Classicism in Commentarial Writing:
Exegetical Parallels in the Indian *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* Commentaries[1]

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Abstract: *The Tibetan concept of canon and of schools of thought pertaining to Indian Buddhism presents a way of looking at Indian Buddhist texts which has been predominant in modern scholarship. Yet, this notion appears to be anachronistic in that it proposes to think of Indian literature as stratified by canonical groupings of texts and to think of authors as united or opposed by belonging to various schools of philosophical thought at a time in India when no such canon existed and when the literature of the time did not speak of such schools. Would it be possible to move away from the Tibetan concept of Indian Buddhist history and read the Indian literature in novel ways that could reveal the texts' interrelatedness in a manner that would be closer to the environment in which they were written? This article suggests a method of reading such texts comparatively in order to identify the extent to which a series of commentaries can be said to be tied together as forming a single commentarial tradition. It does so by using a snippet of the Middle Way School (Madhyamaka, Dbu ma) and examining the Indian commentaries on the seventeenth chapter of Nāgārjuna's (first to second century CE)* Root Verses of the Middle Way School *(Mūlamadhyamakakārikā).*

Introduction

The Tibetan canon of Buddhist commentarial texts called the Bstan ’gyur is divided into larger and smaller sections that organize texts as belonging to certain topics or types of philosophy. One of these groupings is the section containing works on the Middle Way (Madhyamaka, Dbu ma) philosophy of Indian Buddhist Great Vehicle (Mahāyāna) thought. In ancient India, however, there never was a closed canon of Great Vehicle Buddhism, on which the Tibetans could have based themselves when creating their canon. Instead, India had a large amount of Buddhist Sanskrit manuscripts that were not transmitted as a complete canon but which were copied individually as separate manuscripts. This phenomenon is still seen today in the large amount of Buddhist Sanskrit literature that is preserved within Nepalese Buddhism. Thus, when the Tibetans set about choosing which texts to put into which sections of the canon, their selections generally were based on a concept of major fields of Buddhist study. Within each field, they considered certain works as forming the key root-texts, that is, fundamental works to be commented upon and used for memorization. Other Indian works were seen as following those root-texts and therefore related to them. Accordingly, within the section of Madhyamaka texts in the Tibetan canon, the works of the founders of this philosophical field, viz. Nāgārjuna (first to second century CE) and Āryadeva (second to third century CE), were taken as its fundamental sources, and these were then placed at the beginning of the canonical section of the Bstan ’gyur called Madhyamaka. Their works were followed by the major and well-known Madhyamaka commentaries written by various Indian authors over the centuries after the activities of the founding figures. Furthermore, the Tibetan compilers also included a large number of later minor Indian works that were considered to have been written within the same trend of Madhyamaka philosophical thought and manner of explanation.

Herein lies the inherent contradiction of the process of canonization. On the one hand, the Tibetan canonizers solidified the fluidity of the Indian texts into the frozen sections of the Bstan ’gyur. On the other hand, Tibetan thinkers and writers engaged in extensive discussions on how the individual texts differed from each other and felt the need to break up that monolithic ice mountain. Consequently, in their own commentarial and doxographical writings outside the parameters of the canon, they reorganized the material further into smaller heaps with the guiding principle of supposed philosophical and sectarian distinctions. This gave birth to the Tibetan ideas of different sub-schools that were supposed to have existed within Indian Buddhism. The imputation of sub-schools was done in accordance with the perception of which Indian authors were considered to have opposed or criticized each others’ approaches to the fundamental works Tibetans included in the Bstan ’gyur.

Regarding the Indian Madhyamaka, the most persistent partition that the Tibetans created was the division of the authors into a threefold system: the “Proto-Mādhyamikas” (Dbu ma phyi mo ba, *Mātrika-mādhyamika), the Autonomy Mādhyamikas (Dbu ma rang rgyud pa, *Svātantrika-mādhyamika), and the

Consequentialist Mādhyamikas (Dbu ma thal 'gyur pa, *Prāsaṅgika-mādhyamika). The founding fathers of the Madhyamaka, Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva, were seen as "Proto-Mādhyamikas," since their works were accepted by all subsequent Madhyamaka writers and served as prototypes for all followers. Headed by Buddhapālita, Bhāvaviveka (a.k.a. Bhavya or Bhāviveka, c. 500-570 CE), and Candrakīrti (c. 600-650 CE), all succeeding Indian as well as Tibetan commentators and writers were either seen as Autonomy Mādhyamikas or Consequentialist Mādhyamikas. In the minds of the Tibetans, this dichotomy stemmed from the opposing ways of commenting on the Proto-Mādhyamikas in terms of methodology and rhetoric.

Tibetan thinkers began to form and develop the three-fold subdivision in the eleventh-twelfth century, almost seven hundred years after the activities of the above-mentioned Indian commentators.[2] The model appears to be rooted in the Tibetans' difficulty in reconciling themselves with what they saw as an unbridgeable gap between Candrakīrti's methodological endorsement of Buddhapālita's rhetorical style and Bhāvaviveka's criticism of the latter. Candrakīrti, an otherwise insignificant figure in Indian Buddhism, was fully introduced into Tibetan Buddhism in the eleventh century and with time rose to become a scriptural authority for his radical interpretation of emptiness for all main schools in Tibet.[3] The gradual process of canonization coinciding with the rising popularity of Candrakīrti could be seen as major factors that contributed to bringing the above-mentioned methodological differences in Madhyamaka to the fore.

Historically, in the early sixth century, Buddhapālita had written a commentary on Nāgārjuna's fundamental work called the *Root Verses of the Middle Way School* (*Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*) and exclusively used a rhetorical approach of never stating his own viewpoints – only indicating these by criticizing his opponents through showing the unacceptable consequences of their views. This approach was rejected by Bhāvaviveka in his *Root Verses of the Middle Way School* commentary and instead Bhāvaviveka used the rhetorical approach of stating his own points of view in the form of logical arguments that were presented independently or autonomously from his opponents' theories. Next, Bhāvaviveka's methodology

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[2] For some details on the history of this division, see David Seyfort Ruegg, "Three Studies in the History of Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka Philosophy," in *Studies in Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka Thought* Part 1 (Vienna: Arbeitskreis für tibetische und buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 2000), 20-21. As for the earlier eighth century Tibetan and partly Indian divisions of Madhyamaka subschools, which, however, do not involve the works of Candrakīrti, see Seyfort Ruegg, "Three Studies in the History," 23-25; and Georges B. J. Dreyfus and Sara L. McClintock, *The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction: What Difference Does a Difference Make* (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2003), 33 n. 6.

[3] The only earlier contact Tibet had with Candrakīrti was through the eighth-ninth century translation of his commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā*. It seems to have had little impact on Tibetan thought in terms of the particulars of Candrakīrti's own views but was important to the Tibetans in the context of their Nāgārjunian studies, being their only available Indian commentary on *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā*. The other six works by Candrakīrti were all translated in the eleventh century. For a list of his works, see Ulrich Timme Kragh, *Early Buddhist Theories of Action and Result: A Study of Karmaphalasambandha, Candrakīrti's "Prasannapadā," Verses 17.1-20* (Vienna: Arbeitskreis für tibetische und buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 2006), 21-22.

was rejected by the *Root Verses of the Middle Way School* commentator Candrakīrti, who accepted Buddhapālita's original approach. The Tibetans chose to accentuate these debates over the broader development of the school and conceptualized this situation as constituting the formation of two separate sub-schools of Madhyamaka, namely the Autonomists (*Svātantrika) and the Consequentialists (*Prāsaṅgika). This Tibetan way of dividing the Indian Madhyamaka tradition has also been very influential in modern scholarship, where it has become the prevalent way of stratifying the Indian Madhyamaka writers. Yet, when the Indian Madhyamaka writings are approached from the later Tibetan perspective, the aforementioned tension arises between two opposites. At the one end, a large collection of works has been grouped together as forming a segment of the canon called the Madhyamaka section, because they are thought of as a single body of works. At the other end, it is seen by the Tibetans as consisting of different fractions that oppose each other and hence they break up the Madhyamaka into different sub-schools.

Admittedly, there is a degree of justification to the principles of Tibetan canonization and the Tibetan account of Indian Madhyamaka, which is also why these divisions have been so influential in modern scholarship. Clearly, the texts found within the Madhyamaka section of the Bstan 'gyur are unified by a common thread of the Madhyamaka philosophical theme of emptiness and their acceptance of the works by Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva as being authoritative. Also, the Tibetan notion of Madhyamaka sub-schools is to some extent tenable, because it is indeed possible to find mutual criticism, such as the passages in the commentary by Bhāvaviveka wherein he criticizes Buddhapālita, or the critique of Bhāvaviveka in the writings by Candrakīrti.

However, the Tibetan doxography tends to overemphasize differences that were less significant in the Indian context and leads to artificial segregations of the literary heritage because the doxography fails to recognize the continuities imposed by Indian intellectual conservatism. Also, the Tibetan canon offers but one possible way of stratifying Indian Buddhist literature. Many Indian scholars crossed between fields of knowledge and school affiliation, and escape straightforward compartmentalization. The inherent limitation of this singular perspective is thus twofold. On the level of school formation, the Tibetan perception of the Autonomists and Consequentialists overemphasizes the texts' mutual resistance and critique, which actually are only minor elements in these works, and overlooks the strong bonds of dependency that can be found between writings supposed to belong to opposing sub-schools. On the level of canonization, it does not take into account the regional characteristics of the Madhyamaka texts that derive from different times and localities. The Tibetan canon by its very nature neither reveals the chronological development of its contents belonging to a period spanning more than a millennium nor accounts for the spatial differences of the sources stemming from all areas of Indic Buddhism, including South and North India, the Indic northwestern areas of present-day Afghanistan and Pakistan, Central Asia, China, and Tibet itself.

Ergo, this study attempts to step away from the Tibetan perspective, since it is anachronistic only to view Indian literature from the point of view of Tibetan canonization and ideas about Indian school-formation. It is thus crucial to this enterprise to read commentaries in a manner that moves away from the standard Tibetan divisions by embracing a new way of appraising the Indian texts. Wishing to understand the tradition from the point of view of the times of the Indian authors, it is necessary to think in a framework when there still was no canon to dictate which works were grouped together and when concepts of schools and sub-schools were still not existent or at least were fluid. It will be my contention that Indian commentators considered themselves as belonging to a tradition of exegesis of the root-texts on which they were writing their commentaries, which I shall label a "commentarial tradition." A commentarial tradition does not mean that a number of writers happened to compose commentaries on the same root-text in a vacuum without any consideration for the earlier exegetical work; obviously, each writer had a distinct style stemming from personal scholastic preferences or the religious-literary *zeitgeist* to which he belonged. Instead, a commentarial tradition implies a subtle – at first glance unnoticeable – process of continuous perpetuation of the preexisting commentaries, where every new author was bound by the authority of his predecessors, recycled their words without concern for plagiarism, and only sporadically diverged through modification, improvement, or outright critical assessment.

In general, "tradition" in literary Buddhism connotes adherence to a specific style of writing, acceptance of a particular body of explanations and arguments on a given topic, and reverence for a dogmatic antecedent. The dogmatic antecedent takes the form of a "root-text" (*mūla*, *rtsa ba*), which embodies a scriptural authority for the tradition of its commentaries. This orthodoxy of commitment to form as well as the doctrinal restraint found in the commentaries, in principle, amount to *classicism* – not in the sense of following the Greek or Roman classics, but in the more abstract sense of valuing a text of the golden past, namely the root-text, as a classic that can never be excelled in the degenerate present but which can only be embellished through commentary. The commentaries, which then follow a certain root-text, are all part of the same mind-set binding them together as a commentarial tradition.

To this end, I will employ a new form of source criticism that I have labeled "exegetical parallels," and thereby demonstrate that it is possible to trace a commentarial tradition within a number of subsequent commentaries. Exegetical parallels occur when a later commentator adopts textual elements from one or more of the earlier commentaries on the same root-text by incorporating their passages, sentences, words, derivative analyses, metaphors, analogies, or arguments. As will be shown, such parallels form the crux of the commentarial tradition. This unconscious transmission of shared material ties a series of commentaries together and forms a single school of writing. Indian Buddhist school formation can thereby be viewed more as the development of a number of literary genres based on certain root-texts rather than being only a series of competing and opposing schools of

philosophical thought, as it has been viewed in the Tibetan tradition and some segments of modern academic scholarship. It is by stressing the classicistic aspect of Indian commentarial writing, and by stepping away from an approach that is myopically focused on philosophical issues, that it becomes possible to understand Indian Buddhist writing in its own right without the constraint of the Tibetan canon and doxography, which are local phenomena pertinent to a specific Tibetan context and age.

In order to assess the proposed principle of tracing a commentarial tradition through exegetical parallels, I will focus on a specific tradition of Indian Buddhist commentarial writing, namely the commentaries on Nāgārjuna's opus summum, the *Root Verses of the Middle Way School*. The article opens with an overview of the Indian commentaries on the *Root Verses of the Middle Way School* and proposes to use only five of them as its *commentarial base*. The second part qualifies the choice of Candrakīrti's *Clear Worded* (*Prasannapadā*, *Tshig gsal*) as the comparative base and of the seventeenth chapter as its *sample passage*. The third part then lays out the method of exegetical parallels for uncovering the continuities in the commentarial tradition in detail. The core of the article though is its fourth and longest part containing the actual analysis of exegetical parallels viewed through five concrete examples. Here are included methodological discussions, particularly extensive in the context of the third and fifth examples, where the compatibility of the method of exegetical parallels with text criticism is put to the test. The article ends with conclusive remarks on the findings that the new method of exegetical parallels yielded.

Surveying the Commentarial Base

To understand the manner in which later Indian *Root Verses of the Middle Way School* commentaries built upon the earlier *Root Verses of the Middle Way School* works, it is first necessary to isolate those commentaries that are suitable for the comparison. In other words, only the commentaries that are still extant and that include the sample passage are acceptable. This particular group of selected commentaries can be considered the "**commentarial base**" for the comparison. Prior to defining the commentarial base, the full scope of commentaries on Nāgārjuna's *Root Verses of the Middle Way School* root-text must be considered.[4]

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[4] The following sigla are here used for the various canon editions: Q = Emperor Qianlong's (1711-1799) Tibetan Beijing Bka' 'gyur and Bstan 'gyur. D = the Tibetan Sde dge Bka' 'gyur and Bstan 'gyur. T = the Chinese Tripiṭaka Taishō Shinshō Daizōkyō. The sigla for the Tibetan canon editions follow the standard proposed by Paul Harrison and Helmut Eimer, "Kanjur and Tanjur Sigla: A Proposal for Standardisation," in *Transmission of the Tibetan Canon: Papers Presented at a Panel of the 7th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, Graz 1995*, edited by Helmut Eimer (Vienna: Verlag der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1997): xi-xiv. Concerning symbols and markings, the asterisk * stands for Sanskrit reconstruction inferred from a Tibetan or Chinese translated word. Square brackets are used in English translation when inserting words that are only implied by the primary source but that are needed for the clarity and completeness of the sentence. Red boldfaced letters mark an exegetical parallel. Yellow highlighting denotes an exegetical parallel that only occurs in the Chinese but not in the Tibetan origin-replica of the *Lamp of Insight*

To begin with, it can be said that the *Root Verses of the Middle Way School* is considered Nāgārjuna's most fundamental work. In essence, the text is a critique of various interpretations of Buddhist concepts as they had been presented in the Systematized Dharma (Abhidharma) literature, and is an advocacy for the "emptiness" of all those concepts. Written in meter, it consists of 449 verses, and is divided into twenty-seven chapters by the Indian commentaries. There are in full twelve known Indian direct commentaries on the *Root Verses of the Middle Way School*. Additionally, one of these direct commentaries, namely Bhāvaviveka's *Lamp of Insight* (*Prajñāpradīpa*), has its own subcommentary entitled the *Commentary on the Lamp of Insight* (*Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā*).

The Root Verses of the Middle Way School Commentaries

No.	Short Title	Author	Composition	Original Sanskrit	Translations	Extent of the *Root Verses of the Middle Way School*
1	*Fear of Nothing* (*Akutobhayā*)	Anonymous, but attributed to Nāgārjuna by the Tibetan tradition	Ca. third century CE	-	Tibetan translation (Q5229/D3829), made in the late eighth or ninth century CE	Full
2	The *Explanation on the Middle Way School* (*Zhong lun*, 中論; *Madhyamakavṛtti*)	Rāhula (Luomuhou, 羅目侯, second to third century CE)	Ca. third century CE	-	-	-
3	The *Explanation on the Middle Way School Accessing the Meaning of the Great Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras* (*Shun zhong lun yi ru da bo re bo luo mi jing*, 順中論義入大般若波羅蜜經; *Madhyamakavṛttiḥ Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtrārthāvatārā*)	Asaṅga (fourth century CE)	Fourth century CE	-	Chinese (T1565), made in 543 CE	Only chapters 1-3

(*Prajñāpradīpa*), whereas highlighted green indicates an exegetical parallel that is only found in the Tibetan but not in the Chinese origin-replica, which all will become evident in part 4.

4	The *Explanation on the Middle Way School*	*Vimalākṣa (Qingmu, 青目) from Kashmir	Fourth to early fifth century in Central Asia or northern China	-	Chinese (T1564), made in 409 CE	Full
5	*Buddhapālita's Explanation on the Middle Way School* 5	Buddhapālita	Fifth to sixth century CE	Fragment	Tibetan (Q5242/D3842), made in the late eighth or ninth century	Full
6	*Engendering Purity* (*Dkar po 'char ba*, *Śubhodaya*)	Devaśarman	-	-	-	-
7	-	Guṇaśrī	-	-	-	-
8	-	Guṇamati (sixth century CE)	Sixth century, possibly in Gujarat	-	-	-
9	The *Treatise Uncovering the Insight of the Middle Way School of the Great Vehicle* (*Da sheng zhong guan shi lun*, 大乘中觀釋論, *Mahāyāna-madhyamakaprajñā-vivaraṇaśāstra*)	Sthiramati (c. 510-570 CE)	Sixth to seventh century in Gujarat	-	Chinese (T1567), made in 1027-1030 CE	Only chapters 1-13
10	The *Lamp of Insight*	Bhāvaviveka	Sixth century in South India	-	Chinese (T1566), made in ca. 630 CE & Tibetan (Q5253/D3853), made in the late eighth or ninth century	Full
11	The *Clear Worded*	Candrakīrti	Seventh century in North India	Full	Tibetan (Q5260/D3860), made in eleventh century	Full
12		Guṇadatta	-	-	-	-

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5 Although the actual title of this text is *Madhyamakavṛtti*, or according to the Tibetan designation *Buddhapālita-madhyamakavṛtti*, it shall forthwith, for the sake of convenience, be referred to as *Buddhapālita's Explanation*.

Subcommentary on Bhāvaviveka's *Lamp of Insight*						
-	The *Commentary on the Lamp of Insight*, subcommentary on the *Lamp of Insight*	Avalokitavrata (seventh to eighth century CE)	Seventh to eighth century	-	Tibetan (Q5259/D3859), made in the late eighth or ninth century CE	Full

Among these twelve *Root Verses of the Middle Way School* commentaries, five commentaries are no longer extant either in original Sanskrit or as translations into another language. The five non-extant commentaries are those by Rāhula, Devaśarman, Guṇaśrī, Guṇamati, and Guṇadatta.

Rāhula was a follower of the early Madhyamaka School, being perhaps a contemporary of Nāgārjuna, or a student of Āryadeva.[6] His commentary is mentioned by the Chinese author Zhanran, who stated that Rāhula wrote a commentary entitled **Madhyamakaśāstra*, which (partly or fully) was translated into Chinese by Paramārtha (499-569 CE), although only the first chapter of the Chinese translation was still extant when Zhanran wrote his remark.[7] Nowadays, even this one chapter of the translation has disappeared, and the text is no longer extant in any form.

The commentary by Devaśarman is referred to by Avalokitavrata,[8] who mentions its title as being *Engendering Purity*.[9] Avalokitavrata remarks that Bhāvaviveka approved of its interpretations on certain points.[10] Four hundred years later, in his *Explanation of the Lamp to the Path of Awakening* (*Bodhipathapradīpapañjika*),[11] Atiśa Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna (982-1054 CE) mentions Devaśarman's text in a list of Indian *Root Verses of the Middle Way School* commentaries. Atiśa surmised though that Devaśarman's commentary was not a direct commentary on the *Root Verses of the Middle Way School*, but rather a subcommentary on Bhāvaviveka's *Root Verses of the Middle Way School* commentary, the *Lamp of Insight*. This seems to

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[6] See David Seyfort Ruegg, *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1981), 54-55.

[7] See Étienne Lamotte, *Le traité de la grande vertu de sagesse de Nāgārjuna ("Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra"), Tome III, Chapitres xxxi-xlii* (Louvain: Publications de l'Institut Orientaliste de Louvain, 1970), 1374; and Seyfort Ruegg, *Literature of the Madhyamaka*, 49. For the primary source, see Zhanran T1912.46.149c4: san Luo[mu*hou] Fashi zhu yi ming Zhong lun, liang zheng di yi, dan de yin yuan yi pin (三羅[目*侯]法師注亦名中論。梁真諦譯。但得因緣一品。). Translation: "Thirdly, [there is] Ācārya Rāhula's commentary also entitled the *Explanation on the Middle Way School*, translated by Paramārtha during the *Liang* Dynasty, but for some reason only a single chapter has been preserved."

