the argument which is sometimes clearly expressed and sometimes perhaps implied by Padma Dkar-po in the passage, printed in Appendix A, of which the previous section contains my attempt at an English rendering. Padma Dkar-po himself describes the passage as a summary (bstdus-don), and we must remember that it is only about 1% of the length of the full version; it is not surprising that much of what is carefully argued in the full version appears to be just dogma in the summary.

In making such a reconstruction, as in reading one, we must bear in mind the necessary limits of such an enterprise. It is not possible to mirror the Tibetan text in, or into, English. This is why on the whole I have avoided the word “translation” with its unfortunate connotation of neutral, value-free, culture-independent mirroring. My English rendering inevitably contains a considerable element of interpretation already. But in spite of this, in the previous section I tried to let the text “speak for itself” as much as I could, and to acknowledge my interpretative contribution as explicitly as possible by using brackets, footnotes &c., even while remaining conscious that there can be no hard-and-fast distinction between the text as interpreted and what is supplied by the interpreter. I have also tried strenuously to make accessible to the reader the raw materials on which my judgments are based. The text is printed in Appendix A, the structure of the work in which it appears is summarized in Appendix B, and as far as possible, interpretation is based on Padma Dkar-po's own works, to which careful references are given. While similar principles will apply to the reconstruction, I propose to give much freer play to my own judgments about Padma Dkar-po's general purposes and how to argue for them. I have no privileged access: the reader who thinks he can do better is free to have a go. These standards are commonplace in many areas of enquiry, and I see no impediment, and every good reason, why they should be taken seriously in Vajrayāna studies.

The gz hung upon which Padma Dkar-po is commenting sums up the path, of the cig-car-ba in the famous lines

/dngos-po'i gnas-lugs lam dang ni'/ /bras-bu skye-ba'i rim-pa'o/ which just list the ground (dngos-po'i gnas-lugs), the path, (lam) and the goal, or rather what is correlated with it, viz. 'bras-bu skye-ba'i rim-pa. The Guhyasamāja verses, of course, contain and comment upon the words "tantra is continuity, and this is threefold." In his summary, Padma Dkar-po sets up a correlation between the two sets of verses, so that each can be seen as an illustration of the other. The main stages in setting up this correlation are:

I. The GST verses apply to the cig-car-ba (and not to the rim-gyis-pa)
II. The cig-car-ba (not the rim-gyis-pa) has the capacity for dngos-po'i gnas-lugs.
III. dngos-po'i gnas-lugs is the continuity mentioned in the GST verses.
IV. dngos-po'i gnas-lugs, in different aspects, is ground, path and goal.
V. Ground, path and goal are correlated with the other two sets of three categories introduced in the GST verses.

Point I is not dealt with in the summary. Point II is almost a definition: something less than it, forming perhaps a basis for it, is found in the discussion of a “determinate type” (especially in the obscure remark in which Padma Dkar-po interprets the quotation from the Bṣag-skyong-gis zhus-pa). Point III is made in the very beginning of the summary. Point IV is dealt with in the final section of the summary beginning with “We speak of a path because . . .” What there is of point V is also found there.

I. THE GST VERSES APPLY TO THE CIG-CAR-BA, for the Guhyasamāja as a whole applies to him, according to old arguments in the grub-sde-bdun literature.\(^ {110}\) In any case, the path of the cig-car-ba makes direct use of his dellemens, and so the verses sarvakāmanopabhogaśca &c. of the tantra apply to him, and not to the rim-gyis-pa.\(^ {110}\) The result is also obtained by combining II with III.

II. THE CIG-CAR-BA HAS THE CAPACITY FOR DNGOS-PO'I GNAS-LUGS. This section of the summary is awkwardly interpolated into
the main argument, is loosely and elliptically worded, and comes over very weakly in N.

Padma Dkar-po first introduces the notion of "type" (rigs) for the cig-car-ba in connection with the idea of mi-shigs-pa'i thig-le as the capacity for both samsāra and nirvāṇa; but he does not tell us what the connection is. He continues by discussing "type" in the most general sense, as in apohavāda. The point seems to be that the cīg-car-ba, though of course a particular type, does not belong to any special kind of type, so that nothing can be said about its being a type other than what holds for types in general. However, the type-idea is explicitly applied to those destined for a great realization of non-duality. This type is determined from the very beginning, and so must include everybody destined to attain buddhahood, not only the cīg-car-bas; the connection between the two classes is not explained. In any case, what makes a person so destined is not part of the five skandhas, on the basis of which there is only the illusion of the coarse self. It is found in the subtle self111 and this is not visible until one reaches the bhūmis (presumably the first, pramudītī). Normally this happens on the svādhīnānakrama. However, it is on the previous stage, the cittavīsuddhikrama, that the experience of cittavīvakta shows one that the Hindu notion of the atman in inapposite; so presumably this stage includes a partial knowledge of the subtle self.

Again, it is when one sees satya that one understands the viṣṇunādahītu and/or the ālaya and/or the subtle self; one sees inductively (mi-shigs-par), one sees the field of perception of the āryas. In the Guhyasāma system112 one sees satya on the cittavīsuddhikrama and this may well be what Padma Dkar-po has in mind here, though this (samvṛti) satya is not purified by the radiant light until the next krama, and on other grounds he would certainly object to such a division. In any case, it is this mode of seeing which is dngos-po'i gnas-lugs, and since the capacity to understand the viṣṇunādahītu &c. is found in the subtle self, there too is the capacity for dngos-po'i gnas-lugs. All in all, it seems most likely that Padma Dkar-po does have the svādhīnānakrama in mind here. And in spite of all the talk about a "determinate" type, it seems that any description (let alone argument) specific to the cīg-car-ba is going to rest on some distinction, as yet unspecified, in the subtle self.

There seem to be two possible ways of looking at this section of the summary. The first is to see it as an attempt to ground the cīg-car-ba/rim-gyis-pa difference in a distinction within what we might call the mind (more narrowly, within the subtle self), followed by an account of how the right kind of subtle self has the capacity for dngos-po'i gnas-lugs. Evidently this attempt fails because we do not know enough about the subtle self. The second possibility is to regard it as a descriptive strengthening of something we know already, perhaps because the cīg-car-ba is defined as somebody with the disposition to dngos-po'i gnas-lugs and we do know that such people exist, but we want a fuller account of what these claims come to. I think

Padma Dkar-po probably saw the matter in this second way, for if he had seen it in the first way, he would surely have given such an account not in the bsuls-don, but in the section about the distinction of persons (gang jug-pa rt'en-gyi gang-zag). (Kong-sprul is not faced with this particular problem since [so it seems] he does not want to make the distinction. But he then faces the problem of explaining the verses sarvakāmopahogair &c. and the poison/cure verses.)

III. DNGOS-PO'I GNAS-LUGS AS CONTINUITY. For the purpose of this argument, to Padma Dkar-po's opening remark that dngos-po'i gnas-lugs is the nature or mode of being of everything we must add the gloss that that nature is its being cognised non-dually.113 There is a tension in this conception: sometimes it is taken somewhat ontologically, emphasizing the things: which can be cognised by anyone, whether sentient being or buddha (but in the former case not in this mode), and sometimes the emphasis is epistemic, on its non-duality or on its subjective quality as the radiant light. The same tension crops up again in the claim that the nature of things as the radiant light remains unchanged under obscuration (note 54). The best way with this difficulty is probably to abandon the sentient beings and start with the āryas. The non-dua aspects are called just suchness (de-kho-na-niyid &c.). In any case the ontological aspect does not imply commitment to objects of any particular kind (so if this is an "ontology" it is very weak). Though not everyone can see things in this mode, it is their nature so to be seen, and this nature (prakṛti) is what is referred to in the phase prakṛti-tantra. (Padma Dkar-po implicitly denies the connection between this and tantra as cause asserted in the verse.) This prakṛti becomes the source of both samsāra and nirvāṇa, and its capacity to manifest in a manifold of appearances is given names such as gsalungs and mi-shigs-pa'i thig-le; but of course there is no ontological separation between this prakṛti and its appearances. Another sense of "continuance as continuity" is just the continuity or identity of the prakṛti underlying both samsāra and nirvāṇa.

IV. DNGOS-PO'I GNAS-LUGS, IN DIFFERENT ASPECTS, AS GROUND, PATH AND GOAL.

Ground-continuity: the summary says that all desirable qualities arise out of the cognitive experience of dngos-po'i gnas-lugs, which is therefore the ground. The point about continuity is obvious; the point that desirable cognitive qualities arise has already been made. As in other parts of the discussion it seems difficult to see how ethically desirable qualities arise.

Path-continuity: the attitude (lta-ba) towards abhiṣeka and the upāya-mārga is gnas-lugs (in its aspect of ground-mahāmudrā), and the preparations, rituals, practices and actions for and of abhiṣeka and the upāya-mārga take place within this attitude, which is therefore the continuity of the path.

Goal-continuity: Padma Dkar-po's treatment surely rests on an equivocation with different applications of "goal" (bras-bu, phala). One's own goal
is to become Vajradhara, but this has nothing to do with continuity. He says that *dngos-po'i gnas-lugs* is causal Vajradhara (*rgyu rdo-rje 'dzin*) but this is continuity in general or perhaps ground-continuity, but not goal-continuity. The goal for others is that they too should become Vajradhara. Now if "goal" is taken collectively this is a continuous process, since people attain enlightenment individually and not all at once. From the point of view of a bodhisattva concerned with this collective process, no doubt there is a continuity; but it seems artificial to say that this is tantra or *dngos-po'i gnas-lugs*. On the other hand, if one goes back to looking at the process from the point of view of the individuals involved (rather than collectively) one is again left only with continuity in general. It might be better to say merely that goal-continuity is the gradual emergence of the goal (*bras-bu skye-ba'i rim-pa*) but Padma Dkar-po is certainly trying to squeeze more out of the idea than this. He says in the summary that *bras-bu skye-ba'i rim-pa* is the gradual emergence of the goal-for-others; yet if we look at what the *gzhung-grel* actually says under the heading *bras-bu skye-ba'i rim-pa*, this claim too seems like an equivocation. It seems clear that that section deals with the emergence of the goal seen from the point of view of each individual traversing the path. To this it might be replied that the individual goal, to become Vajradhara, cannot be achieved unless all sentient beings achieve the same state too, so that the distinction between the individual and the collective goal is an illusion. But I am certain that Padma Dkar-po would repudiate this line of defence, for he saw the attainment of buddhahood as something that can occur within ordinary normal historical time, and has occurred to individuals whom he names. The purpose of the *cig-car-ba/rim-gyis-pa* distinction revolves about this belief; whereas of course the collective process, as he says himself, is endless.

*Dngos-po'i gnas-lugs* as linking ground, path and goal: about the linking of ground and path enough has been said already, and the close connection of ground and goal is well-known (and does not depend especially on the use of the term *dngos-po'i gnas-lugs*). But Padma Dkar-po has something interesting to say about the causal links of path and goal. In the summary he says that *gnas-lugs* is the cooperating condition (*sahakārī-pratiyaya*) of buddhahood and so is tantra as means. He also says that it is the grasping cause (*upādāna-hetu*) of buddhahood. Clearly these remarks, unless they are merely slogans trading on shifting and perhaps metaphorical uses of such words as means (*thabs, upāya*) and path (*lam, mārga*) demand to be filled out with some kind of account of the causal connection, even though, for general reasons mentioned in my introductory remarks to this reconstruction, one must not expect more than a description.

Padma Dkar-po’s definitions of this *hetu* and *pratiyaya* are: "The grasping cause is what causes the effect to arise from its own essence; the cooperating condition is what causes the effect to arise from something else." He gives examples, one of which provides the basis for the fuller account which we seek:

Now we know that *dngos-po'i gnas-lugs* contains within it both the satyas. So the claim that it is both the cooperating condition and the grasping cause expands exactly into the first pair of examples (apart from the word "distant" which I will not pursue). Both examples illustrate another important theme: samvrta-satya, the illusory body, the three poisons &c., far from disappearing when yuganaddha or buddhahood is attained, continue in the sense that this effect has them as a cause *having the same essence* (*ngo-bo*). For example, the illusory body becomes the *ṛṣipākṣya*. This aspect of continuity will be dealt with in Part II.

**V. Correlation of Ground, Path and Goal with the Guhyasamāja Verses**

The last section of the summary deals with the identification of tantra as goal with inalienable tantra. Earlier in the same passage tantra as means is said to be the cooperating condition of rising into buddhahood; this claim was just explained, and seems to run counter to the usual identification of tantra as means with the path (since the radiant light is the ground); so the immediately preceding remark about tantra as ground (*gzhis'i rgyud*) means (as I took it in IV above) ground as in ground/path/goal, and not the *ādhāra* equated with *upāya* in GST XVIII.34c. Concerning tantra as cause, Padma Dkar-po quotes Lavapa who says it is the adept (this is also Tsong-kha-pa’s view), but then interprets this as the adept’s subtle self. Tantra as nature, however, is said to be the radiant light in the opening passage, and this again is clearly the ground in the ground/path/goal sense. The effect of all this is that the first trio in v. 33, Padma Dkar-po ignores *ādhāra* while treating *prakṛti* and *asamhārya* as one would expect, while in the second trio in v. 34, he changes the verse’s identification of *prakṛti* with *hetu*, identifies *upāya* with the path (still saying nothing about *ādhāra*), and identifies *asamhārya* and *phala* with the goal as one would expect. It seems not too much to say that he takes the remark that tantra is threefold continuity and applies it directly to the ground/path/goal division, as in point IV, while treating the two trios mentioned in the GST verses as a subsidiary matter on which he is not bound to follow them.

Thus in the summary as a whole, Padma Dkar-po’s main objectives have been to clarify what is meant by talking of tantra as continuity, to exhibit
the threefold continuity of ground, path and goal, and to say what he could about the connection of these with the cig-car-ba. If the two unfamiliar terms cig-car-ba and dngos-po'i gnas-lugs are regarded as closely connected, then they can be jointly explained by means of more familiar vocabulary drawn mainly from Mahāyāna and from the radiant light doctrine. I feel that this explanation (one might call it a reduction) is successful. A more ambitious project would be the independent definition of the new terms and the exhibiting of their connection at what might be called a psychological level (in terms of the subtle self), followed again by an explanation in terms of Mahāyāna and the radiant light. Padma Dkar-po seems not to have been attempting a reduction along these more ambitious lines, but seems to have regarded the suggestion more as an illustration. Though the present section is, of course, my own reconstruction of the summary, I think I have also demonstrated (albeit in crude outline) what Padma Dkar-po understood by these objectives, how he carried them out, and with what degree of success.

* * * *

We have seen Padma Dkar-po making considerable use of the notions of a person being potentially a buddha, and of the purity of mind by nature in contrast with the adventitious quality of defilements. These ideas might be said to be shared by the radiant light doctrine and the tathāgatagarbha theory. It is noteworthy that Padma Dkar-po wrote nothing on garbha theory and the notion plays no part in his doctrinal scheme; so far as I know this holds for the whole 'Brug-pa tradition. It may be worth hazarding a guess as to the reasons for this absence.

My guess would be that, for Padma Dkar-po, the garbha doctrine adds nothing but ontology to the doctrines he does use. The capacity to become a buddha becomes a separate item in the catalogue of items which go to make up a person; but this new item has no separate function, since even in ordinary persons it is just natural cognition (tha-mal-gyi shes-pa) or the radiant light which is obscured by the defilements. In any case, the transcendental character of the garbha, which the texts hint at when they stress how hard it is to see, how it resembles space, &c., is unsympathetic for Padma Dkar-po.

Even writers such as Dol-po Shes-rab Rgyal-mtshan, who make much use of the garbha doctrine, seem to see it mainly as an aid to faith and devotion and a belief in the possibility of liberation. It is not very useful in describing the path, which is Padma Dkar-po’s main interest. For instance, Dol-po-pa in his Ri-chos nges-don rgya-mtsho uses the garbha doctrine a lot, with extensive quotations from the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, in the opening chapter describing the starting-point of the path, but hardly at all in the two chapters dealing with the path itself. In any case the garbha doctrine can have no explanatory power to explain the path and goal, since like Molière's virtus dormitiva it was invented specifically to have the required properties.

The main point of Padma Dkar-po’s introduction of dngos-po'i gnas-lugs is to provide a genuine explanatory power of the kind absent in the garbha notion. To ensure this, we must of course think of dngos-po'i gnas-lugs as defined without reference to the notion of a buddha; if anything, the latter must depend on the former. In this way the cognitive, psychological, logical and other parts of the doctrine can be seen in some degree of isolation from the buddhological aspects. (It can also be desirable to underpin this way the doctrine that the appearance of buddhas in the world is a purely contingent matter, so that people are encouraged not to be lazy.) Now unless the vocabulary is specially constructed for the purpose, there is no a priori reason why a single account of the whole path having this sort of explanatory power should be available in a form applying uniformly to everybody. (The variousness of the ' Tara-gatas’s skillful means is a constant theme of the buddha-utterance, especially in the tantras.) So there is no reason why there should not be a “natural” division of people into types suitable for different styles of explanation, such as that used by Padma Dkar-po. It will then be a purely contingent matter that for any particular person there should be an explanation of the type discussed by Padma Dkar-po. (It will be contingent, say, on his being a cig-car-ba.)

In the summary, the explanation of continuity as the graded emergence of the goal (bras-bu skye-ba'i rim-pa) rests mainly on the ethical aspect of buddhahood (working for the benefit of others, not entering nirvāṇa, &c.). Now Padma Dkar-po’s explanations of the radiant light and of yu yangadha are in the main independent of the notion of buddhahood and of these ethical considerations. In principle it would be desirable to explain how such capacities as effortless action (anabhoga-cārya, lhun-gyis grub-pa'i spyod-pa) for the benefit of others stem from the radiant light or from yu yangadha. In a sense, this is unnecessary, since it is affirmed so plainly in the tantras, and at first sight Padma Dkar-po’s use of these quotations might make the impression that it is simply a matter of brute fact that once defilements have been expunged and wrong views corrected, these socially desirable effects will manifest all by themselves. Really, an answer to this question should be sought elsewhere. Just as la-ba (attitude, point of view) is the province of works on mahāmudrā, the cultivation (sgom-pa) of this attitude is the province of the bsre'-pho works on which this article has mainly drawn. The next stage is that of action (spyod-pa), and it is really here rather than on the cultivation level that the ethically significant capacities for acting for the good of others are developed, and so one will seek an account of the process not in the works of the bsre'-pho cycle, but in those on ro-snyoms. They, however, are beyond the scope of this paper. Nor can we deal here with various other matters on which the summary seems most immediately to require supplementation, such as the notion of the subtle self, the radiant light doctrine, &c.
Part I of this paper has been on tantra in general as ground, path and goal; Path II will consist of the application and illustration of these ideas in an account of yuganaddha (zung-jug), which is the notion unifying the goal section of the gzhung-grel. There seem to be good reasons for taking the goal section before the path section. First, since the path is directed towards the goal, its purpose cannot even be set out until the goal has been described. Secondly, Padma Dkar-po’s own conception of the path does not seem to have been underpinned by any single unifying conception other than those of its ground and goal; by itself the path is rather heterogeneous. Thirdly, the graded emergence of the goal (‘bras-bu skye-ba’i rim-pa) is itself divided into ground, path and goal; these seem to be the same ground, path and goal, viewed from the viewpoint of yuganaddha. This gives us an outline for the application of the ideas already developed. We will proceed by considering first yuganaddha in general, and then its ground, path and goal aspects in detail.11 Finally we will be able to use the details of these three aspects to bring Padma Dkar-po’s general picture of yuganaddha more sharply into focus. This second part of the paper will appear in the next issue of this Journal.
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APPENDIX B

PADMA DKAR-PO’S BSRE-THO WORKS:
OUTLINE OF THE SA-BCAD

gang ’jug-pa rtan-gyi gang-zag, 8a4::5a5
gang-du ’jug-pa’i lam-la gnyis
cig-car-du ’jug-pa’i lam-la gnyis
dsdbus-pa’i don, 10b5::6a2 (given in Appendix A)
mgon-par rtogs-pa gstan-la dbab-pa-la gsum
dngos-po’i ngs-lugs-la gnyis
lus dngos-po’i ngs-lugs-la gnyis
rgs-rim-nas ngsos-bzung*, 14b1::7b5
phra-rim gstan-la dbab-pa-la bshi
lus ji-ltar grub-pa’i tshul, 24b1::c.8a3
rtsa dngos-po’i ngs-lugs, 45a6::10b1
rlung dngos-po’i ngs-lugs, 74a3::11b5
byang-sems dngos-po’i ngs-lugs, 79b4::13a4
sems dngos-po’i ngs-lugs-la gsum
gzi phyag-rgya chen-po gstan-la dbab, 115a2::14b1
lam phyag-rgya chen-po nyams-su blang, 120a4::15a3
bras-bu phyag-rgya chen-po mgon-du’i gyur-ba, 128b3::15b3
lam-la gnyis
smin-byed-kyi dbang, 129b6::16a6
grol-bar byed-pa’i lam-la gnyis
rim gnyis bsgom-tshul spyir-bshad*, 142a6::17a6
mgon-par rtogs-pa so-sor gstan-la dbab-pa-la gnyis
bskyed-rim, 147b4::18a4
rdzongs-rim-la-gnyis
mdor-bstan*, 164a2::19a3
gnas-bshad-la brgyad
gtum-mo lam-gyi gzi-ma, 179b6::20a6
las-rgya lam-gyi ‘bogs-don, 278b2::x
sgyu-lus lam-gyi srog zhung, 310a6::77a5
rmi-lam lam-gyi drod-tshad, 324b1::87b4
‘od-gsal lam-gyi snying-po, 331a1::94b6
bar-do lam-gyi blo-chod, 345b6::108a4
’pho-ba lam-gyi bsun-ma, 360b6::119b3
grong-’jug lam-gyi ‘thud-ma, 368a4::133b3
bras-bu skye-ba’i rim-pa-la gsum
’ita-ba nnam-dag zung-’jug-gi ting-nges’i gnas bslab-tshul-la gsum
gzi zung-’jug rtogs-tshul, 370a5::136a4
lam zung-’jug bsgom-tshul, 372a3::136b3
bras-bu zung-’jug char-tshul, 374a3::137a1
sgom-pa nnam-dag zung-’jug-gi ting-nges’i gnas bslab-tshul, x::137b4
spuyod-pa nnam-dag zung-’jug-gi ting-nges’i gnas bslab-tshul-la gnyis
chags-can-gyi spuyod-pa, x::138b1
chags-bral-gyi spuyod-pa, x::139b5
rim-gyis ’jug-pa’i lam, 379b3::x
References: 8a4: Sa5 means gzhung-'grel 8a4, khrig-yig 5a5; x = absent

(The sections marked * contain especially useful summaries of the reasons why the sections following them are organized as shown here.)