[8] Seyfort Ruegg, *Literature of the Madhyamaka*, 49; and Tom J. F. Tillemans, *Materials for the Study of Āryadeva, Dharmapāla and Candrakīrti* (Vienna: Arbeitskreis für tibetische und buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 1990), 57 n. 123. For the primary source, see Avalokitavrata's *Commentary on the Lamp of Insight* volume 1 (*wa*), D3842.73a.5.

[9] Avalokitavrata's *Commentary on the Lamp of Insight* volume 1 (*wa*), D3842.225a7.

[10] Seyfort Ruegg, *Literature of the Madhyamaka*, 62.

[11] Seyfort Ruegg, *Literature of the Madhyamaka*, 49. For the primary source, see *Bodhipathapradīpapañjika*, D3948.280b6-281a2; English translation by Richard Sherburne, *The Complete Works of Atīśa, Śrī Dīpaṃkara Jñāna* (New Delhi: Aditya Prakashan, 2000), 238-239.

be incorrect given Avalokitavrata's remark mentioned above, saying that Bhāvaviveka in his *Lamp of Insight* agreed with Devaśarman's interpretation on a certain point, and Devaśarman would therefore have had to write his text prior to Bhāvaviveka's composition of the *Lamp of Insight*.

The non-extant commentaries by Guṇaśrī and Guṇamati are both mentioned in the lists of the *Root Verses of the Middle Way School* commentaries given by Avalokitavrata in the *Commentary on the Lamp of Insight* and Atiśa in *Explanation of the Lamp to the Path of Awakening*,[12] but other than the names of their authors almost nothing is known about these texts. The name Guṇamati might refer to the renowned Consciousness-Only Proponent (Vijñānavāda) scholar Guṇamati of Valabhi (fifth to sixth century),[13] who was the teacher of Sthiramati. What is known is that Avalokitavrata noted that Bhāvaviveka was critical of Guṇamati's exegesis.[14]

Finally, the non-extant commentary by the little-known Guṇadatta is only mentioned in the eleventh century list of Indian *Root Verses of the Middle Way School* commentaries given by Atiśa in his *Explanation of the Lamp to the Path of Awakening*.[15] Since these five commentaries are no longer extant, they cannot be included in the present study on the interrelatedness of the extant Indian *Root Verses of the Middle Way School* commentaries.

From among the eight remaining commentaries, all of which are extant, the two commentaries by Asaṅga and Sthiramati are – at least in their present form – not complete commentaries. Asaṅga's commentary deals only with chapters one to three, while that of Sthiramati includes chapters one to thirteen. The comparison of the *Root Verses of the Middle Way School* commentaries presented here is based on a sample passage, which is the seventeenth chapter of the *Root Verses of the Middle Way School* and its commentaries. Since the texts by Asaṅga and Sthiramati do not cover the seventeenth chapter, these two commentaries must unfortunately be omitted from the present discussion, leaving only six texts as possible candidates for the commentarial base.

However, the last entry in the table, Avalokitavrata's subcommentary on Bhāvaviveka's *Lamp of Insight*, is also problematic. Unlike the direct *Root Verses of the Middle Way School* commentaries, which follow a structure where a verse of the *Root Verses of the Middle Way School* is first cited and then laid out through

[12] Seyfort Ruegg, *Literature of the Madhyamaka*, 49; and Tillemans, *Materials for the Study*, 57 n. 123. See Avalokitavrata's *Commentary on the Lamp of Insight* volume 1 (*wa*), D3842.73a.5, and Atiśa's *Bodhipathapradīpapañjika*, D3948.280b6-281a2; English translation by Sherburne, *Works of Atīśa*, 238-239.

[13] Valabhi was located in the present-day Gujarat state of India.

[14] Y. Kajiyama, "Bhāvaviveka's Prajñāpradīpaḥ (1. Kapitel)," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens und Archiv für indische Philosophie* 7 (1963): 37-38; and Y. Kajiyama "Bhāvaviveka's Prajñāpradīpaḥ (1. Kapitel) (Fortsetzung)," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens und Archiv für indische Philosophie* 8 (1964): 106; as well as Seyfort Ruegg, *Literature of the Madhyamaka*, 62.

[15] Seyfort Ruegg, *Literature of the Madhyamaka*, 49. For the primary source, see *Bodhipathapradīpapañjika*, D3948.280b6-281a2; English translation by Sherburne, *Works of Atīśa*, 238-239.

exegesis of its literal and philosophical meaning, Avalokitavrata's *Commentary on the Lamp of Insight* does not follow this structure, but instead cites and explains every sentence of the *Lamp of Insight*. As a result, Avalokitavrata's subcommentary does not lend itself to the present comparative purpose and cannot be included in the commentarial base. It will, however, be referred to in the lengthy analysis of the third example in support of the proposed interpretation of Bhāvaviveka's commentary presented there.

Thus, the present study on the interrelatedness of the Indian *Root Verses of the Middle Way School* commentaries must necessarily be based on only five commentaries, all of which are both extant and contain the seventeenth chapter of the *Root Verses of the Middle Way School* and, most importantly, follow the same structure. The five are:

1. The anonymous *Fear of Nothing* (c. third-fourth century, extant in Tibetan)
2. *Vimalākṣa's *Explanation on the Middle Way School* (*Zhong lun*, 中論; **Madhyamakavṛtti*; early fifth century, extant in Chinese)
3. *Buddhapālita's Explanation* (fifth-sixth century, extant in Tibetan)
4. Bhāvaviveka's *Lamp of Insight* (sixth century, extant in Chinese and Tibetan)
5. Candrakīrti's *Clear Worded* (seventh century, extant in Sanskrit and Tibetan)

The five commentaries considered here range over a time span covering roughly five-hundred years, from the third until the seventh century CE. Geographically, they relate to several different regions of Indic Buddhism, extending from Central Asia in the north, the Ganges plain of northern India in the middle, to the kingdoms of south India. Chronologically, the period begins with a time in the third to fourth centuries, when Buddhist monasticism was strong and widespread, Great Vehicle philosophy was flowering, and many new Great Vehicle works were being composed. Towards the end of the period, in the sixth to seventh centuries, the number of Buddhist monasteries had declined, and Buddhist monasticism had almost completely waned in outlying regions, such as the northwest areas of present-day Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as in south India. Some new monastic mega-centers had been and were continuing to be constructed in central north India, for instance the famous Nālandā Monastery in present-day Bihar.

Setting the Boundaries for the Comparative Base

The search for exegetical parallels in the *Root Verses of the Middle Way School* commentaries involves a comparative style of reading in which a later commentary is read in correlation with earlier commentaries. The chronological principle behind this process of comparison necessitates conceptualizing an earlier text, from which a textual element was lifted, as the "**origin-text**," and a later text, to which the element was transported, as the "**destination-text**." Since the commentaries to be compared were originally all written in Sanskrit and the exegetical parallels were copied in this language, the terms "origin-text" and "destination-text" always refer

to the Sanskrit originals, regardless of whether these are still extant or not. Given that the Sanskrit originals are no longer extant for most of the commentaries to be compared, the comparison must proceed by way of their extant translations in Chinese and Tibetan, which consequently shall be referred to as "replicas." By the same token, the translation of an origin-text becomes the "**origin-replica**," and the translation of a destination-text will be labeled the "**destination-replica**."

A comparison requires a starting point, that is, a "**comparative base**" wherein differences or – as is the case here – similarities to the other texts can be detected. The comparative base is always a destination-text(s) and/or destination-replica(s). Evidently, an origin-text or origin-replica cannot constitute the comparative base, because to speak of borrowing presupposes a later text. In some cases, where a commentarial tradition consists of only one destination-text or destination-replica, this text would have to be the base for the comparison, since the lifted textual elements are found therein. In other cases, where there are more than one destination-text or destination-replica, it is indispensable to argue for which of these is optimal to use as the comparative base for the study. In the present case, a single destination-text and its corresponding destination-replica have been chosen as the comparative base, namely the latest destination-text in the form of Candrakīrti's *Clear Worded*. Other options would have been possible, but they are not within the scope of this paper. The most comprehensive approach would have been to compare all five texts of the commentarial base synoptically sentence by sentence and to have noted any form of parallel, either between all the texts or some of the texts when that is the case. In this situation, the study would have all four destination-texts as its comparative base. Alternatively, two or three destination-texts could likewise have been chosen.

The present choice of the *Clear Worded* as the comparative base was made for two reasons. The first reason is that it is the latest of the commentaries and that it therefore possesses the greatest potential for exegetical parallels. Since the five commentaries were written over time and each successive commentary has – in theory – the possibility to incorporate exegetical passages from an increasing number of available earlier commentaries, the richest commentary for finding exegetical parallels therefore ought to be the latest commentary. For example, * Vimalākṣa, the author of the second commentary in the series, only had the option to create exegetical parallels based on the first commentary, namely the anonymous *Fear of Nothing*. Buddhapālita, the author of the third commentary had – in theory – the opportunity to create exegetical parallels from either *Fear of Nothing*, * Vimalākṣa's *Explanation on the Middle Way School*, or even from material found in both of these earlier works. In this way, the number of possibilities for creating exegetical parallels ought to rise exponentially with each successive commentary.

However, it is important to underline that the later authors did not necessarily know the earliest commentaries, but that they were certainly familiar with at least one or sometimes two preceding commentaries from which they adapted material, some of which in turn can be traced right back to the earliest commentarial layer. For instance, *Vimalākṣa, the author of the Central Asian commentary *Explanation*

on the Middle Way School, was familiar with the earliest commentary *Fear of Nothing*,[16] but – as will be shown in this paper's fifth part – *Vimalākṣa's text was probably not known to the later Indian commentators Buddhapālita, Bhāvaviveka, and Candrakīrti. Moreover, the earliest commentary *Fear of Nothing* was known to Buddhapālita, who adopted many explanations from this text, and possibly also to Bhāvaviveka, but it is unlikely that *Fear of Nothing* was known to Candrakīrti. Buddhapālita's commentary was available to both Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti; furthermore, Candrakīrti had access to Bhāvaviveka's text.

Conversely, it cannot be ruled out that the five authors have had access to other commentaries that have only partially survived, are no longer extant, or are completely unknown today. For example, although the five commentaries contain no direct references to the partially extant *Root Verses of the Middle Way School* commentaries by Asaṅga and Sthiramati, it has not yet been examined whether there might be any indirect influence in the form of hidden exegetical parallels.[17] In the case of the no longer extant commentaries that are known only by the names of their authors Rāhula, Devaśarman, Guṇaśrī, Guṇamati, and Guṇadatta, their possible influence is understandably difficult – but perhaps not impossible – to evaluate. For example, given the references made by Bhāvaviveka's subcommentator Avalokitavrata, Bhāvaviveka seems to have had access to the *Root Verses of the Middle Way School* commentaries by Devaśarman and Guṇamati. The third possibility – that the five authors relied on the *Root Verses of the Middle Way School* commentaries whose existence is unknown to modern scholarship – cannot be excluded either, since their presence may well be hidden in the form of silent quotations in the extant works. A thorough comparison combined with any third outside source could enable detection of exegetical parallels derived from such works.

Explaining the history of the exegetical transmission between the extant *Root Verses of the Middle Way School* commentaries and showing their dependence upon one another is therefore inherently hampered by the uncertainty caused by the chance that a non-extant text may have yielded a strong yet undetectable influence on the tradition. It must consequently be kept in mind that the textual relationships that can be established are naturally limited by the current availability of sources. Nevertheless, the simplified presupposition that the latest author Candrakīrti had the highest number of sources available from which he could create exegetical parallels remains reasonable.

The second reason why Candrakīrti's *Clear Worded* has been chosen as the comparative base is that it is the only of the five *Root Verses of the Middle Way School* commentaries still fully at hand in its original language, Sanskrit. It must be noted, in spite of this, that the study of the *Root Verses of the Middle Way School*

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[16] C. W. (Sandy) Huntington Jr., "The Akutobhayā and Early Indian Madhyamaka" (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 1986).

[17] As noted above, these two partial commentaries have not been considered here, because they do not include the seventeenth chapter of the *Root Verses of the Middle Way School*, on which the present analysis is based.

commentaries offers many linguistic challenges in that the texts are preserved in three different classical languages, that is, Sanskrit, Chinese, and Tibetan, necessitating complex philological cross-references between the languages. It is commonly accepted that the *Root Verses of the Middle Way School* root-text as well as all five of its commentaries originally were written in Sanskrit. The language in which the exegetical parallels were created and copied was therefore Sanskrit. Still, besides Candrakīrti's *Clear Worded*, the four earlier commentaries are no longer extant in their original Sanskrit form,[18] but are only available in their Chinese and/or Tibetan translations. Given that the original language of the exegetical parallels is Sanskrit and that this language constitutes the most reliable form of the parallels, the only fully preserved Sanskrit commentary, namely the *Clear Worded*, is probably the best starting point for the study.

With Candrakīrti's *Clear Worded* as the basis for the comparison, it is now possible to select a segment within that comparative base, namely a "**sample passage**," of this otherwise copious work to serve as a textual basis for the analysis of the exegetical parallels. A sample passage that is ideal as a testing ground for a new methodology should preferably have a moderate length but most importantly ought to have the characteristics of a standardized commentarial style without drawn-out digressions or issues that are contested within the commentarial base. Once the method has been tried on a prototypical sample passage, it can be appraised in other contexts.

In the *Clear Worded*, the seventeenth chapter entitled "The Analysis of Action and Result" (*Karmaphalaparīkṣā*) particularly fits this profile, and has therefore been selected as the sample passage. The size of Candrakīrti's exegesis on the thirty-three verses of Nāgārjuna's root-text of this chapter is of a sufficient length to offer a substantial amount of material for the comparison. Also, the uncontested nature of the Abhidharmic ethical topic of this chapter merits the choice, given the consensus among the five commentaries concerning its doctrinal contents.

Overall, the chapter can be delineated into three parts, respectively encompassing exegesis of the *Root Verses of the Middle Way School*'s verses 1-5, 6-20, and 21-33. In the first part, a brief presentation of the Buddhist tenet of "action and result" (*karmaphala*) and taxonomies of "action" (*karman*) are given. The second part exposes the doctrinal conundrum of the time-gap, which is the inevitable consequence stemming from the principle that future results ripen from earlier actions. Further, it lays out the solutions to the time-gap proposed by two Buddhist Abhidharmic schools that existed at the time of Nāgārjuna and that involve two different propositions of "a connection between an action and its result," which in the Madhyamaka literature became termed *karmaphalasambandha*. One school had proposed that the mind-stream (*cittasantāna*) can furnish this connection, while

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[18] **Buddhapālita's Explanation* forms a partial exception, in that a Sanskrit fragment has been found; see Shaoyong Ye, "The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā and Buddhapālita's Commentary (1): Romanized Texts based on the newly identified Sanskrit Manuscripts from Tibet," *Annual Report of the International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology* 10 (2007): 117-147. This fragment, however, does not include the seventeenth chapter of the commentary, which is the chapter analyzed here.

the other spoke of an "indestructible phenomenon" (*avipranāṣa*). Finally, in the third part of the chapter, the Abhidharmic thesis of a connection is rejected and replaced with the Madhyamaka concept of the lack of independent natures in the action and its result, which the followers of the Middle Way School (Mādhyamika, Dbu ma pa) view as the only viable way to account for "action and result" instead of a mechanistic, Newtonian-like model, where an independent cause exerts a force in the form of an independent result.[19]

The core analysis of the article is based on a detailed examination of five examples of exegetical parallels belonging to all three parts of the sample passage. The remaining exegetical parallels will only be incorporated in the form of statistical data without explanatory evaluation. Yet, before arriving at the examples, a last theoretical component of defining exegetical parallels is required.

Charting Exegetical Parallels

The initial inspiration for the present study came from the groundbreaking work of C. W. (Sandy) Huntington, Jr., whose unpublished PhD dissertation of 1986 and later article entitled "A Lost Text of Early Indian Madhyamaka" (1995) established a very close dependency between the two earliest *Root Verses of the Middle Way School* commentaries, that is, the anonymous *Fear of Nothing* and *Vimalākṣa's Explanation on the Middle Way School*. Huntington additionally noted many "textual correspondences," as he calls them, between *Fear of Nothing* and some parts of *Buddhapālita's Explanation on the Middle Way School*. He demonstrated how it is possible to locate shared passages between these texts, and argued that *Vimalākṣa's and Buddhapālita's commentaries are independently based on *Fear of Nothing*.

However, Huntington only compares his own English translations of the two principle commentaries, whereas this study proposes to step away from Huntington's approach and instead offers to conduct a comparison directly between the classical Asian languages involved. Moreover, it attempts to take Huntington's findings one step further by analyzing five *Root Verses of the Middle Way School* commentaries, including the three commentaries considered by Huntington along with the two later, much longer commentaries by Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti.

Further, it may be necessary to explain why Huntington's term "textual correspondences" was not utilized here. To begin with, "correspondences" imply only a vague semblance, which would be unfortunate in the context where identification of verbatim identities in the origin-text as well as the destination-text is of outmost importance. Hence, the stronger word "parallel," indicating exact identity, is preferable. Next, the word "textual" only implies that the parallel occurs within two or more texts, and does not specify the nature of these texts. The word "exegetical," to the contrary, points to the criterion for the parallel to occur in the

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[19] For an annotated translation of the seventeenth chapter, see Kragh, *Early Buddhist Theories*, 163-357; and for the last third of the chapter, see Kragh, "Karmaphalasambandha in Verses 17.1-20 of Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā" (PhD diss., University of Copenhagen, 2003), 255-271.

same context in the origin-text and the destination-text, namely within their exegesis of the same verse from the root-text. This criterion is needed to be able to distinguish exegetical parallels from other, more general forms of source criticism. For example, most commentaries contain quotations from other scriptures and passages that are reminiscent of texts belonging to other genres, be it *sūtra*-scriptures or *śāstra*-treatises. While such quotations and reminiscent passages are "textual" and might also be called "parallels," they cannot be considered "exegetical parallels" because they do not fulfill the criterion that they must occur in the exact same context in the origin- and destination-text, namely within the exegesis of the same verse of the same root-text. Therefore, it is here preferable to use the more precise term "exegetical parallels" rather than Huntington's broad term "textual correspondences."

Coining the term "exegetical parallels" also requires distinction from Ernst Steinkellner's concept of "parallel texts" presented in his 1988 article "Methodological Remarks on the Constitution of Sanskrit Texts from the Buddhist Pramāṇa-Tradition." In the article, Steinkellner discusses the difficulty of reading the often unclear renderings of Tibetan translations of Indian epistemological *pramāṇa* texts for which the Sanskrit original is no longer extant. To circumvent this problem, he formulates a strategy for clarifying ambiguous Tibetan passages by finding identical or highly similar passages in extant Sanskrit epistemology works. He calls these passages "parallel texts," where the word "texts" is not understood as "works" but as paragraphs, sentences, or parts of sentences. For the optimal result, Steinkellner prefers to use "parallel texts" from other extant Sanskrit works by the same author who wrote the non-extant Sanskrit source that served as the basis for the given Tibetan translation. In the cases where this is not possible, Steinkellner adopts "parallel texts" from related works by other authors, but considers these less reliable. The methodology allows Steinkellner in some cases to reconstruct the lost original Sanskrit text. Having furnished many examples from the epistemology literature, he proceeds to present a taxonomy of different types of "parallel texts," while he discusses how to weigh the importance of each kind of textual witness for providing clues to the Sanskrit original. The context of Steinkellner's discussion is therefore specifically the problem of reading Indian epistemology texts only extant in Tibetan translation.

The problematization is related to but fundamentally different from the topic of the present article. Assuredly, an understanding of the interconnectedness of the *Root Verses of the Middle Way School* commentaries can be useful when reading the translations of the four earlier *Root Verses of the Middle Way School* commentaries that are no longer extant in Sanskrit, because the Chinese and Tibetan passages from the earlier commentaries, which have parallels in the Sanskrit text of the *Clear Worded*, might be reconstructed into Sanskrit on the basis of Candrakīrti's text. If the sole purpose of the present research were to reconstruct a non-extant Sanskrit manuscript, then from among the different kinds of "parallel texts" discussed by Steinkellner, the exegetical parallels analyzed here would belong to the types he calls *textus usus secondarii* (T') and *textus usus tertiarii*

(T''), that is, parallels from the work of one author adapted into the work of a second author or further into the work of a third author. However, unlike the cases presented by Steinkellner, the primary object of this article is not to discuss the difficulties posed by reading Tibetan translations and creating Sanskrit reconstructions, since the comparative base here is a text extant in its original Sanskrit form, namely Candrakīrti's *Clear Worded*. Rather, its primary object is to identify a commentarial tradition shared by a number of commentaries on the same root-text by locating the exegetical parallels that constitute this tradition on the close literary level of the texts.

Another point of divergence between the methodologies of Steinkellner and that of exegetical parallels is Steinkellner's dictum that parallels found in two or more works by the same author are valued higher than parallels between texts by different authors, because it is assumed that parallels within a single authorship are more reliable for Sanskrit reconstruction. This principle is contrary to the purpose of locating exegetical parallels, because exegetical parallels are intended to show dependencies between different authorships and not within a single authorship, where they would only show redundancy. Thus, when the emphasis is on exegesis – its history, continuities, and implicit discontinuities – the notion of "exegetical parallel" is more applicable than Steinkellner's term "parallel text."

Having narrowed the range of the "**exegetical parallel**," a clearer understanding begins to emerge and it is now possible to define it:

> An exegetical parallel consists of exegetical words, phrases, clauses, or whole sentences lifted from an earlier commentary on a given root-verse, which are then used verbatim in a larger block or are interwoven into an embellished explanation found in one or more later commentaries by other authors on that particular verse.

In the context of the definition, it is important to remember that "an earlier commentary" is not necessarily the earliest commentary, because the later commentaries adopt their material mostly from the immediately preceding commentaries. Also, exegetical parallels are not simply quotations but are rather recycled bits and pieces of explanations on a specific verse that have been silently copied into a later commentary. They are always verbatim but they may have been broken up by additional explanations that were intertwined into the parallel, or they may have been rearranged so that the first half of a sentence appears at the end, or whole sentences may have been inverted. The change of order does not necessarily happen from the side of the authors but it might originate from the stylistic preferences of the Chinese or Tibetan translators of the origin- and destination-replicas. Similarly, the translation of the same Sanskrit term may on occasion vary between the different Chinese or Tibetan translators.

The definition on its own merely points out the general characteristics of an exegetical parallel. In practice, every exegetical parallel has its unique features and, for this reason, there could be many ways of creating a typology. Consequently, classifications depend on what features they are intended to reveal. One approach could be to group parallels according to their stylistic traits, while another might

follow a source-based procedure. For the five examples that follow, the latter concept was applied, and the exegetical parallels have therefore been divided according to where they occur within the commentarial base. The chosen examples also illustrate the different formats of exegetical parallels to demonstrate the varying extent of the parallel elements, which take the shape of single words, phrases, clauses, whole sentences, or passages. These five examples to be presented below shall respectively be labeled:

1. "omnipresent exegetical parallels"
2. "omni-Indian exegetical parallels"
3. "later Indian exegetical parallels"
4. "Buddhapālita-Candrakīrti exegetical parallels"
5. "Bhāvaviveka-Candrakīrti exegetical parallels."

Locating Exegetical Parallels

Omnipresent Exegetical Parallels

The first and most basic type of exegetical parallel is the omnipresent exegetical parallels, meaning parallels that occur in all of the five *Root Verses of the Middle Way School* commentaries. The example for an omnipresent exegetical parallel will be taken from the explanation on Nāgārjuna's *Root Verses of the Middle Way School* root-verse 17.7, which provides a botanical analogy used for the first of the two Abhidharmic models of *karmaphalasambandha*. The connection between the action and its result is said to be forged by the mind-series, which in this verse is likened to the growth-series of a plant starting with a seed and ending with a fruit:

> The series of a shoot and so forth evolves from the seed,
> And from that comes the fruit;
> But without the seed,
> It does not evolve.[20]

The verse contains the phrase "but without the seed, it does not evolve" (*ṛte bījāt sa ca nābhipravarttate*),[21] which is commented upon by all five commentaries using the same formulation with minor variations:

	Fear of Nothing	Explanation on the Middle Way School	*Buddhapālita's* Explanation	The *Lamp of Insight*	The *Clear Worded*
Sanskrit	-	-	-	-	*ṛte bījāt vinā bījāt sa*

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[20] Translation adapted from Kragh, *Early Buddhist Theories*, 268; Sanskrit edition, 106-108: *yo 'ṅkuraprabhṛtir bījāt saṃtāno 'bhipravarttate/ /tataḥ phalam ṛte bījāt sa ca nābhipravarttate//*.

[21] In Tibetan: *sa bon ni med na de yang 'byung mi 'gyur*. For this passage in the various editions of the *Root Verses of the Middle Way School* commentaries, see Huntington, "Akutobhayā," 407; Akira

					cāṅkurādisantāno nābhipravarttate.[22]
Chinese	-	**li zhong, wu xiang xu sheng** (離種無相續生).[23]	-	**ruo li zhong zi, ya deng xiang xu** ze **wu liu zhuan**(若離種子芽等相續則無流轉).[24]	
Tibetan	*sa bon med na myu gu la sogs pa'i rgyun de yang mngon par 'byung bar mi 'gyur ro/*.[25]	-	*sa bon med na myu gu la sogs pa'i rgyun de yang mngon par 'byung bar mi 'gyur ro/*.[26]	*sa bon med na myu gu sngon du btang ba'i rgyun de las mngon par 'byung bar mi 'gyur ro/*.[27]	*sa bon med na ste/ sa bon mi bdog par 'gyur na ni myu gu la sogs pa'i rgyun de yang 'byung bar mi 'gyur ro/*.[28]

Saito, "A Study of the Buddhapālita-Mūlamadhyamaka-Vṛtti" (PhD diss., Australian National University, 1984), vol. 2, 224; William Longstreet Ames, "Bhavaviveka's Prajnapradipa: Six Chapters" (PhD diss., University of Washington, 1986), 514; and Kragh, *Early Buddhist Theories*, 151. For the passage in the Chinese commentaries, see T1564.22a12 and T1566.110a17: 離種無相續.

[22] Sanskrit edition by Kragh, *Early Buddhist Theories*, 108. Translation by Kragh, *Early Buddhist Theories*, 269: "…**but without the seed**, (i.e.,) with no seed, **it**, (i.e.,) **the series of the sprout and so forth, does not evolve**."

[23] T1564.22a20. Translation: "**Without the seed, the series does not arise**."

[24] T1566.100a19-20. Translation: "**If there is no seed, the series of a sprout and so forth** then **does not evolve**."

[28] Tibetan edition by Kragh, *Early Buddhist Theories*, 151. Translation: "**Without the seed**, [i.e.,] when the seed is not present, **that series of the sprout and so forth does also not evolve**."

[26] Tibetan edition by Saito, *Study of the Buddhapālita*, vol. 2, 224. Translation: "**If there is no seed, that series of the sprout and so forth does also not evolve**."

[27] Tibetan edition by Ames, "Bhavaviveka's Prajnapradipa," 515. Translation: "**If there is no seed**, [the fruit] **does not evolve** from **that series**, in which it is preceded by **a sprout**."

[25] Tibetan edition by Huntington, "Akutobhayā," 407. Translation: "**If there is no seed, that series of the sprout and so forth does also not evolve**." The Dunhuang manuscript of *Fear of Nothing* (IOL Tib J 637, folio 34b.7) reads: */sa bon myed na myu gu las stsogs pa'-i rgyun de yang mngon bar 'byung bar my-i 'gyur ro/*. The manuscript is digitally available online from the International Dunhuang Project, linked to above. The pertinent folio is missing in the fragmented Dunhuang *Fear of Nothing* manuscript (IOL Tib J 638).

This example illustrates a fundamental explanatory type of literal exegesis containing an exegetical parallel, in that all five commentaries have the same sentence with only minor variations. In the table above, the text written in boldfaced red letters marks the exegetical parallel. The Chinese character highlighted yellow denotes a parallel that is only found in the Chinese origin-replica of the *Lamp of Insight*, but which is not found in the Tibetan origin-replica of the *Lamp of Insight*.

Starting in the right-hand column with the *Clear Worded*, its sentence contains all the words from the root-text, among which short explanatory glosses have been inserted. Thus, "without the seed" (*ṛte bījāt*) are the words from the root-text, which are followed by the synonymous gloss *vinā bījāt*. All the four earlier commentaries here only have the words from the root-text, without Candrakīrti's annotation.[29]

The *Clear Worded* then continues with the words from the root-text "but … it does not evolve" (*sa ca … nābhipravarttate*), where the explanatory phrase "the series of the sprout and so forth" (*aṅkurādisantāno*) has been inserted after *sa ca* in order to gloss the pronoun "it" (*sa*). *Fear of Nothing* and **Buddhapālita's Explanation* contain exactly the same gloss. *Explanation on the Middle Way School* has the phrase partly, since it has the word "series" (*xiang xu*, 相續) although the exact same word has been inserted into both of the Chinese translations of the root-verse (see note 21 above), and it is therefore uncertain whether *Explanation on the Middle Way School* actually attests the exegetical parallel gloss found in the other commentaries here. The *Lamp of Insight* attests the gloss in its Chinese translation by the characters "the series of the sprout and so forth" (*ya deng xiang xu*, 芽等相續). The words "and so forth" (*deng*, 等) are highlighted in yellow, since it is only attested by the *Lamp of Insight*'s Chinese translation.

The Tibetan translation of the *Lamp of Insight*, however, reads very differently, namely "[the fruit] does not evolve from that series, in which it is preceded by a sprout" (*myu gu sngon du btang ba'i rgyun de las mngon par 'byung bar mi 'gyur ro*). Here, the *rgyun* is still qualified as the series of the sprout. Yet, the phrase "…and so forth" (*la sogs pa, *ādi*) seen in the other commentaries does not occur in the Tibetan translation of the *Lamp of Insight*, but is instead replaced by the phrase "preceded by" (*sngon du btang ba, *pūrvaka*). Further, the syntactical structure of the sentence is modified so that the series is placed in the ablative case with the grammatical case-marker *las*, for which reason the series cannot be the grammatical subject of the verbal predicate *mngon par 'byung bar mi 'gyur ro*, as it is in all the other parallel sentences. Instead, a subject must be supplied from the preceding sentence, not cited here, which has the word "fruit" (*phala, 'bras bu*) as its subject. As was shown, the Tibetan translation of Bhāvaviveka's sentence deviates from the other exegetical parallels. Using the principle of exegetical parallels to verify the non-extant origin-text by comparing the two deviant

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[29] In the Chinese translation of the *Lamp of Insight*, the phrase has though been slightly expanded starting with the conditional "if" (*ruo*, 若) and the character for "seed" has been expanded from the root-text's single character *zhong* (種) to the synonymous double-character *zhong zi* (種子).

origin-replicas, it must be concluded that the Chinese translation of this sentence is more reliable.

In general, the seventeenth chapter contains many more such exegetical parallels present in all five commentaries. Expressed statistically, there are in total 356 sentences in the seventeenth chapter of the *Clear Worded*, and, among these, twenty-two sentences contain omnipresent exegetical parallels, which is 6 percent of the total number of sentences.[30] Omnipresent exegetical parallels typically occur in sentences, in which very literal explanations of the root-text are given.

On one hand, omnipresent exegetical parallels are simple and straightforward. On the other hand, they present a methodological problem, which stems from their nature of being tied so closely to the verses (*kārikā*) of the root-text. Huntington[31] discussed a similar problem in his own research, arguing that words of the root-verse that occur in the commentaries should not be considered textual correspondences: "No significant correspondence between the two commentaries can be based on similarities directly tied to the phrasing of the *kārikā* being discussed." In other words, Huntington argues that words of the root-verse that occur in the commentaries should not be considered textual correspondences. In terms of establishing a clear dependency between two or more commentaries, Huntington's purpose is to avoid counting the mere repetition of words from the root-text as significant for this dependency, because all commentaries on the root-text obviously repeat its words whether they are dependent on each other or not.[32]

In this context, it is crucial to discuss the issue of whether repetition of words from the root-text in the commentaries ought to be considered a part of a whole exegetical parallel. It seems that Huntington's position that commentarial words from the root-text should not be considered parallels is justifiable in cases, where only the words of the root-text are repeated without the occurrence of any other form of parallel in the concerned commentarial passage. However, what is more typical – as seen in the above example – is that words of the root-text appear within a specifically structured commentarial block with many other parallel elements,

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[30] While only five examples of exegetical parallels are illustrated in this article, an exhaustive study of exegetical parallels in the seventeenth chapter of the *Clear Worded* can be found in Kragh, *Early Buddhist Theories*, 84-139, covering the *Clear Worded* 17.1-17.20, and author, *Karmaphalasambandha*, 74-111, covering the *Clear Worded* 17.21-33. The statistical data of exegetical parallels of the first type mentioned above is derived from these publications. With page- and line-reference to the Sanskrit text as arranged in de La Poussin's edition of the *Clear Worded* (that is, Louis de La Vallée Poussin, *"Mūlamadhyamakakārikās (Mādhyamikasūtras)" de Nāgārjuna avec la "Prasannapadā" commentaire de Candrakīrti*, Bibliotheca Buddhica 4, 1903-1913 [repr., Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1970]), which also are indicated in the critical edition of the seventeenth chapter by Kragh in *Early Buddhist Theories*, these twenty-two exegetical parallels occur as follows: 302.3; 305.1-2; 305.9; 311.5; 312.7-10 (two sentences); 312.10-11; 313.7-8 (two sentences); 315.12-13; 317.3; 318.6-8; 319.2; 520.1; 324.9-10; 326.2-3; 326.7-8; 326.8-9; 326.16-17; 328.6; 329.10; and 329.13.

[31] Huntington, "Akutobhayā," 30.

[32] This issue is, however, not related to the problem of how the Tibetan translators mechanically translated the root-text by relying on each others' translations without consideration for the individual commentary's interpretation of the verse in question, which has been discussed by Akira Saito, "Problems in Translating the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā as Cited in its Commentaries," in *Buddhist Translations: Problems and Perspectives*, edited by Lama Doboom Tulku (Delhi: Manohar, 1995), 87-96.

such as derivative analyses, glosses, examples, paraphrases, or additions. Evidently, it is reasonable to include the words of the root-text that occur within such a block as belonging to the exegetical parallel. Unlike in Huntington's study, which incorporates only two commentaries, it would also be significant to mark shared repetitions of the root-text in studies that utilize more commentaries, because there are cases where some of the commentaries repeat the root-text in the same passage, while others do not.

Further, marking repetitions of words from the root-text as exegetical parallels contributes towards tracing variations of the root-text's wording in the different commentaries, particularly when a variant wording is repeated in two or more commentaries. Indeed, the Chinese translations contain numerous variants to the root-text, while the Tibetan translations tend to have a more uniform and polished version that occurs in most cases in all the commentaries, which could suggest that the root-text was edited and standardized over time. Since the presence of shared or divergent readings of the root-text is significant in terms of establishing dependencies between the commentaries, especially when explaining the process of how the commentaries were translated into Chinese and Tibetan and to which extent a translation agrees with the translation of other commentaries, it is important to note parallels in the wording of the root-text as it occurs in the commentaries. For both these reasons given above, parallel repetitions of the root-text in the commentaries ought to be included just as any other exegetical parallel.

Omni-Indian Exegetical Parallels

While the omnipresent exegetical parallels pertain to both the Indian commentaries as well as the Central Asian commentary *Explanation on the Middle Way School*, the second type of exegetical parallel occurs only in the Indian commentaries, viz. *Fear of Nothing*, **Buddhapālita's Explanation*, the *Lamp of Insight*, and the *Clear Worded*. Hence, it will be referred to as "omni-Indian exegetical parallels." The example for this parallel is found in the context of a sevenfold list of actions given by Nāgārjuna in the *Root Verses of the Middle Way School* root-verses 17.4-5, which belongs to the taxonomies of action given in the first part of the chapter:

> Speech, motion, undisclosed undertakings involving or not involving restraint,
> Beneficence derived from utilization, non-beneficence derived likewise, and intention
> – These seven phenomena are said to have action as their mark.[33]

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[33] Simplified translation adapted from Kragh, *Early Buddhist Theories*, 229-230. Sanskrit edition by Kragh, *Early Buddhist Theories*, 98: *vāg viṣpando 'viratayo yāś cāvijñaptisaṃjñitāḥ/ avijñaptaya evānyāḥ smṛtā viratayas tathā/ /paribhogānvayaṃ puṇyam apuṇyañ ca tathāvidhaṃ/ cetanā ceti saptaite dharmāḥ karmāñjanāḥ smṛtāḥ//.*

When defining the word "intention" (*cetanā*, *sems pa*, *si*, 思) from this verse, the four Indian commentaries attest the following omni-Indian exegetical parallel:

	Fear of Nothing	***Buddhapālita's Explanation**	**The *Lamp of Insight***	**The *Clear Worded***
Sanskrit	-	-	-	*cittābhisaṃskārā manaskarmalakṣaṇā cetanā ceti.* 34
Chinese	-	-	Yi he fa gu **ming zhi wei si**. Wei gong de yu guo e, ji fei gong de yu guo e, **qi xin** suo zuo **yi ye zhe ming si** (以何法故。名之為思。謂功德與過惡。及非功德與過惡。起心所作意業者名思).35	-
Tibetan	*sems pa zhes bya ba ni mngon par 'du byed pa zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go.*36	*sems pa zhes bya ba ni sems mngon par 'du byed pa'o/*.37	*'o na sems pa zhes bya ba* de gang yin zhe na/ yon tan dang skyon las *sems mngon par 'du byed pa ste yid kyi las so/*.38	*yid kyi las* kyi mtshan nyid can *sems mngon par 'du byed pa sems pa zhes bya ba* dang ste/.39

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34   Sanskrit edition by Kragh, *Early Buddhist Theories*, 102. The reading *cittābhisaṃskārā manaskarmalakṣaṇā* seen here instead of the compound *cittābhisaṃskāramanaskarmalakṣaṇā* seen in Kragh's edition has been adopted as the better reading on the basis of the oldest *Clear Worded* manuscript P. Translation by Kragh, *Early Buddhist Theories*, 250: "And **what is called intention** is characterized as **a mental action that conditions the mind**."

35   T1566.99c11-13. Translation: "What is the phenomenon **which is called intention**? When a good or bad quality – or what is not a good or bad quality – **conditions the mind** and then forms **a mental action,** that **is called 'intention.'**"

37   Tibetan edition by Saito, *Buddhapālita*, vol. 2, 222. Translation: "**What is called intention is that which conditions the mind**."

39   Tibetan edition by Kragh, *Early Buddhist Theories*, 149. Translation: "And **what is called intention is characterized as a mental action that conditions the mind**."

38   Tibetan edition by Ames, "Bhavaviveka's Prajnapradipa," 511. Translation: "If one asks what is that **which is called intention**? It is **a mental action that conditions the mind** due to good or bad qualities."

36   Tibetan edition by Huntington, "Akutobhayā," 405-406. Translation: "**What is called intention** means '**that which conditions**.'" The Dunhuang *Fear of Nothing* manuscript (IOL Tib J 637, folio

   In this example, the *Clear Worded* glosses the word from the root-verse "intention" (*cetanā*) with the definition "that characterized as a mental action, which conditions the mind" (*cittābhisaṃskārā manaskarmalakṣaṇā*). This, of course, is a standard definition for intention, which is well-known in the Abhidharma-literature, such as the *Commentary on the Repository of Abhidharma* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*) and *Compendium of Abhidharma* (*Abhidharmasamuccaya*).[40] The first part of the definition, viz. "that which conditions the mind" (*cittābhisaṃskārā*), also occurs in *Fear of Nothing* and Buddhapālita's commentary. In the *Lamp of Insight*, the definition has been expanded to include the second part of the definition, in that the phrase "mental action" (*yid kyi las*, *manaskarma, *yi ye*, 意業) has been added to the first part along with the explanatory remark "due to good or bad qualities."[41] The same addition to the definition is seen in the *Clear Worded*, though without the *Lamp of Insight*'s explanatory remark.

   In total, there are twenty-nine sentences with omni-Indian exegetical parallels among the 356 sentences of the seventeenth chapter of the *Clear Worded*, which amounts to 8 percent of the chapter.[42] The main difference between the Indian and the omnipresent exegetical parallels is that the former typically contains single words from the root-text that are being defined, whereas the latter characteristically contains longer phrases from the root-text without substantial annotations. The process of defining is rooted in the Abhidharma-literature, and it is noticeable that with time the definitions are expanded and enhanced.

Later Indian Exegetical Parallels

Unlike the omni-Indian exegetical parallels, which reflect the commentarial tradition passed down through all the Indian commentaries, the third type of exegetical parallel is present only in the three later Indian commentaries dating from the fifth to seventh centuries, that is, **Buddhapālita's Explanation*, the *Lamp of Insight* and the *Clear Worded*. Therefore, they will be called "later Indian exegetical parallels." The analysis will be done on the term *byams pa* (*maitra*) that can be translated as "kindness" or more literally as "friendliness." The translation "friendliness" will be used here due to the literal explanations given by the commentaries below. The word appears in the *Root Verses of the Middle Way School* verse 17.1, which is notable for its concise definition of the whole ethical theory of "action and result":

34b.2) reads: *sems pa zhes bya ba n-i mngon bar 'du byed pa zhes bya ba'-i tha tshig go/*. The pertinent folio is missing in the fragmented Dunhuang *Fear of Nothing* manuscript (IOL Tib J 638).

  [40] See Kragh, *Early Buddhist Theories*, 223 n. 339, and 251 n. 415.

  [41] This explanatory remark is duplicated in the Chinese translation.

  [42] These twenty-eight exegetical parallels occur as follows: 305.4; 305.5; 307.10; 310.3; 311.1; 313.9-11 (two sentences); 317.9-10; 318.1-2; 318.2-5; 318.7-8; 321.1-2 (two sentences); 321.12; 322.2-3; 322.6-8 (two sentences); 322.9; 326.12 (two sentences); 324.3; 327.1; 327.6 (two sentences); 327.8; 327.15 (two sentences); 328.7; and 328.10. Regarding the system of these references, see note 30 above.

> An attitude of self-restraint, benefiting others,
> And friendliness is *dharma*;
> It is a seed for a result
> After passing away and here.[43]

When commenting on the verse, Candrakīrti gives two explanations on the word "friendliness." Firstly, "friendliness" means "the attitude which arises in reference to a friend, [and] which is without hostility towards sentient beings." Secondly, "friendliness" in itself means "a friend."

In this example, there is no corresponding passage in the Chinese translation of the *Lamp of Insight*.[44] Hence, it is in this case not possible to draw an exegetical parallel to the Chinese text.