[For Appendix C, see Part II of this paper.]

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INDIAN WORKS

ADK: Abhidhammakośa
BCA: Bodhicaryāvatāra
BCAP: Pāṇijika on BCA by Prajñākaramati, ed. Vaidya
GST: Guhyasamājatantra, ed. Bagchi
HT: Hevajra-tantra, ed. and trans. Snellgrove
Lāṅkā: Lāṅkāvatārasūtra, ed. Vaidya
MK: Madhyamakakārikās
MMV: Madhyamakāvatāra
PK: Pañcakrama, ed. Poussin
PPD: Pradipoddayotana, Derge
PSP: Prasannapadā, Skt. ed. Poussin
PSPT: Derge trans. of PSP

(For Tilopa’sĀhā-pramāṇa samyag-nāma dākinī-upadeśa, see gzhung
under Padma Dkar-po in the Tibetan section.)

TIBETAN WORKS

(The works are grouped by author. The full title, where given, is
prefaced by a sobriquet or short title in italics, by which the work
is identified in the footnotes. The different rgyud-sde spyi’i runam-
gzhag are also identified there by author.)

Sa-skya-pa Bsdod-nams Rtses-mo
Rgyud-sde spyi’i rnam-bzhag, Sa-skya bka’-bum, vol. 2

Dol-po Shes-rab Rgyal-mtshan
Ri-chos nges-don rgya-mtsho

Rgyud bla-ma’i ‘grel-pa Legs-bshad ngyi-ma’i ‘od-zer
Klong-chen-pa Dri-med ‘Od-zer (from vol. 1 of the Bla-ma yang-tig)
Khregs-chod-kyi rgyab-yig nam-mkha’ dri-med, 28b - 45a
Thod-rgal-gyi rgyab-yig ngyi-zla gza-skar, 45a - 74a

Bu-ston
Gsang-dus bshad-thabs: Gsang-ba ‘dus-pa’i rgyud-‘grel-gyi
bshad-thabs-kyi yan-lag gsang-ba’i sgo-byed, gsung-bum vol. 8
Pradipoddayotana-tikā, ibid.

Tsong-kha-pa (from the 18-vol. bka’-bum)
Sgron-gsal mchan-‘grel, vol. nga
Kim-lha rab-gsal sgron-me, vol. ja
Rigs-pa’i rgya-mtsho, vol. ba

Mi-brskyod Rdo-rje
Dwags-brgyud grub-pa’i shing-rta, Dbu-ma-la ’jug-pa’i nram-
bshad dpal-lldan Dus-gsum mkyhen-pa’i zhal-lung
Sgam-po-pa Bkra-shis Rnam-rgyal
Nor-bu’i ‘od-zer: Gsang-sngags rdo-rje theg-pa’i spyi-don mdor-
bsdus-pa
Nyil-ma’i ‘od-zer: Dpal Kye’i rdo-rje rgyud-kyi rgyal-po legs-par
bshad-pa
Padma Dkar-po (except where otherwise stated references are to
the 24-vol. reproduction of the Gnam’brug Par-ma)
Tshad-ma Jam-pa’i dongs-rgyan, vol. 1
Tshad-ma rigs-pa’i snying-po, vol. 1
Nges-don grub-pa’i shing-rta: Dbu-ma’i gzhung-lugs gsum gsal-
bar byed-pa, vol. 8
Rgyud-sde spyi’i rnam bzhag Mkhas-pa’i yid-phrog, vol. 11
Snyan-rgyud rgyal-mtshan: U-rgyan chos-kyi gan-mdzod-nas
phyung-ba/ snyan-rgyud yid-bzhin nor-bu legs-par bshad-
pa’i rgyal-mtshan-gyi rtser bton-pa dngos-grub-kyi
char’bebs, vol. 14
Yid-phrog: Dpal kye rdo-rje’i spyi-don grub-pa’i yid-phrog,
vol. 15
Gsang-dus rgyan: Gsang-ba ‘dus-pa’i rgyan zhes-bya-ba Mar-
lugs thun-mong ma-yin-pa’i bshad-pa, vol. 16
Phyag-chen gan-mdzod: Phyag-rgya chen-po man-ngag-gi bshad-
shyar rgyal-ba’i gan-mdzod, vol. 21
Rnal-byor bzhid-mdzu-tshugs: Rnal-byor bzhid-bshad-pa don-
dam mdzu-tshugs-su bstan-pa, vol. 21

Bsre’-pho:
gzung: Bka’ yang-dag-pa’i tshad-ma mkha’-’gro-ma’i man-
ngag by Tilopa (cf. Indian section); references are to the
version in Rare bKa’-brgyud-pa texts from Himachal
Pradesh. (Also in Gdam-mngag mdzod, vol. 7)
gzung-’grel: Jo-bo Nāropa’i khay-chos bsre’-pho’i
gzhung-’grel rdo-rje chang-gi dgos-pa gsal-bar byed-
pa, Rtsi-bri ed.
khrig-yig: Jo-bo Nāropa’i khay-chos bsre-pho’i khrig rdo-
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rje'i theg-par bgrud-pa'i shing-rta chen-po, Rtsi-bri ed.
lam-bsdu: collection of short works entitled after its first member: Bse'-pho lam-dbye-bsdu, Rtsi-bri ed.
(Apart from the Gzhung all these Bse'-pho works are found also in the Gnam-brug Par-ma, vols. 22-3.)

Kong-sprul Blo-gros Mtha-yas
Kyie-rdo spyi-don: Rgyud-kyi rgyal-po dpal brtag-pa gnyis-pa'i spyi-don legs-bshad gsang-ba bla-na-med-pa rdo-rje drwa-ba'i rgyan
Rgyud-bla'i rnam-'grel: Rgyud bla-ma'i snying-po'i don-gyi bshad-srol dang sbyar-ba'i rnam-'grel phyir mi-lcod-pa'i sengge'i nga-ro

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(W) A. Wayman: The Buddhist Tantras (New York: Samuel Weiser, 1973)
(YG) A. Wayman: Yoga of the Guhyasamâjatantra (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1977)

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ADDENDUM

The following materials came to my attention too late for inclusion in the body of this paper:

(a) Padma Dkar-po's rgyud-gsum ngos-'dzin-gyi yi-ge phyin-ci-ma-log-pa'i gnam (gsung-'bum vol. 24), an account of the “three tantras” more elementary and less compressed than the summary around which Part I of this paper is organized. It also contains extra interesting material, and I hope to publish a lightly annotated translation in some future issue of this Journal.

(b) Khregs-chod-pa and thod-rgal-ba: Klong-chen-pa contrasts these two personality types at thod-rgal-gyi rgyab-yig (see above) 57b2; Padma Dkar-po does so at rdzogs-pa chen-po'i snying-po dril-ba padma snying-tig (gsung-'bum vol. 20). 4b3 ff.

NOTES

1. Numbered as in GST; p. 153 in the COS ed. Guenther (N 114 n.2) points out that in 44a, Tib. rnam-pa suggests akštri for akštr,-. The Tibetan is given (following Padma Dkar-po) toward the end of Appendix A; see note 23 for Kong-sprul’s variant. Though variations like this may reflect or be the basis of doctrinal variations between different authors, I do not take this into account here. But quotations in texts of various periods are likely to contain important information about translation history.

2. Works commonly described as bstan-bcos in Tibet include e.g. the Madhyamakakârikâs of Nâgarjuna and the Ratagotravibhâga-uttaratantra (Rgyud bla-ma) attributed to Maitrela.

3. In Tibet this collection of five items was called dgos-'brel (see Broido (1983c)).

4. For a general review of Tibetan methods of explaining the tantras, see Broido (1981). Padma Dkar-po’s views in this area are discussed in Broido (1983b).

5. Compare the sections “What is Tantra?” in Guenther (N 112) and “Some fundamentals of the Tantras” in Wayman (YG, 62). Whereas Guenther ignores bshad-thabs completely, Wayman has attempted to take it into account, e.g. in his article “Twilight language and a tantric song” in W. Unfortunately this is not as easy as he seems to think (see Broido (1982)).


7. rgyud-gsum-gyis don nyams-clang-gi mgon-rgos-s byar-te byed-pas... bshad-thabs-kyi gto-bo yin-no/, ibid. 68a5.

8. The section on the three tantras is headed Sems-kyi rgyud rgyun-chags-la gong-gnas rgyud-gsum bshad-ba (ibid. 67b3) but this ‘implication of continuity’ is not taken up here by Bsd-nams Rtsi-mo. The method itself is described as bshad-thabs-kyi man-ngag-gi tshul, 67b4.
9. des rgyud ji-ltar 'chad-na, ibid. 68a4.
10. Bka'-shis Rnam-rgyal, Nor-bu'i 'od-zer 15a2; Nyi-ma'i 'od-zer 13a4, 14a7. This latter passage explains how when using the “three tantras,” one may either treat separate passages each by one “tantra,” or individual words by all three, according to the purpose of instruction. He uses gzhung-gi-skabs for the sections of the text. Bsd-nams Rtsa-mo seems to make a similar distinction, op. cit. 68a4; if this is right, the obscure (to me) phrase bkra-por bshad-pa must mean something like “to explain in separate sections.”
11. Sgron-gsal mchan-'grel, 2b5. This forms part of Tsong-kha-pa’s comment on Candrakīrti’s introductory verse /dpal-lсан rgyud. . . . , PPD 1a2.
12. GST XII.60; see YG, sevi s.v.
13. mi-gnas-pa'i myang-'das rdo-rje-'chang, 2b6.
14. don-gyi rgyud-la gsum-du phyre-ba, ibid.
15. The word “tantra” (rgyud) upon which these remarks comment comes at the beginning of the introductory verse (see note 11) which, inter alia, also announces that the work (PPD) will be about the application of the mtha-drug (i.e. of bshad-thabs) to the tantra (GST). After a brief verse summary of the six kramas, Candrakīrti launches into his famous verses on the “seven ornaments” of bshad-thabs (2a3-3b6).
16. Tsong-kha-pa’s account has been discussed by Guenther in his well-known style (N. 114-6). I would comment only that Padma Dkar-po’s account is not at all “essentially similar” (117.4). Something like this passage of Tsong-kha-pa is also behind the opinion attributed to his pupil Mkhgas-grub-rje by Wayman in the section “Definitions and varieties of tantra” (YG, 61). But no evidence is given by Wayman for the claim that “Those explanations clarify the definition of ‘Tantra’ as ‘continuous series,’” on the question of continuity, Tsong-kha-pa’s explanation adds nothing to the verse.
17. Monier-Williams, s.v. prabandha, stresses “connection, band, tie . . . an uninterrupted connection, continuous series, uninterrupted, continuity;” obviously the second group of words corresponds to rgyun-chags (continuity, continuous), while the first group would sanction the translation by ’brel-ba (note 23).
18. PPD-tikā, 4a1.
19. rgyud ni rab-tu ’brel cing rgyun chags-par ‘jug-pas . . . ., ibid.
20. The Tibetan for this quotation is in Appendix A.
21. The colloquial sense of gnas-lugs is “the nature of things,” “the way things are,” and may be contrasted with Padma Dkar-po’s technical use of the term, for which see Broio (1979). Bu-ston’s remark is consistent with either use.
23. Kye-rdor spyi-don, 20a2:

/rgyu{n ces-by-a ’brel-ba don/’brel-ba-la yang rnam-gsum ste/
/gzhi dang rang-bzhin ‘bras-bu dang/’mi-phrog-pa-yis phe-ba-nyid/ (33)
ed and discussed at some length in Broido (1983a).  
32. See Broido (1983b).
33. The three avāstā have been well-discussed by Guenther in his essay “The levels of understanding in Buddhism” (Pers., see pp. 61-3): Phya-gchen gan-mdzod, 30a3.
34. Really what is involved here is two different concepts of the relation between mahāmudrā and the upāya-mārga; see Broido (1983a).
35. The relation between mahāmudrā and rdzogs-chen is discussed by Padma Dkar-po in ch. 5 of the Phya-gchen gan-mdzod.
37. The Vimalamitra’s snying thig and its cognates are codified by the Klong-chen-pa in the Snying-thig ya-bzhi.
39. Kye-rdor spyi-don, 20b3-4. The work is used nowadays in this tradition as an elementary text on vajrayāna theory. Its general structure derives mainly from Padma Dkar-po’s Gzhung-grel and Yid-phrog (these however are advanced works). Yet if everybody is a cig-car-ba, either Kong-sprul uses this word differently from Padma Dkar-po, or he has a different and more optimistic view of human capabilities. I suspect he uses the word differently, since the general style of his Bka’-brgyud-pa works (not only the Hevajra works but also his commentary on the Zab-mo nang-gi-don) is more like a lam-rim or the Rim-gyis ‘jug-pa’i lam of the Gzhung-grel.
40. See the vajrayāna chapter of the sdom-gsum rab-dbye.
41. This seems to be the conception underlying the Rim-lnga dmar-khrid, but it is difficult to be certain because of Bu-ston’s reluctance to commit any view of goal-attainment to paper. It seems to be more explicit in the following remark from the PPD-rikā, 6b3:

de-kha-na-niyd ni bden-gnyis dbyer-med-pa’i zung-’jug-gi ting-nge-dzin yin-la/ de-la gcig-car bslab-par mi-nus-pas skyes-bu ’phong slob-pa’i dpes rim-gyis bslab-par bya’o/

42. The idea is well-known but has been reviewed briefly in the context of Padma Dkar-po’s thinking in Broido (1983a).
43. Compare the bka’ yang-dag-pa’i tshad-ma 1b, quoted gzhung-grel 10ab:

/rim-gyis-pa-yi sman-chen ‘di/’cig-car-ba-yi dug-tu ’gyur/ /cig-car-ba-yi sman-chen ‘di/’rim-gyis-pa-yi dug-tu ’gyur/

Of course the idea is developed considerably further by Padma Dkar-po in his commentary.
44. E.g. Phya-gchen gan-mdzod, 23a ff. There are also three cycles of books about the three types (titles and brief contents, ibid. 19a2). This is part of a more comprehensive scheme of arrangement of the Brug-pa literature of mahāmudrā and related topics, which goes back to Gtsang-pa Rgya-ras (ibid. 4a1).
45. It is widely accepted that the major role in the individuation of persons is played by the individuation of bodies (e.g. P. F. Strawson, Individuals, 1950). The dispute revolves about the possibility that sometimes another criterion may override this one (say to distinguish Mr. Hyde from Dr. Jekyll). But if it is analytic that “same person, same body,” then the notion of reincarnation of persons is not consistent with our idea of a person. Then there is the question whether in India and Tibet the idea of a person is compatible with ours. At first sight this might appear to be a separate and purely factual question, perhaps to be settled by anthropologists or social scientists. But of course the idea of a person is inextricably bound up with the identity and difference conditions for the referents of the personal pronouns, and it is precisely these conditions which are at issue when we speak of reincarnation: for the personal pronouns refer to persons, and not to bodies.
46. bshad-byi lugs-la’ gang ’jug-pa’i gang-zag dang’ / gang-du ’jug-pa’i lam (Gzhung-grel 7a3, 8a4).
47. For the rim-gyis ’jug-pa’i lam, see Gzhung-grel 387b3 and especially Padma Dkar-po’s writings on the yid-bzhin nor-bu skor-gsum, e.g. Snyan-rgyud rgyal-mtshan.
48. Roughly speaking there is a vajra-pakrama, a cittavivadhlakrama, and a svāttidhiṇākrama; the latter has subdivisions called mgon-par rtogs-pa’i rim-pa (corresponding roughly to the abhisambodhi-krama), and a stage of goal-attainment laying out the various methods of rising into buddhahood (tshan-rgya-ba) from transference, the dream state, the various intermediate states, &c., and called rang-niyd lhag-par gnas-pa’i rim-pa. Though the word zung-’jug is still used, it does not have the weight attached to it in the cig-car-ba’i lam.,
49. N. 118-6; TVL 3.29.
50. This first sentence appears in Guenther’s version in TVL, but has disappeared in N, where the phrase dngos-po’i gnas-lugs is taken as part of the second sentence and translated by “the concrete fact of Being.” We may perhaps agree that the phrase is difficult and better left untranslated (see Broido 1979); but what does this English phrase tell us about it? What does it mean? Surely Being (whatever that may be) is not a fact of some kind? And what is a concrete fact, if not a fact about particular things, while surely Being, whatever it is, is not a particular thing? I don’t want to reject out of hand the possibility of an existentialist/transcendentalist interpretation (preferably supported by some facts) but surely we are entitled to know what the proposed interpretation means? Here, what was perhaps a problem in Tibetan has been replaced by a problem about Guenther’s own idiolect.
51. This second remark, which is the key to the whole passage, has been butchered in both of Guenther’s versions (n.49). The phrase sems-can-nas sangs-rgyas-kyi bar-du is about the progress of a person from the level (gnas-skabs) of an ordinary person to that of a buddha (cf. note 33). In order to speak of a progress, something must remain unchanged, and this is dngos-po’i gnas-lugs, here said quite literally to “abide unchanging like the
sky because of continuity” (nam-mkha-ltar ’gyur-ba-med-par gnas-pas rgyun-chags-pa-niyid-kyi phyir). In both versions Guenther assimilates this sentence to the one before it which is on the different matter of gnas-lugs as the nature of everything making up the world. Thus he reinforces the mistake (in N) by adding the gloss “encompassing everything” and by replacing the phrase “unchanging like the sky” with “like the serene sky.” (The TVL version at least has “unalterably present, like the sky” but is just as bad in the other respects.) The theme of tattva or dngos-po'i gnas-lugs as the “continuity from samsāra to nirvāṇa is an ancient one, and is expressed in similar language in the Vimalaprabhā: “Thus the non-duality of truth and clarity is called samsāra or nirvāṇa because it abides in silence without changing so much as a hair’s breadth from beginningless samsāra to endless nirvāṇa” (de-lta-bu’i zab-gsal gnyis-med de-niyid thog-ma-med-pa’i ’khor-ba-nas tha-ma-med-pa’i mya-ngan ’dus-kyi bar-du spu-ris mi ’gyur-bar gnas-pa phyir sams dngos-po gnas-lugs bang de-kho-na-nyid ces kyung bya’o/. Gzhung-grel 118b6); this is the very reason why Padma Dkar-po quotes the passage.

52. rang-bzhin here and in most other places discussed in this article corresponds to Skt. prakṛti. These words seem to mean “nature” (as in “it is the nature of things to fall”), in a straightforward, pre-critical sense. I cannot understand either why Guenther uses “actuality” and “Being-itself” in this context or why he oscillates between the two. In prakṛti-tantra, “tantra” means both a soteriological genre and tantra-as-continuity (cf. Khrid-yig 6b2).