	Buddhapālita's Explanation	The *Lamp of Insight*	The *Clear Worded*
Sanskrit	-	-	***mitre bhavam*** *aviruddhaṃ sattveṣu yac cetas tan* ***maitraṃ*** *cetaḥ/ mitram* ***eva vā maitram***/ *[*svahitaṃ] yac cetas tan maitraṃ cetaḥ*.[45]
Tibetan	***byams pa ni mdza' bshes la 'byung ba*** *ste gcugs pa las 'byung ba zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go*/ ***yang na byams pa ni byams pa nyid de*** *sems snum pa zhes bya ba'i tha tshig ste/*	***byams pa*** *zhes bya ba* ***ni mdza' bshes la 'byung bas byams pa*** *'o*//*yang na byams pa nyid byams pa ste*/ ***bdag gi don*** *la de* ***dang mthun pa'i rkyen*** *brjod pa'i phyir ro*/.[47]	***mdza' bshes las 'byung*** *zhing sems can rnams dang 'gal ba med pa'i sems gang yin pa de ni* ***byams pa'i*** *sems so*//***yang na byams pa ni*** *gnyen bshes* ***nyid*** *yin* ***te***/ ***bdag*** *la phan 'dogs pa'i sems gang yin pa de nyid byams pa'i sems yin no*/.[48]

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[43] Sanskrit edition by Kragh, *Early Buddhist Theories*, 86: *ātmasaṃyamakaṃ cetaḥ parānugrāhakaṃ ca yat/ maitraṃ sa dharmas tad bījaṃ phalasya pretya ceha ca/*. For more on this verse, see Kragh, *Early Buddhist Theories*, 174.

[44] See T1566.99a22-23.

[45] Sanskrit edition by Kragh, *Early Buddhist Theories*, 90. The earlier Sanskrit edition by Kragh, *Karmaphalasambandha*, has the emendation **svahitaṃ* instead of the emendation **ātmānugrāhakaṃ* adopted here. Translation by Kragh, *Early Buddhist Theories*, 209: "An attitude **which arises in reference to a friend**, [and] which is without hostility towards sentient beings, is an attitude of **friendliness**. **Alternatively, friendliness is in itself** a friend, for an attitude of friendliness is the attitude **benefiting oneself**."

[48] Tibetan edition by Kragh, *Early Buddhist Theories*, 145. Translation: "An attitude **which arises in reference to a friend**, and which is without hostility towards sentient beings, that is an attitude of **friendliness**. **Alternatively, friendliness is in itself** a friend, because an attitude of friendliness is the attitude benefiting **oneself**."

[47] Tibetan edition adapted from Ames, "Bhavaviveka's Prajnapradipa," 507. Translation: "Since '**friendliness**' is **what arises in reference to a friend**, [it is called] friendliness. **Alternatively,**

*de ni **bdag gi don** gyi **rkyen** yin no/*.46		

The following analysis of the above passages will adhere to a structure, where the three sentences in Candrakīrti's segment will be explained separately as three units. Each unit will be discussed first in terms of its meaning, then in terms of the exegetical parallels it shares with the two earlier commentaries, and finally in terms of the implicit grammatical underpinnings of the passage as well as pertinent methodological issues. The discussion will bring out certain difficulties associated with the method of identifying exegetical parallels and show how the standard approach of text criticism in some contexts obscures work on exegetical parallels. At the end of the example for the later Indian exegetical parallels, the statistical data and common characterization will be included.

In unit one, *mitre bhavam aviruddhaṃ sattveṣu yac cetas, tan maitraṃ cetaḥ*, Candrakīrti gives his first explanation on the word "friendliness" from the root-verse. Although the root-text uses the word "friendliness" on its own, the commentator qualifies "friendliness" as being an attribute of the word "attitude" (*cetaḥ*) that is found in the first line of the verse. Since the sentence is a characterization of a term, the expression "an attitude of friendliness" (*maitraṃ cetaḥ*) is the term being characterized. The remaining part, "an attitude which arises in reference to a friend, [and] which is without hostility towards sentient beings" (*mitre bhavam aviruddhaṃ sattveṣu yac cetas*), is the characterization itself, consisting of two distinct features. On the one hand, "friendliness" is an attitude "which arises in reference to a friend" (*mitre bhavam*, *mdza' bshes las 'byung*) and, on the other hand, it is "an attitude which is without hostility towards sentient beings" (*aviruddhaṃ sattveṣu yac cetas*).

The corresponding exegetical parallel relates only to the phrase "which arises in reference to a friend" (*mitre bhavam*, *mdza' bshes las 'byung*) and the word "friendliness" (*maitra*, *byams pa*), since these are the only words shared with the corresponding sentences in the two earlier commentaries. **Buddhapālita's Explanation* states: "Friendliness is what arises in reference to a friend, in the sense of what arises in reference to someone dear" (*byams pa ni mdza' bshes la 'byung ba ste gcugs pa las 'byung ba zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go*). Similar to Candrakīrti's

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friendliness is in itself friendliness, because it is expressed by **a secondary nominal suffix** [forming a derivative] **having the same meaning** [as its base] (**svārthataddhitapratyaya*)." In Ames' edition, the *la* in *mdza' bshes la 'byung bas* is given as *las* based on the reading of the Sde dge and Co ne xylographs, but here the form *la* is chosen based on the Beijing and Snar thang xylographs (whose reading is duly noted by Ames), since this form agrees with the exegetical parallel shown here.

46 Tibetan edition by Saito, *Buddhapālita*, vol. 2, 220. Translation: "**Friendliness** is **what arises in reference to a friend**, in the sense of 'what arises in reference to someone dear.' **Alternatively, friendliness** is **in itself friendliness**, in the sense of an affectionate mind, in which case this is **a suffix** [forming a derivative] **having the same meaning** [as its base] (*svārthapratyaya)." In Saito's edition, the second *'byung ba* is given as *byung ba* based on the reading of the Sde dge and Co ne xylographs, but here the form *'byung ba* has been chosen based on the Beijing and Snar thang xylographs (whose readings are duly noted by Saito), since this form agrees with the first *'byung ba* of the sentence as well as with the exegetical parallel shown here.

sentence, Buddhapālita here defines "friendliness" (*maitra*, *byams pa*) as "what arises in reference to a friend" (*mdza' bshes la 'byung ba*, *mitre bhavam*), but his sentence neither includes Candrakīrti's insertion of the word "attitude" nor the second part of Candrakīrti's characterization of friendliness as "an attitude which is without hostility towards sentient beings." Further, Buddhapālita reiterates the characterization "what arises in reference to a friend" by adding, "in the sense of what arises in reference to someone dear" (*gcugs pa las 'byung ba zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go*). This addition does not appear in the *Clear Worded*. Besides these semantic differences, there is moreover a minor syntactical difference between the sentence in *Buddhapālita's Explanation* and the *Clear Worded*, namely that the word "friendliness" comes first in Buddhapālita's sentence but second to last in the *Clear Worded*. This is probably just a Tibetan translation issue.

In the second origin-replica, Bhāvaviveka's *Lamp of Insight*, the same exegetical parallel occurs as the one between *Buddhapālita's Explanation* and the *Clear Worded*, although the sentence in the *Lamp of Insight* differs slightly from these texts. The *Lamp of Insight* states: "since "friendliness" is what arises in reference to a friend, [it is called] friendliness" (*byams pa zhes bya ba ni mdza' bshes la 'byung bas byams pa'o*). Apart from the word "since," the first clause of this sentence is identical with the first clause of *Buddhapālita's Explanation*. After the clause, the word "friendliness" (*byams pa'o*) is repeated in the *Lamp of Insight*, which is not seen in the two other commentaries. To sum up, the three sentences in *Buddhapālita's Explanation*, the *Lamp of Insight*, and the *Clear Worded* are dissimilar in a number of ways, but they all share the words "friendliness" and "what arises in reference to a friend," thus forming an exegetical parallel.

The characterization of "friendliness" as "what arises in reference to a friend" carries an implicit grammatical underpinning, which is not stated directly in any of the commentaries, but which would have been understood by a reader trained in the classical Sanskrit grammatical tradition (*vyākaraṇa*), just as the authors Buddhapālita, Bhāvaviveka, and Candrakīrti were. The characterization of friendliness is made in the form of a "**derivative analysis**" (*nirukti*, *nges pa'i tshig*), which is a traditional Indian way of explaining the derivation of a word. In Buddhist commentarial writing, the derivative analysis is seen as just one of four possible ways to explain a term, namely enumeration of related terms (*paryāya*, *rnam grangs*), definition (*lakṣana*, *mtshan nyid*), derivative analysis (*nirukti*, *nges pa'i tshig*), and subdivision (*prabheda*, *rab tu dbye ba*).[49]

The derivative analysis procedure hails back to the early Vedic commentator Yāska (ca. sixth to fifth century BCE), composer of the treatise *Etymologies* (*Nirukta*), who attempted to explain words from the Hindu Vedas through analyzing

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[49] This set of four ways of explaining the *dharma* occurs, for example, in the *Discourse Revealing the Intention* (*Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra*; D106.62a7-62b1). In the *Commentary on the Ornament of Discourses of the Great Vehicle* (*Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāraṭīkā*; D4029.171b2) by Asvabhāva (sixth century CE), the same four are taken as subdivisions of the four types of correct knowledge (*so so yang dag par rig pa*, *pratisaṃvid*), that is correct knowledge of *dharma*, meaning (*artha*, *don*), derivative analysis (*nirukti*, *nges pa'i tshig*), and confidence (*pratibhāna*, *spobs pa*).

their root-meanings.[50] Yāska was of the opinion that nouns have their origin in verbs, and he thus tried to explain nouns by identifying the verbal roots they were derived from, showing how a verb semantically could be tied to a given word as its basis. In later Sanskrit scholarship, most derivative analyses were therefore made by linking the word being analyzed to a verb. As an example for this procedure, the following passage from Vasubandhu's *Commentary on the Repository of Systematized Dharma* might be cited, where Vasubandhu first defines derivative analysis and then provides an illustration: "A derivative analysis is a verbal dissection (*nirvacana*), like for example saying that the term "physical matter" (*rūpa*) is so-called, because it is breakable (*rūpyate*)."[51] In other words, Vasubandhu gives the illustration that the standard Buddhist term for physical matter, namely *rūpa*, is a derivation of the verbal root "to break" (*rup*), whereby the term *rūpa* is shown to be justified due to the breakable character of matter.

In the above passage of explaining "friendliness" as "what arises in reference to a friend," this characterization constitutes a derivative analysis in that it serves to explain the basis (*prakṛti*) from which the term "friendliness" is derived, thereby elucidating the meaning of the term. Yet, the author of the derivative analysis did not attempt to derive "friendliness" from a verbal stem, as would be the typical manner of making a derivative analysis, but instead gave the simpler derivative analysis that "friendliness" (*maitra*) is "what arises in reference to a friend" (*mitra*), thus indicating that the noun *maitra* is a derivative of the noun *mitra*.

While one level of implicit meaning is simply to indicate that *maitra* should be understood as a derivative of *mitra*, another level may be discerned in the wording of the phrase "which arises in reference to a friend" (*mitre bhavam*, *mdza' bshes las 'byung*). *Mitre*, "in reference to a friend," is the word that is the basis of the derivation and with the ending -e it is placed in the locative case. The phrase therefore consists of the formula: basis of derivation – locative case + *bhavam*. To a reader trained in the classical Sanskrit grammatical tradition, this formula would be understood as reflecting a well-known rule from the magnum opus of Sanskrit grammar, namely Pāṇini's *Eight Chapters* (*Aṣṭādhyāyī*) rule 4.3.53: *tatra bhavaḥ*, "what occurs in that" or "what pertains to that," with "there" (*tatra*) indicating the locative case.[52] In the *Eight Chapters*, this formula is used to define a locative

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[50] For an introduction to Yāska, see Hartmut Scharfe, *Grammatical Literature* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1977), 117-123. For an English translation of *Nirukta*, see Lakshman Sarup, *The "Nighaṇṭu" and the "Nirukta": The Oldest Indian Treatise on Etymology, Philology, and Semantics* (London: Oxford University Press, 1920-1929). For a Sanskrit edition of *Nirukta*, see Lakshman Sarup, "Yaska: Nirukta," Input by Munoe Tokunaga (and partly M. Kobayashi), http://www.sub.uni-goettingen.de/ebene_1/fiindolo/gretil/1_sanskr/1_veda/5_vedang/3_pratis/niruktau.htm, July 1999.

[51] *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* edition by Pralhad Pradhan, *Abhidharma-Kośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu* (Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1967), 419.18-19: *nirvacanaṃ niruktiḥ/ yathā rūpyate tasmād rūpam ity evam ādi/*.

[52] See the *Eight Chapters* (*Aṣṭādhyāyī*) rules 4.3.53, 4.3.25, and 4.3.39 in the edition and translation by Śrīśa Chandra Vasu, *The "Ashṭādhyāyī" of Pāṇini* (1891; repr., Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1997), 767, 759, and 763. It may be added that the present passage has *bhavam* instead of the *bhavaḥ* seen in the *Eight Chapters*, because *bhavam* here modifies the phrase *maitraṃ cetaḥ*, which is neuter, and that

sub-type of nominal *taddhita* derivation, where the derived word should be understood as referring to something found within the locality expressed by the word that is the basis for the derivation, or where the derived word should be understood as occurring in reference to the word that is the basis for the derivation.[53] The difference between these two slightly different interpretations of locative derivation is due to the quite broad semantic range covered by the locative case in Sanskrit, which extends from the indication of the predicate's concrete locality to the indication of the predicate's direct or indirect object in the case of certain verbs, such as verbs of emotion.[54] To give an example of such a derivation, the commentary on Pāṇini's text called the *Commentary on the Glossary from Kāśi [Varanasi]* (*Kāśikavivaraṇapañjika*) mentions the Sanskrit word *sraughna*, "a person from Srughna,"[55] where Srughna is a place-name for a town in northern India. A corresponding example in English might be that when the English nominal suffix "-an" is added to a place name, it creates a derivation expressing someone living in that place; for example, an "Indi*an*" is "someone found in India."

Buddhapālita's derivative analysis that "friendliness" is "what arises in reference to a friend" thus not only indicates in general that *maitra* should be understood as a derivation of *mitra*, but it also ties in with the classical Indian grammatical tradition by using a formula known from Pāṇini's *Eight Chapters* to specify that this is a nominal derivation formed with a *taddhita* suffix belonging to the locative subtype of derivation. It thereby clarifies the conceptual relationship between the derivative "friendliness" and its basis "friend" as belonging to the locative case, where – in this instance – the locative case should be understood as indicating the direct object for the emotion "friendliness." In other words, "friendliness" is explained as an attitude that is directed towards another person, who is considered one's friend. It is with these subtle grammatical ramifications that Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti repeat Buddhapālita's derivative analysis in their commentaries.[56]

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bhavam therefore accordingly must be adjusted to reflect the same gender-ending. Hence, the difference in ending between *bhavam* and *bhavaḥ* is of little or no consequence in making this comparison between the present text and the *Eight Chapters*.

[53] For an introduction to derivatives of the *tatra bhavaḥ* type, see Gary A. Tubb and Emery R. Boose, *Scholastic Sanskrit: A Manual for Students* (New York: The American Institute of Buddhist Studies at Columbia University, co-published with Columbia University's Center for Buddhist Studies and Tibet House US, 2007), 72-73.

[54] On the locative case in Sanskrit, see J. S. Speijer, *Sanskrit Syntax* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1886; repr., Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1998), 102-113.

[55] See Vasu, *"Ashṭādhyāyī" of Pāṇini*, 767. The commentary reads *srughne bhavaḥ sraughnaḥ*, meaning "a Sraughna is someone found in Srughna."

[56] It may be added that this interpretation of the passage agrees with the interpretation given by Avalokitavrata in his subcommentary on Bhāvaviveka's *Lamp of Insight*. Avalokitavrata explains the first sentence of the passage in the *Lamp of Insight* as follows: "As for the word "friendliness": since the attitude of friendliness found in one's own stream of being (*svasantānamaitracittam*) arises towards a friend, who is someone else (*parārthamitre*), it is called "friendliness," because it is a word-suffix used in reference to another (*parahitapadapratyaya*), in the sense of other-meaning (*parārtha/anyārtha*)." See the *Commentary on the Lamp of Insight* (D3859 volume 3 [*za*], 19b; Golden Manuscript Bstan 'gyur, section Mdo, vol. Za, folio 26b.3): *byams pa zhes bya ba'i sgra ni rang gi rgyud la yod pa'i byams pa'i sems mdza' bshes gzhan gyi yul la 'byung bas byams pa ste/ gzhan gyi don la gzhan dang mthun pa'i tshig gi rkyen brjod pa'i phyir ram/.* The unusual expression

The exegetical parallel's association with Pāṇini's explanation on locative nominal derivation rests entirely on the wording of the Sanskrit phrase *mitre bhavam* attested by the *Clear Worded*, since it is based on the similarity of this phrase to the *Eight Chapters'* formula *tatra bhavaḥ*. Moreover, it is also due to the presence of this Sanskrit phrase in the *Clear Worded* that the Tibetan wording of the same phrase, that is, *mdza' bshes la 'byung ba*, becomes comprehensible. From the purely Tibetan point of view, there is, de facto, uncertainty with regard to the meaning of this phrase, which is reflected in the two variant readings of the phrase found in the various Tibetan manuscripts of the texts. All four major Tibetan versions of *Buddhapālita's Explanation* attest the reading *mdza' bshes la 'byung ba*, which is the reading that agrees with the *Clear Worded*'s *mitre bhavam*, since the Tibetan locative case-particle *la* corresponds to the Sanskrit locative case ending -e in *mitre*.[57] The four major Tibetan versions of Bhāvaviveka's *Lamp of Insight*, however, are divided on how to render this phrase; three versions attest the same reading as *Buddhapālita's Explanation*, that is, *mdza' bshes la 'byung bas* with the word "friend" in the locative case, whereas one version attests a variant reading *mdza' bshes las 'byung bas*, where the ablative case particle *las* stands instead of the locative case particle *la*, thus rendering the phrase as "what arises from a friend."[58] In the case of the Tibetan translation of the *Clear Worded*, all four major versions attest the variant phrase "*mdza' bshes las 'byung*,"[59] for which reason the Tibetan translation of the *Clear Worded* does not correspond to the extant Sanskrit text. The ablative variant can also be seen in *Buddhapālita's Explanation*'s explanatory phrase "what arises in reference to someone dear" (*gcugs pa las 'byung ba*), where the words someone dear (*gcugs pa*) likewise is placed in the ablative case by the particle *las*, for which reason it ought to be translated literally as "what arises from someone dear."

The Sanskrit locative reading *mitre bhavam* is though secured by its ample attestation in the fifteen extant Sanskrit manuscripts of *Clear Worded*, where the

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"other-meaning" (*gzhan gyi don*, *parārtha/anyārtha*) is used by Avalokitavrata to contrast this first interpretation of the derivation with the second interpretation, which follows in the next sentence of the passage to be discussed under units two and three. The central point of Avalokitavrata's analysis is that in the first interpretation of "friendliness" as a derivative of "friend" the derived word "friendliness" should be understood as something other than the basis from which it is derived, that is, the word "friend." As will transpire from unit two, in the second interpretation the derivation and its basis should be understood as identical and therefore synonymous.

[57] The four major canonical versions are those of the Beijing, Snar thang, Sde dge, and Pho lha nas' Golden Manuscript Bstan 'gyur. For details on these editions, see Kragh, *Early Buddhist Theories*, 73-75. The critical edition of *Buddhapālita's Explanation* by Saito, vol. 2, 220, provides the readings of the Beijing, Snar thang, Sde dge, and Co ne editions. The Co ne Bstan 'gyur is an apograph of Sde dge, and is therefore not counted here as a major edition. In the Golden Manuscript Bstan 'gyur, the sentence is found in section Mdo, vol. Tsa, on folio 356a.5.

[58] As to the four major versions, see footnote 57 above. The Beijing, Snar thang, and Golden Manuscript Bstan 'gyur versions attest the locative reading, whereas the Sde dge Bstan 'gyur version attests the ablative variant reading.

[59] As to the four major versions, see note 54 above. For the readings of this sentence in the *Clear Worded*, see the critical edition by Kragh, *Early Buddhist Theories*, 108.

majority of the manuscripts contains this reading.[60] A single manuscript, which was written in 1731 belonging to the five most important *Clear Worded* manuscripts, contains a significant variant reading, where the locative case ending is missing and the phrase takes the form of a compound "friend-arising" (*mitrabhavam*).[61] This compound form leaves it up to the reader to determine the case-relationship between the two members of the compound and thus opens up to interpretations other than the locative case, although such deviant interpretations would not seem to be in line with the intention of the passage.

When the unexpected Tibetan ablative variant reading is compared with the two readings of the Sanskrit manuscripts, where the locative reading predominates, it becomes clear that the Tibetan ablative reading must be rejected as a corruption of the sentence that would not make it viable to associate the sentence with its proper background in the grammatical literature. It is possible that this corruption arose already at the time of one or more of the Tibetan translations, when the Sanskrit manuscripts on which these were based contained compounded forms of the phrase as seen today in one of the Sanskrit manuscripts. It is equally possible that all the Tibetan translations originally had the locative reading *mdza' bshes la*, but that this correct form was corrupted into the ablative reading *mdza' bshes las* during the centuries during when these translations were transmitted in the form of hand-copied manuscripts. If the latter is the case, this corruption might be explained by the fact that the Tibetan verb "to arise" (*'byung ba*), mostly occurs in ablative constructions, and that a Tibetan scribe or reader therefore might have substituted the less familiar locative phrase with the more typical ablative phrase.