53. ngo-bo-niyid-kys grub-pa. The idea appears in MK XVIII.7: /gzhon-las shes-min zhi-ba dang’ / &c., less clearly in Skt. aparaprtyayaṃ sāntam. Of course this ngo-bo-niyid is not a svabhāva, by means of which paramārtha-satyā (here the radiant light) is precisely not established (MMV VI.23 and bhāṣya). The idea is rather that the subjective factor in experience contains a self-reflexive component (cf. Kant): the radiant light is known in the act of knowing (things), if one’s cognition is clear enough. Padma Dkar-po’s point could have been made by the phrase rang-nyid-kys.

54. The idea of this distinction, which is well-known e.g. in garbha theory, is that though the radiant light (or dngos-po’i gnas-lugs) itself may be obscured, its nature remains the same under the obscurity. One may feel that this is not very happily put by saying “its nature remains unobscured,” but I feel the idea is confused. It is the radiant light itself which is obscured and remains the same under the obscurity.

55. ngo-bo-niyid-kys, cf. notes 53, 54.

56. The idea of the simile is that the nature of coal is to be black, and so, as Padma Dkar-po explains more fully at Phyag-chen gan-mdzod 93a1, “it is like coals which do not become white even though washed in a stream of milk” (sol-ba’ o-ma’i rgyun-gyis kyang dkar-por mi ’gyur-ba lia-bu’o/). Another related use of the simile is found at Nges-don grub-pa’i shing-rta 66b5.

57. sens-kyi rang-bzhin dri-med (corr. to Skt. citraprakāṭi vaimālya, e.g. Ratnagotrabhāga I.49). The phrase “the mind is stainless by nature” might seem more natural (and is how the Chinese translated the Ratnagotrabhāga verse: Takasai 233 n. 251), but does not fit Padma Dkar-po’s Tibetan: it corresponds rather to something like sens ni rang-bzhin-gyi sams-niyid dri-med. Here sens is similar to yid (manas) and stands in contrast to sams-niyid (similar to sens-kyi rang-bzhin). Guenther’s translation misses this, translating sens by “Being” which on his own view should be sams-niyid. (He has given several conflicting accounts of Bka’-brgyud-pa views of sens and sams-niyid, the best being perhaps that in ch. 4 of TVL.)

58. Guenther misses the point of this remark, viz. that it refers back to the immediately preceding quotation from Maitreyā (cf. n. 60).

59. ’das-pa

60. rang-bzhin (prakṛti). The point of this and the following remarks is just the connection of sens, yid &c. with their nature as sens-niyid, as the radiant light &c., in spite of the impurity of the appearances with which they are normally associated. Guenther’s translation of rang-bzhin here by “its Being-itself” completely obscures this connection (especially as sens was just translated by “Being” (see note 57)).

61. mi-shigs-pa’i thig-ler grub-pas. Guenther’s “creative potentiality” here seems perfectly reasonable for thig-le (bindu, tilaka) in this context. This word gives rise to difficulties which are well-known in the case of its companions nādi and rgyu, and which are not circumvented by the literal translations “vein,” “wind,” “drop” &c. Guenther rightly stresses that for Padma Dkar-po the radiant light, though mere nothingness (stūnyātā) in itself, is capable of manifesting as anything. The word usually used by Padma Dkar-po for this capacity is gdo’gs, a word I have discussed elsewhere (1983a).

62. gzhin here means “ground” in the specific sense explained in the Introduction. Though the more literal “foundation” would work too, Guenther’s “causal situation” is wrong. Part of Padma Dkar-po’s point is that tathātā, dngos-po’i gnas-lugs &c. can become samsāra or nirvāṇa. No one thing can be the “causal situation” for both of these.

63. ji-snyed-pa’i chos means roughly the things of the world of samsāra as seen by a buddha. He sees them (perhaps) by the faculty of ji-snyed-pa mkhyen-pa’i ye-shes. Tsong-kha-pa is both unclear about what this faculty is, and doubtful about its existence (Rigs-pa’i rgya-mtsho 245a1). For the full luxuriance of Tibetan speculation on this topic, one should consult the commentaries on Ratnagotrabhāga II.7, especially those connected with the Jo-nang-pa tradition (e.g. Shes-rab Rgyal-mtshan’s Legs-bshad ngyi-ma’i ’od-zer and Kong-sprul’s Rgyud-bla’i tshig-grel).

64. de-dag-nyid sgrub-pa dag-pa-na. Guenther’s translation “when it is purified of its former stains” misses the point that it is these (de-dag) skandhas which are to be purified.

65. b’cod-pa zla mi-shes-pa. The phrase “inexhaustible patterning” is due
to Guenther and seems a happy choice. More loosely, one might say that tathātā &c. may become the foundation for establishing a person’s body, speech and mind (lus, ngag, yid) as the body, speech and mind (sku, gsung, thugs) of a buddha. Less happy is his translation of this last phrase by “a buddha’s existential, communicative and spiritual significance.” The connection between bkod-pa (vyūha) and thig-le (bindu), which is the basis of this sentence as a whole, can be seen by combining the well-known connection of thig-le and one sense of byang-sems (bodhicitta) with the connection of the latter to bkod-pa expressed in Nāropa’s verse (quoted N 254): gnas-pa rtsa-la g.yo-ba ri lung//bkod-pa byang-chub sems-su shes/.

66. rigs, a word with several uses. The most general is "class" (Guenther) or "sort" or "type" (exactly as opposed to "token"). More specifically it can mean "race" (as in "the human race," mi-rigs), or "caste" (Skt. nāma, e.g. brahin, kṣatriya &c.), or "lineage" (Skt. gotra), or "family" (Skt. kula, as in the buddha-families of the vajrayāna, e.g. khadgakula, ral-gri’i rigs). Here the application will be to the type of the cig-car-ba or more generally of the person "of definite type" (rigs nges-pa). Here "type" has the advantage that it preserves the ambiguity between the more general uses of rigs and the more specific ones. While the immediately following definition is of the most general use, the later application suggests a more specific one.

67. rnam-pa thams-cad, sarvakāra

68. dbang-po thams-cad, sarvendriya. These two phrases are not mentioned further in the sequel, so it is not clear whether Padma Dkar-po is taking dbang-po in the sense of "faculty" or the more specific sense of "sensory faculty" (e.g. mig-gi dbang-po, sense of sight, &c.). See ch.2 of ADK for the sense in which sight &c. are taken as specific faculties, distinct from the organs which house them.

69. HT II.iv.73 (the next lines: Gzhung-grel 115b5). The quotation illustrates the continuity between sentient beings and buddhas (see note 51), as is clear both from Padma Dkar-po’s use of the lines and from their context in HT. Guenther’s translation “Neither buddha nor sentient being, not even an ontological one” misses this point, apart from the questionable details (e.g. “ontological”).

70. dngos-po rigs-mi-mthun-pa-mams. The remark seems to be a slogan-like summary of the apohavāda theory, which is why rigs is apparently taken very generally; yet cf. the next note.

71. rigs de-la zhes dang bcas-na gdung nga’am rus zhes kyang btags-so/. It is difficult to translate this directly since the language is so ambiguous and there are various logical confusions. A slightly more direct translation would be “and so one calls it a type, just as one speaks of families or clans.” As Michael Aris (1979, esp. pp. 97-8) has shown in his valuable analysis of Bhutanese clan-lineages, the term rus and gdung are the technical terms used to describe paternal lineages, and denote what is transmitted from father to son down the lineage. In a maternal lineage, what is transmitted is called sha, flesh.) The literal sense of both rus and gdung is “bone,” and

Guenther’s translation assumes that Padma Dkar-po had this literal sense in mind. That would require an implausible coincidence, especially since Padma Dkar-po will have been aware of the ambiguity, which can be removed easily by using other examples if the specific technical sense is not just what is needed. Aris points out (loc. cit.) the extreme ambiguity of rigs (family) in contexts like this one.

Padma Dkar-po has certainly made a type-error in the sense of Russell. The argument should run something like this: the worldly person says that this or that thing is of this or that type because there is a similarity. Thus, just as the members of a family or clan (gdung, rus) are related by descent and so receive the name of their particular family because of this particular relationship, so things related by a particular similarity are given the name of a particular type. (Nothing here needs to be named “type” or “family.”) The quoted remark is irrelevant to this argument, but would be relevant to the following higher-order argument: just as families or clans in general are related by a similarity on account of which they are called families or clans, so types in general are related by a similarity on account of which they are called types. (While this argument is a special case of the previous one, not to distinguish them leads straight to Russell-type paradoxes.) Padma Dkar-po confuses calling something a clan (rus zhes dogs-pa) with naming a clan (‘Khyung-po, Rgya &c.).

72. sangs-rgyas-kyi nye-bar len-pa’i rgyu, see note 115.

73. shin-tu rnyed-pa dka’-ba'i sgrub-pa-po'i gang-zag. Guenther translates by “an individual who is rarely met with,” ignoring the phrase sgrub-pa-po'i (“of one who practices or accomplishes”), and reads Lavapa as saying that it is the person, rather than the accomplisher, who is qualified by the phrase “rarely met with” (i.e. shin-tu rnyed-par dka’-ba, lit. “very difficult to attain”). Guenther’s omission of sgrub-pa-po'i makes it impossible to follow Padma Dkar-po’s point. In any case, the remark is easier to understand as taken to mean that it is the accomplishment which is difficult, and so I have taken it (my translation would be strictly right if dka’-ba'i were read dka’-ba). Since [dngos-po'i gnas-lugs] is the grasping cause of Buddhahood, in saying that tantra as cause is a person who accomplishes that which is difficult to attain, the Mahāsiddha Lavapa implied or suggested (dgongs-so) that it is this person’s subtle self. Straightforward inference would yield only the conclusion that dngos-po'i gnas-lugs is the person: that it is the person’s subtle self seems to be added by Padma Dkar-po on the basis of his own understanding of Lavapa. For Padma Dkar-po’s views on dgongs-pa (abhipraya) and on what is implied, rather than explicitly stated, by a text, see my (1983b).

74. It is well-known that Nāropa was an important figure in the transmission history of the Guhyasamāja (e.g. BA 361). As part of the methods of explanation (bshad-thabs) for that tantra found in PPD, among the “seven ornaments,” we find the division of those who practice the tantras into five types, of which the best is the “jewel-like” (rin-po-che lta-bu) type, identi-
fied with the cig-car-bya by Padma Dkar-po earlier in the Gzhung-grel (9a6; noted by Guenther, N 115 n.2). For more detail and references on the "ornament of the five types of person" (gang-zag lnga'i rgyan) see Broido (1981).

75. rigs nges-pa. Guenther translates with "determined by class" but (in spite of some equivocation) "of determinate class" makes better sense and seems to correspond better with the Skt. nityatakula given by Guenther. (In Tibetan, grammar alone will not separate the two phrases.)

76. mnal-byor chen-po, lit. "a great yoga." Guenther rightly points out that this has little to do with what the West understands by yoga and that Padma Dkar-po himself takes mnal-byor as the non-duality of prajña and upāya (Pers. 85). I shall follow the spirit of Padma Dkar-po's view by using "a great realization" or "a great non-duality" according to context. Here however Guenther has modified the text, in effect, to read mnal-byor-pa chen-po, lit. "a great yogin," and has avoided the problem just mentioned by changing this to "a great philosopher." But Padma Dkar-po is no more talking about what we understand by a philosopher than about what we understand by a yogin.

77. In order to make sense of this argument, we must understand Padma Dkar-po to be including the cig-car-bya in the definite type, rather than identifying the two types; for surely since the rim-gyis-pa too can attain buddhahood he is ipso facto determined by type to attain a great realization.

78. 'dzin-pa

79. Apparently the foolish person (byis-pa, bala) does not see the subtle person. (But the later discussion will make it clear that the rim-gyis-pa may see it; cf. note 77.)

80. gang-zag-tu 'dzin-pa med-pas

81. gzung-ba; the idea seems to be that the skandhas are perceived as objects, as it were, and the illusion arises of a perceiving subject distinct from the perceived objects. This part of the argument is very familiar in Western thought. Both in the West and in India people have gone on to claim that one experiences this perceiving subject (as an immaterial thinking substance (Descartes), or as an atman (orthodox Indian thought)). Kant in the West, and the Mādhyamikas in India and Tibet, have replied that this idea finds no application to anything. However Padma Dkar-po's line of argument will be based on other experiences which conflict with the experiential claim.

82. btags-so

83. nyer-bzung

84. sms dang sms-byung (cittacaita)

85. skyes-bu dman-pa'i gang-zag

86. skyes-bu chen-po'i gang-zag

87. i.e. with the view described in note 81 as orthodox or Cartesian.

88. phra-ba'i gang-zag

89. mgon-sum-du rtogs-na, lit. "understood in pratyakṣa."

90. sms rnam-par dben-pa; Guenther omits this word, wrecking Padma Dkar-po's point. It is the experience of the cittavīśuddhiñcrama, the second of the Pañcakramas' five stages. The word viśvita (rnam-par dben-pa) literally means "isolated, detached, solitary" and so a natural translation for kāya viśvita, bāgviśvita, cittava viśvita seems to be "detached body, speech, mind" rather than Wayman's "arcane body, speech, mind."

91. bdag-lta, Skt. atmanāśāna (if one agrees with it), atmanāśān (if one thinks it is a dogma).

92. so-skyle' lam-du, i.e. on the sambhāra-mārga and prayaoga-mārga, implicitly contrasted with the darśana-marga and those above it.

93. rjes-thob(-khyi ye-shes), the ārya's cognition of objects in a dualistic sense but as purified by the preceding samāhāra-nāmas (mnyam-gzhang gi ye-shes); it is the ārya's counterpart to ji-snyed-pa mkyen-pa'i ye-shes, cf. notes 30 and 63.

94. rnam-shes-khyi khams, mentioned in the earlier quotation from MMV VI.138-9.

95. mi-shigs-par, c.f. mi-shigs-pa'i thig-le above and note 61.

96. sgyu-ma'i rhung-gis

97. rnam-'gyur-las

98. spyod-pa'i yul (Skt. gocara)

99. This passage needs considerably more work; my rendering is fairly literal but not very informative. Guenther's version is mainly fancy, especially his "openness to new possibilities," "noetic performance," "chance-producing acts."

100. Probably the Vajramāla.

101. snying-po, Skt. probably sūra.

102. smin-byed, vipāka.

103. grol-ba (muktī), more often grol-byaed.

104. thabs-khyi rgyud. Guenther's "operational process continuity" is not only incomprehensible in itself, but has little to do with the Tibetan. (What happens if we substitute "operational process" into smin-byed-khyi thabs or grol-ba'i thabs in this passage?)

105. Guenther's rendering of this passage is incomprehensible, especially his "out of the causal situation and its process character" and "not tainted by spurious impulses to do good," neither of which correspond to anything in the text.

106. This passage starting from gnas-lugs dri-ma-med-pa nyid . . . has been translated by Guenther not only in N (to which notes 104-5 refer), but also in TVL (3-4), a version which is somewhat more sober, if still full of peculiarities.

107. bag-chags, karmic traces. Guenther's "experientially initiated potentialities of experience" is not bad for this difficult phrase.

108. The general idea seems to be ethical: the good of others (gzhon-don) is to the fore, in spite of appearances to the contrary.
MANCHU PATRONAGE AND TIBETAN BUDDHISM
DURING THE FIRST HALF OF THE CH'ING DYNASTY
A REVIEW ARTICLE

Samuel M. Grupper


From the latter half of the seventeenth century the series of reincarnations known as the Lčaṅ skya Qutuṅtu served as an important link between the Manchu court and the Mongol, Tibetan and Chinese elites. Rol pa'i rdo rje, the second Lčaṅ skya Qutuṅtu, stemmed from an illustrious Tibetanized-Mongol family of western Kansu province whose members assumed prominent roles as scholars and administrators of the Dge lugs pa. As a novice, Rol pa'i rdo rje learned Tantric practices from the most prestigious scholastic of the day, the Abbot of Dga' ldan monastery, Khri chen Blo bzān bstan pa'i ni ma. At once a distinguished scholar and a celebrated teacher—he tutored the Ch'ien-lung Emperor in Tibetan Buddhism and Sanskrit—the Lčaṅ skya Qutuṅtu also wrote prolifically on philosophy and hagiography. In fact, a review of his achievements indicates he played a more prominent role in Ch'ing cultural life than is commonly supposed. As editor and philologist he brought together and supervised the translation commissions for the Tibetan Tanjur into Mongolian and the Chinese Kanjur into Manchu, compiled a Tibetan-Mongolian Dictionary, the Mkhlas pa'i byuṅ gnas, and wrote a commentary to Thon mi Sambhoṭa's grammar. He authored words on Thags pa Lama, the Seventh Dalai Lama Blo bzān bskal bzān rgya mtsho, and his former teacher, the Abbot of Dga' ldan. But he is perhaps best known for the diplomatic negotiations he conducted with the Dalai Lama, the Panchen Lama, and Rje btsun dam pa Qutuṅtu concerning the tumult caused by the Žungar-

*I wish to express my gratitude to Dr. Ruth Dunnell for having generously taken the time to read earlier drafts of this essay and for having discussed with me the broad historical context of the problems I have described in this paper.
Kalka wars in Mongolia. His friendship with the emperor enabled him to speak with special authority on matters of importance to the Manchu ruling house and, conversely, to express directly to the throne the concerns of the Dge lugs pa. The biography, in short, deals with the life of a cultivated, knowledgeable representative of Tibetan Buddhism and companion of the Manchu emperor who enjoyed great privilege and moved in the highest echelons of Ch'ing society as a scholastic and man of affairs. The record of Rol pa'i rdo rje's remarkable spiritual, literary and diplomatic activities therefore provides a personal focus for the religious and ritual concerns of the Manchu court when the growing power of the Ch'ing dynasty neared its zenith in Inner Asia.

Hans-Rainer Kämpe has accumulated and brought under control a considerable amount of data in preparing his informative introduction to this useful text. Methodologically, he generally follows the model for textual studies of bi-lingual Tibeto-Mongol literary sources set out by Rudolph Kaschewsky in his work on the biography of Tson kha pa. Kämpe has mastered the philological and literary sources dealing with the complex Ch'ing period materials and has put together an edition that is nearly an *explication de texte*. The result is an excellent piece of scholarship and a most provocative introduction to a literary monument of the mid-Ch'ing period.

The editor presents his materials in four parts. In part one, he considers the history of the text, presenting well-ordered bibliographic data, the whereabouts of various copies in specific manuscript collections and a discussion on the text's literary relationships. He then gives a brief account of its author, Nag dban thub bstan dbaṅ phyug, Rol pa'i rdo rje's brother, covers other sources on the life of Rol pa'i rdo rje, and provides a thumbnail sketch placing the subject within the historical context of his times. In part two, he ranges, though not as extensively as did Kaschewsky, over the text folio by folio to summarize its essential facts in what often amounts to a line-by-line paraphrase (and in many cases a word-for-word translation) of the Tibetan text and its Mongol translation. In part three, he provides notes to the previous sections and includes a glossary of religious and secular Tibetan, Mongol, Manchu and Chinese titles and technical terms associated with individuals named in the text, as well as identifications of place names. Part four consists of facsimiles of the Tibetan and Mongol texts.

The assessment of the critical source value of this hagiography presents special problems of interpretation. The description of the diplomatic and religious duties Rol pa'i rdo rje carried out as liaison between the Ch'ien-lung Emperor and the Dge lugs pa prelates ruling Tibet and Mongolia, together with specific accounts of court-centered Tantric rites, makes it clear the biography is addressed to members of the Tibeto-Mongol clerical community. It is of significant value therefore in attempting to determine how eighteenth century lamas looked at their vocation. Because the author's major concern was to depict the life of a Buddhist saint with respect to his influence on the lives of others by his example and doctrine (and in the case of the Lčän skya Qutüg pasthe he influenced were members of the Manchu imperial household) it raises an historiographical question: Were the Manchu rulers devout believers or merely generous benefactors who assumed their role as patrons of Tibetan Buddhism along with their sovereignty of the eastern portion of Inner Asia?

In what follows, I will attempt to outline this historiographical issue from the vantage point of Manchu studies and the cognate discipline of Mongolistics, to see what these two areas of study can bring to bear on the question of Tibetan Buddhism during the first half of the Ch'ing dynasty.

A glance at the religious observances of the court mentioned in the biography makes such events seem inappropriate, if not inexplicable, had not the ruling house indeed professed Tibetan Buddhism. In this regard, most specialists of Ch'ing studies relying predominantly on Chinese sources have skirted the issue of Manchu conviction in Tibetan Buddhism, favoring the interpretation that imperial patronage began as a measure for holding the loyalty of the Mongol nobility. Such a policy obviously came to serve Sino-Manchu ambitions in establishing protectorates in Mongolia and Tibet. Now, thanks largely to David Farquhar's exploration of the antecedents of the Manchu theory of state and religion, a conceptual framework exists to explain how the monarchy organized its relations with the Tibetans and Mongols of the Ch'ing state.