In terms of the method of exegetical parallels, the discussion of this corruption serves to illustrate a point of the applicability of this method. The presence of the phrase *mitre bhavam* in the Sanskrit manuscripts of the *Clear Worded* not only makes it possible to realize the corruption of the ablative phrase in the four major versions of the Tibetan translation of the *Clear Worded*. By recognizing that the phrase is an exegetical parallel, which also is found in the two earlier commentaries by Buddhapālita and Bhāvaviveka, it further becomes possible to determine the likely Sanskrit reading behind the Tibetan translations of these two texts, whereby the corrupt phrase *gcugs pa las* in **Buddhapālita's Explanation* can be emended to its correct locative form *gcugs pa la*, and the correct choice *mdza' bshes la* instead of *mdza' bshes las* can be chosen among the two variant readings that are

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[60] The locative reading is attested by the major manuscripts ད (*da*, folio 52a), བ (*ba*, 110a) and ལ (*la*, 87b), as well as by the minor apograph-manuscripts ཨ (*a*, 93b.10), ཨེ (*e*, 79b.3), ཅ (*ca*, 126b.2), ཕ (*pha*, 70b.4), ག (*ga*, 117b.6), ཀ (*ka*, folio number not available) and ཧ (*ha*, 119a.3). The reading is also partially attested by the minor apograph-manuscript མ (*ma*, 90b.5), which reads *mitre bhav*, and thus contains the locative construction, but has the word *bhavam* in a corrupt form. Manuscript པ (*pa*, 55b), the oldest of the five major manuscripts, has a lacuna in this place, where only the first syllable *mi* has been preserved, so this manuscript does not provide any reading. Unfortunately, the minor apograph-manuscripts ཨི (*i*) and ན (*na*) could not be consulted at this point due to lack of access to a microfilm-reader. Regarding the fifteen *Clear Worded* Sanskrit manuscripts and their sigla, see Kragh, *Early Buddhist Theories*, 35-40.

[61] The manuscript in question is manuscript ཇ (*ja*, 118b).

found in the four major versions of the *Lamp of Insight*. This observation demonstrates the first methodological issue to be illustrated by this example: that the recognition of exegetical parallels in some instances may help to clarify text critical problems, particularly when a secure Sanskrit version is available for one or more of the texts. In such cases, the method of exegetical parallels can aid the method of text criticism.

In unit two, *mitram eva vā maitram*, Candrakīrti gives his second explanation on the word "friendliness," namely "alternatively, friendliness is in itself a friend." This derivative analysis is given as an alternative to the first derivative analysis discussed above, as indicated by the word "alternatively, or" (*vā*, *yang na*). The second derivative analysis also indicates that "friendliness" (*maitra*, *byams pa*) is derived from the word "friend" (*mitra*, *gnyen bshes*), but while the former derivative analysis presented friendliness as arising in reference to a friend, who is someone other than oneself, the second derivative analysis renders friendliness as being a friend in itself. The inseparability of "friendliness" and "friend" is specified in the sentence by their nominative case agreement, by the implicit copula verb "is" (*asti*, *yin*), which has become explicit in the Tibetan translation in the form of *yin*, and furthermore by the emphatic adverb "in itself" (*eva*, *nyid*). It may be noted that where the Sanskrit text uses the same word *mitra* for "friend" in the former and the present sentences, the Tibetan translation uses two slightly different words, namely *mdza' bshes* and *gnyen bshes*. These two words are synonymous, but – if they ought to be distinguished – can be translated respectively as "a dear friend" and "a friend companion." Perhaps the Tibetan translator felt that friendliness as an inner state of mind could not be called "beloved" (*mdza'*) and therefore translated the second occurrence of the word with "companion" (*gnyen*) instead.

The corresponding exegetical parallel pertains only to the words "alternatively, friendliness is in itself …" (*… eva vā maitram*), since the two earlier commentaries – at least in their extant form – do not attest the word "friend" (*mitram*). In **Buddhapālita's Explanation*, the full sentence reads, "alternatively, friendliness is in itself friendliness, in the sense of an affectionate mind" (*yang na byams pa ni byams pa nyid de sems snum pa zhes bya ba'i tha tshig ste*). In view of that, Candrakīrti's sentence "alternatively, friendliness is in itself a friend" (*yang na byams pa ni gnyen bshes nyid yin te*, *mitram eva vā maitram*) contains an exegetical parallel to the first clause of **Buddhapālita's Explanation*'s sentence, namely "alternatively, friendliness is in itself friendliness" (*yang na byams pa ni byams pa nyid de*), with the significant difference that Candrakīrti's text has "a friend" (*mitram*, *gnyen bshes*) as the subject-predicate, whereas **Buddhapālita's Explanation* instead has "friendliness" (*byams pa*, **maitram*). In addition, Buddhapālita added the explanatory remark "in the sense of an affectionate mind" (*sems snum pa zhes bya ba'i tha tshig ste*, **snehacetas ity artham*), which reoccurs in neither the *Lamp of Insight* nor the *Clear Worded*.

The *Lamp of Insight* likewise repeats the first clause of **Buddhapālita's Explanation*'s sentence, but in a form that seems to be completely verbatim: "alternatively, friendliness is in itself friendliness" (*yang na byams pa nyid byams*

pa ste). The same repetition of "friendliness" accordingly turns up in **Buddhapālita's Explanation* and the *Lamp of Insight*, which stands in contradistinction to the reading "a friend" in the *Clear Worded*.

The repetition of the word "friendliness" is securely attested by all the Tibetan canonical versions of **Buddhapālita's Explanation* and the *Lamp of Insight* as well as by Avalokitavrata's subcommentary on the *Lamp of Insight*.[62] In the Sanskrit manuscripts of the *Clear Worded*, the reading "a friend" is, in fact, only attested by a single manuscript and by all the canonical versions of the Tibetan translation.[63] By far, the majority of the *Clear Worded* Sanskrit manuscripts indeed also attests the repetition of "friendliness" found in **Buddhapālita's Explanation* and the *Lamp of Insight*.[64] Nevertheless, the fact that the reading "a friend" is in the minority does not mean that it is incorrect, and as will be proven in the analysis of unit three, it is in truth the only correct reading. Therefore, **Buddhapālita's Explanation*'s and the *Lamp of Insight*'s tautological sentence "alternatively, friendliness is in itself friendliness" (**maitram eva vā maitraṃ*) must be emended to conform with the *Clear Worded*'s correct sentence "alternatively, friendliness is in itself a friend" (*mitram eva vā maitraṃ*).

From the Sanskrit point of view, the divergence between the two sentences is diminishable to just two differing vowel-strokes in the first syllable of the words *mitram* and *maitram*. It therefore appears that the error of writing *maitram* instead of *mitram* occurred already in the handwritten Sanskrit manuscript transmissions of the texts before they were translated into Tibetan, particularly since the Tibetan difference between "a friend" (*gnyen bshes*) and "friendliness" (*byams pa*) is considerably bigger. It is, of course, also notable that this is exactly the

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[62] For **Buddhapālita's Explanation*, see the critical edition by Saito, *Buddhapālita*, vol. 2, 220, and the Pho lha nas Golden Manuscript Bstan 'gyur, section Mdo, vol. Tsa, folio 356a.5. For the *Lamp of Insight*, see the critical edition by Ames, "Bhavaviveka's Prajnapradipa," 507; and the Pho lha nas Golden Manuscript Bstan 'gyur, section Mdo, vol. Tsha, folio 242b.5. For Avalokitavrata's *Commentary on the Lamp of Insight*, see D3859 volume 3 (*za*), 19b; and the Pho lha nas Golden Manuscript Bstan 'gyur, section Mdo, vol. Za, folio 26b.3.

[63] Manuscript प (*pa*), which is the oldest of the five major *Clear Worded* Sanskrit manuscripts dated from the twelfth to thirteenth century, reads (folio 55b): *mitram eva vā maitraṃ*. For the Tibetan translation, see Kragh, *Early Buddhist Theories*, 145.

[64] Thus, all the remaining twelve Sanskrit manuscripts currently available to me, that is, the four remaining major manuscripts द (*da*, folio 52a), ब (*ba*, 10a), ज (*ja*, 118b), and ल (*la*, 87b) as well as the eight available minor apograph-manuscripts अ (*a*, 93b.10), ए (*e*, 79b.3), च (*ca*, 126b.2), फ (*pha*, 70b.4), ग (*ga*, 117b.6), क (*ka*, folio number not available), ह (*ha*, 119a.3), and म (*ma*, 90b.5) attest the reading *maitram eva vā maitraṃ*, with the insignificant corruption that manuscript अ (*a*) has *aiva* instead of *eva* and manuscript क (*ka*) has the second *maitraṃ* as *metraṃ*. As noted above, the minor apograph-manuscripts इ (*i*) and न (*na*) were not consulted. Modern scholarship was unaware of the existence of manuscript प (*pa*) until 1990, when it was listed in the bibliography of Buddhist Sanskrit manuscripts compiled by Keisho Tsukamoto, Yukei Matsunaga, and Hirofumi Isoda, *A Descriptive Bibliography of the Sanskrit Buddhist Literature*, vol. 3 (Kyoto: Heirakuji Shoten, 1990). Hence, the reading *maitram eva* also occurs in the earlier *Clear Worded* editions by de La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 305; J. W. de Jong, "Textcritical Notes on the Prasannapadā," *Indo-Iranian Journal* 20, nos. 1-2 (1978): 25-59; and J. W. de Jong, "Textcritical Notes on the Prasannapadā," *Indo-Iranian Journal* 20, nos. 3-4 (1978): 217-52.

above-mentioned corruption that is found in all the later Sanskrit manuscripts of the *Clear Worded*.[65]

When the word "friendliness" is emended to "a friend" in *Buddhapālita's Explanation* and the *Lamp of Insight*, this further clarifies the meaning of Buddhapālita's explanatory remark "in the sense of an affectionate mind." The remark serves to justify that "friendliness" can be considered "a friend," since "friendliness" is an affectionate state of mind (*sems snum pa*, *snehacetas*), which functions as one's friend. To understand Buddhapālita's justification, the double meaning of the Sanskrit word *sneha* (*snum pa*) must be considered. In its abstract meaning, *sneha* means "affectionate, tender," and "friendliness" is thus characterized as being an affectionate or tender state of mind. Yet, in its literal sense, *sneha* means "oily, smooth, lubricated," and with this connotation, the expression signifies that "friendliness" is smooth, frictionless and easy-going, and is therefore a state of mind that is one's own inner friend. By enabling the emendation of Buddhapālita's text, the exegetical parallel helps to throw light on this intended meaning.[66]

Moreover, the above discussion of the text critical issues of the three commentaries may serve to raise another issue concerning the applicability of the method of exegetical parallels. The extant readings of the sentence in *Buddhapālita's Explanation* and the *Lamp of Insight* provide no text critical evidence for making an emendation of "friendliness" to "a friend," and hence the method of text criticism alone cannot solve the problem of how to make sense of this problematic sentence. Rather, it is the recognition of the exegetical parallel between the two earlier commentaries and the *Clear Worded* that permits the problem to be solved, since the correct reading "a friend" is found in the oldest Sanskrit manuscript of the *Clear Worded* and the Tibetan translation, whereby the modern editor of *Buddhapālita's Explanation* and the *Lamp of Insight* becomes able to make the requisite emendation. In this sense, the method of exegetical parallels can again be seen as being a helpful aid for text criticism.

It is, however, a big question whether a careful editor of a text really would introduce such a considerable emendation into the text. While it is true that the emendation from *maitram* to *mitram* would be minor in the case of a Sanskrit edition, an emendation from *byams pa* to *gnyen bshes* in a Tibetan edition would be substantial and very far removed from what the readings of the available textual witnesses offer. It is in this case debatable whether the method of exegetical parallels can and should be used to produce emendations in text critical work, and there certainly is good reason to apply the method only with outmost caution for such a purpose, which – it must be underlined – is not the intended objective of the method.

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[65] See note 64.

[66] It may be added that the double meaning of *sneha* is not evident in the Tibetan translation, where the word is represented by *snum pa*, which exclusively means "oily." The double connotation only appears when the Sanskrit word behind the Tibetan translation is considered.

In fact, the issue points to a subtle difference between text criticism and exegetical parallels. To understand this difference, it must first be recalled that the sentence in the three commentaries above actually contains two opposite exegetical parallels. On one hand, there is the overall exegetical parallel between the two earlier commentaries and the *Clear Worded*, where the *Clear Worded* attests the word "a friend" instead of the word "friendliness" that is found in the two earlier commentaries. On the other hand, there is also the more narrow exegetical parallel solely existing between the two earlier commentaries in that both texts share the incorrect word "friendliness." Thus, if it were argued that a text critical emendation ought to be made in the two earlier commentaries solely on the basis of the exegetical parallel to the *Clear Worded*, it could likewise be argued that the incorrect reading "friendliness" should be retained in the earlier commentaries, because this reading is equally supported by the exegetical parallel that exists between these two texts. It is thus as if the two opposite exegetical parallels annul each other, which in principle renders the exegetical parallels useless as an argument for text criticism and emendation in the present instance.

The problem indicates that there is a need for speaking of at least two different varieties of exegetical parallels. Firstly, there are "correct" exegetical parallels that may be assumed to hail back to the first writing of a given commentary; the word "a friend" (*mitram*) would plausibly be such an instance. Secondly, there are "corrupt" exegetical parallels that arose later in the transmission of the texts; the word "friendliness" (**maitram*) in the present sentence would credibly fall into this category, since the corruptions are likely to have arisen later in the history of the text either coincidentally or consciously. It is thus necessary to think of the texts as evolving over time.

Yet, the issue reaches even deeper. It is conceivable that two or more destination-texts were based on different versions of an origin-text, because the origin-text evolved over time. Thus, an exegetical parallel occurring in a later commentary might differ from an exegetical parallel found in a second later commentary, because the versions of the origin-text that each commentator relied on were not exactly the same. Evolutions of texts must therefore also be considered even if only concerned with "correct" exegetical parallels that hail back to the first writing of a given commentary. Hence, for the method of exegetical parallels, one of the aims is to understand texts as evolving through time and see how later commentaries, which were composed in different times, incorporate material from one or more origin-texts as these had evolved in the particular age and region, where the destination-texts were written.

This focus is contrary to text criticism, which indeed downplays the evolution of a text in its attempt to delegate all later changes of the text to the footnotes in the edition's critical apparatus and instead only to preserve those readings in the actual text edition that traditionally are presumed to belong to the original text composed by the author's own hand or which, at least, are presumed to belong to the earliest possible version of the text. It is therefore necessary to realize that while the method of exegetical parallels at times may be seen as supporting the

method of text criticism, the two methods, in fact, do not share the same purpose. Text criticism aims to establish a single version of the edited text, which must remain as faithful as possible to the presumed earliest version. The method of exegetical parallels instead aims to describe a commentarial tradition as it developed over time by identifying the ways in which later commentators utilized materials from earlier texts, which they did by relying on those later manuscripts of the earlier texts that were available at the time of the writing of the later commentaries. Thus, while the objective of text criticism is origin, the objective of the method of exegetical parallels is evolution.

In unit three, *[*svahitaṃ] yac cetas tan maitraṃ cetaḥ*, Candrakīrti offers a reason why friendliness can be seen as a friend in itself, namely because "an attitude of friendliness is the attitude benefiting oneself." Although he does not clarify how the attitude of friendliness benefits oneself, his statement should probably be understood in view of the Buddhist doctrine of "action and result," according to which such an attitude brings oneself benefit in the form of pleasant future rebirths, given that the attitude is beneficent (*puṇya*).

Textually, the phrase "benefiting oneself" (*bdag la phan 'dogs pa'i*, **svahitaṃ*) is highly problematic, considering that it is only attested by the eleventh century Tibetan translation.[67] The sentence as it stands in the Sanskrit manuscripts of the *Clear Worded* are incomplete and paradoxical, for the Sanskrit manuscripts only have the sentence "an attitude of friendliness is an attitude."[68] There is therefore need for emendation in the form of a reconstruction based on the Tibetan text.[69]

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[67] Although the Tibetan translation of the *Clear Worded* was made in the eleventh century, it is today preserved only in the form of five eighteenth-century manuscripts and xylographs; see Kragh, *Early Buddhist Theories*, 73-75.

[68] Or, if translated more literally: "Which state of mind, that [is] an attitude of friendliness" (*yac cetas taṃ maitraṃ cetaḥ*). The incomplete sentence occurs in all the thirteen consulted manuscripts, most of which display a number of additional minor corruptions as follows: major manuscript प *pa* with orthographical variants, namely, *yac cetas tan maitrañ cetaḥ*; major manuscript ब (*ba*) in the form quoted above *yac cetas taṃ maitraṃ cetaḥ*; major manuscripts ज (*ja*) and ल (*la*) as well as the apographs चएगह (*ca, e, ga,* and *ha*) with a corruption of the pronoun *taṃ*, namely, *yac cetas ta maitraṃ cetaḥ*; apograph अ (*a*) with corruption of *taṃ* and of the second *cetas*, namely, *yac cetas ta maitraṃ ceta*; apograph फ (*pha*) with corruption of *taṃ* plus a compound form of *maitraṃ cetaḥ*, namely, *yac cetas ta maitracetaḥ*; apograph म (*ma*) with corruptions of the first *cetas* and *taṃ*, namely, *yac cetaṃs ta maitraṃ cetaḥ*; apograph क (*ka*) with omission of *taṃ*, namely, *yac cetas maitraṃ cetaḥ*; and major manuscript द (*da*) with corruption of the first *cetas* and orthographical variant of *taṃ*, namely, *yac ca tan maitraṃ cetaḥ*. As noted above, the apographs इ (*i*) and न (*na*) were not consulted. For manuscript folio references, see note 57 above.

[69] It should be noted that the two major earlier modern editors of the *Clear Worded* did not opt for this solution of relying on the Tibetan reading of this sentence, but that their solutions for this sentence were not ideal. De La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 305, chose to merge the prior and present sentences by transposing a part of the prior sentence to the end of the whole construction. Thus, de La Vallée Poussin's sentence literally reads: "What is an attitude of friendliness, that is an attitude of friendliness or simply friendliness" (*maitraṃ yac cetas tan maitraceto maitram eva vā*). This modified sentence, which does not reflect any of the manuscript readings, makes little sense, because it basically states that "an attitude of friendliness is an attitude of friendliness," which is tautological. Étienne Lamotte, in "Le Traité de l'Acte de Vasubandhu: Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa," *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques* 4 (1935-1936): 266, who therein produced a French translation of this chapter on the basis of de La Vallée Poussin's Sanskrit edition, tried to make meaning of the sentence by inserting the verb "is called,"

The Tibetan translation's phrase "benefiting oneself" (*bdag la phan 'dogs pa'i*), not found in the incomplete Sanskrit sentence, can be rendered into Sanskrit in two different ways. Firstly, it could be reconstructed as **ātmānugrāhakaṃ*. In the present context, this would be the most straightforward reconstruction, because the expression "benefiting others" (*gzhan la phan 'dogs pa*, **parānugrāhakaṃ*) is used repeatedly in the passage that immediately precedes the present passage.[70] Secondly, it could be reconstructed as **svahitaṃ*, which is the reconstruction adopted here. This reconstruction rests on the exegetical parallel being discussed.

The corresponding exegetical parallel pertains mainly to the two earlier commentaries, since the *Clear Worded* shares only the word "oneself" (*bdag*) of its Tibetan translation with the two earlier texts. While Candrakīrti argued for why "friendliness is in itself a friend" by giving an ethical reason, Buddhapālita gave a grammatical rationale, which was repeated by Bhāvaviveka. In **Buddhapālita's Explanation*, the argument is presented that friendliness is in itself a friend, "in which case this is a suffix [forming a derivative] having the same meaning [as its base]" (*de ni bdag gi don gyi rkyen yin no*). In other words, "friendliness" is a derivation of "a friend" in the sense that the two words are synonyms, because this could be seen as a type of derivation, where the derivative and its base share the same meaning. This type of derivation is in the Indian grammatical tradition called "synonymous derivation" (*bdag gi don gyi rkyen*, **svārthapratyaya* or **svārthikapratyaya*). Synonymous derivation is a form of pleonasm, where a longer form of a word is used instead of a shorter form of the same word with little or no additional meaning. For example, the Sanskrit word "darkness" (*tamisra*) is a derivation of "darkness" (*tamas*) and the derivative and its base are more or less synonymous, but a poet writing in verse-meter might prefer one form over another due to metrical reasons.[71] Buddhapālita thus argued that "friendliness" could be

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which still results in a tautological statement: «Ce penser amical se nomme « amical penser » (*maitracetas*) ou « amitié » (*maitra*) tout court» (English translation: "This benevolent thinking is called 'benevolent thinking' [*maitracetas*] or 'benevolence' [*maitra*] in short."). Later on, de Jong, "Textcritical Notes on the Prasannapadā," 220, attempted to make sense out of the corrupted sentence by combining it with the preceding sentence but avoided de La Vallée Poussin's transposition. His Sanskrit version of the whole passage might be translated: "An attitude which arises in reference to a friend, [and] which is without hostility towards sentient beings, is an attitude of friendliness or simply friendliness. And what is friendliness, that is an attitude of friendliness" (*mitre bhavam aviruddhaṃ sattveṣu yac cetas tan maitraṃ cetaḥ/ maitram eva vā/ maitraṃ yac ca tan maitraṃ cetaḥ*). This version reflects fully manuscript ད (*da*). The last sentence is again a tautology, and is therefore not a satisfactory solution. De Jong also suggested that the Tibetan translation should be emended to make it fit with his Sanskrit version. It should be underlined that neither of these editors had the benefit of being able to rely on the superior readings of manuscript པ (*pa*), which is particularly crucial for understanding the middle sentence, since they were not aware of its existence and so did not utilize it. The earliest *Clear Worded* edition by C. C. Das and C. C. Cāstrī, *Madhyamaka Vṛtti*, for the first time edited (Calcutta, 1897), was not available at present and has not been consulted.