Behind the policies for the restabilization of Buddhist Inner Asian society established by the *Pax Manjurica* lay a fundamental conception of Buddhist monarchy, one of the constitutional features of which was close cooperation of crown and clergy. Its interpreters exhorted the emperor to promote publication and study of the sutras, and encouraged his devotion and that of his family and officials to the Dharma as the basis for preserving the state against natural calamities, public disorders and foreign invasions. The association of the Manchu ruler with his chaplain provided a measure of continuity with established precedents, which, in fact, amounted to the Manchu application of rites and customs that antedate even the Yuan pattern.

Medieval Chinese documentary and hagiographical sources contain references to foreign acaryas as National Masters (Kuo-shih), noting that they initiated various Tang emperors as Bodhisattvas/Jen-wang or Cakrayantins/Lun-wang. The Sung dynasty followed Tang precedents in subsidizing translations of canonical works including those outlining the benefits religiously-inspired monarchs could expect. For example, affairs of state held a prominent place in the *Jen wang hu kuo po jo po lo mi to Ching*
TIBETAN BUDDHISM IN THE REIGN OF CH'ING T'AI-TSU

More than half a century ago, Oshibuchi Hajime, the Japanese epigraphist, outlined the characteristics of the formative stage of the Manchu conversion to Tibetan Buddhism.7 Confining my remarks largely to his findings, the ensuing points present a number of details that will help to order the evidence regarding a religiously-inspired monarchy.

Early seventeenth century Tibeto-Mongol sources refer to contemporary Tibetan missionaries established in the Cahar Khanate, while supporting Manchu documents suggest the movement of individual lamas eastward from Cahar into its dependencies in Manchuria.8 This period, which coincides with the extension and consolidation of Nurhaci's regime into northwestern and southern Manchuria, also marked the arrival of Tibetan missionaries at the Manchu court. At an undetermined date prior to 1621, Buddhist influence had progressed to the extent that Nurhaci had taken initiation9 and appointed his lama, the Olug Darhan Nangso,10 as Dharma-master of the Manchu realm.11 Consequently, the emperor placed under the Olug's jurisdiction a temple outside the capital at Liao-yang, the Lienhua Suo, and endowed it with landed property and servants, the so-called La ma Yuăn.12 This is the first attested instance of Manchu patronage of Tibetan Buddhism. An appropriate inference to be drawn from the prosopographical data is that the lama—a possessor of rights of lordship over several hundred Korcin and Sahalca households who followed him to the capital—took his place in Manchu society as a peer of the Manchu and Mongol aristocratic retainers of the emperor.

These facts, whatever the details, show that Nurhaci's consecration and the resulting benefice established on the outskirts of the pre-dynastic capital as a patrimony for the Olug—a property which subsequently became the inheritance of his successors—mirrors the emperor's desire to be associated with Tibetan Buddhist ideals. Taken together with the lama's "national" prestige (cf. n. 11), they point toward Manchu acceptance of the social doctrine associated with the dichotomy of society into secular and religious spheres, an arrangement that had long distinguished Tibeto-Mongol culture.

Nor do these cases stand alone. A review of the onomastic evidence makes it possible to place the founding Manchu emperor personally with respect to such ideas.13 At present, however, it remains an open question whether one should interpret the establishment of an imperial chaplaincy by Nurhaci roughly at the same time as his declaration of dynastic ambitions as emperor of the Later Chin (Hou Chin) dynasty in 1616 as an expression of religious endorsement for Manchu expansionism.14 The true significance of these events, I feel, lies not in the ruler's need to hold the support of a group of Mongol partisans per se, but rather in the cultural appeal of Tibeto-Mongol Buddhism and the aura of authority of the
TIBETAN BUDDHISM IN THE REIGN OF CH’ING T’AI-TSUNG

Given the foregoing vantage point, I would like now to connect Nurhaci’s involvement in the lama-patron relationship to the flourishing of Tibetan Buddhist activities that took place during the reign of his son, Abahai. The religious interests underlying Nurhaci’s conversion anticipated, in part, Abahai’s decision in 1635 to found the Temple of Mahakala at Mukden in order to enshrine the image of the guardian deity of the Sa skya pa, the remains of the Sa skya Lama Sharpa Qutuqtu, and the Mongol Kanjur. Political considerations surrounding the fall of the Cahar Khanate notwithstanding, when the group of Sa syka lamas who had transferred their allegiance from the last Mongol qagan, Legdan, consecrated Abahai, they affirmed a link with the religious practices embarked upon by Nurhaci and the Olug Darhan Nangso Lama.

At the same time, the throne began to alter its relation to religious authority. A review of the evidence for the endowment of Tibetan Buddhist communities at Mukden during the following decade shows extensively funded branch temples and stupas for a grand program of temple construction. This period of augmented imperial support belongs to an epoch of changed political circumstances, i.e. the extermination of the Cahar Khanate and the rapid westward expansion of Manchu power over the Mongols south of the Gobi. Over the course of a generation (1610s-1640s), the dual principle of the theoretical equality of the emperor and his chaplain, and by extension the parity of state and religion—the distinguishing trait of the medieval Mongol-Sa skya pa alliance (Tib. lugs gnis Mong. kuyar kusun)—came to occupy a place in Manchu ideas about statecraft. This came about partly because of Manchu alliances with, and annexations or conquests of, various Mongol tribes.

With these facts in mind, most would agree (nor would I dispute) that this pro-Buddhist policy dictated the main lines of strategy in relation to the regime’s Mongol allies, and was aimed at accepting Manchu authority. Adoption of the model of cakravartin monarchy not only enhanced the Manchu emperor’s ability to govern the Mongols, but initiated intentionally the pattern of groups and institutions traditionally thought to have unified Yuan society. Outwardly, this explanation shifts only slightly the received interpretation that the throne patronized Tibetan Buddhism to ensure Mongol support. But here I wish to stress a critical difference in emphasis. As well as satisfying Mongol expectations about the nature of the evolving Ch’ing state, Manchu support for Buddhism defined a characteristic of the realm’s political development according to the

medieval Mongol-Sa skya pa model: a polity in which a religiously-inspired monarchy headed a theologically-grounded state.

As a result, the foundation of an imperial sanctuary at the capital dedicated to the worship of Mahakala was more than an elaborate gesture of good intentions and, in fact, indicated an act of continuity with medieval and contemporary Mongol images of monarchy. On several occasions the sanctuary provided the appropriate ritual environment when the Sa skya pa enlarged the imperial household’s sacrificial image according to traditional Tantric initiations. These initiations and public rites coincided with the period when Abahai received investiture as qagan and secured the homage of his Manchu and Mongol supporters. Not only did these rituals entitle Abahai, himself part Mongol, to be called emperor, but they furnished him with the overarching ideological basis for establishing a successor state to the medieval Yuan dynasty and for reconstituting its political components. As a further step toward that end and as a consequence of his enthronement, Abahai proclaimed the Dayicing (Mong. Dayicing-Ch. Ta-ch’ing) dynasty.

Keeping in mind the relation of these ideas of applied theology to the central event of formally establishing the dynasty, I would argue that the Manchu state, at this stage of its development, had taken on the trappings of a traditional Buddhist realm. It had enshrined a sacral ruler, sanctioned the theoretical dual organization of state and religion first endorsed by Nurhaci and the Olug Darhan Nangso Lama, and embraced as its own the dynastic cult of Mahakala to celebrate and preserve the Manchu ratification of state and religion. Against this background it is apparent that as early as 1635, if not already in the time of Nurhaci, the Sa skya lamas (with imperial encouragement) had recast the medieval claim for their brand of Buddhist Tantrism to be the state religion of the nascent Ch’ing dynasty.

A further sign of the honor the Manchus paid to these Sa skya pa ideas took place in 1643 when Abahai’s religious advisor Bilitgii Nangso began to direct work on the extension of the Mahakala complex. Under the shared patronage of Abahai and Fu-lin (i.e., the Shun-chih Emperor, r. 1644-1662), the Sa skya pa completed in 1645 an elaborate complex of four temples and adjunct stupas—the Rnam par sna’ ba’i lha khan, the Thugs rje chen po’i lha khan, the Tshe dpag med mgon gyi lha khan, and the Dus kyi khor lo’i lha khan—to encircle the Temple of Mahakala, the palace of the cakravartin, and the capital of Mukden within a mandala. On the one hand, the construction of this architectonic representation of the Buddhist cosmological order (an arrangement reminiscent of the ensemble of Bsam yas at the old Tibetan imperial precinct of Brag mar) celebrated Abahai’s succession as cakravartin, defined Manchu dynastic right, and set the Manchu capital and realm under the protection of Mahakala. On the other hand, it identified the interests of the ruling house with its sanctuary and the presiding lamas while demonstrating an abiding conviction in the efficacy of the Sa skya pa world view.
If the above data and the facts and arguments presented in their support are reliable, a number of conclusions can be drawn about early Manchu imperial devotion to Tibetan Buddhism:

There seems sufficient reason to assert that the first two reigns followed a cultural pattern well-known to students of Tibetan history. Both rulers accepted Tibetan Buddhism, both showed deference to their lamas (Abahai, in fact, patronized several), and both endowed their chaplains' temples in commemoration of their initiations. Both, their posthumous personas as Ta'i-tsu and Ta'i-tsung notwithstanding, were consecrated rulers whose vows committed them publicly and personally to support Tibetan Buddhism.

These experiences, I contend, represent more than episodic dealings with Tibetan Buddhism. The acts of imperial participation and material assistance documented in the epigraphical and architectural monuments and collaterals sources show that Nurhaci and Abahai regarded themselves as Buddhist monarchs, and illustrate the official recognition of the religious bonds the first two sovereigns had with their lamas. This religious theme is especially apparent in the iconography of the Mahakala complex, perhaps the most eloquent of contemporaneous architectural expressions of Tantric Buddhist dynastic right to be found outside Tibet. Beyond question, in terms of conception and scale, it appears to dwarf any seventeenth century sanctuary except the Potala and points to having played an analogous role in the evolution of Manchu imperial culture.

In this regard, the early Manchu Buddhist monuments constitute evidence favoring the interpretation that the most powerful political institution of the Manchu polity—the monarchy—at its political centers of gravity, first at Liao-yang and then at Mukden, identified itself with the ideals of Tibetan Buddhism long before it claimed to rule the majority of Tibetans and Mongols. The self-definition of a religiously-inspired monarchy ruling a Buddhist state obviously dignified the sense of emerging Manchu national importance. But the most striking thing, in historiographical terms, is that it marked the formation of a realm ideologically indistinguishable from the manner in which the contemporary Mongol khanates viewed themselves. Together with other elements of Mongol statecraft and trappings preferred by the Manchu ruling house prior to the conquest of China, the founding emperors embraced the notion of a Tibeto-Mongol style Buddhist monarchy as one of the components of imperial authority, though in what proportion to the whole remains undetermined.

What this means, among other things, is the approval in Manchu ruling circles of Mongol-Sa sky pa ideas. But my point is that, based on the cultural pattern established in the pre- and early dynastic periods profiled above, this body of material should be interpreted as evidence of a Manchu predilection for a Buddhist-inspired polity. Certainly no one would argue that contemporary Mongol monarchies lacked this religious inspiration.

Yet the material evidence relative to Buddhist devotion in the early Manchu Khanate surpasses any of the published monuments from the seventeenth century Mongol-Buddhist states. Moreover, I would argue that the Manchu ruling house, at this stage, chose to patronize Tibetan Buddhism not simply because it wished to subordinate the Mongols to Manchu rule. Rather, because of its own mixed cultural legacy and the realm's diverse ethnic composition of Manchus, Mongols and Chinese, it anticipated that its dynastic ambitions as a successor state to the Yuan dynasty would be better served by adopting the Mongol-Sa sky pa pattern of the hybrid political and social order that had existed under medieval Mongol rule. The Mukden Buddhist monuments, and to a lesser degree the complex at Liao-yang from which they most likely evolved, symbolize a Buddhist world order conceptually distinct from the Sinocentric model conventionally attributed to the Manchus in their efforts to form a state in the pre-dynastic era.

To recapitulate: of the factors surveyed in this essay to demonstrate the existence of the partnership of the ruler and the representatives of Tibetan Buddhism, I feel two are the most significant for defining the nature of the relationship between them. First, the devotional—the formal recognition of a personal spiritual bond between the Manchu emperor and his chaplain, the so-called lama-patron relationship. Second, the institutional—the establishment of Tibetan Buddhism as an officially recognized, state-supported national institution.

Both factors contributed to the theological foundation of the Manchu monarchy. The evidence shows that cordial relations between the imperial household and the Sa sky pa in the 1620s-1630s relied on reciprocity between crown and clergy remaining steadfast, and did not depend on the outcome of international relations prompted by geopolitical ambitions in Tibet or Outer Mongolia, or by the political limitations the Manchu imposed on allied Inner Mongolia. Under the influence of the Sa sky pa, the Manchus instituted the fundamental bond that the Mongol ruling house had established with its chaplains at the formative stage of conversion to Tibetan Buddhism during the period of the Mongol world empire. Without enumerating all the problems surrounding this relationship, it should be obvious that the Manchu organization of state and faith paralleled medieval and contemporary Mongol conventions, an association of crown and clergy rooted in Tibetan practice.

Meanwhile, at Liao-yang and then Mukden, the Manchus had formulated a coherent policy towards Tibetan Buddhism and perpetuated it once they had moved the government to Peking. Prolonged involvement with the Sa sky pa meant that the Manchus brought with them a set of well-formed expectations about the nature of a Tibeto-Mongol Buddhist-inspired monarchy and a full comprehension of the lama-patron relationship when the Manchu regent, Dorgon, proposed to meet the Dge lugs pa hierarchs at Peking in 1651.
While Ming loyalists operated in the southwest of China, the Ch'ing had strategic reasons for entering into favorable relations with the Dalai Lama. But an alliance with newly unified Tibet was not the only Manchu concern. More formidable by far were the internal conflicts that had to be resolved if foreign diplomacy was to succeed. Divisions within the imperial clan that surfaced following Dorgon's sudden death in 1650 posed a dangerous threat to central authority and required the immediate attention of Manchu policy makers. Dorgon's successor, Jirgalang, an advocate of imperial prerogatives, viewed the lack of unity and rampant partisanship as the most critical political factors to be overcome in reasserting imperial control. Consequently, talks with the Dge lugs pa mission convened amidst grave political strains that plagued the regime until the middle of 1652.

How, in this instance, internal politics determined external policies may never be known. But some consideration of the weakened condition of the monarchy and the recent overthrow of Dorgon's faction could not have failed to have affected the course of the negotiations. As the restoration of the monarchy was the one solid achievement of his regency, Jirgalang could not afford to forego traditional Buddhist sanction to make it enforceable. On this account, we have seen that ideological currents in the highest circles of Manchu society had moved in the direction of a universalizing Buddhist-inspired succession for some time. The new dispensation of 1653 that replaced the Sa skya pa with the Dge lugs pa culturally and ideologically benefitted the regime's well-established Buddhist identity. Given the consequence of the antecedents and models ratified by Nurhaci and Abahai and their respective chaplains, a case can be made for the logic behind why the Shun-chih Emperor supported the Dge lugs pa and gave his protection to the Dalai Lama. The emperor's patronage (under Jirgalang's guidance) was a measure of his satisfaction with the sacralization of his restoration, and an endorsement of his policy of centralizing power over the aristocracy. At the same time, this authentication of his reign serves to explain why Dge lugs pa influence at court was not called into serious question, and how the sect's capacity to pursue its religious mission with more autonomy was strengthened.

The Manchu-Dge lugs pa accord—an arrangement that won the sect significant state subsidies—produced profound social and economic consequences too. If this pro-Buddhist policy was followed, as the evidence indicates it was, it was of considerable importance, since the effect would be to increase the community of interests between the Mongol lords and their Tibetan Buddhist chaplains as a class, together with the Manchu ruling house and its chaplains. What impact Tibetan Buddhism had on the lives of Manchus outside court circles is an important subject requiring further study. At the very least, however, it appears as if the discriminatory allocation of power over socially subordinate groups and landed property to the Dge lugs pa, in those regions under Manchu domination, grew out of a favorable climate of opinion surrounding the continuing contributions of Buddhist ideas in the evolution of the Manchu monarchy. It did not, as it is sometimes disparagingly said, begin as an instrument of social control to instill Mongol submission to the Manchu emperor, but instead developed in accordance with traditional Tibeto-Mongol cultural standards which the Manchus acknowledged as their own. This does not mean, of course, that individual hierarchs and monastic institutions always treated their subjects in an exemplary fashion, any more than members of the lay aristocracy so treated theirs.

Having detected the reality of a religiously-inspired Manchu monarchy, and keeping in mind the inevitable gaps between theory and practice, what historiographical relevance does it have for Ch'ing era Sino-Tibetan and Sino-Mongolian studies? There are, in my opinion, two interrelated interpretive changes that stand out.

First, it shifts the focus of early Manchu patronage away from Tibetan Buddhism as merely a pragmatic policy instrument for Tibeto-Mongol affairs towards intrinsic religious motivation and its corollary principle of Buddhist monarchy.

Second, it means that Manchu ideology with respect to the Tibetans and Mongols has to be re-interpreted in terms in which the development of an idea of a traditional, cohesive Buddhist state becomes more important, and the notion that patronage of Tibetan Buddhism served the Manchus' divide and rule policy becomes much less important.

That Nurhaci, Abahai and the Shun-chih Emperor used their religious charisma and personal relationships with their lamas to influence their Buddhist subjects as circumstances permitted seems undeniable. But to suggest, as have some, that Manchu rulers patronized Tibetan Buddhism as a state policy predominantly to impose a system of divide and rule, results in a distorted and misleading interpretation of the amalgam of personal relations, religious beliefs and institutional factors that made for affairs of state and faith. As in the case of the Yuan dynasty, Manchu policy toward Tibetan Buddhism must be explained by personal religious considerations as well as by partisan and ideological motives.

**TIBETAN BUDDHISM DURING THE MID-CH'ING PERIOD**

The early history of crown and clergy outlined above brings into relief the sincere regard the Manchus had for the lama-patron relationship. Subsequent Manchu rulers thought this relationship had a salutary effect too, and took care to credit the first emperors with establishing relations with Tibetan Buddhism. The fact that the K'ang-hsi Emperor endorsed it at the time he enfeoffed the first Lčān skya Qutugtu attests to conditions prevalent during his reign and to the vitality of the constitutional principle of the crown-clergy partnership. Therefore, however remote the 1620s-1640s and the 1690s-1780s (i.e., the era of the early Manchu-Sa skya
pa alliance and the era of the mature Manchu-Dge lugs pa alliance) are from each other, it is important to know that they are linked to a cultural legacy connected with a theoretical organization of the regime. The paradigm of a state ruled by a Bodhisattva or a cakravartin may seem abstruse, yet it mirrored an imperial ideology—whatever the political realities—where a hierarchy of shared religious values and experiences influenced the conduct of political and social relations. While one might object that the first two or three reign periods do not clinch the case for a customary dynastic partnership between ruler and chaplain or its corollary dual principle, an overview reaching through the Ch‘ien-lung period presents definite elements of continuity in spiritual values, and from it emerges evidence for imperial confidence in this bond.

Toward that end, the biography of Rol pa’i rdo rje contains significant information relative to the antecedents of, and continuities with, the pre-and early dynastic eras. The text is, in my opinion, illuminated by the author’s awareness of the Buddhist heritage of the Manchu ruling house, against which heritage he has measured contemporary eighteenth century devotional acts. Given the nature of this evidence, several events of the mid-Ch‘ing period reported in the biography may now be considered in order to see how they accord with the conclusions on imperial conviction in Tibetan Buddhism I have drawn above.

As noted in the text, the Lcān skya Qutuṅtu engaged the emperor in rites which in the lama’s thinking had an underlying theological continuity with the court-Buddhism of the Yüan. The Ch‘ien-lung Emperor, despite competing demands for his attention, had an abiding interest in the distant origins of his house’s support of Tibetan Buddhism. The text contains data for understanding the imperial family’s consciousness of its Buddhist heritage and its desire to continue its role, which formally obligated the ruler to uphold the Dharma and protect its institutions:

—In 1743, the Ch‘ien-lung Emperor invited the Lcān skya Qutuṅtu and the Abbot of Dga’ ldan to his palace at Mokden. They examined and paid their respects to the monastery—the shrines of the body, speech and mind [of the Buddha], and the shrine of the chosen divinity [thugs dam-\(_{\text{mi}}\) dam] of the refuge of sentient beings, Thags pa Lama. The image of Mahākāla and other Buddhist shrines built by the emperor’s father, grandfather, and ancestors.

—In 1746, the Lcān skya Qutuṅtu bestowed the Cabrasaṃvara initiation on the Ch‘ien-lung Emperor, a rite the Qutuṅtu equated with the establishment of the lama-patron relationship begun by Qubilai and Thags pa Lama.