[70]　The reconstruction **ātmānugrāhakaṃ* was first suggested by the *Clear Worded* editor, P. L. Vaidya, *"Madhyamakaśāstra" of Nāgārjuna with the Commentary: "Prasannapadā" by Candrakīrti* (Darbhanga: The Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning, 1960), 149; in the 1987 reprint by Shridhar Tripathi, 132, where it is mistyped as *ātyānugrāhakaṃ*. It was subsequently adopted in the edition of the seventeenth chapter by Kragh, *Early Buddhist Theories*, 90.

[71]　The example is taken from Tubb and Boose, *Scholastic Sanskrit*, 82-83, where more examples can be found.

understood as "a friend," if *maitra* is taken as a synonymous derivative of its base *mitra*.

Bhāvaviveka repeated Buddhapālita's grammatical remark in a slightly expanded form: "because it is expressed by a secondary nominal suffix [forming a derivative] having the same meaning [as its base]" (*bdag gi don la de dang mthun pa'i rkyen brjod pa'i phyir ro*). The overall meaning of Bhāvaviveka's sentence is the same as Buddhapālita's shorter statement (in which case this is a suffix [forming a derivative] having the same meaning [as its base]; *de ni bdag gi don gyi rkyen yin no*); the main difference is that Bhāvaviveka expanded Buddhapālita's term *svārthapratyaya* or *svārthikapratyaya* (*bdag gi don gyi rkyen*) to the longer form *svārthataddhitapratyaya* or *svārthikataddhitapratyaya* (*bdag gi don la de dang mthun pa'i rkyen*).[72] The additional element in Bhāvaviveka's term is *taddhita*, which is a simple specification of the derivation suffix (*pratyaya*) as being a "secondary nominal derivation suffix" used to form nominal derivatives out of nouns, as opposed to a "primary nominal derivation suffix" (*kṛt*) used to create nominal derivatives out of verbs. The Tibetan rendering of the term, namely, *de dang mthun pa'i rkyen*, is unusual, since the term *taddhita* in later translations, such as the late eleventh century Tibetan translation of the *Clear Worded*, usually is rendered with *de la phan pa'i*.[73] The unusual rendering might be attributed to the fact that Bhāvaviveka's commentary and its subcommentary by Avalokitavrata were translated into Tibetan in the late eighth or early ninth century by the imperial translators Jñānagarbha and Cog ro klu'i rgyal mtshan, and it is therefore possible that it reflects an early attempt to render the term into Tibetan, where *tad-* was translated straightforward with *de-*, and *-hita* was translated in its sense "suitable for, agreeable to" (*dang mthun pa*) and not in its sense "beneficial for" (*la phan pa*), as seen in the later translation. In this manner, Bhāvaviveka repeated Buddhapālita's grammatical argument, and thereby created a clear exegetical parallel.

While discussing unit two above, it was mentioned that it is necessary to read the sentence that occurs in *Buddhapālita's Explanation* and the *Lamp of Insight*, "alternatively, friendliness is in itself friendliness" into its correct form, being, "alternatively, friendliness is in itself a friend." It was also stated that the succeeding sentence would provide the argument as to why such a reading is required. In this regard, it can now be argued that the mention of *svārthika* in both commentaries presupposes that the word "friendliness" is a derivative (*viśeṣa*), and a derivation must have a base that is different from itself, namely the word "friend" (*mitra*). It would be impossible to use the grammatical argument of synonymous derivation, if the sentence would say, "friendliness is in itself friendliness," because "friendliness" (*maitra*) cannot be taken as a derivative of "friendliness" (*maitra*).

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[72] I am indebted to Stefan Baums, Dipak Bhattacharya, and Matthew T. Kapstein for a stimulating discussion on H-Buddhism on how to reconstruct Bhāvaviveka's term into Sanskrit.

[73] See the similar term *taddhitānta* translated with *de la phan pa'i mtha' can*, which occurs twice in the *Clear Worded*; see Susumu Yamaguchi, *Index to the "Prasannapadā Madhyamaka-Vṛtti"* (Kyoto: Heirakuji-Shoten, 1974), 102.

The authors' grammatical argument therefore requires the correct sentence to be "alternatively, friendliness is in itself a friend" (*mitram eva vā maitram*).

Methodologically, unit three also illustrates a delicate textual problem, which may help to contrast the methods of exegetical parallels and text criticism. The exegetical parallel found in the two earlier commentaries helps solving the incomplete Sanskrit sentence in the *Clear Worded*. If the Sanskrit reconstruction of the *Clear Worded*'s Tibetan phrase *bdag la phan 'dogs pa'i* is supposed to be *svahitaṃ, it becomes possible to envision the following exegetical parallel being transmitted respectively through the three commentaries by Buddhapālita, Bhāvaviveka, and Candrakīrti: *svārthapratyaya → *svārthataddhitapratyaya → *svahitaṃ.[74] The *Clear Worded* would thus preserve the syllable *sva- from *svārtha or *svārthika found either in *Buddhapālita's Explanation* or the *Lamp of Insight*, as well as the syllable -*hita- from -*taddhita- seen only in the *Lamp of Insight*. This partial presence of the exegetical parallel in the *Clear Worded* rests on reconstructing the Tibetan phrase *bdag la phan 'dogs pa'i* into Sanskrit as *svahitaṃ, and to see this reconstruction as the best choice is only feasible when the exegetical parallel is taken into consideration. If the passage in the *Clear Worded* is considered on its own, without comparison to the earlier commentaries, reconstructing the Tibetan phrase with *ātmānugrāhakaṃ is a more obvious choice, but such a reconstruction does not accord with the exegetical parallel, since it in no way reflects *svārthapratyaya or *svārthataddhitapratyaya. Hence, the method of exegetical parallels may again help to solve a text critical problem, even in such cases where there is no trustworthy Sanskrit original to rely on.

Presuming that the *Clear Worded*'s unit three reads *svahitaṃ, it is still unknown why Candrakīrti embraced the word *svahitaṃ (*bdag la phan 'dogs pa'i*) instead of adopting the entire exegetical parallel. There seem to be three possibilities. Firstly, Candrakīrti could have misunderstood Buddhapālita's term *svārthapratyaya and taken -*pratyaya (*rkyen*) in its Buddhist doctrinal sense of "condition" instead of its grammatical sense "suffix," in which case he would have read Buddhapālita's sentence as meaning "in that case [friendliness] has advantage for oneself as its condition." He would therefore not have echoed the grammatical argument in the *Clear Worded*, but instead turned it into the ethical argument seen above, that is, "an attitude of friendliness is the attitude benefiting oneself." However, the presence of the term *taddhitapratyaya in the *Lamp of Insight* makes this mistake unlikely, since the *Lamp of Insight*'s longer term carries a straightforward grammatical sense, and it is clear that Candrakīrti read the *Lamp of Insight*. Consequently, this explanation can be rejected.

Secondly, Candrakīrti could consciously have chosen to alter the grammatical argument of the two earlier commentaries into an ethical statement, while still choosing to retain the parts *sva- and -*hita- of the earlier argument, thereby transforming Bhāvaviveka's *svārthataddhitapratyaya into his own *svahitaṃ.

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[74] Or, if the longer form of the term is chosen: *svārthikapratyaya → *svārthikataddhitapratyaya → *svahitaṃ.

This proposition is likewise untenable, since Candrakīrti was not in the habit of utilizing single syllables of words as exegetical parallels within new constructions of entirely different meaning.

Thirdly, it is conceivable that the reading *svahitaṃ came about as the result of a corrupt manuscript. For example, it is possible that Candrakīrti's sentence was longer in its original form and included a grammatical argument at its beginning, but then something went wrong by the time it was translated into Tibetan. The Sanskrit manuscripts used for the Tibetan translation could have been corrupt, and the Tibetan translator would have had to piece single syllables together, such as *sva…ddhita…yac cetas taṃ maitraṃ cetas*, thereby creating a new sentence, which only corresponded in part to the original text and its exegetical parallel. This possibility is supported by the consistent corruption of the sentence in all the surviving Sanskrit manuscripts, and cannot be ruled out. At the same time, it cannot be excluded that it was Candrakīrti himself, who encountered an incomplete sentence in the manuscripts of *Buddhapālita's Explanation* and the *Lamp of Insight* he relied on when writing his text.[75] In that scenario, Candrakīrti would have had to piece together the wording of the earlier commentaries to construct his own sentence, as later reflected correctly in the Tibetan translation but corrupted in the Sanskrit manuscripts.

The real issue that underlies this problem of how the exegetical parallel was transmitted from the earlier commentaries to the *Clear Worded* involves a question of the nature of the sources that Candrakīrti and other scholars of the distant past had at their disposal. It is common practice to take for granted that source manuscripts back in the day of the composition of the texts were pristine and complete, and that each commentator therefore had access to perfect copies of the preceding works. This presumption lands the researcher in the predicament that inconsistencies between a series of texts must always be explained as the outcomes of later corruptions. However, it is neither given that there ever was a perfectly fault-free original of any text, nor is it likely that early manuscript copies of a work were completely without error. The modern practice of issuing lists of errata and corrigenda even with a first edition of a printed work can be seen as a reflection thereof. Similarly, an author's autograph might also be plagued by unclear expositions, inconsistencies in argument, or stylistic imperfections. With this in view, the traditional antiquarian[76] objective of the text critic to reproduce the virginal and perfect work of an ancient author is an illusive proposition. In a less than ideal world, the researcher ought to be prepared to approach inconsistencies pragmatically with openness towards the possibility that some errors, omissions,

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[75] It is noteworthy that Bhāvaviveka's subcommentator Avalokitavrata (D3859 volume 3 [*za*], 19b) likewise in his comment on this sentence transforms Bhāvaviveka's term *svārthataddhitapratyaya* into a form containing *svahita*, namely *bdag dang mthun pa'i tshig gi rkyen* (*svahitapadapratyaya*). See also footnote 56 above, where Avalokitavrata's parallel construction *parahitapadapratyaya* (*gzhan dang mthun pa'i tshig rkyen*) is mentioned, which immediately precedes the present sentence in his commentary.

[76] I am indebted to Charles Lock for showing the connection between text criticism and antiquarianism in a private communication.

and variant readings might actually be the fabric of the very earliest versions of a text.

The prospect of a critical edition that adequately represents a work's original flaws seems very attractive in this context, especially if the editorial intention is not to produce the most readable adaptation but a version that lies closest to the historical reality. Although the method of exegetical parallels may not offer decisive proof for such original flaws but merely indicate their probable presence in a given passage, it may nevertheless be an essential tool in this endeavour by suggesting what reading might be expected, as was exemplified by Candrakīrti's **svahitaṃ* with its vague connection to the longer formulations of the earlier commentaries. With the probability of an original flawed sentence in mind, the editor may suddenly be able to recognize the flawed sentence, fully or partly, in one of the text's manuscript witnesses, which otherwise inevitably would have been taken to be a later corruption, if the original text were presumed to be flawless. In this regard, the method of exegetical parallels provides the editor with a tool for tracing original errors in the succeeding tradition, unveiling attempts to fix the flaws, and uncovering the effects they had on the commentarial tradition.

In sum, a text critical edition may not necessarily be the optimal approach when working with exegetical parallels, because variant readings tend to be hidden out of view in the edition's critical apparatus. Misleading emendations that do not conform with the exegetical parallels, such as the above-mentioned reconstruction **ātmānugrāhakaṃ*, make the detection of subtle exegetical parallels more difficult. Oppositely, a too forceful application of the method of exegetical parallels to text critical work in the form of emendations may also distort the critical edition by endorsing emendations that may be too far removed from the actual witnesses of the text. While it is possible that the two methods in some contexts aid each other, as has also been illustrated above, it seems that their fundamentally opposite principles speak against using them in unison. What would then be the ideal approach for working with exegetical parallels, if not by the use of text critical editions? In-depth work on exegetical parallels would ideally have to be done by directly comparing the readings of all existing manuscripts of the involved texts by arranging each sentence synoptically. A synoptic display would foster the best possible circumstance for viewing the texts as these were transmitted over time, and will therefore enable detection of exegetical parallels on the most subtle level, both with regard to parallels within the consistent and authentic readings as well as parallels of inconsistencies and errors. Without entirely disposing of text criticism, critical editions with their emendations could be used alongside the synoptic manuscript readings to provide often-needed solutions to passages that are hopelessly corrupt.

In this way, the analysis pertaining to the three units of the example of the third type of exegetical parallel is concluded. In total, there are sixteen sentences with "later Indian exegetical parallels" among the 356 sentences of the *Clear Worded*'s

seventeenth chapter, which amount to 4.5 percent of the chapter.[77] Their frequency is thus lower than the omnipresent exegetical parallels (6 percent) and the omni-Indian exegetical parallels (8 percent).

The general nature of the later Indian exegetical parallels is difficult to characterize, since they span so many different forms of parallels, starting with simple shared repetitions of words from the root-text to highly technical passages, as the one illustrated here. In general, it may be observed that later Indian exegetical parallels tend to be less literal repetitions of the root-text than the omnipresent exegetical parallels, and they are at times more scholastic in nature than the omni-Indian exegetical parallels. When comparing the later Indian with the omnipresent and the omni-Indian exegetical parallels from the perspective of the commentarial tradition, a perceptible contrast emerges. At one end of the spectrum, the omnipresent and the omni-Indian exegetical parallels show the stream by which the commentarial tradition filtered down through all the successive commentaries, revealing a current that may leave the reader wondering whether the source for these parallels is an undercurrent traceable back even beyond Nāgārjuna's authorship and time. At the other end of the spectrum, the later Indian exegetical parallels are novelties springing up relatively late in the commentarial tradition, and their complexity in many cases presupposes expertise in a more evolved monastic curriculum, requiring fluency in the Sanskrit grammatical tradition, skill in logic, and an ability to engage in denser forms of exegesis and debate. They thus disclose a new intellectual flow in Great Vehicle Buddhism in general and within the Madhyamaka tradition in particular, feeding into the main stream of the commentarial tradition.

Buddhapālita-Candrakīrti Exegetical Parallels

The fourth type of exegetical parallel is only shared between the commentaries by Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti, and henceforth will be referred to as "Buddhapālita-Candrakīrti exegetical parallels." In the example given below, Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti introduce the *Root Verses of the Middle Way School* verse 17.21, which is the first verse of the last part of the seventeenth chapter proposing the Madhyamaka view on the connection between an action and its result. Unlike the three preceding examples for exegetical parallels, where the commentators were directly commenting on the root-verses of the *Root Verses of the Middle Way School*, the fourth example does not include any words from the root-text by Nāgārjuna. It is instead the authors' own words that precede root-verse 17.21.

The character of the example is polemical in nature, where both authors sarcastically comment on the Abhidharmic concepts of the connection between an action and its result, which were presented as the views of Nāgārjuna's opponents in the second part of the seventeenth chapter. While mocking the adversaries, both

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[77] These sentences occur at: 302.3; 303.7-8; 305.3 (two sentences); 305.11; 306.3; 307.2-3 (two sentences); 307.10; 310.1; 313.11-12; 316.11; 316.14-15; 321.6-8; 323.19; and 324.6. Regarding the system of these references, see note 30 above.

commentators employ a favorite metaphor of the Prajñāpāramitā and Madhyamaka literature, which is used to express the instability or utter nonexistence of something by comparing it to a mirage-city (*gandharvanagara*, *dri za'i grong khyer*).[78] In this particular context, both writers similarly add the word "rampart" (*prākāra*, *ra ba*) to speak of "the ramparts of a mirage-city." This is meant to compare the opponents' position to a mirage-city whose defensive mounds are about to fall under the critique that is going to be raised by the followers of the Middle Way School.

	Buddhapālita's Explanation	The *Clear Worded*
Sanskrit	-	*atrocyate/ kim* iha *bhavanto gandharvanagaraprākāra*-patanāśaṅkitayātīvodvignās tatparirakṣāpariśramāyāsam āpannāḥ/ ye nāma svayaṃ *karmaṇy anupapadyamāne* tat*phala*nimittaṃ *vipravadadhve*. [79]
Tibetan	*bshad pa*/ *ci khyod dri za'i grong khyer gyi ra ba* 'chos pas g-yen spyo 'am/ khyod *las mi 'thad* bzhin du kyi *'bras bu'i* phyir *rtsod* ko.[80]	'di la *bshad par* bya ste/ gang dag *las* nyid kyang *mi 'thad* pa de'i phyir *'bras bu*'i rgyu can gyi *rtsod* pa byed pa *khyed* cag *ci*'i phyir *dri za'i grong khyer gyi ra ba* 'gyel gyis dogs pas ches yid byung bar gyur zhing de srung ba'i ngal bas tshegs su 'gyur/.[81]

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[78] Or literally, "an angel-city" or "*gandharva*-city." It is possible that the mirage-city from the Indian context refers to the general atmospheric phenomenon called superior mirage, where a thing, such as a city from a foreign land, appears in the sky as an optical illusion. For example, as reported by my grandmother Agnes Kragh, who lived on the Danish west coast, people on the Danish North Sea beach occasionally witness the superior mirage of a Scottish town, which in actuality is located about 420 miles (680 kilometers) across the sea, appearing in the sky above the horizon, as if being a city in the sky reminiscient of the Indian mirage-city in the sky.

[79] Sanskrit edition by Kragh, *Early Buddhist Theories*, 70. Translation (adapted from Kragh, *Karmaphalasambandha*, 255): "[The Mādhyamika] **responds** here: **You have** here **argued** on account of **the result** of action, even though [the independent existence of] **action** itself **is not justifiable**. Aren't you anxious that **the ramparts of your mirage-city** might fall after having gone through this trouble to protect them?"

[81] Tibetan edition by Kragh, *Early Buddhist Theories*, 130. Translation: "[The Mādhyamika] **responds** here: **You have argued** for **the result** being endowed with a cause, even though [the independent existence of] **action** itself **is not justifiable**. Aren't you anxious that **the ramparts of your mirage-city** might fall after having gone through this trouble to protect them?"

[80] Tibetan edition by Saito, *Buddhapālita*, vol. 2, 232. Translation: "[The Mādhyamika] **responds:** Why do you speak so divisively by attempting to repair **the ramparts of your mirage-city**? **You have**

In the first sentence, the commentators begin their passages with the verb "to respond" (*ucyate*, *bshad pa*), which in the Madhyamaka commentaries denotes that the Mādhyamika is speaking. The second sentence contains the mocking question, where the two commentaries share the metaphor of "the ramparts of a mirage-city" (*gandharvanagaraprākāra*, *dri za'i grong khyer gyi ra ba*). The formulations of the question differ slightly, but their gist remains the same. Finally, the third sentence explains why the opponents' position is comparable to a mirage-city by arguing that it is untenable to assert independent existence of "action," which is the basis for their position. In the third sentence, the exegetical parallel does not take place on the sentence level but merely through the individual words "have argued" (*vipravadadhve*, *rtsod*), "action" (*karmani*, *las*), "result" (*phala*, *'bras bu*), and "is not justifiable" (*anupapadyamāna*, *mi 'thad*). For all three sentences, it is remarkable that the sentence- and word-order are similar in the origin-replica and destination-text but are dissimilar in the destination-replica due to the character of the Tibetan translation.

Among the 356 sentences in the seventeenth chapter of the *Clear Worded*, there are twelve sentences (3.5 percent) that attest Buddhapālita-Candrakīrti exegetical parallels.[82] In nature, the parallels are either structural, since they deal with unpacking the root-text, or they consist of shared metaphors and analogies as seen in the example above.

Bhāvaviveka-Candrakīrti Exegetical Parallels

The most common type of exegetical parallel in the seventeenth chapter of the *Clear Worded* is those parallels that are shared exclusively between Bhāvaviveka's *Lamp of Insight* and Candrakīrti's *Clear Worded*. Accordingly, the fifth and last major kind of exegetical parallel is called "Bhāvaviveka-Candrakīrti exegetical parallels." An illustration can be found in a passage of Candrakīrti's commentary on the *Root Verses of the Middle Way School* root-verse 17.3ab. In the context of distinguishing "intention" (*cetanā*, *sems pa*) from "action following intention" (*cetayitvā*, *bsam pa*), the particular verse characterizes "intention" as being "mental action" (*mānasa*, *yid kyi*). The two pertinent lines of the verse say:

> Among these, that which is called "intention"
> Is taught as mental action.[83]

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indeed **argued** on account of **the result** of action, while [the independent existence of] **action is not justifiable**."

[82] These occur at: 307.1; 311.16; 316.5-6; 316.12-13; 316.14; 317.6-7; 323.11-13 (three sentences); and 329.3-6 (three sentences).

[83] Translation adapted from Kragh, *Early Buddhist Theories*, 224. The first words in the verse, "among these," are *tatra* in Sanskrit. Sanskrit text in Kragh *Early Buddhist Theories*, 94: *tatra yac cetanety uktaṃ/ karma tan mānasaṃ smṛtam//*.

The verse-lines are explained in the *Lamp of Insight* and the *Clear Worded* as follows:

	The *Lamp of Insight*	The *Clear Worded*
Sanskrit	-	*manasi bhavaṃ mānasaṃ/ manodvāreṇaiva tasya niṣṭhāgamanāt* kāyavākpravṛttinirapekṣatvāc ca *manovijñānasaṃprayukta*iva *cetanā mānasaṃ karmety ucyate/ tatraśabdo nirdhāraṇe/*. [84]
Chinese	Wei **si yu yi xiang ying ming wei yi ye.** Fu ci ci **si yu yi men zhong de jiu jing gu**, ming wei yi ye (謂思與意相應名為意業。復次此思於意門中得究竟故。名為意業). [85]	-
Tibetan	*de la zhes bya ba'i sgra ni dmigs kyis* bsal ba'i don to/ /las gang sems pa zhes gsungs pa de ni yid kyir 'dod de/ *yid kyi zhes bya ba ni yid la byung ba ste/ yid kyi sgo kho na nas de mthar thug par* 'gyur ba'i *phyir* ro/. [86]	*yid la yod pa ni yid kyi ste/ yid kyi sgo nas de mthar thug par* 'gro ba'i *phyir* dang/ lus dang ngag 'jug pa la ltos pa med pa'i phyir *yid kyi rnam par shes pa dang tshungs par ldan pa'i sems pa* kho na *la yid kyi las zhes brjod do/ /de la zhes bya ba'i sgra ni dmigs kyis* dgar ba'o//. [87]

[84] Sanskrit edition by Kragh, *Early Buddhist Theories*, 96. Translation (adapted from Kragh, *Early Buddhist Theories*, 224-225): "**Mental means something found in the mind. Because it is completed only by means of the mind** and because it is independent of bodily and verbal activity, **intention, which is connected** only **with the mental consciousness, is said to be mental action. The word** *tatra* **is used in the sense of selection.**"

[85] T1566.99b14. Translation: "It is said: **Intention, which is connected with the mental consciousness, is said to be mental action.** Further, **because it is completed only by means of the mind,** intention is said to be mental action." The Chinese translation does not attest the first sentence found in the Tibetan translation of the *Lamp of Insight*, where the function of the word *tatra* is explained.

[86] Tibetan edition by Ames, "Bhavaviveka's Prajnapradipa," 509. Translation: "**The word** *tatra* **has** the meaning **of selection.** The action called intention is proclaimed to be mental, **because mental means something found in the mind,** and **it is completed only by means of the mind**." The present Tibetan edition contains one emendation introduced by me. The phrase "something found in the mind" (*yid la byung ba*) is an emendation of the corrupt phrase "something that has arisen from the mind" (*yid las byung ba*), which is found in the Tibetan xylographs. The emendation is based on the *Clear Worded*'s readings *manasi bhavam* and *yid la yod pa*, and is confirmed by the explanation given in Avalokitavrata's subcommentary on the *Lamp of Insight*, which glosses the phrase as *yid la byung zhing yod pa* (D3859 volume 3 [*za*], 21b3). The emendation of this corruption is similar to what was seen above in the example for the later Indian exegetical parallels with the phrase *mdza' bshes la 'byung ba*.

[87] Tibetan edition by Kragh, *Early Buddhist Theories*, 147. Translation: "**Mental means something found in the mind. Because it is completed by means of the mind** and because it is independent of

The example chosen for this type of exegetical parallel is complicated by the substantial disparities between the Chinese and Tibetan origin-replicas. Therefore, different color codes have been applied in the table above, as usual, with red indicating an exegetical parallel, highlighted yellow denoting an exegetical parallel only attested by the Chinese origin-replica, and highlighted green signifying an exegetical parallel only attested by the Tibetan origin-replica.

In unit one, *manasi bhavaṃ mānasaṃ*, Candrakīrti's exegesis begins by explaining the word "*mānasa*" through the derivative analysis, "something found in the mind" (*manasi bhavaṃ*). This implies that *mānasa* should be understood as a derivative from the base "mind" (*manas*) achieved through the use of the secondary nominal derivative suffix "–a," called the *taddhita* suffix, in its locative sense. The formula *manasi bhavaṃ* is identical with the formula applied in the expression "that which arises in reference to a friend" (*mitre bhavam*), which was seen in the example for the third kind of exegetical parallel called "later Indian exegetical parallels." In the present instance, the locative case is used in its true locative sense, which was not the case with the above example *mitre bhavam*, where the locative case served to indicate a direct object.

The corresponding exegetical parallel can only be found in the Tibetan origin-replica of the *Lamp of Insight*, where it occurs as the third sentence: "mental means something found in the mind" (*yid kyi zhes bya ba ni yid la byung ba ste*). Except for the quotation-marker *zhes bya ba* (**iti*), the sentence is fully reflected in the destination-text. The Tibetan verbal noun *byung ba* in the origin-replica corresponds to the Sanskrit verbal noun *bhavaṃ* in the destination-text, which in the destination-replica received the alternative translation *yod pa* (*bhavaṃ*). In the example for the later Indian exegetical parallel, the Tibetan translator of the destination-replica translated this verbal noun in the similar construction "that which arises in reference to a friend" (*mdza' bshes la 'byung ba*, **mitre bhavam*) with the verbal noun *'byung ba*. It therefore seems that for Pa tshab lo tsā ba, the translator of the destination-replica, the verbal nouns *'byung ba* and *yod pa* could be used interchangeably for Sanskrit *bhavam*.

In unit two, *manodvāreṇaiva tasya niṣṭhāgamanāt*, Candrakīrti gives his first argument as to why intention is said to be a mental action, namely, "because it is completed only by means of the mind."

The corresponding exegetical parallel is found verbatim in both origin-replicas with only two minor differences. In the Chinese origin-replica, this argument is placed as the second of two sentences, and hence the argument is preceded by the word "further" (*fu ci*, 復次). In the Tibetan origin-replica, the rendering of the nominalized Tibetan verb "is completed" (*mthar thug par 'gyur ba*) is at variance with the synonymous rendering of the Tibetan destination-replica, where the verb is given as *mthar thug par 'gro ba*. The Sanskrit verbal noun of the destination-text is *niṣṭhāgamanāt*. An attestation of the synonymous phrase *mthar phyin par 'gyur*

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bodily and verbal activity, only <mark>intention, which is connected with the mental consciousness, is said to be mental action.</mark> <mark style="background:green">The word *tatra* is used in the sense of selection.</mark>"

ba, used as a translation for Sanskrit *niṣṭhāgamana* in another source extant in both Sanskrit and Tibetan translation, leads to the conclusion that the two Tibetan renderings most likely reflect the same Sanskrit term.[88] Further, the Tibetan origin-replica includes the word "only" (*kho na*), which also occurs in the destination-text (*eva*). It is omitted in the Tibetan destination-replica, perhaps due to the non-idiomatic character of the phrase *sgo kho na nas*, as opposed to the more common idiomatic phrase *sgo nas*.

In unit three, *kāyavākpravṛttinirapekṣatvāc ca*, Candrakīrti gives his second argument as to why intention is said to be a mental action. This argument, namely, "and because it is independent of bodily and verbal activity," is not an exegetical parallel, since it does not reflect any phrase in the origin-text. Consequently, it is irrelevant for the current discussion.

In unit four, *manovijñānasaṃprayuktaiva cetanā mānasaṃ karmety ucyate*, Candrakīrti repeats the proposition of the root-text indicating intention to be a mental action, and further qualifies the word "intention" by attributing it exclusively to the mental consciousness, viz. "intention, which is connected only with the mental consciousness, is said to be mental action."

The corresponding exegetical parallel is found only in the first sentence of the Chinese origin-replica, and reads, "It is said: intention, which is connected with the mental consciousness, is said to be mental action" (wei si yu yi xiang ying ming wei yi ye, 謂思與意相應名為意業). The Chinese sentence contains the word "it is said" (*wei*, 謂) – used as an opening to the commentarial passage – that is not reflected in the sentence of the destination-text. Further, the destination-text includes the word "only" (*eva*), which finds no correspondence in the Chinese origin-replica. Besides these two minor variations, the two sentences are identical.

In unit five, *tatraśabdo nirdhāraṇe*, Candrakīrti – as an afterthought – adds an explanation on the first word of the root-verse, namely "among these" (*tatra*), by stating its semantic nature: "The word *tatra* is used in the sense of selection (*nirdhāraṇe*)." The reason for providing this clarification is that the pronoun *tatra* has a large range of meanings in Sanskrit, the most basic being "there." In the present verse, however, Candrakīrti argues that it must be understood in its less common partitive sense, "among these." The pronoun emphasizes "intention" among the two elements presented in the preceding verse of the root-text, that is, "intention" (*cetanā*) and "action following intention" (*cetayitvā*).

The corresponding exegetical parallel appears only in the Tibetan origin-replica, where it is placed first in the quoted passage. Most probably, Bhāvaviveka follows the word order of the Sanskrit root-verse, while Candrakīrti, for unknown reasons, places the same sentence after having explained the main proposition of the verse-lines. Another notable aspect is a slight divergence between the renderings of the Tibetan terms denoting "selection" in the origin- and destination-replicas. In the origin-replica, the term is *dmigs kyi bsal ba*, whereas in the destination-replica

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[88] See Hirakawa, *Index to the "Abhidharmakoṣabhāṣya,"* vol. 3, 105.

dmigs kyi dgar ba – the latter corresponding to the Sanskrit word *nirdhāraṇa* in the destination-text. It is possible that both renderings reflect the same Sanskrit term, but it is equally possible that the Sanskrit term of the origin-text was the synonymous *avadhāraṇa*, since the origin-replica's *dmigs kyi bsal ba* is attested as a translation for that word in another source.[89]

In this way, the presentation of the five units of this example and the corresponding exegetical parallels is completed. What remains now is to look at the disparities between the two origin-replicas. Altogether, there are three disparities, one in the Chinese origin-replica and two in the Tibetan origin-replica. In the former, the passage begins with a sentence not found in the Tibetan origin-replica, and in the latter, the passage begins with two sentences not found in the Chinese origin-replica. All three sentences, however, are found as exegetical parallels in the destination-text. This textual brainteaser raises the double question of what the non-extant Sanskrit origin-text of Bhāvaviveka's *Lamp of Insight* read, and, further, whether the presence of the exegetical parallels can be used to determine the reading of the non-extant origin-text.

In the context of the omnipresent exegetical parallels, the exegetical parallel confirmed the reading of the Chinese origin-replica of the *Lamp of Insight* to be more reliable than the discrepant reading of a similar sentence in the Tibetan origin-replica of the same text. Also, when discussing the later Indian exegetical parallels, the exegetical parallel backed up the validity of the sentence found in the Tibetan origin-replica of the *Lamp of Insight*, which was entirely omitted in the Chinese origin-replica. Likewise, in the present context, the evidence that all three sentences contain parts of exegetical parallels authenticates all the sentences as belonging at least partially to the non-extant Sanskrit origin-text of the *Lamp of Insight*.

The circumstance that exegetical parallels authenticate some sentences from both translations of the *Lamp of Insight* begs the question of how it is possible that discrepant sentences in either translation equally reflect the Sanskrit original. Source criticism would have that both translations are just as reliable, because they reflect two different versions of the Sanskrit text. If the exegetical parallels in the *Clear Worded* are based on some unknown third version of the Sanskrit text of the *Lamp of Insight* and this third version in some passages agrees with the first Sanskrit version, which was the basis for the Chinese translation, and in other passages agrees with the second Sanskrit version, which was the basis for the Tibetan translation, then it follows that the exegetical parallels in the *Clear Worded* confirm readings from either translation of the *Lamp of Insight*.

The significance of the foregoing deliberations, in tandem with the observation made with regard to the Chinese origin-replica in the example for the omnipresent exegetical parallels, is that it might be a disadvantage only to consider the Tibetan translation of the *Lamp of Insight* as authentically reflecting the non-extant Sanskrit text. Instead of shying away from the Chinese translation of this particular text, as

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[89] See Hirakawa, *Index to the "Abhidharmakoṣabhāṣya,"* vol. 3, 214.

it has been the tendency in modern scholarship, both translations must be considered equally important witnesses to the original *Lamp of Insight*. It is possible that scholars have ignored the Chinese translation, because they exclusively employed the classical method of text criticism, which does not offer tools for solving discrepancies between manuscripts in different languages. The method is only geared for collating manuscripts in the same language and not across languages. With no means to resolve the differences, the modern scholar who attempts to include the Chinese translation is forced to rely purely on her or his own preference for the right sense. In this situation, the method of exegetical parallels is helpful, since it provides the benefit of an outside source, permitting authentication of either reading.

The fifth kind called "Bhāvaviveka-Candrakīrti exegetical parallels" is the most frequent type in the seventeenth chapter of the *Clear Worded*. Out of its 356 sentences, there are thirty-three sentences (9 percent) that exhibit this type of exegetical parallel.[90] In general, the parallels vary in nature, since they pertain to a plethora of commentarial issues, including shared explanations on the root-text, shared polemical arguments, and shared lists of terms.

Excavating the Commentarial Tradition

The above five examples of exegetical parallels represent all the major types of exegetical parallels found in the seventeenth chapter of the *Clear Worded*. Six additional minor types of exegetical parallels have not been exemplified, but are included in the following table encompassing the entirety of exegetical parallels occurring therein and indicating their frequency as a percentage of the chapter's total number of sentences:

The *Clear Worded*'s Sources for Exegetical Parallels

Exemplified Major Types	Percentage
1. Omnipresent (*Fear of Nothing* → the *Explanation on the Middle Way School* → *Buddhapālita's Explanation* → the *Lamp of Insight* → the *Clear Worded*)	6 percent
2. Omni-Indian (*Fear of Nothing* → *Buddhapālita's Explanation* → the *Lamp of Insight* → the *Clear Worded*)	8 percent
3. Later Indian (*Buddhapālita's Explanation* → the *Lamp of Insight* → the *Clear Worded*)	5 percent
4. Buddhapālita-Candrakīrti (*Buddhapālita's Explanation* → the *Clear Worded*)	3.5 percent
5. Bhāvaviveka-Candrakīrti (the *Lamp of Insight* → the *Clear Worded*)	9 percent

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[90] These sentences occur at: 305.2; 305.4; 305.9-10; 306.1; 306.1-2; 306.8 (two sentences); 306.9; 307.3; 307.5; 309.1; 309.2; 310.1; 311.6-7 (two sentences); 314.12-13 (only Chinese translation); 316.7-9 (two sentences); 316.9-10; 319.2-3; 320.2; 321.6; 321.6; 324.5-6; 326.12-15 (three sentences); 327.7-8; 327.14; 328.3; 328.3-4; and 328.5-6 (two sentences).

Non-Exemplified Minor Types	Percentage
6. *Fear of Nothing* → **Buddhapālita's Explanation* → the *Clear Worded*[91]	1 percent
7. *Fear of Nothing* → the *Explanation on the Middle Way School* → the *Lamp of Insight* → the *Clear Worded*[92]	0.6 percent
8. *Fear of Nothing* → the *Lamp of Insight* → the *Clear Worded*[93]	0.3 percent
9. The *Explanation on the Middle Way School* → **Buddhapālita's Explanation* → the *Lamp of Insight* → the *Clear Worded*[94]	0.8 percent
10. The *Explanation on the Middle Way School* → the *Lamp of Insight* → the *Clear Worded*[95]	0.6 percent
11. The *Explanation on the Middle Way School* → the *Clear Worded*[96]	0.8 percent
Total percentage of sentences in the seventeenth chapter of the *Clear Worded* exhibiting some form of exegetical parallel with the earlier commentaries	35.6 percent

On one hand, the eleven types of exegetical parallels indicated by this table reveal the multiple lines of transmission of shared exegesis that tie the five commentaries together into a coherent commentarial tradition. On the other hand, the table discloses two discontinuities, because it shows that the exegesis of the two earliest commentaries, namely *Fear of Nothing* and the *Explanation on the Middle Way School*, is only indirectly present in the *Clear Worded*. Firstly, it is notable that the table does not contain any exegetical parallel shared exclusively between the earliest commentary *Fear of Nothing* and the *Clear Worded* without any other commentary serving as an intermediary link. While the omni-present and omni-Indian exegetical parallels as well as the minor types seen in groups six-eight can be traced back to *Fear of Nothing*, they all include one or more later commentaries from which Candrakīrti could have adopted those particular parallels. Secondly, the table includes six types of exegetical parallels featuring the second earliest commentary, the *Explanation on the Middle Way School*, but five of these, namely types one, seven, nine, and ten, are likewise indirect cases, where the exegesis of the *Explanation on the Middle Way School* has been transmitted to the *Clear Worded* via other intermediary commentaries. Only type eleven indicates a direct dependency exclusively between the *Clear Worded* and the *Explanation on the Middle Way School*, but the three parallels of this type are too few and ambivalent to establish this correspondence with sufficient certainty, because they all consist of just single words within longer sentences. Given the lack of evidence for a direct dependency of the *Clear Worded* on the two earliest commentaries, it must be concluded that Candrakīrti was not directly familiar with *Fear of Nothing*

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[91] Occurring at: 325.3, 325.10, 326.3-4, and 326.15.

[92] Occurring at: 328.8-9 (two sentences).

[93] Occurring at: 325.6-7.

[94] Occurring at: 324.10-11 (three sentences).

[95] Occurring at: 306.2-3, and 327.4.

[96] Occurring at: 305.7-8, and 330.4-7 (two sentences).

and the Central Asian commentary, the *Explanation on the Middle Way School*. Indeed, given that *Fear of Nothing* was not familiar to the north Indian author Candrakīrti and is not listed by Avalokitavrata or Atiśa in their lists of the *Root Verses of the Middle Way School* commentaries, the question could be raised whether *Fear of Nothing* might too have been a Central Asian commentary that did not proliferate in India. In that case, its shared exegetical parallels of types one and two might have been derived from an unknown even earlier source, whence the author of *Fear of Nothing*, **Buddhapālita's Explanation*, and possibly also Bhāvaviveka could have drawn their shared exegesis.[97]

While not relying directly on *Fear of Nothing* and the *Explanation on the Middle Way School*, there is abundant evidence that Candrakīrti paid close attention to the exegesis offered by **Buddhapālita's Explanation* and the *Lamp of Insight* on account of the fact that all types of exegetical parallels – apart from type eleven – include one or both of these commentaries. Candrakīrti's reliance on these two texts in particular is also confirmed by his own statement in the final verses of the *Clear Worded*, where he wrote:

> Having read … the commentary composed by Buddhapālita and the subtle commentary by Bhāvin, I have blended what has been transmitted through the tradition with what I reached through my own analysis, and have presented it fully for the satisfaction of those with cultivated minds.[98]

Candrakīrti here clearly acknowledges his debt to the earlier commentaries by Buddhapālita and Bhāvaviveka,[99] and characterizes his process of commentarial writing as a hybrid of repeating what has been transmitted through the tradition of these commentaries combined with his own reflections. The incorporation of "what has been transmitted through the tradition" just might refer to the kind of exegetical parallels that have been identified here.

When the two earliest extant *Root Verses of the Middle Way School* commentaries, *Fear of Nothing* and the *Explanation on the Middle Way School*, are disregarded as direct sources for the exegetical parallels in the *Clear Worded*, the above table can be simplified so as only to reflect **Buddhapālita's Explanation* and the *Lamp of Insight* as the two direct sources for the shared exegesis:

The *Clear Worded*'s Source of Exegetical Parallel	Percentage
1. **Buddhapālita's Explanation* → the *Lamp of Insight* → the *Clear Worded*	19.8
2. **Buddhapālita's Explanation* → the *Clear Worded*	4.5

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[97] The same principle could apply to other possible types of parallels that might be shared only between *Fear of Nothing* and the other commentaries but not with the *Clear Worded* and therefore not included in the present study.

[98] *dṛṣṭvā … vṛttiṃ cāpy atha buddhapālitakṛtāṃ śūkṣmaṃ ca yad bhāvinā/ pāraṃparyasam-āgataṃ pravicayāc cāsāditaṃ yan mayā piṇḍīkṛtya tad etad unnatadhiyāṃ tuṣṭau samāveditam//*, *Praise to the Middle Way Treatise* (*Madhyamakaśāstrastuti*), verse 11; see J. W. de Jong, "La Madhyamakaśāstrastuti de Candrakīrti," *Oriens Extremus* 9 (1962): 51.

[99] Or Bhāvin, as he calls Bhāvaviveka, probably for metric reasons.

3. The *Lamp of Insight* → the *Clear Worded*	10.5
Total percentage of sentences in the seventeenth chapter of the *Clear Worded* exhibiting some form of exegetical parallel with *Buddhapālita's Explanation* and/or the *Lamp of Insight*	34.8

When seen from this simplified perspective, the most frequent type of exegetical parallel is those that the *Clear Worded* shares with both *Buddhapālita's Explanation* and the *Lamp of Insight*, which underlines the presence of a continued tradition of standard exegesis in Indian *Root Verses of the Middle Way School* writings. Moreover, when the 10.5 percent of exegetical parallels shared only between the *Clear Worded* and the *Lamp of Insight* is compared with the 4.5 percent of those shared exclusively with *Buddhapālita's Explanation*, it is evident that Candrakīrti relied more often on the *Lamp of Insight*. It thus seems that when Candrakīrti sat in his study and wrote the *Clear Worded*, he almost certainly had Bhāvaviveka's *Lamp of Insight* lying beside him and often consulted its exegesis. He also had *Buddhapālita's Explanation* at hand, but chose less often to adopt its explanations. This finding may be surprising in light of the standard Tibetan doxographical assumption that Candrakīrti rejected Bhāvaviveka's *Lamp of Insight* given his critique of its argumentative methodology expressed in the first chapter of the *Clear Worded*.[100]

Many modern scholars have been strongly influenced by the Tibetan doxographical wedge between Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti, with the notable exception of David Seyfort Ruegg. After recapitulating Candrakīrti's critique of Bhāvaviveka, Seyfort Ruegg noted Candrakīrti's silent approval of parts of Bhāvaviveka's work, when he wrote:

> But it is to be observed that Candrakīrti has in fact not taken issue with Bhavya on very many other issues of importance in Madhyamaka thought, and that by his silence he appears to let stand much of what Bhavya has written, however much he has criticized Bhavya as a ratiocinative speculator (*tārkika* "Syllogist") and as a thinker unduly fond of (autonomous) inferences (*anumāna*) and reasoning (*prayogavākya*) and devoted to eristics (*tarka*).[101]

Given the current observation of substantial exegetical parallels between the *Clear Worded* and the *Lamp of Insight*, it is in fact possible to go further than Seyfort Ruegg's statement that Candrakīrti "appears to let stand much of what Bhavya has written," for although Seyfort Ruegg says that Candrakīrti accepted substantial parts of Bhavya's writing by his silence, Candrakīrti actually accepted

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[100] See the *Clear Worded*, chapter 1; Sanskrit edition by de La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 14ff.; English translation by David Seyfort Ruegg, "Two Prolegomena to Madhyamaka Philosophy: Candrakīrti's 'Prasannapadā madhyamakavṛttiḥ' on Madhyamakakārikā I.1 and tsoṅ kha pa blo bzaṅ grags pa / rgyal tshab dar ma rin chen's 'bka' gnad/gnas brgyad kyi zin bris': Annotated Translations," in *Studies in Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka Thought* Part 2, Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 54, edited by Ernst Steinkellner (Vienna: Arbeitskreis für tibetische und buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 2002), 25ff.