—At an unspecified date during the Yung-cheng period (1723-1735), an image of the Ch‘ien-lung Emperor’s father, the Yung-cheng Emperor, depicted as a lama, was installed at the Sung chu Temple, the Lcān skya Qutuṅtu’s residence in Peking. This was because the emperor was regarded as the bearer of the crown of the Yellow caps and the Buddha’s universal doctrine, as a great lord of religion and the immeasurable compassion he possessed as a lama who had increased ancient (religious) tradition.

—In 1777, the Lcān skya Qutuṅtu held a requiem for the emperor’s mother.

—In 1780, he translated at the Ch‘ing court for the Panchen Lama, who praised the Ch‘ien-lung Emperor as protector of the Yellow Doctrine, and granted him the Mahākāla and Cabrasaṃvara initiations. At that time, the Panchen Lama entrusted the Yellow Doctrine and the protection of the chief monasteries of Tibet to the emperor.

While the underlying historical character of these rites and iconographies remains undetermined, they furnish incontrovertible evidence that the pattern of a religiously-inspired ruling house in effect during pre- and early Ch‘ing dynastic times was preserved and even extended and perfected in the Ch‘ien-lung period. Nor were such associations with Tibetan Buddhism in any way inconsistent with the Confucian and shamanistic ceremonies held at the Manchu court; similar state ceremonies and animistic rites had been performed at the pro-Buddhist Yüan court. A detailed investigation and sensitive interpretation of the biography promises to reveal more about the contemporary religious attitudes and practices of the Manchu imperial household, its participation in Tibetan Buddhist ceremonies and the general level of Buddhist culture and belief at court.

Even at the present level of research, the specific points relative to court observances, consecrations and iconography extending from pre-dynastic to mid-Ch‘ing times indicate that the Manchu imperial household held to a characteristic Buddhist ethos. The existence of this cultural pattern appears comparable to the confidential relationship of crown and clergy that existed under the Yüan. It is not surprising, given the range of these circumstances, that the Manchu ruling house had a positive and unassuming regard for Tibetan Buddhism as a pillar of the regime since the early seventeenth century.

In the areas of the history of the relations of the Manchu sovereigns with Tibetan Buddhism and the religious convictions of the ruling house, to mention just two possible subjects for further study, the biography of the Second Lcān skya Qutuṅtu serves as a significant source for fruitful work to be done. Cultural and intellectual historians as well as Buddhologists stand in Kämpfe’s debt for making this hagiography available.

NOTES


2. David Faruqahar, “Emperor as Bodhisattva in the Governance of the Ch‘ing Empire,” HIAS 38, 1975, 5-25. In opposition to this viewpoint stands the influential divide-and-rule theory pioneered by Owen Lat-
timore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*, Boston 1967 reprint, p. 219: "The Manchu Empire, intervening in the affairs of the Mongols, 'froze' the development of the Lama church and effected a permanent cleavage between the Mongol state (divided between many princes) and the Mongol church (unified and powerful but not supreme), thus preventing a national unity of all the Mongols." See also ibid., pp. 232-233.

3. Amoghavajra translated the *jen wang hu kuo po jo po lo mi to Ching Taishō*, no. 246 into Chinese in 765, and Dânâpâla, a Tantric active at the court of Sung T'ai-tsung in the late tenth century, translated the *Fo shuo lun wang chi i pao Ching* (Taishō, no 38).


5. The history of Tibetan missionaries at the pre-dynastic court represents a neglected area of Manchu studies. Farquhar concentrates on the Chinese and Tibet-Mongol ideological antecedents and their consequences during the dynastic era. Prior to 1637, he observes "no evidence available shows that Buddhism of any kind was a very important religion [to the Manchus]." See, "Emperor as Bodhisattva," p. 20. Walther Heissig, "A Mongolian Source to the Lamaist Suppression of Shamanism in the 17th Century," *Anthropos* 48, 1953, 1-30: 493-537, p. 500, earlier came to a similar conclusion.


7. A review of the early epigraphical sources and architectural monuments provides a point of departure for the study of Tibetan Buddhism in the Ch'ing era; any work on contemporary Sino-Tibetan or Sino-Mongol studies otherwise must remain partial in its reach and conclusions. These undervalued Buddhist historical sources, the Sino-Manchu inscription of 1630 on the outskirts of the pre-dynastic capital at Liao-yang and the quadrilingual (Manchu-Mongol-Tibetan-Chinese) inscription of 1638 at Mukden, furnish data regarding the Buddhist principles of organization that contributed to the theoretical development of the Manchu polity. For analyses of these texts, see Oshibuchi, Hajime, "Rgyöyö Rama-fun Hibun no Kaisetsu," *Naïto Hakase Kanreki Shukuga Shinagaku Ronsō*, edited by Haneda Tôrö, Kyoto 1926, 327-371. See also Oshibuchi's corrections published in "Rgyöyö Rama-fun Hibun no Kaisetsu Hosei," *Shirin* 22, 1937, 724-729 and *Manshû hiki kô*, Tokyo 1943.

8. The Mongols, especially the Cahars, wielded considerable control over western Manchuria in the 1570's. See Erdeni-yin tobci, p. 200/9-18. Given Cahar domination of the region for nearly half a century, and Legdan Qağan's patronage of Šar pa Qutuqtu, the presence of Sa skya pa missionaries in his Manchurian dependencies does not strike me as an unreasonable assumption.

9. The Sino-Manchu Inscription of 1630 commemorates the foundation in 1621 of the La-ma Yüan, a patrimonial granted the Olug Darhan Nangso Lama. However, it also refers to the fact that he had initiated the emperor. Presumably, this rite took place during an earlier visit that occurred at an undetermined date. The lama's obituary in the *Chiŭ Man-chou tang* [Early Manchu Archives, hereafter CMCT], 1-10, Taipei 1970, v. 2, pp. 1091-1093, dated May 2, 1622 but referring to October 6, 1621, refers to two trips he made to the capital. The same source attests to the fact that Nurhaci promised to build a stupa for the lama's remains.

For present purposes, I regard the most important information found in the 1630 La-ma Yüan stele to be lines 4-5 of the Chinese text, which run:

[4] ..................... As soon as [he lama] reached our nation, he
[5] met with Tai-ts'u Huang-tî (Nurhaci) who honored his ritual and
revered the master, (thereafter) diversely and habitually supporting him.

The monument, to my way of thinking, represents as clear an expression of the reality of the lama-patron relationship as one is ever likely to find in a Buddhist document meant for secular purposes. Despite his zeal to build a state, Nurhaci took care to exempt clerical property and personnel from taxes and corvée. This arrangement, demonstrated further by the lama's Manchu title darhan (<Mong. dargan “tax-free”), had its roots in medieval Mongol-Sa skya pa practices.

The emperor's initiation into the Tibetan rite drew on a long line of Tibeto-Mongol historical antecedents. For theoretical reasons, I wish to draw attention to the existence of the concept associated with conversion to Tantric Buddhism, the formal relationship between the convert and his religious master, the so-called mchod yon "lama-patron" relationship. The establishment of a religious bond called for the faithful's compliance with two obligations: 1) the religious subordination of the initiate to his teacher, and 2) the neophyte's liability for his teacher's material well-being. Nurhaci undoubtedly compiled with the second of these two ties. For remarks concerning various aspects of the lama-patron relationship, see Zahiruddin Ahmad, *Sino-Tibetan Relations in the Seventeenth Century*, Roma 1970, pp. 95-97; D.L. Snellgrove, *Buddhist Himālaya*. Oxford 1957, p. 196. Concerning the notion of royal consecration, cf. the latter's article "The Notion of Divine Kingship in Tantric Buddhism," in *The Sacral Kingship*, Leiden 1959, pp. 204-218; also see Stephan Beyer, *The Cult of Tārā*, Berkeley 1973, pp. 67-68.

10. The text of the 1658 inscription at La-ma Yüan and the Manchu annals serve to establish the fact that the court provided an estate for the Olug Darhan Nangso Lama. Moreover, analysis of the form olug and the translations of it in the collateral Mongol (yike), Manchu (amba), and Chinese (ta) epigraphical sources (cf. notes 7 and 9) as "great" serve to identify the word as the Manchu transcription of the Turkic form(s) olug~ulug. (Cf. Gerard Clauson, *An Etymological Dictionary of Pre-
Thirteenth Century Turkish, Oxford 1972, p. 139, ulug “‘greatness’ both physical and in [an] abstract moral sense; ‘seniority’ and the like.”) The presence of this epithet among the lama’s titles taken in conjunction with his designation in the annals as a Tanggūt (or a Tibetan, according to the Chinese text of the 1630 inscription) indicate Amdo or the Tibetanized Uighur communities of Western Kansu as his place of origin and point toward his possible Turkic ancestry. Given the significant body of evidence that Uighur Buddhism had received heavy doses of Tantric influences since Yüan times, I do not find the likelihood of an Uighur lama preaching Tibetan Buddhism problematical. In fact, one encounters the term ulug qualifying the names and titles of a number of Sa skya pa dignitaries during the Yüan period. For attestations in the literary sources, see George Kara and Peter Zieme, Fragmenta tantrischer Werke in uigurischer Übersetzung, Berlin 1976, pp. 76 and 110: “Ulug Šisrap (<Tib. Šes rab) baxši.” As a point of departure for the Uighur translation literature of Tibetan Buddhism, see their editions of the Lam zab mo bla ma'i rnal byor in Die uigurischen Übersetzungen des Guruyogas “Tiefer Weg” von Sa-skya Pandita und der Manjushrānasmamgitti, Berlin 1977, and Ein uighurisches Tobenbuch. Nāraptas Lehre in Uigurischer Übersetzung von vier tibetischen Traktaten nach der Sammelhandschrift aus Dunhuang British Museum Or. 8212 (109). Budapest 1978. See also, Kara’s “Uiguro-Tibetica,” in Proceedings if the Csoma de Körös Memorial Symposium held at Mátrafüred, Hungary 24-30 September 1976, edited by Louis Ligeti, Budapest 1978, 161-167, especially pp. 162.

The Manchu form nangso is a transcription of the Mongol loanword nangso (<Tib. nai so). According to Giuseppe Tucci, Tibetan Painted Scrolls, 3 vols., Roma 1949, v. 1, p. 35, it represents an abbreviation of the compound form nai so chen mo, a title characteristic of the Mongol-Sa skya pa alliance of the Yüan period. In an edict of Gyantse, cited by Tucci, the highest official of the medieval state was the nai so:

[This] dignity, in its administrative organization, was certainly modelled on the Sa skya pa’s organization of the state: the Gyantse princes for several generations had held the office of Nañ c’en, i.e. Nañ so c’en mo [the Grand Nañ so] at the Sa skya pa court. But from the Dalai Lama’s biographies we see that this office was also found in other states [1949, I. 43], and in fact continued ancient traditions. The Nañ so presided over the administration of justice [Gyantse genealogies, p. 34], and was sort of Prime Minister: the King’s or the abbot’s orders were made executive by this official, who naturally was also their first counselor. . . . Round the sovereigns, whether they were the Sa skya pa abbots or the Tag mo gru pa’s or the lords of the Gyantse (and in lesser measure, round all the families with any territorial jurisdiction), a petty court was gathered, headed by these Nañ so . . .

These attributes roughly characterize the office of those dignitaries who bore the title nangso at the various Mongol courts in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century and relate equally well to the nangso residents at the courts of Nurhaci and Abahai. Hypothetically, the use of the Uighur-Sa skya pa elements olug and nangso in the compound clerical title of Nurhaci’s chaplain permits one to pose the question whether the lama the Manchus officially credited with initiating the emperor was a Sa skya pa missionary. The career of the Olug, a contemporary of the Sa skya pa Sar pa Qutugtu, provides complementary material for the study of missionary activities during this epoch. The sect’s preeminence at the Caha court since 1617 and its proselytizing efforts in the east (cf. notes 8, 12 and 14) are further cases in point. In my opinion, the Olug Darhan Nangso Lama’s work in Manchuria should be seen within the larger framework of the Sa skya pa missionary history of the early seventeenth century. This makes sense inasmuch as no contemporary Manchu evidence has emerged concerning a sustained Dge lungs pa mission farther eastward than Western Manchuria prior to the activities of Neyici Toyn (who went to Mukden twice between 1629 and 1644).

Alternately, Tibeto-Mongol documentary and literary evidence contains no reference to Manchu-Dge lungs pa contacts prior to the 1637 embassy of the Ilagušan Qutugtu to Mukden (see n. 4). Further descriptions of cultic activities presented in this paper make it clear that elements of Sa skya pa organization (rather than Dge lungs pa features) were increasingly favored at Mukden in the 1630s and 1640s. As a result, the immediate precondition for Manchu acceptance of the introduction of the Sa skya pa tradition, I suggest, is best explained by ascribing the Olug to the sect’s lineage.

Another interesting facet of what appears to be Sa skya pa intellectual and literary influence on the Manchu elite is the reference in Manchu sources dated 1636 to the Subasiti bi tie (i.e., the Subhatsitaratnamandhi of Sa skya Pandita), see MWLT, vol. VII, p. 1523.

11. Judging from the facts that the lama had catechized the emperor and received state support in return, it seems indisputable that Tantric Buddhism had gained Nurhaci’s trust. This interpretation is further strengthened by the inscription (Manchu line 1/ Chinese line 1) that identifies the Olug Darhan Nangso as the Lama of the Ayisin/Ta Chin Nation, a title reminiscent of the status of state Buddhism during the period of the medieval Mongol-Sa skya pa alliance and indicative of the fact that national as well as personal religious relations were thought to be of utmost importance, patronage and Nurhaci’s dynastic ambitions. For further information regarding this type of connection, cf. notes 13-14, 15-19, 21-23, 25, and 28.

12. The establishment of the Lien-hua Su (supposedly a reconsecrated temple dating from T'ang times) coincided with Sa skya pa missionary activities that took place under the direction of Sar pa Qutugtu (see the Tibeto-Mongol inscription of 1626, Pozdnuyev, v. 2, p. 255, cf. notes 8 and
14. During the reigns of the first two Manchu emperors, the temple remained dependent on imperial generosity, first securing an estate, the Lama Yüan, and then the produce and labor from a peasant hamlet for its support. Subsequently, Abahai’s commitment to the material support his father had promised the Buddhist community at La-ma Yüan, the details of which were formalized during his own reign, brought him into contact with the successor of the Olug, Bagä ba (< Tib. Phags pa) Lama.

13. While no direct evidence points to a role for the Olug at the enthronement of Nurhaci, definite elements of a Buddhist policy can be detected in the emperor’s conduct in the years following his induction (see notes 9, 11 and 14). As described in the documentary sources, the Manchu lords raised Nurhaci as emperor, Han (i.e., Khan), in 1616, after which Manchu sources refer to him by the title Genggiyen Han. Comparative study of Tibeto-Mongol imperial tradition furnishes instructive material regarding the Manchu title genggiyen and leads me to suggest that it can be explained in terms of the theoretical requirements of Buddhist initiation. The vocable genggiyen “clear, bright” should be compared with the Mongol forms gegen “clarté, éclat . . . titre d’un saint personage (khoutouktou),” Kowalewski, Dictionnaire mongol-russe-français, Kazan 1844-1849, p. 2495. Precedents for the Buddhist usage of the title Gegen Qagan, the agnomen of the Yuan emperor and patron of Tibetan Buddhism, *Siddhipala, as well as the sixteenth century Tümed ruler and Dge lugs pa patron, Altan Gegen Hakan (=Qagan), occur in the Hor chos ‘byu’i of ‘Jig med rig pa’i rdzod (G. Huth, Geschichte des Buddhismus in der Mongolei, Strassburg 1892-1896, 2 vols., v. 1, pp. 36 and 57.) The Mongol form gegen by its definition and application has a distinctive Buddhist connotation as a *mtshan “ordination name.” One need only note that such titles were conveyed at the time of imperial investiture to see that they have religio-dynastic connotations. The Hor chos ‘byu’i, v. 1, p. 24 lines 9-11, relates the ascendency of *Siddhipala in the following terms: (9) . . . de’i sras siddhiphal chu yos (10) lo ba dgu lo bcu dgu’i thog rgal sar ‘khood pa la de gen rgyal po žes (11) mtshan brags pa. “His (i.e. Buyantu Qagan’s) son, Siddhipala, born the Water-Hare year (1302), was established on the throne at the age of nineteen, and given the mtshan (ordination name) Gegen Rgyal po [i.e., ‘King Gegen,’ or ‘Gegen Khan.’ For further examples of imperial ordination names, e.g., the Qagans Buyantu and Külgü, bestowed at the time when Mongol sovereigns took power, cf. Huth, v. 1, p. 24. (Also see Louis Ligeti, “Notes sur le colophon du ‘Yitikan Sudur.’” in Asiatica edited by Johannes Schubert, Leipzig 1954, 397-404, pp. 401-403 for the reconstruction of the name *Siddhipala.) For the definition of mtshan, see Das, Tibetan-English Dictionary, Delhi 1970 reprint, p. 1036, “resp. for ming ‘name,’ esp. the new name which everyone receives that takes orders.” The fact that during the Yuan dynasty ordination names were bestowed at the time of imperial investiture indicates Tibetan Bud-

dhist authorities had more than an advisory role in imperial politics, their ceremonial ratification being a necessary component of the induction rite. In the case of Nurhaci, it may serve to explain why—because of his initiation—the first Manchu emperor felt compelled to promote the Olug Darhan Nangso Lama to an important benefice just outside his capital. Beyond the suggestion that the Manchu form genggiyen mirrors Nurhaci’s Buddhist ordination recorded in the 1630 Sino-Manchu inscription, perhaps the best measure of Mongol (as well as Buddhist) influence on the Manchu institution of emperor is the preeminent place Mongol titles held in the pre- and early dynastic Manchu scheme of things. See notes 20, 24 and 25 for additional references.

14. On the basis of the material discussed so far (cf. n. 11), the existence of the lama-patron relationship at court indicates Nurhaci attached a higher importance to this act than a mere demonstration of imperial largesse. Reference to contemporary comparative material, i.e., the Tibeto-Mongol inscription of 1626 at the Çağan Suburan, site of Legdan Qagan’s capital and the spiritual center of the Sa skyan pa-Mongol renaissance, provides some instructive material for interpreting the Sino-Manchu sources and showing Nurhaci’s motivation for becoming a Buddhist. According to the Mongol version of the 1626 inscription, an imperial patron could have compelling reasons for subsidizing a stupa’s construction and adornment (Pozdnayev, v. 2, p. 257/5):

dörben dír-egsi gi cagravardi çağan bolun burqan-u şasín-i bariği öglige-yin ejen-i basa basa bolqu bolugai.

May he again and again become the ruler of the four continents, the cakravartin and the adherent of Buddhism, the donor (dänapati).

The pertinent idea appearing in these lines demonstrates that contemporary Tibeto-Mongol canonical writers believed patronage, appropriately conducted, benefitted the imperial donor in postulating an assertion for dominion, setting him among the hierarchy of princely believers stretching back to Asoka, and, whatever his pedigree, theoretically furnishing him with claims of authenticity to govern as a world ruler, a cakravartin. In the case of Nurhaci, it sanctified the Manchu ruler’s dignity, raising him near the level of his Mongol rivals, and gave him the ideological basis for consolidating his realm. This charismatic power based on traditional Tibeto-Mongol prototypes, needless to say, would have been impossible without the presence of the Tibetan Buddhist establishment at his court.

The Çağan suburan inscription further attests to the central place of the idea of conquest and dominion and its religious sanction in contemporary Tibeto-Mongol political thought (Pozdnayev, v. 2, pp. 254/24-255/25); the text within brackets was restored by Pozdnayev on the basis of the parallel Tibetan text.)
15. The exchange of honors and titles between rulers and their chaplains as cakravartins and lords of religion reflects a distinctive feature of the claim of dynastic right. Without going into the details that the subject deserves, note the example of the consecration of Qubilai in 1264, at which time he granted 'Phags pa Lama the title Nom-un qa'an, “Dharma-king,” in return for the designation Minggan altan kurdüü-1 ergigulüü cagavard seech qa'an “Cakravartin who turns 1000 golden wheels, Sechen Qa'an” [Erdene-yin tobc, pp. 116/18 and 118/7-8]. To this can be added the exchange of titles between the Tumed lord, Altan Qa'an and the Dge lugs pa iarach Bsd nams Rgya-mtho in 1378: minggan altan kurdün-1 ergigulüü cagavar-d seech qa'an and vacir-d dharma dalai lam-a, “Cakravartin who turns 1000 Golden wheels, Sechen Qa'an”, and the “Vajradhara Dalai Lama” [Erdene-yin tobc, p. 263/1-5, whence stems the title Dalai Lama. Furthermore, in 1614, the Ordos prince Bošüg-tu Jinong granted Mayidari Qutguq the title Yekde Asaraqči nom-un qa'an, “Rgya chen Byam pa Dharma-king”, receiving in return the title Altan kurdün-1 ergigulüü cagavard seech jinong qa'an “Cakravartin who turns the golden wheel, Sechen Jinong and Qa'an” [Erdene-yin tobc, p. 264/7-12]. For additional instances of this custom, cf. notes 9 and 11. In conjunction with the Buddhist renaissance, the institution of cakravartin monarchy diffused among the various Mongol khanates (e.g., Tumet, Ordos, Cahar) during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century. The theoretical organization of these theologically-inspired domains in terms other than the lama-patron relation between sovereign and chaplain, however, remains undefined.

One encounters evidence that the Manchus followed a similar course of action when in the late 1640s they renewed an invitation to the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama to come to Peking. According to the 1651 inscription of the Sara süm-e at Peking (Manchu inscription, line 5): lama-de noman han-i gebu bu, “[The Shun-chih Emperor] granted the title of Dharma-king to the [Dalai] Lama.” For the transcription of the text, see Franke, “Die dreisprachige Grundunginschrift des ‘Gelben Temples’ zu Peking aus dem Jahre 1651,” ZDMG 114, 1964, 391-412, p. 392. See n. 29 below for addi
Regarding the identification of Mahākāla as the tutelary genius of the Sa skya pa, see Mireille Helffer, "Traditions musicales des Sa-skya-pa relatives au culte de Mgon-po," JA 264, 1976, 357-404, pp. 360, n. 13, and 376, n. 87. Heissig, "Lamaist Suppression of Shamanism," p. 499 has interpreted Mongol data surrounding this event. For further references to Mahākāla worship, see notes 15, 20-22, 26 and 36.

20. The entry in the CMCT, v. 10, p. 4605/2-8, dated February 12, 1636, records that Abahai, his brother Dayisan, and their Mongol ally, the Koric Prince Jasaq-tu Dügereng participated in a mandala ceremony at which they venerated the image of Mahākāla Buddha. The relevant portion of the text, line 8, reads: fuchu juleri jafati han: amba beyile: jasag-tu dugereng-be gayifi uyungeri niyaktürri: uyungeri hengkilehe: "... offering [ritual objects] before [the image of Mahākāla] Buddha, the Emperor led the Grand Prince [Dayisan] and Jasaq-tu Dügereng to bow and prostrate themselves nine times." Regarding the identification of the Amba Beyile Dayisan, cf. Hummel, Eminent Chinese, pp. 1 and 214. The Manchus and their Koric allies took the Mahākāla consecration of 1264 (in which Phags pa Lama had initiated Qubilai as a cakravartin) as the prestigious antecedent for this rite. For further comments, cf. Walther Heissig, Altan kūrdūn mingan gozešütü bicine, eine Mongolische Chronik von Siregetü Guosi Dharma (1739), Copenhagen 1958, III 6r/8-6v/4. Also see n. 15 above concerning the exchange of titles between Qubilai and Phags pa Lama. In addition, see notes 18, 20 and 21.

21. As remarked in n. 20, the CMCT specifically refers to the veneration shown by members of the imperial household to the image of Mahākāla which the Sa skya pa Lama, Mañjuśrī Paṇḍita [=Mergen Lama], had brought to Mukden on February 2, 1635. A Chinese source, the Ta-ch’ing li ch’ao shih-lu Vol. 4, ch’ian 43, 10a-b, records that Abahai led a grand procession of Manchu and Mongol dignitaries to the Mahākāla sanctuary on September 19, 1638. According to Oshibuchi, Biliqü Nangso Lama conducted the emperor to the Buddha image where they led the assembly to perform the kowtow ceremony. Cf. Oshibuchi, Mansha kiki ko, p. 154. Herbert Franke notes that "rites connected with Hevajra and Mahākāla had been customary for the enthronements of the Yuan emperors." See his article "Tibetans in Yuan China," in China under Mongol Rule, edited by John D. Langlois, Jr., Princeton 1981, 296-328, p. 308. Regarding the actual ceremony of investiture, cf. Franke, Beiträge zur Kulturgeschichte Chinas unter der Mongolenherrschaft. Das Shan-chu hsin-hua des Yang Yü, Wiesbaden 1956, pp. 30-31. With respect to the manifestations and iconography of Mahākāla, see Shin’ko Mochizuki, Bukkyō daijiten, Tokyo 1960-1963, v. 4, pp. 3216-3218; B. Bhattacharyya, Indian Buddhist Iconography, Calcutta 1958, pp.344-348.

Farquhar, in his article "The Origins of the Manchu’s Mongolian Policy," in The Chinese World Order (edited by John K. Fairbank, Cambridge 1970, 198-205), p. 199, observes that the early Manchu emperors appear to have derived their titles from prestigious Mongol prototypes. For example, in 1607, Nurhaci received his title Kündulen Han (Mong. Kündelen Qagān, "Respected Emperor") from the Kalka prince Enggeder. Nor was this an isolated case. Abahai, the name by which Nurhaci’s successor is popularly known, is a form unattested in Manchu sources. The word, in fact, is a loanword from Mongol Abugai "nom respectueux donné aux aînes par l’âge ou la parenté: titre des fils cadets d’un monarque ou prince héréditaire" (Kowalewski, p. 41) and thus accords perfectly with his Manchu title Hing Taiji (Ch. Huang Tai-tzu) as it appears in the Sino-Manchu sources. Perhaps most significantly, when Abahai received the homage of the forty-nine Mongol beiles in 1636, it was they who bestowed upon him the Manchu title Gosin onco kūlwyasun endurongge han and its Mongol prototype Aχuđa ḥröišiyeqë dageḏu eɾemtuñ naviɾmataçu boģa qagān as emperor of the Dayicing, and not the Manchu or Chinese officials. For further remarks on the forty-nine lords of the sixteen Mongol tribes who proclaimed Abahai emperor, see Louis Ligeti, "Deux tablettes des T’ai-tsong des Ts’īng.,” AOH 8, 1958, 201-239, pp. 213 and 235, n. 57-22. Everyone who has treated the question agrees that the Manchu word dayicing and the Mongol loan word dayicing convey the Chinese dynastic title Ta-ch’ing (normally pronounced Tai-ch’ing in the seventeenth century; moreover, despite modern usage it should be noted that during the life of the dynasty, the title was apparently never used without the first part, Tai-/Ta-). Given the context of the Mahākāla consecration (see notes 19-20) and associated Buddhist ceremonies that had preceded the inauguration of the dynasty on May 14, 1636, I wish to draw attention to the transcription of another Mongol form with the identical orthography dayicing. Close analysis confirms the foreignness of the word which does not come from a Mongol root, does not conform to the language’s principles of word formation and is unattested in Middle Mongol linguistic monuments. However, evidence exists that the Chinese word may have entered Mongol from a Tibetan intermediary attested in the mid-fifteenth century materials edited by Tatsu Nishida, Seibankan yakugo no kenkyū [= The Tibetan-Chinese Vocabulary of the Hsi-Fan Kuan I-yü] Kyoto 1970: Document II. Chinese Text, p. 124 Ta-ch’ing fa wang/ Tibetan text, p. 124 Dai-chi hua wan "Dharma-king of the Great Vehicle." The bilingual petition shows the scribe rendered the Chinese compound ta-ch’ing (or tai-ch’eng) ‘great vehicle,’ a calque of the Sanskrit term Mahāyāna, by the Tibetan phonetic transcription dai-chiḥ, a form neither Jāscheke nor Das registers. (Cf. Ernest J. Eitel, Handbook of Chinese Buddhism, Amsterdam 1970 reprint of the 1904 edition, p. 90, Mahāyāna (="ta-ch’eng") "lit. great conveyance. . . A later form of Buddhist dogma, one of the three phases of its development (v. triyāna), corresponding to the third degree of sainthood, the state of a Bodhisattva, who being able to transport himself to Nirvana, may be com-
Panḍita [=Mergen Lama], who in 1635 had brought with him to Mukden the image of Mahākāla and the Kanjur.


25. Johannes Schubert, "Die viersprachige Inschrift des buddhistischen Klosters Fa lun su in Mukden," Artibus Asiae 5, 1930-1935, pp. 71-75; 255-255. My transcription is based on the Mongolian text of the foundation inscription of 1645 for the Dus kyi 'khor lo'i lha khaṅ (Ch. Fa-lun suu), plate 3, p. 74:

1) dorun-a tu tala dur esergüegči-i daraqiu-yin tulada baygilugšan: teyn büged geygilugči-yin süm-e: [lines 7-8] "The [Rnam par snah bai lha khaṅ] Temple of Vairocana which we have established in the eastern quarter in order to subdue the resistors . . . 2) emün-e tü tala dur qamü amitan-i engke amugulang bolgaju: tariya toqosu qaraqajiu-yin tulada baygilugšan: yeke nigüesügči-yin süm-e: [lines 8-9] "The [Thugs rje chen po'i lha khaṅ] Temple of Mahākāranā which we have established in the southern quarter in order to purposely watch over crops thereby putting all living beings at ease . . . 3) òruñ-e tü tala dur əmin nasun urtuqu-yin tulada baygilugšan: nasun čaglasi-üger-yin süm-e: [line 10] "The [Tshe dpug med mgon gyi lha khaṅ] Temple of Amitayus which we have established in the western quarter in order to prolong life . . . 4) umar-a tu tala dur qan oran-i oşgata orduqilu-yin tulada baygilugšan: čag-un kürdün süm-e: [lines 11-12] "The [Dus kyi 'khor lo'i lha khaṅ] Temple of Kālacakra which we have established in the northern quarter in order to command the realm . . . "

For the medieval rites of Mahākāla worship and Mongol emperorship, cf. n. 20.

26. This testament of Buddhist faith, an expression of belief corroborated by the inventory of architectural monuments, set the pre-dynastic Manchu capital together with the residence of the Manchu cakravartin firmly within the Buddhist cultural tradition. Moreover, the meticulous application of the Lama-patron relation since at least 1621 shows, in effect, that Tibetan Buddhism played a major role in the exaltation of the early Manchu sovereigns, their consolidation of the state according to religious principles established during the Yuan dynasty, and their conscious succession to the legacy of the medieval Mongol Empire. I cannot here demonstrate the filiation of ideas needed to prove Manchu reliance on Mongol-Sa skya pa patterns of state. It must suffice to say that Manchu acceptance of these ideas, which bound medieval Mongol Buddhism with the religious revival of the Buddhist Renaissance of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, is clearly not gratuitous, and goes a long way to explain why the Manchus had a vested interest in the promotion of the doctrine. For a preliminary assessment of the Manchu monarchy's continuation of the Mongol-Sa skya pa conception of religio-political organization, see my dissertation, "The Man-
chu Imperial Cult of the Early Ch’ing dynasty: Texts and Studies on the Tantric Sanctuary of Mahakāla at Mukden,” Bloomingston 1980.
27. I.e., the Sa skya pa lamas, Maṇjuśrī Pāṇḍita and Bilāgū Nangso Lama, and the Dge lugs pa envoy at Mukden, the Ilaḵuṣan Qutuqtu.
28. Robert B. Oxnam, Ruling from Horseback, Manchu Politics in the Oboi Regency, 1661-1669, Chicago 1975, pp. 47-49, has characterized the years 1651-1653—the time of the Dalai Lama’s mission to Peking—as a "period of intense factional rivalry" and "among the fiercest and most complex in the early Ch’ing." The death of Dorgon late in 1650 allowed his cousin, Jirgalang, to move against the Dorgon faction and other groups seeking to dismember imperial power. By mid-1652, he had overcome these centrifugal elements and succeeded in transforming the Shun-chih Emperor’s nominal rule to one of actual control over the government.
29. In January 1653 the Dalai Lama arrived at Peking, the Panchen Lama having declined repeated invitations because of his advanced age. For the two generations preceding formal Manchu-Dge lugs pa relations, the throne had shown keen interest in Tibetan Buddhism and had made it a key part of the religious and cultural life of the court. This fact together with subsequent actions taken by the throne run counter to the received interpretation that the Manchus had invited the Dge lugs pa to Peking to present tribute. According to Saṅgh Sechen [Erdeni-yin tobch, p. 296-12-15], the emperor on this occasion substantiated the "rule of the saints" by supporting Tibetan Buddhism and venerating the Dge lugs pa prelates as his religious masters:

(12) . . . Ilaḵuṣan čidaḵči-u (13) erket-yin šašin-i ülemji tekduń; Ilaḵuṣan-u kobeğin qamyg-i međeği-yi oru-yin (14) čimeg bolgün tabišlańu; amitan-u itegel boğda banchin erdeni-yi ečen-e ece lam-a barigad: (15) buqan-u şašin-i ülemji-de tekduń boğdaš-un törő-yi asru tŭősیدen baygülę.

[The Shun-chih Emperor] abundantly supported the lina’s religion of the powerful saints and venerated the son of the lina, the Omniscient [Dalai Lama], as the ornament of his sinupct. He cherished the Lama in the absence of the Refuge of Sentient Beings, the Boğda Panchen Erdeni, giving protection to the Superior of the Buddhist religion [i.e. the Dalai Lama], and firmly established, to a high degree, the rule of the saints.

The account of the emperor’s recognition of the Dge lugs pa hierarchs and doctrine calls to mind not only the formal features of the regimes of his predecessors and their Sa skya chaplains but the whole tradition of Tibet-Mongol acknowledgements between state and faith up to that time (see n. 15). The titles the parties exchanged as a result of this mission suggest a set of conditions consistent with the tradition of mutual recognition. The Dalai Lama received the title Rdo rje 'thain ("Vajradhara") and the Shun-chih Emperor took the title Gnam gyi lha 'jam dbyañs goñ ma bdag po chen po ("God of the Sky, Great Maňjušrī-Emperor and Great Being"). (See Tsepon W.D. Shakabpa, Tibet, A Political History, New Haven 1967, p.

116: cf Farquhar, “Emperor as Bodhisattva,” p. 20. n. 49; Huth, Geschichte des Buddhismus, p. 268.) The point is, of course, that the establishment of this personal religious bond followed a definite cultural model and institutional structure that had come directly from Sa skya pa inspiration. When the pre-dynastic pattern of crown and clergy relations is compared with the Dge lugs pa exaltation of the role of the emperor and his chaplain over other segments of society, they are seen to resemble each other closely. This state of affairs takes on added significance since it coincides exactly with Jirgalang’s centralization of authority within imperial hands. At the same time, the reasons for Jirgalang’s substitution of a Dge lugs pa ratification of his house’s dynastic right in place of the Sa skya pa legitimation remains unclear. The sectarian realignment coincides with his attempt to dissociate the ruler from the aristocratic factionalism of the day. The Sa skya pa, as they had toward the end of the Yuan, may have become embroiled in partisan causes bringing discredit to themselves and ultimately forcing the throne to reject them. This view, however, remains speculative pending further research into the question of the earliest period of Manchu-Dge lugs pa relations.

30. For a brief discussion of a fairly widespread Chinese Buddhist sect that traces its origins to the Tibetan Tantric Buddhism of the Sa skya pa introduced during the Yuan and, as we have seen, perpetuated in Dge lugs pa form by the Ch’ing, see Christopher I. Beckwith, “A Hitherto Unnoticed Yuan-Period Collection Attributed to ‘Phagspa,”” in L. Ligeti (edited), Tibetan and Buddhist Studies Commemorating the 200th Anniversary of the Birth of Alexander Csoma de Körös, v. 1, Budapest, 1984, pp. 10-11.

31. The Manchus attempted to set the institutionalization of the relationship between the K’ang-hsi Emperor and the first Lcha skya Qutuqtu in an appropriate historical context when they established the Qutuqtu’s see at Dolon Nor. The foundation charter of 1714 records the submission of the Kalka Mongols to the emperor in 1691 in the following terms (Pozdnayev, Mongolia, v. 2. p. 188-5/8):

taytsu taytsung boğda kelek-chi tobch-yi ya bariu örišiyel erke yin kiründin-i orčuuluq-iyar mongol ulus-un olan ayimaq-ud uman ジャー ber ünen sanaj-a ber dağan örübe

Because T’ai-tsu and T’ai-tsun, cherishing the relations which the [Buddhist] saints expressed, turned the wheel of compassion and power, many tribes of the Mongol nation gradually and earnestly offered their submission.

Viewed against the background of pre- and early Ch’ing dynastic devotion, such tributes to imperial advocacy of Buddhist ideals of state and faith correctly relate the evolution of this tendency to the ideals of the founding sovereigns. Statements of this sort often appeared in foundation charters. Albeit formulaic, they obviously had historical validity.
32. Kämpfe, p. 35.
33. Ibid. p. 34: I have paraphrased the Mongol text (60a/11-23):

(11) tendeche garagin (12) qagai il-dur: mañjusri (13) bojda ejen ber: mugeen (14) kemeki ordu qarsidaqan (15) jalaraj: tere ecliq ebiq (16) degeduesin bayiquluqisan keyid (17) sum-e: be-y-e jalig sedkii-un sedkisi-
uegi (18) sitioq-un bd: amidan-u (19) itegel 'bags ba blama-a yin (20) rügs dam-un sitioq maha (21) gala-yin körüg be-y-e (22) terigüen dotuqadu
sitioq-un (23) degen ayiladcu můrgüged: bara-a bolju morilacqasun.

34. Regarding this initiation, see n. 38.
35. The biographer asserts that the Lćan skya Qutuqtu re-called this event when he wrote the biography of 'Phags pa Lama. For additional remarks cf. Kämpfe, p. 35. Also see n. 28 above.
36. Ibid. p. 52. I have paraphrased the Mongol text 169v/10-27:

(10) ene (11) bojda ejen-ten jeru burqan-u (12) šasín kiged ilangqyuy-a sira
(13) malag-a yin didim-i (14) barigci yin öni-yin (15) yosun-i deger-e ece
tegesii (16) arbligulugad: nom-un (17) oglige-yin yağun (18) egüden-i
gekeju: ene bojda cu (19) šasín-u yeke ejen môn-u (20) uçir-iyar üllis-ügei
(21) qayira bar blam-a bolgan (22) barigsan anu tere metü bui (23) tende
ene ku bojda ejen-ten (24) toyid-un dürii yosun-i (25) barigsan gasiyamisig
jirig-tü (26) über-un körüg nigen-i (27) qayiralaqasun-i ene bojda bar
zung te (1) zi-yin dugang dur jalju ergin kündüel-i jokiyabi:

For remarks regarding the ideological significance of such effigies, see
Farquhar, “Emperor as Bodhisattva,” pp. 5-6.
37. The Emperor’s mother, Empress Hsiao-sheng (1693-1777), was herself a
member of a Manchu consort clan and not of Mongol origin. Cf. Hummel,
Eminent Chinese, p. 369. The fact that her funeral was presided over by
Tibetan clergy led by the most prominent lama resident in China would
seem to indicate that Tibetan Buddhism was an integral matter of faith in
Manchu ruling circles independent of the requirements of showing tolera-
tion of the beliefs of the Manchu’s Mongol allies. For further remarks, cf.
Kämpfe, p. 48.
38. For details concerning the initiations for the chosen divinities (i.e. yi

Glossary

Jen-wang 仁王
Kuo-shih 國師
Lun-wang 輪王

Lun-wang hu kuo po jo po lo mi to Ching 仁王護國諸波羅蜜多經
Lun wang ch’i pao Ching 輪王七寶經

Mindai chibetto hachi dai kyō-ō ni tsuite 明代不耐七大教主について

Lien-hua Ssu 蓮花寺
La-ma Yüan 剃麻國
Hou Chin 後金

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Ryōyō Rama-fun Hibun no Kaisetsu Hosei 造陽喇嘛傳碑文的解說補正
Manshū hiki kō 滿洲碑記考
Chiu Man-chou tang 深滿洲境
Ta Chin 大全

Ta-Ch’ing li ch’iu shih lu 大清列聖錄
Huang Tai-tzu 皇太子

Seibankan yakugo no kenkyū の書館譯語の研究
Ta-ch’eng fa wang 大乘法王
Book Reviews


One can question reviewing a surprisingly clumsy though extremely popular translation of a book first issued in England in 1931. The only thing really new about it is the suppression of Professor d’Arsonval’s original short preface, and its replacement by one from Aaron Sussman, the editor and advertising manager for the first American edition.

The new preface is a bit misleading. It implies that the change of title, originally With Mystics and Magicians in Tibet, was somehow involved with improving originally poor book sales. However, the English edition with that title, far from being “packed off to limbo,” was frequently reprinted, even going into a number of Penguin Books reissues.

The first editions were the best. If one can find them on the second hand market, they are surely preferable. That first American edition published by Claude Kendall has much to recommend it. Not only is it easier on the eyes, but it includes, as this edition does not, 15 valuable though fuzzy pictures. These pictures have not been reprinted in Librairie Plon’s 1979 edition of photographs, titled Le Tibet d’Alexandra David-Neel.

A question to answer is the value for serious Tibetologists of this admittedly popular presentation. Evidently, many Tibetan terms suffer from peculiar transcriptions. A scholar’s edition ought to include an index plus a correct glossary. On the other hand, ADN has carefully defined every term she uses. She does not pretend to be more than an involved and sympathetic reporter, one who has done her best to make a study in depth.

She succeeds in her efforts to give not only newcomers to Tibetan and Buddhist studies an insight into “psychic phenomena” as viewed by many Tibetans. Young students especially can be grateful that the popularity of her book has enabled them to find, at a moderate price, a wide ranging and essentially accurate picture of what was going on.

Whether or not one believes in the validity of the “magic” does not affect the interest in a study of its practices. A purely scholarly approach to this study is far less likely to be available at a reasonable price. Moreover,
ADN’s treatment of personalities and the social mulch add elements of significant value often missed in more pretentious publications.

The uses of enchantment were treated by Bruno Bettelheim to justify the fairy tale, once a part of every child’s first reading. He noted how it enabled children to have strength in a hope to overcome what seemed, and probably were, not just solvable problems, but enduring, permanent difficulties. Bettelheim did not adequately explore the continuing value of such enchantments. In this world of unresolvable troubles, they evidently also help many adults to cope.

Alexandra David-Neel views this area of studies with honesty, insight, and sympathy. She has made contributions of value for a wide gamut of specialists, the linguists, social scientists, medical specialists, folklorists, art enthusiasts and comparative religion investigators. While she stresses events implying mystic interpretations, she doesn’t neglect alternate explanations. She gives details as they related to the actual lives of real and interesting people. Her story of Dawa-sang-dup is not just interesting. She sees that guns and faith seem stronger than either alone. She notes her Tibetan studies, but frequently admits her need to resort to interpreters.

For those who have for one reason or another not yet read her books and articles, this is surely a good one with which to begin.

Braham Norwick
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The Rain of Wisdom is the first major translation project completed by a group of Chögyam Trungpa Rinpoche’s American disciples, the Nalanda Translation Committee. Known generally by the abbreviated title Ocean of Songs of the Bka’-brgyud (Bka’-brgyud mgur-mtsho), The Rain of Wisdom is one of a very small number of published Tibetan compilations that may be properly described as poetry anthologies. (Another is the Sain-pa Bka’-brgyud mgur-mtsho compiled by Jam-mgon Kon-sprul Blo-gros-mtha’-yas, 1813-1899.) The relative discouragement of secular poetry and the standard practice of issuing complete editions of the collected poems of particular religious writers (i.e. the mgur-’bums) perhaps account for the comparatively poor development of this genre in Tibet, despite the copious production of anthologies in India and China, the nations which most influenced Tibetan literature. Edited originally by Karma-pa VIII Mi-bskyod-rdo-rje (1507-1554), The Rain of Wisdom has grown with additional contributions by successive generations of Bka’-brgyud-pa masters. In its present form it embodies the quintessence of the Bka’-brgyud tradition of Buddhist verse practiced from the 11th century down to the present day, as represented by the work of some 35 poets. The English translation should thus interest students of the Buddhist religion as well as of traditional Asian literatures.

It is evident that the Nalandâ Committee has made every effort to produce a translation that represents the original text to a very high degree of accuracy, but which also is written in an easy and natural English style, eschewing the cramped conventions which render much translation from Tibetan virtually inaccessible to all but the most patient of readers. An example is in order. These extracts come from “The Song of Kônchok Yenlak” (pp. 49-53):

He saw that all the petty goals and activities of oneself and others, and the circumstances of happiness and misery in all places and times were like a swirling illusion or dream... Therefore, the experience of things as they are was born in him like summer heat—unfabricated, innate, ordinary, free of fixation, free of bondage, free of liberation. He summed this up as an oral instruction for his worthy disciples, and when he intended to teach, he sang this vajra song...

When I was young, I attended spiritual friends,
But now that my youth is past, my goal is accomplished.

I pedantically analyzed the texts again and again,
But when experience arose in my being, I saw the main point.

I have corruptly lived off the donations to my guru,
But this turned into a multitude of virtue completely freeing myself and others.

I have had constant companionship for a long time,
But they have now become permanent spiritual friends.

A comparison of select passages with the Rum-btegs xylographic edition of the text reveals only minor faults, mostly with respect to the interpretation of some more or less obscure terms and idiomatic expressions, e.g.:

For Nalanda:

...without being consumed by obstacles. (p. 7)

Read “certainly” Tib. gdon mi za bar

For Nalanda:

The Buddha, the Victorious One, also taught his sons the dharma of the Avatamsaka from the Āryasamantabhadracaryāprāṇidhānārāja. (p. 7)
Tibetan religious poetry is, of course, a translator’s nightmare. It is expressive of a system of values, a Weltanschauung, which is far distant from that in which the contemporary Western reader has been nurtured. Its conventions are alien, its formal characteristics incapable of straightforward transposition into modern English. The Nalanda translators have approached their task as Western Buddhists, who have partially adopted the value-system of the poets they are translating. In order to introduce their readers to the world of their poets, they have appended to their translation an informative afterword (pp. 293-333), which introduces the spiritual milieu of the poems, and which provides much valuable data regarding the text and the identities of the poets themselves. A detailed glossary (pp. 340-376) is also appended.

Concerning the afterword, a few remarks on the section entitled The Lineage and Its Teachings (pp. 293-303) are perhaps in order here. These pages represent, to all intents and purposes, the popular style of teaching Tibetan Buddhism for which Chogyam Trungpa is well known. While I do not wish to question either the insights underlying this approach, or its applicability to the requirements of interested Westerners who are not specialists in Tibetan Buddhist Studies, it may be somewhat misleading here. For example, the description of the Kagyü path follows, in points of detail, the program of Trungpa Rinpoche’s Dharmadhatu centers rather than traditional accounts. Thus, it is asserted that “[t]he first step is samatha meditation . . . the first stage of hinayāna practice” (p. 296). Certainly this applies to Trungpa Rinpoche’s students and a great many other Western Buddhists too. But it does not accurately reflect the sequence of study and practice undertaken by neophytes in a traditional setting. Does this small exercise in pedagogical expedience really matter in the present context? To see that it does, consider that the poets anthologized here represent their hinayāna background not with reference to śamatha and vipaśyāna, but with their frequent allusions to the main themes of actual hinayāna study in Tibet: impermanence, suffering, moral causation and the discipline of the prātimokṣa.

The Kagyü poetic tradition is rightly traced by the translators back to the dohā tradition of the Indian Mahāsiddhas (p. 300). There are, however, at least two other traditions of verse composition from which they drew, namely, the indigenous Tibetan traditions of folksong, verse oratory and bardic chant, and the verse translations of Sanskrit formal poetry and śāstraic verse. The full relation of the Kagyü poets to their cultural and educational background unfortunately has not been explored here, as well it might have been. For to have done so would to some extent have revealed the manner in which these wonderful poets give expression not only to the enlightenment of a specific spiritual tradition, but also to an intricate nexus of not particularly religious cultural values, and to the cultivated erudition of a uniquely Tibetan style of formal scholastic education.
The glossary, though generally quite useful, does occasionally substitute Trungpaesque definitions for traditional ones. E.g., maśtrī (byams-pa) is defined as “friendliness to oneself, the prerequisite for compassion for others” (p. 355), in flat opposition to the standard definition, which is “the attitude which desires that all sentient beings have happiness and the causes thereof” (sams can thams cad bde ba dan bde ba’i rgyu dan idan par ’dod pa’i sens). Another example is found under “grasping and fixation” (p. 349), where the explanation is tailored to support this altogether eccentric translation of the phase gzhi ba dan’i dzin pa, which simply means “apprehended (object) and apprehending (subject).”

These points aside, I must reaffirm that The Rain of Wisdom is a fine contribution to the body of Tibetan literature in translation. Delightful to read, it evidences also some of the potential for scholarly work that is to be found in the group of disciples who have gathered around Chögyam Trungpa. As the Nalanda Translation Committee’s first, it bodes well for their future undertakings and merits this Tibetan characterization: thog mar dge ba.

Matthew Kapstein
Brown University


This volume, which is the first in the oriental collection of the French National Press on the history and civilisation of Central Asia, sets out a cultural history of four of the Himalayan Kingdoms, namely Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan.

With the exception of a general introduction and the notable section on the Limbu of Nepal by Philippe Sagant, the sources are secondary and the method, if not the viewpoint, essentially archaeological and archival. The editor himself is of the view, which perhaps applies to all matters of cultural history and reconstruction, that the general task is premature and our knowledge a definite patchwork.

Ladakh and Sikkim are today part of the State of India. Nepal and Bhutan still have an independent existence; the first has Hinduism and the second Mahāyāna Buddhism as state religion; these are the two great religions that in part define the traditional civilisations of the area.

In the introduction MacDonal moves from general features of topography and ecology of the Himalayan region to the sequence of settlement of the peoples, seen as from valley to hillside. He sketches the general movement of ethnic groups, that is of indo-aryan speakers from west to east in the ‘middle-hills’, who have a rice-based economy, and Tibetan-speaking peoples southwards. Here he provides an overview of a vast and fragment ed literature, one that dates at least from Hodgson’s writings in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal in 1847. up to and beyond the more recent reconstructions, such as those of S.K. Chatterji (1950) in the same periodical.

He outlines the contrasts not just between the two religious cultures per se, Hindu and Buddhist, but also the mode of action of the two states, India and China (“La Chine s’impose; l’Inde s’infiltre”), and of their two institutionalised religious forms, the Brahmical and monastic. There is also a social history of monasteries in India, followed by a section on the growth of Buddhism as revealed in art and sculpture, and a socio-political history of Tibet. The broad scope and clarity of this introduction more than make up for any theoretical or particular factual criticism that many, including MacDonal could make. This is a valuable introduction, not just to this book but to the field as a whole.

The section by Sagant is a first-hand account of the life of the Limbu, a people of eastern Nepal who, like many others, have a legend of descent from kings. The inclusion of this ethnography of traditional local organisation and the effects of political indianisation gives an entirely different window onto the Kingdoms of the Himalaya, one in which culture as lived in ritual, and history as social process, rather than cultural particulars in and of themselves, come to the fore.

The chapters of Ladakh, Bhutan, Sikkim and the Kathmandu Valley Kingdoms of Nepal all follow roughly the same format, namely that of a gazetteer. The sequence is geography, trade and commerce, origins of people, history (century by century), ethnic groups today, languages, costumes, customs, state and administration, religion, monks and monasteries, festivals and pilgrimages, architecture, sculpture and painting and literature. These chapters are all amply illustrated, and the emphasis is on time, place and source rather than on any more general abstraction; but these do not necessarily appear in the form of a technical debate with other scholars. Though the sources are not fully treated and listed, and indeed in a single volume they could not be, much of the work is a useful compendium for the professional, as well as being attractive to the general reader who is prepared to support fully an interest in the Kingdoms of the Himalaya.

G.E. Clarke
University of Sussex

III) Fourteenth through sixteenth centuries—

A) Zhwa-dmar II Mkha'-spyon-dbang-po (1350-1405), *The Collected Writings (Gsung-'bum) of the Second Zhwa-dmar Mkha'-spyon-dbang-po* (Gantog: 1978). LC Acc. no. 78-903290. NOTE: This reprint of the Gsung-'bum is unfortunately lacking the biography of Marpa, which is otherwise available in the following publication: Bde-mchog Snyan-brgyud Biographies—Reproduction of a Collection of Rare Manuscripts from the Stag-sna Monastery in Ladak, Kargyu Sungrab Nyamso Khang (Darjeeling: 1983). LC Acc. no. 84-900207, pp. 1 131.


This treasure trove of early sources of Kargyuudp biography has been so far almost universally neglected, unfortunately. A study of them must precede any attempt at critical scholarship in the Kargyuudp studies of the future. This is a mere ‘sin of omission,’ and should not be taken as a criticism of the publication in question, a remarkable achievement for what it is.

The NTC may likewise be forgiven for a few in-house references in the introduction and notes. In a book such as this, coming as it does from the half-California ‘hidden country’ (sbras yul) of Boulder, Colorado, one would have expected much more of it. As it is, we can only applaud and encourage their evident restraint, particularly with regard to Marpa, a figure of singular and universal inspiration to Tibetans and Buddhists, not only the Kargyuudp.

Threateningly, at least, Tibetologists do not need translations. So it is only fitting that in reviewing a translation of the life of a translator it should be asked how well the translation serves its primary audience, meaning, in particular, human beings with English as their native language. The answer is, “Very well indeed!” This despite some reservations which should not be allowed to overshadow this basic assessment. Some of these reservations have to do with specific translation policies of the NTC. I have my own feelings about the advisability of using a large number of Sanskrit and Tibetan terms in the main body of an English translation, and of using over literal translations when the context alters the tone of meaning in English. Example: p. xlv, “The Tamg of Milarepa” where the translation of the Tibetan word ‘dul-ba would have better conveyed the real coloration of the original with something like ‘training,’ ‘discipline’ or even ‘spiritual transformation.’ I believe strongly in the ability of the English language to trans-
mit everything Tibetan literature has to say, a faith that is admittedly easily conceived and only with difficulty given birth.

If I may use the phrase "heart-felt magic" to apply to literary rather than religious communion, it is precisely here that the translators fall short of their primary goal: communication. There are short flashes of true brilliance, but particularly in the longer passages, the NTC has often failed to carry the 'narrative thrust' in a natural, flowing way. I am tempted to see this as a result of 'many cooks.' But then, Lobsang Lhalungpa's Life of Milarepa (E.P. Dutton, NY: 1977) was also a committee translation, and
nevertheless remarkably readable. My own ideal translation? The only way to do it is to let the original speak for itself. Express what you hear in English. If the original is instructive, communicative, or inspiring, the translation will be likewise, naturally. Translation is the art of re-creation, not a craft. Least of all should it be an assembly-line process.

To illustrate the points made above, I would ask anyone with a copy of The Life of Marpa to refer to the passage beginning on the last line of page 44 and ending on page 48. For the sake of everyone else, I quote the entire passage:

I dreamt that I arrived at Śrī Parvata in the South.
In the cool shade of a grove of plakṣa trees,
On a tīra corpse seat
Sat Lord Saraha, the Great Brahman.
I had never before seen such majestic brilliance.
He was flanked by two queens.
His body was adorned with charnel ground ornaments.
His joyous face was beaming.

"Welcome, my son!" he said.
Seeing the lord, I was overwhelmed with joy.
The hairs of my body stood on end, and I was moved to tears.
I circumambulated him seven times and I offered a full prostration.
I received the soles of his feet on the top of my head.
"Father, accept me with kindness," I supplicated.

He blessed my body with his.
The moment he touched his hand to the top of my head,
My body was intoxicated with undefiled bliss.
Like an elephant drunk with liquor,
There dawned an experience of immovability.
He blessed my speech with his.
With the lion's roar of emptiness,
He spoke "that without letter."
Like a dream dreamt by a mute,
There dawned an experience beyond words.
He blessed my mind with his.
I realized the coemergent dharma-kāya,
That which neither comes nor goes.

Like a human corpse left in a charnel ground,
There dawned an experience of nought.
Then the pure speech of great bliss arose
From the vase of his precious throat.
With sign speech in the melody of Brahmā,
He sang this vajra song which points out things as they are,
The meaning of an empty sky free from clouds.
Thus I heard this unborn self-utterance:

"NAMO Compassion and emptiness are inseparable.
This uninterrupted flowing innate mind
Is suchness, primordially pure.
Space is seen in intercourse with space.
Because the root resides at home,
Mind consciousness is imprisoned.
Meditating on this, subsequent thoughts
Are not patched together in the mind.
Knowing the phenomenal world is the nature of mind,
Meditation requires no further antidote.
The nature of mind cannot be thought.
Rest in this natural state.
When you see this truth, you will be liberated.
Just as a child would, watch the behavior of barbarians.
Be carefree; eat flesh; be a madman.

"Just like a fearless lion,
Let your elephant mind wander free.
See the bees hovering among the flowers.
Not viewing samsāra as wrong,
There is no such thing as attaining nirvāṇa.
This is the way of ordinary mind.
Rest in natural freshness.
Do not think of activities.
Do not cling to one side or one direction.
Look into the midst of the space of simplicity."

Going beyond the exhausting of dharmaśā is the essential truth.
The summit of views, mahāmudrā.
This sign meaning, which pierces to the pith of mind,
I heard from the mouth of the Great Brahman.

At that instant, I awoke.
I was caught by the iron hook of this unforgettable memory.
Within the dungeon of ignorant sleep.
The vision of insight-wisdom opened up
And the sun dawned in a cloudless sky,
Clearing the darkness of confusion.
I thought, "Even if I met the buddhas of the three times,
From now on, I would have nothing to ask them."
I circled seven times and bowed down before him.  
As I took the soles of his feet on my head  
I prayed, “Father, accept me with compassion.”  

Then my body was blessed by his Buddhahood.  
The mere touch of his hand on the top of my head  
made my body pure and drunk with bliss.  
Like an elephant drunk with wine,  
an unshakable inner experience arose.

My speech was blessed by his Buddhahood.  
With the lion’s roar of Voidness,  
he explained the meaning of the Wordless.  
Like a mute man dreaming a dream,  
an unspeakable inner experience arose.

My mind was blessed by his Buddhahood.  
I realized the meaning of the Dharmahood  
that was there all along, without coming or going  
and, like an insensate corpse in the cemetery,  
an unthinkable inner experience arose.

Then his voice made of pure Great Bliss  
made the symbolic sounds of celestial music  
emerge from the vase of jewelled song,  
a Vajra Song pointing to Reality  
(the meaning of Voidness? — a cloudless sky).

I heard these words, unborn sounds produced by sound:

“Praise to Voidness and Compassion inseparable!  
I see in a ceaseless stream the primordial Mind,  
the eternally pure actuality—  
Space embracing space.

“Though it stays in a house of grass,"  
the thoughts confine consciousness to prison walls.  
Outward knowledge and meditation  
have no way to settle down together in Mind.  
Know the world of appearances as of the nature of Mind.  
Fixing up antidotes is no meditation.  
The nature of Mind is no way of thinking.  
So settle in in the unfixed sphere.

“If you divine the significance of that, you are free.  
So consider the activities of children and laudrymen.  
Look to the cannibals and crazy people, as you like.  
“Like a lion lacking in pride,  
put the elephant of Mind above you.  
Consider the bees among the flowers.

* This apparently alludes to the sutra image of the vicious circle of samsara as a 'house of reeds,' something much less stable and substantial than it initially appears to be. The reading is, however, unsure.
haps I am just suffering from 'sour grapes.' Three new and potentially very valuable translations are promised for the near future. They are:

1) Dbang-phyug.rgyal-mtshan's biography of Tilopa.
2) Padma-dkar-po's History of Buddhism (Chos-'byung).
3) Tārānātha's History of the 'Seven Injunctions' (Bka'-bas-bdun-ldam).

I can only sit in awe and wish them the best in the very difficult tasks they have undertaken. I hope that this translation of Marpa's biography, acceptable as it may be, will find a more polished second edition. Marpa the Translator deserves it.

Dan Martin
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ADDENDUM

Please note that a very similar version of the passage translated by the NTC, which I have quoted above, had previously appeared in Rain of Wisdom (Boulder: 1980), pp. 134-7.

The Tibetan text as reproduced below is from a separately published extract included in the Gdams-ngag Mdzod as it was published by Lama Ngodrup & Sherab Drimey (Paro: 1979), vol. VII, pp. 64.2 to 66.2. Kong-sprul gives the words spoken by Saraha to Marpa an added title:

Phyag.rgya.chen-po Yid-la Mi Byed-pa Snying-po Dong.gyi Gdams-ngag Yi-ge Bzhi-pa'i Don Rdo-rje'i Mgur-du Bh thugs-pa

This is further explained in the added colophon and I render freely:

The Meaning of the 'Four Statements,' Precepts of the Authentic Innermost Significance of the Great Seal (Mahāmudrā) Put into Vajra Song.

The 'Four Statements' by the dream Saraha are considered to be a summation of Mahāmudrā teachings. Kong-sprul, in his colophon, gives the following correspondences for these 'Four Statements.'

First—Dharmabody (Chos-kyi Sku). Determining the basic facts of Mind (Sems-kyi gzhi-rtsa bcad).

Second—Complete Assets Body (Longs-spyod Rdo-rje Sku). Demonstrating the methods of laying Mind to rest (Sems-kyi bzhag thabs bstan).

Third—Emanation Body (Sprul-pa'i Sku). Avoiding the turnoffs (from the Path) of Mind (Sems-kyi gol-sa spong).

Fourth—Substantial Identity Body (Ngo-bo-nyid Sku). Demonstrating the expedients of Mind (Sems-kyi lam-khyer bstan).
Although this is not the place for a full study on the subject, I would at least like to point out for those interested two short texts concerned with the 'Four Statements'.

1) A three folio beginning of a text with the title Phyag-rgya chen-po Yi-ge Bzhi-pa'i Gdams-pa, reproduced in Rare Dkar-brgyud-pa Texts from the Library of Ri-bo-che Rie-drung of Padma-bkod (Tibetan Nyingmapa Monastery, Tezù, Arunachal Pradesh, India: 1974), pp. 77 to 82. (Note that the folio reproduced on pp. 83-84 is from an unidentified text and the folios reproduced on pp. 85-97 continue the text started on pp. 215-222). Even though the colophon is missing, we know, thanks to the lineage of teachers given on pp. 78-80, that this text is by a disciple of Rgods-tshang-ras-pa Snas-tshogs-rang-grol (1494-1570 A.D.), and therefore roughly late sixteenth century.


All this is offered to explain the divergent reading yi-ge bzhi-pa in line 12 of the text, and as material toward the future interpretation of the words of the dream Saraha.

I have given variant readings which substantially alter the meaning from four sources:

A: A woodblock print of 74 folios with no added colophon. Marginal title: Mar-pa (page no.). Folios 17 verso (line 3) to 18 verso (line 3). Personal copy.


C: A modern Indian reprint in pothi style in 84 folios with no printing information given. Marginal title: nga (page no.). This represents a manuscript copy (or tracing) of a woodblock-printed original made in Bzang-yul (in the G.yor-po area of Lho-kha in South Tibet) by a monk named Sangs-rgyas-dbang-po. Pp. 41.4 to 43.7.


A Viennese mother-daughter writer-photographer team are the authors of this large format book which probably should have been titled Jewels of the Himalayas. Although the land, places and peoples of Kashmir, Ladakh, Tibet (represented by Tibetans living in Kathmandu, Nepal) and Nepal are strikingly documented, it is the jewelry that is the primary focus of the book. The full color photographs of the jewelry being worn 'in the field' are not only fine documents of the total effect that the jewelry conveys in its full context (as opposed to being set out in a case in a museum), but the photographs are also very impressive artistic works in themselves. Often there are several views of an ensemble, including extreme close-ups, which allow a nearly complete view of not only the jewelry, but also how the jewelry and costume integrate to create a complete presentation of personal identity, regional origin and cultural membership.

Tibetan cultural influence dominates, with the most striking sections of the book being of Ladakh, its people, monasteries, deities, and incredible landscape: and of the Tibetans as they appear in Kathmandu, Nepal. The latter contains several pages of close-up views of gold ga'is (charm boxes) set with carved turquoises, strung on necklaces of large red corals and gzi (gzi/dzi/tzi) beads interspersed with multi-strands of pearls. These are the best depictions of the Lhasa style of jewelry in print.

This book also presents a wealth of other ethnic cultural traditions. It begins with Kashmir and shows Muslim influences in Bukawa and Ghujar jewelry ensembles. The Chujjar silver necklaces shown contain distinctly Muslim design elements such as triangular finials for multi-strand stringings of spacer bars, each with pendant chain dangles and a large, round plaque chased with intricate patterns, set with stones or glass jewels and fringed with chain dangles, each ending in a small pendant (No. 15). Rings, bracelets, earrings, nose ornament, coin necklace, and glass bead multi-strand choker with silver beads and spacers, complete the ensemble (No. 17).

Also pictured are women of Baltistan, the Baltis, with their large ornate filigree crescent-shaped silver earrings (Nos. 24, 25). A mixture of influences can be seen in the ornaments of the Chigtani, a Shi'ite Muslim group living in western Ladakh (Nos. 35-37). In addition to Ladakhi-style silver filigree ga'is set with turquoises, the women also wear necklaces of coral, turquoise and agate beads. The charm boxes are not worn in necklaces. Instead, they are sewn to a head piece which trails down the back. They also are sewn to cloth flaps which are attached to each shoulder and hang down over the upper arm. Also attached to these flaps are Kashmir-style amulet tubes of silver within which are held verses from the Koran, used for their amuletic power. A Ladakhi-style brass incised disc is used as a fastener for the shoulder jewelry piece; traditions from Tibet, Ladakh, and Kashmir are all combined in one distinctive costume.
One photograph of a woman from Karakorum on the Pakistani border is quite extraordinary (Nos. 21-22). The woman is a Drukpa (‘Brug-pa Buddhist and is “... reported to be a sorceress” (p. 55). Her costume and jewelry are expressive of the amuletic powers of adornment. It features a leather sign-board kind of arrangement, worn on the chest, which has a row of four large discs of brass decorated with incised and sawn open work patterns, below which are double rows of brass British Army buttons. A double row of white glass buttons completes the decoration of the flap. Similar copper discs or plaques are fastened to each shoulder with cascades of red glass (or possibly red coral) and yellow glass (or amber) beads intermixed, each ending in a cowrie shell. Her hair is worn in many braids, each finished off with a brass bell. She also wears many strands of red and yellow beads as a choker. Very long pearl strands hang down from the ears with amber, coral and turquoise beads (or their simulants) at the bottom of the loop. This is a common style in Ladakh, but here it is done in an exaggerated length. A large copper-silver alloy disc protrudes from under the chest ornament flap, a device and symbol of her oracular power. She also wears rings, bracelets, a copper ga’u, and a cloth head-piece with red corals and ambers sewn on in a manner similar to the Ladakh perak. To the top of this she has pinned some red flowers.

The section on Ladakh contains many fine pictures of the distinctive jewelry of this region. The most spectacular is the perak, a cloth-covered leather triangle which covers the head and comes to a point in the front, shading the forehead. Onto the top are sewn rows of turquoise beads and in the center a ga’u is attached. Many examples are pictured, from modest ones with a single silver ga’u and only a few rows of turquoise (No. 31), to full-blown versions with gold filigree ga’u set with gems and extending down the back almost to the waist; an additional side panel has long lines of coral beads with turquoise interspersed (Nos. 64-68). The richer ladies wear large red coral and turquoise beads strung with multiple strands of small baroque pearls, from which hangs a gold ga’u faced with filigree and set with fine turquoise and red glass gems. The poorer women wear silver ga’u, often five to ten smaller ones strung into orange coral strands and worn with other coral strands interspersed with silver dangles and spacers of a design peculiar to Ladakh (Nos. 59, 62). Also shown is the silver chatelaine which is hooked onto the right front of the garment next to, and partially overlapped by, the necklaces and charm boxes (No. 57). Originally, it was used to hold a set of tools such as an ear spoon, nail cleaning pick, tweezers, scissors, etc., probably originating in Central Asia, but this has evolved into a purely decorative ornament, usually done now as multiple chains hung in three tiers (Nos. 61, 77).

The close-up pictures of Lhasa style ga’u as worn by the Tibetan women living around Bodhnath, outside of Kathmandu, are next featured. This style of charm box is characterized by its large size, with intricate gold filigree or carved and chased gold floral motifs encrusting the face, which is set with carved turquoise pieces representing flaming jewels. Only the most intense blue stones are used. Imitation diamonds, rubies and emeralds and sometimes rows of pearls set in as borders are utilized as well (Nos. 85, 88-91). The normally square shape of the box itself is often curved to give a star-like appearance to the pointed corners, with the triangular tabs extending from the curved sides, each one also faced with turquoise, set-in like mosaic (Nos. 88, 90). The overall effect, when worn strung from a rope of multi-strands of pearls interspaced with the large, round red corals and the 'tiger striped' round gzi beads, is of an overwhelming richness. When it is worn with an additional large necklace of pearls, gzi and red coral balls which extends below the ga’u, and a shorter supporting strand strung into the top of the ga’u in order to give the larger strand a rounded shape as it hangs, the impression is redoubled. On top of all this, the chatelaine (Tibetan: khru-khru), which is done in silver elsewhere, is made mostly of pearls and gzi in Lhasa style, with tiers either hung from ornate gold pieces set with stones (Nos. 85, 92), or from jade carvings from China with smaller jade pieces interspersed, carved jade dangles ending the ropes of pearls (No. 89). One can also infer from these pictures which gzi beads are most esteemed by their owners by the position they take in these ornaments. The round gzi with tiger stripes are given prime position in the main strands which are strung through the suspension tube of the ga’u and the necklace which extends below it (No. 88). If one does not possess a full set of round gzi, the long oval beads with two, four and six ‘eyes’ (Tibetan: mig) are utilized on the main strand (No. 89), with the earth-door/sky-door (Tibetan: sa-sgo gnam-sgo, a circle on one side, a square on the other) and the smaller gzi with zig-zag patterns being used in the chatelaine (also, small two-eyed and small three-eyed gzi) as well as in the smaller suspension strand (Nos. 88, 91, 92).

Also shown in this section are an ornamented saddle (No. 97), fire-striking kit (No. 96), a bracelet of silver (No. 95), and a gold earring set with a turquoise called a-long, the most common style of earring worn in Tibet. Also in this section are shown Sherpa women with Nepali–influenced ornaments (No. 99), such as a large gold corolla earring set with a turquoise, and a multi-strand silver chain belt showing both Nepali and Tibetan nomadic influences in the design (No. 100). A Lhasa noblewoman’s hair ornaments made of three tiers of carved turquoise set in gold, which are worn suspended from a strap over the head (to sit at either side of the head in front of the ears), are pictured modeled by a beautiful Nepali woman (No. 101). This is the only posed shot in the book, but is nevertheless a striking picture. These ornaments are rarely worn today, as they are part of an ensemble that included a cloth-covered frame to which many braids of hair were attached, causing the whole construction to extend out around the head. The frames themselves were heavily encrusted with coral and turquoise beads sewn on in a row.
The last section on Nepal shows the intricately-worked gold ornaments made by the Newaris of Kathmandu. Here the authors happened upon a ceremony in which prepubescent girls are married to the god Narasimha. The daughters of rich families, these girls are shown dressed in rich silk brocades and adorned with gold jewelry, which are the treasured wealth of the family. They wear collars of gold plates sewn to a velvet backing which are pierced with open work and raised from the back to depict a wealth of floral motifs swirling in giddy profusion (Nos. 122, 123, 126). Similarly, gold plates are sewn to a velvet backing to form a diadem with a central strip which travels from the forehead across the top of the head to the back; a crescent moon hangs from the juncture in front, down onto the forehead (Nos. 121-123). Hair ornaments in the form of leaves and flowers, some set with stones, adorn a young girl celebrating a ceremony marking her first menstruation. She wears the tik-mah gold plaque collar which is fringed with date-shaped green glass beads. A gold neck chain and gilded bronze torque complete the outfit (No. 122). Also pictured in the Nepal section are sadhu mendicants at Pashupatinath, the complex of shrines to Shiva on the banks of the Bagmati, Nepal's Ganges. This site of pilgrimage also attracts from all over India ascetics who, with their emaciated bodies covered in ashes, adorn themselves with the seed of Elaeocarpus janitans, called rudraksa. One of the sadhus pictured has made himself a kind of top hat by twining together the coals of a long strand of rudraksa seeds (No. 120).

The writing of *Himalayan Kingdoms* was done by Ghislaine zu Windsch-Graetz, and reflects her background in archaeological research. She has done an admirable job of providing background information on the history and religion of the region. The level of writing is high, considering the usual coffeetable-book gloses, and becomes especially interesting when she gives impressionistic accounts of the authors' travels in collecting the visual material for this book. Unfortunately, rarely do the text and the photography mesh as they do where the initiation of the young Nepali girls is described and the photos are used to illustrate the event. Often, one feels that the author has been carried away by her own enthusiasm for the mysteries of the East and included material that is of only tangential interest. Frequently, topics central to the understanding of the photos are excluded as being outside the scope of the book (p. 111): "Unfortunately, it is not possible in a work of this scope to undertake a complete study of the ornaments worn by the men and women of Tibet. The country is immense, with numerous ethnic groups and ornaments of a multiple variety." More on this diversity of Tibetan ornaments could have been included, in lieu of a complete description.

One of the more confused sections is on the 'mystical' properties of stones. Most of the beliefs presented appear to be Islamic traditions, such as the following (p. 29): "Turquoise has always been and continues to be, much valued in the East as a talisman, a function for which it is to be engraved with a text from the Koran. The clergy held it in particular esteem since they believed it increased the faculty of premonitions." It would have been more appropriate to cite the beliefs of the Buddhist traditions concerning turquoise, since most (almost all) of the peoples pictured wearing turquoise in this book are Buddhists. Other beliefs concerning precious stones are described in a mixture of mystical, astrological and scientific terms. It is difficult to tell if the author wishes us to interpret these statements in a literal and scientific sense or in a metaphorical or 'mystical' way. What are we to make of claims for diamonds glowing in the dark after being rubbed with wool or leather? What is the significance of different stones becoming phosphorescent after heating or acquiring electro-static charges? (p. 29)

The author is excessively zealous in her presentation, appearing more interested in convincing the reader than in giving a coherent account of the different traditions. One feels that the author is a believer, trying to maintain a Western, objective attitude and vocabulary, but failing to do so. One would have preferred, instead, an account of the beliefs of those peoples actually pictured concerning the stones they are wearing.

Serious inaccuracies in the text result from the lack of awareness of the use of simulations in the jewelry. This is especially evident in the Tibetan jewelry. The author asserts that the gold ga'u are set with diamonds, rubies and sapphires. Actually, these are almost certainly glass imitations. This is also true of many of the pearls which are strung between the large red coral and gzi beads. While many are genuine, many are high quality imitation which used to sell in Lhasa for nearly as much as the real ones. The hanging ornaments (based on the chatelaine), which are now frequently strung with jade, pearls and gzi beads, also use red and green glass beads which the author describes on page 129 as "... white pearls ... mixed with ruby or emerald balls ..." This kind of error can be very misleading. One might assume that the actual value of this jewelry lies in the 'precious' stones, whereas the gzi and red coral of these necklaces are the really expensive components. Similarly, in the gold ga'u, the 'diamonds' and 'rubies' and 'emeralds' are inexpensive simulations and they are the matched sets of very intense blue turquoise pieces and, of course, the gold weight which make up its principle value.

In only one photograph (No. 94) are the materials of a traditional coral and amber necklace identified as plastic imitations. In a photo of a Sherpa woman (No. 99), we are told that she has combined a gold and turquoise ornament, "with refreshing nonchalence ... with a necklace of plastic pearls." In the same picture we can see that she has also combined real coral and turquoise beads with what appear to be imitation (glass) gzi beads. This points up a problem with methodology in making a book like this. Even when one has obtained extremely interesting photographic documents in the field, one cannot always be sure of what one has captured once one has returned to the West and cannot question the subjects further. And, even if one could, often these reports will be inaccurate, especially if the question is: "Are these pearls real? Are those diamonds set into your
The Tibet Society

MINUTES

The Tibet Society's
Annual Membership Meeting
March 23, 1984

Monroe Room East, Washington Hilton Hotel, Washington, D.C.
March 23, 1984

The meeting was called to order by the President, Prof. Thubten Jigme Norbu, at 8:20 p.m. Mr. Robert G. Service was appointed secretary for the meeting. Prof. Norbu reported that the Secretary-Treasurer had resigned and that Ms. Janet Olsen was now handling office work in Bloomington. Drs. Elliot Sperling and Denys Voaden were appointed to count the ballots for the Board of Director's election.

The financial report was presented by Dr. Christopher I. Beckwith. He noted that the Society was in a sound financial position. Printing costs and postage remained the largest items of expenditure. He pointed out that the cost of Volume 2 of the Journal, about $3,000, would appear on the 1984 Statement.

Following the financial report, Dr. Beckwith, in his capacity as editor of the Journal, delivered the Report of the Publications Committee. He announced that Volume 2 of the Journal had just been published. The Newsletter continues to appear regularly. Volume 3 of the Journal is expected out this summer. There is a backlog of good material. At present, the only problems faced by the Journal are a lack of money for expansion and a shortage of adequate editorial assistance. The Occasional Papers Series has two manuscripts awaiting publication, both of them translations from the Russian. These are Roerich's The Tibetan Language and a new, improved translation of Vostrikov's Tibetan Historical Literature. Unfortunately, there are no funds to cover the cost of publishing either work at present. Prof. Beckwith called special attention to the inclusion of the Brief Communications feature in the Journal and expressed the hope that it would grow into a lively forum for the exchange of information and ideas con-
cerning Tibetan Studies. There were no questions or comments from the floor regarding either report.

Prof. Norbu then announced that members of the Tibet Society and of the Mongolia Society would meet for dinner on Saturday, March 24, at the Hunan Gourmet restaurant, 726 7th Street, N.W.

Prof. Beckwith reported that an International Conference on Tibetan Studies marking the 200th anniversary of the birth of Alexander Csoma de Kórós would be held at Indiana University, April 17-19, 1984. The Tibet Society and the Mongolia Society would jointly host a reception, including a tour of the Antoinette K. Gordon Collection of Tibetan Art. Invited participants would deliver papers, but Prof. Beckwith stressed that the conference was open and observers welcome. Among the participants would be Alex Wayman, Roy Andrew Miller, Turrell V. Wylie, Samuel Grupper, Per Kvaerne, Eva Dargyay, Klaus Sagaster, Karoly Czegledy, Katsumi Mimaki, and Anne-Marie Blondeau.

For the Nominating Committee, Dr. Elliot Sperling announced that Drs. Richard A. Gard, Braham Norwick, and Michael L. Walter had been elected by the membership to three-year terms on the Board of Directors.

There being no old business the meeting moved on to new business. Dr. F. Th. Dijkema, Oriental Editor of E. J. Brill, Leiden, reported that the firm wished to continue the Scripta Tibetana Series, of which nothing has appeared since the initial number in 1966. Due to publishing costs and the limited market, Brill believes that the only way to be able to continue the series will be for manuscripts to have some external financial support. The series is envisioned as including both text editions and monographs. Dr. Dijkema invited the submission of appropriate manuscripts for which subventions could be obtained. There was a question from the floor as to whether the Roerich manuscript would fit into this series. Dr. Dijkema responded that as a monograph it would certainly be considered if there was some external funding.

There being no further business the meeting was adjourned at 8:45 p.m.

R.G. Service
Secretary Pro Tempore

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THE TIBET SOCIETY

FINANCIAL REPORT

January - December, 1984

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The Journal of the Tibet Society is a scholarly periodical devoted to all areas of research on Tibet and regions influenced by Tibetan culture, including the arts, astronomy, geography, history, linguistics, medicine, philosophy, religion, the social sciences, and other subjects. Publication in the Journal is open to scholars of all countries. The languages of the Journal are English, French, German, and Tibetan. The editor welcomes the submission of articles, brief communications, and books for review, which deal with Tibet or the Tibetan cultural realm.

Tibetan may be transliterated by contributors in accordance with any of the standard scientific transliteration systems generally accepted. The following rules must be observed, however:

1) Absolute consistency must be maintained, except when quoting previous writers' works, in which case the system found in the quoted original must be retained in the quotation.

2) If any capitalization is necessary, only the first letter of any word may be capitalized, e.g. Dpal-lсан, and not dPal-lSan, the exception being that in words beginning (in transliteration) with a non-alphabetic diacritical mark—such as the apostrophe—the following letter is to be capitalized, e.g. 'Jam-dPal.

3) The type font currently available to us includes the following diacritical marks and special letters: ' " ". Ŵ Ŵ Ŵ (A complete Greek font is also available.) It is therefore desirable for all transliteration, whatever the system, to restrict itself accordingly.

Transcription of other commonly used languages with non-Latin scripts is to be done according to the following systems:

Arabic: ' b t h j (or g) ḥ kh d dh t r s šṣ d ṭ Ή g f q k l m n h w y.
   The article should always be transcribed al- (or Al-), and
   diphthongs should employ o and y (instead of u and i) as second
   elements.
Chinese: The Wade-Giles system.
Manchu: The system found in J. Norman, A Concise Manchu-
Mongol: The system found in N. Poppe, Grammar of Written
Russian: a b v g d e ḷ z i y k l m n o p r s t u f kh ts ch sh shch 'i' è yu
   ya.
Sanskrit: The system adopted by the 10th International Congress of
   Orientalists (Geneva, 1894).

Manuscripts should be typed on white bond paper, double-spaced, with wide
margins on all sides. Notes must also be typed double-spaced, consecutively
numbered, on a separate page or pages at the end of the manuscripts (not at the
bottom of the page). Please submit a neat, finished, manuscript. The original
copy should be submitted. Authors must retain at least one copy of their manuscript. It is
necessary that all errors be corrected on the galleys, which should be returned
immediately.

All quoted passages of Tibetan more than a few words in length must be noted in
the article text with a number (such as a line-reference to the original source) in
square brackets—e.g.: [8,1]—and then written or typed out in Tibetan print-style
script (dbucan) on a separate page or pages. These passages will be printed in
Tibetan at the end of the article. In other words, the original Tibetan of long quoted
passages will not appear in transliteration in the body or notes of an article, but will
appear in Tibetan script alone, at the end of the article. (For examples, please see the
articles by H. Uebach and A. Wayman in Volume I. The same method is to be
followed for citations of Chinese words or of Japanese words containing ideograms,
which unless very well known should generally be provided. For an example, please
see the article by J. Kolmaš in Volume I. For certain kinds of studies, this procedure
may not be feasible, in which case exceptions might be made.