[101] Seyfort Ruegg, "Two Prolegomena," 6.

a great deal of Bhāvaviveka's commentary explicitly, simply by inserting numerous sentences and clauses directly from Bhāvaviveka's text right into his own commentary.

In conclusion, the method of exegetical parallels is capable of revealing bonds between a series of commentaries consisting in shared exegesis, rather than grouping commentaries doxographically on the basis of collective adherence to common philosophical principles presupposed for school-formation. It relates to a level of commentarial writing that is more literary than abstract. Hence, this reading strategy offers an alternative or supplementary approach to understanding relationships between Indian commentaries as they existed prior to their aggregation within the Tibetan canon, and is thereby a way to escape the anachronism of associating Indian Buddhist texts purely from the later canonical perspective. Although the method indeed confirms the canon's validity of placing these commentaries together in its section of Madhyamaka, given that the method establishes them as belonging to a single commentarial tradition, it concurrently transcends the boundaries of this particular canon by showing affinities between commentaries derived from different canons, namely the Chinese and the Tibetan canons. Moreover, it uncovers affinities between texts found beneath the sectarian divisions imposed by the later Tibetan doxography, and underlines the literary consistency that makes up a textual tradition, even when the texts have been considered to belong to separate philosophical sub-branches, such as the Autonomists and Consequentialists sub-schools. For, it is by cognizing the pre-modern attitude of classicism that a true history of ideas can be written without superimposing the artifice of the modern reverence for originality.

Glossary

Note: these glossary entries are organized in Tibetan alphabetical order. All entries list the following information in this order: THL Extended Wylie transliteration of the term, THL Phonetic rendering of the term, the English translation, the Sanskrit equivalent, the Chinese equivalent, other equivalents such as Mongolian or Latin, associated dates, and the type of term.

Ka					
Wylie	**Phonetics**	**English**	**Other**	**Dates**	**Type**
dkar po 'char ba	*Karpo Charwa*	*Engendering Purity*	San. *Śubhodaya*		Text
bka' 'gyur	*Kangyur*				Text
Kha					
Wylie	**Phonetics**	**English**	**Other**	**Dates**	**Type**
kho na	khona	only	San. *eva*		Term
Ga					
Wylie	**Phonetics**	**English**	**Other**	**Dates**	**Type**
rgyun	gyün	series			Term
Nga					
Wylie	**Phonetics**	**English**	**Other**	**Dates**	**Type**
nges pa'i tshig	ngepé tsik	derivative analysis	San. *nirukti*		Term
sngon du btang ba	ngöndu tangwa	preceded by	San. *pūrvaka*		Term
Ca					
Wylie	**Phonetics**	**English**	**Other**	**Dates**	**Type**
co ne	Choné				Monastery
cog ro klu'i rgyal mtshan	Chokro Lü Gyentsen				Person
gcugs pa	chukpa	someone dear			Term
gcugs pa las 'byung ba	chukpalé jungwa	what arises in reference to someone dear			Term
Nya					
Wylie	**Phonetics**	**English**	**Other**	**Dates**	**Type**
nyid	nyi	in itself	San. *eva*		Term
gnyen	nyen	companion			Term
gnyen bshes	nyenshé	friend	San. *mitra*		Term
Ta					
Wylie	**Phonetics**	**English**	**Other**	**Dates**	**Type**
bstan 'gyur	*Tengyur*				Text
Tha					
Wylie	**Phonetics**	**English**	**Other**	**Dates**	**Type**
mthar thug par 'gyur ba	tartukpar gyurwa	is completed			Term
mthar thug par 'gro ba	tartukpar drowa	is completed			Term

Da					
Wylie	**Phonetics**	**English**	**Other**	**Dates**	**Type**
dang mthun pa	dang tünpa	suitable for, agreeable to	San. *-hita*		Term
de dang mthun pa'i rkyen	dedang tünpé kyen	secondary nominal derivation suffix	San. **taddhitapratyaya*		Term
de la phan pa'i	dela penpé		San. *taddhita*		Term
de la phan pa'i mtha' can	dela penpé tachen		San. *taddhitānta*		Term
don	dön	meaning	San. *artha*		Term
dri za'i grong khyer	drizé drongkhyer	mirage-city	San. *gandharvanagara*		Term
dri za'i grong khyer gyi ra ba	drizé drongkhyergyi rawa	the ramparts of a mirage-city	San. *gandharvanagara-prākāra*		Term
bdag	dak	oneself			Term
bdag gi don gyi rkyen	dakgi döngyi kyen	synonymous derivation	San. **svārthapratyaya* or **svārthikapratyaya*		Term
bdag gi don la de dang mthun pa'i rkyen	dakgi dönla dedang tünpé kyen		San. **svārthataddhita-pratyaya* or **svārthikataddhita-pratyaya*		Term
bdag dang mthun pa'i tshig gi rkyen	dakdang tünpé tsikgi kyen		San. **svahitapadapratyaya*		Term
bdag la phan 'dogs pa'i	dakla pendokpé	benefiting oneself	San. **svahitaṃ*		Term
bdag la phan 'dogs pa'i	dakla pendokpé	benefiting oneself	San. **ātmānugrāhakaṃ*		Term
mdo	do	discourse, sūtra			Term
sde dge	Degé				Place
Na					
Wylie	**Phonetics**	**English**	**Other**	**Dates**	**Type**
rnam grangs	namdrang	enumeration of related terms	San. *paryāya*		Term
snar thang	Nartang				Monastery
snum pa	numpa	affectionate, tender, oily, smooth, lubricated	San. *sneha*		Term
snum pa'i	numpé	affectionate	San. *sneha*		Term
Pa					
Wylie	**Phonetics**	**English**	**Other**	**Dates**	**Type**
pa tshab lo tsā ba	Patsap Lotsawa				Person
spobs pa	poppa	confidence	San. *pratibhāna*		Term
Pha					
Wylie	**Phonetics**	**English**	**Other**	**Dates**	**Type**
pho lha nas	Polhané				Person

Ba					
Wylie	**Phonetics**	**English**	**Other**	**Dates**	**Type**
byams pa	jampa	friendliness	San. *maitra*		Term
byams pa'o	jampao	friendliness			Term
byung ba	jungwa	arisen			Term
dbu ma	Uma	the Middle Way School	San. *Madhyamaka*		Doxographical Category
dbu ma thal 'gyur pa	Uma Telgyurpa	Consequentialist Mādhyamika	San. **Prāsaṅgika-mādhyamika*		Doxographical Category
dbu ma pa	Umapa	follower of the Middle Way School	San. *Mādhyamika*		Doxographical Category
dbu ma phyi mo ba	Uma Chimowa	proto-Mādhyamika	San. **Mātrika-mādhyamika*		Doxographical Category
dbu ma rang rgyud pa	Uma Ranggyüpa	Autonomy Mādhyamika	San. **Svātantrika-mādhyamika*		Doxographical Category
'byung ba	jungwa	arising			Term
'bras bu	drebu	result	San. *phala*		Term
Ma					
Wylie	**Phonetics**	**English**	**Other**	**Dates**	**Type**
mi 'thad	mité	is not justifiable	San. *anupapadyamāna*		Term
dmigs kyi dgar ba	mikkyi garwa	selection			Term
dmigs kyi bsal ba	mikkyi selwa	selection			Term
Tsa					
Wylie	**Phonetics**	**English**	**Other**	**Dates**	**Type**
rtsa ba	tsawa	root-text	San. *mūla*		Term
rtsod	tsö	have argued	San. *vipravadadhve*		Term
Tsha					
Wylie	**Phonetics**	**English**	**Other**	**Dates**	**Type**
tshig gsal	*Tsiksel*	*The Clear Worded*	San. *Prasannapadā*		Text
mtshan nyid	tsennyi	definition	San. *lakṣana*		Term
Dza					
Wylie	**Phonetics**	**English**	**Other**	**Dates**	**Type**
mdza'	dza	beloved			Term
mdza' bshes	dzanshé	friend			Term
mdza' bshes la 'byung ba	dzanshela jungwa	what arises in reference to a friend	San. **mitre bhavam*		Term
mdza' bshes las 'byung	dzanshelé jungwé	what arises in reference to a friend	San. *mitre bhavam*		Term
Zha					
Wylie	**Phonetics**	**English**	**Other**	**Dates**	**Type**
zhes bya ba	zhejawa	called (or quotation-mark)	San. **iti*		Term
gzhan gyi don	zhengyi dön	other-meaning	San. **parārtha/anyārtha*		Term

Wylie	Phonetics	English	Other	Dates	Type
gzhan dang mthun pa'i tshig rkyen	zhen dang tünpé tsikkyen	a word-suffix used in reference to another	San. **parahitapada-pratyaya*		Term
gzhan la phan 'dogs pa	zhenla pendokpé	benefiting others	San. **parānugrāhakaṃ*		Term

Ya

Wylie	Phonetics	English	Other	Dates	Type
yang na	yangna	alternatively, or	San. *vā*		Term
yid kyi	yikyi	mental action	San. *mānasa*		Term
yid kyi las	yikyi lé	mental action	San. **manaskarma* Chi. *yi ye*		Term
yid la byung ba	yila jungwa	something found in the mind			Term
yid la byung zhing yod pa	yila jungzhing yöpa	something arisen and found in the mind			Term
yid la yod pa	yila yöpa	something found in the mind			Term
yid las byung ba	yilé jungwa	something that has arisen from the mind			Term
yin	yin	is	San. *asti*		Term
yod pa	yöpa	found, existing	San. *bhavaṃ*		Term

Ra

Wylie	Phonetics	English	Other	Dates	Type
ra ba	rawa	rampart	San. *prākāra*		Term
rab tu dbye ba	raptu yewa	subdivision	San. *prabheda*		Term

La

Wylie	Phonetics	English	Other	Dates	Type
la phan pa	la penpa	beneficial for			Term
la sogs pa	lasokpa	…and so forth	San. **ādi*		Term
las	lé	action	San. *karmani*		Term

Sha

Wylie	Phonetics	English	Other	Dates	Type
bshad pa	shepa	to respond	San. *ucyate*		Term

Sa

Wylie	Phonetics	English	Other	Dates	Type
sems snum pa	sem numpa	affectionate state of mind	San. **snehacetas*		Term
sems pa	sempa	intention	San. *cetanā* Chi. *si*		Term
so so yang dag par rig pa	soso yangdakpar rikpa	correct knowledge	San. **pratisaṃvid*		Term
bsam pa	sampa	action following intention	San. *cetayitvā*		Term

Sanskrit					
Wylie	**Phonetics**	**English**	**Sanskrit**	**Dates**	**Type**
chos mngon pa	Chö Ngönpa	Systematized Dharma	*Abhidharma*		Doxographical Category
chos mngon pa'i mdzod kyi bshad pa	*Chö Ngönpé Dzökyi Shepa*	*Commentary on the Repository of Systematized Dharma*	*Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*		Text
chos mngon pa kun las btus pa	*Chö Ngönpa Künlé Tüpa*	*Compendium of Systematized Dharma*	*Abhidharma-samuccaya*		Text
slob dpon	loppön	teacher	*ācārya* (Chi. *fashi*)		Term
dbu ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa ga las 'jigs med	*Uma Tsawé Drelpa Galé Jikmé*	*Fear of Nothing*	**Akutobhayā*	ca. third century CE	Text
		the series of the sprout and so forth	*aṅkurādisantāno*		Term
rjes dpag	jepak	inference	*anumāna*		Term
'phags pa lha	Pakpa Lha		*Āryadeva*	second to third century CE	Person
thogs med	Tokmé		*Asaṅga*	fourth century CE	Person
		Eight Chapters	*Aṣṭādhyāyī*		Text
			Asvabhāva	sixth century CE	Person
mar me mdzad dpal ye shes	Marmedzé Pel Yeshé		*Atiśa Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna*	982-1054 CE	Person
		selection	*avadhāraṇa*		Term
spyan ras gzigs brtul zhugs	Chenrezik Tülzhuk		*Avalokitavrata*	seventh to eighth century CE	Person
		indestructible phenomenon	*avipranāśa*		Term
		an attitude which is without hostility towards sentient beings	*aviruddhaṃ sattveṣu yac cetas*		Term
legs ldan 'byed	Lekden Jé		*Bhāvaviveka*	c. 500-570 CE	Person
legs ldan 'byed	Lekden Jé		*Bhāviveka*	c. 500-570 CE	Person
legs ldan 'byed	Lekden Jé		*Bhavya*	c. 500-570 CE	Person

byang chub lam sgron dka' 'grel	Jangchup Lamdron Kadrel	*Explanation of the Lamp to the Path of Awakening*	*Bodhipathapradīpa-pañjika*		Text
sangs rgyas bskyangs	Sanggyé Kyang		*Buddhapālita*	c. 470-540 CE	Person
dbu ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa bu ddha pā li ta	Uma Tsawé Drelpa Buddhapalita	**Buddhapālita's Explanation*	**Buddhapālita-vṛtti*		Text
dbu ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa bu ddha pā li ta	Uma Tsawé Drelpa Buddhapalita	**Buddhapālita's Explanation on the Middle Way School*	**Buddhapālita-madhyamakavṛtti*	fifth to sixth century CE	Text
zla ba grags pa	Dawa Drakpa		*Candrakīrti*	c. 600-650 CE	Person
		attitude	*cetaḥ*		Term
		that which conditions the mind	*cittābhisaṃskārā*		Term
		mind-stream	*cittasantāna*		Term
			Devaśarman		Person
chos	chö	phenomenon, factor, quality, teaching	*dharma*		Term
		alternatively, friendliness is in itself …	*... eva vā maitram*		Term
			Gujarat		Place
yon tan sbyin	Yönten Jin		*Guṇadatta*		Person
yon tan blo gros	Yönten Lodrö		*Guṇamati*	sixth century CE	Person
			Guṇamati of Valabhi	fifth to sixth century	Person
yon tan dpal	Yönten Pel		*Guṇaśrī*		Person
ye shes snying po	Yeshé Nyingpo		*Jñānagarbha*		Person
		verse	*kārikā*		Term
las	lé	action	*karman*		Term
las dang 'bras bu	lé dang drebu	action and result	*karmaphala*		Term
las dang 'bras bu brtag pa	*Lé dang Drebu Takpa*	*The Analysis of Action and Result*	*Karmaphalaparīkṣā*		Text
las dang 'bras bu'i 'brel pa	lé dang drebū drelpa	a connection between an action and its result	*karmaphala-sambandha*		Term
		Commentary on the Glossary from Kāśi (Varanasi)	*Kāśikavivaraṇa-pañjika*		Text
		primary nominal derivation suffix	*kṛt*		Term

		Praise to the Middle Way Treatise	*Madhyamakaśāstra-stuti*		Text
		Explanation on the Middle Way School	**Madhyamakavṛtti* (Chi. *Zhong lun*)		Text
		Explanation on the Middle Way School Accessing the Meaning of the Great Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras	**Madhyamakavṛttiḥ Mahā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtrārthāvatārā* (Chi. *Shun zhong lun yi ru da bo re bo luo mi jing*)	fourth century CE	Text
theg pa chen po	Tekpa Chenpo	The Great Vehicle	*Mahāyāna*		Doxographical Category
		The Treatise Uncovering the Insight of the Middle Way School of the Great Vehicle	**Mahāyāna-madhyamakaprajñā-vivaraṇaśāstra* (Chi. *Da sheng zhong guan shi lun*)	sixth to seventh century CE	Text
theg pa chen po'i mdo sde'i rgyan gyi rgya cher bshad pa	*Tekpa Chenpö Dodegyengyi Gyacher Shepa*	*Commentary on the Ornament of Discourses of the Great Vehicle*	*Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra-ṭīkā*		Text
byams pa'i sems	jampé sem	benevolent thinking	*maitracetas*		Term
byams pa	jampa	friendliness	*maitraṃ*		Term
byams pa'i sems	jampé sem	an attitude of friendliness	*maitraṃ cetaḥ*		Term
		friendliness in itself	*maitram eva*		Term
		alternatively, friendliness is in itself friendliness	*maitram eva vā maitraṃ*		Term
		What is an attitude of friendliness, that is an attitude of friendliness or simply friendliness	*maitraṃ yac cetas tan maitraceto maitram eva vā*		
		mind	*manas*		Term
		mental	*mānasa*		Term
		something found in the mind	*manasi bhavaṃ*		Term
		(no meaning, corruption of the word maitraṃ)	*metraṃ*		Term
		friend	*mitra*		Term
		friend-arising	*mitrabhavam*		Term
		alternatively, friendliness is in itself a friend	*mitram eva vā maitram*		Term
		in reference to a friend	*mitre*		Term

		an attitude which arises in reference to a friend, [and] which is without hostility towards sentient beings	*mitre bhavam aviruddhaṃ sattveṣu yac cetas*		Term
		An attitude which arises in reference to a friend, [and] which is without hostility towards sentient beings, is an attitude of friendliness or simply friendliness. And what is friendliness, that is an attitude of friendliness	*mitre bhavam aviruddhaṃ sattveṣu yac cetas tan maitraṃ cetaḥ/ maitram eva vā/ maitraṃ yac ca tan maitraṃ cetaḥ*		Term
dbu ma rtsa baʾi tshig leʾuʾr byas pa shes rab ces bya ba	*Uma Tsawé Tsikleur Jepa Sherap Chejawa*	*The Root Verses of the Middle Way School*	*Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā*		Text
klu sgrub	Ludrup		*Nāgārjuna*	first to second century CE	Person
			Nālandā		Monastery
		Etymologies	*Nirukta*		Text
		verbal dissection	*nirvacana*		Term
			Pāṇini		Person
			Paramārtha	499-569 CE	Person
		a friend who is an object that is someone else	**parārthamitre*		Term
		basis	*prakṛti*		Term
dbu ma rtsa baʾi ʾgrel pa shes rab sgron ma	*Uma Tsawé Drelpa Sherap Drönma*	*The Lamp of Insight*	*Prajñāpradīpa*		Text
shes rab sgron ma rgya cher bshad pa	*Sherap Drönma Gyacher Drelpa*	*Commentary on the Lamp of Insight*	*Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā*		Text
tshad ma	tsema	epistemology	*pramāṇa*		Term
thal ʾgyur pa	Telgyurpa	Consequentialist	**Prāsaṅgika*		Doxographical Category
rkyen	kyen	derivation suffix	*pratyaya*		Term
		reasoning	*prayogavākya*		Term
bsod nams	sönam	beneficient, beneficience	*puṇya*		Term
			Rāhula (Chi. *Luomuhou*)	second to third century CE	Person

		without the seed	*ṛte bījāt*		Term
		but without the seed, it does not evolve	*ṛte bījāt sa ca nābhipravarttate*		Term
		to break	*rup*		Term
gzugs	zuk	physical matter	*rūpa*		Term
		breakable	*rūpyate*		Term
		it	*sa*		Term
		but … it does not evolve	*sa ca … nābhipravarttate*		Term
mdo sde dgongs ʾgrel	*Dodé Gongdrel*	*Discourse Revealing the Intention*	*Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra*		Text
bstan bcos	tenchö	treatise	*śāstra*		Term
		a person from Srughna	*sraughna*		Term
			Srughna		Place
blo gros brtan pa	Lodrö Tenpa		*Sthiramati*	c. 510-570 CE	Person
mdo	do	scripture	*sūtra*		Term
		own, same	**sva-*		Term
		synonymous	**svārtha*		Term
		having the same meaning [as its base]	**svārthapratyaya*		Term
		secondary nominal suffix [forming a derivative] having the same meaning [as its base]	**svārthataddhita-pratyaya*		Term
		being synonymous	**svārthika*		Term
		synonymous derivation	*svārthika*		Term
		attitude of friendliness found in one's own stream of being	**svasantāna-maitracittam*		Term
rang rgyud pa	Ranggyüpa	Autonomist	**Svātantrika*		Doxographical Category
		darkness	*tamas*		Term
		darkness	*tamisra*		Term
		eristics	*tarka*		Term
		syllogist	*tārkika*		Term
		there	*tatra*		Term
		what occurs in that	*tatra bhavaḥ*		Term
sde snod gsum	Denö Sum	*the Three Baskets*	*Tripiṭaka*		Textual Group
			Valabhi		Place
dbyig gnyen	Yiknyen		*Vasubandhu*		Person

		Consciousness-Only Proponent	*Vijñānavāda*		Doxographical Category
			*Vimalākṣa (Chi. *Qingmu*)	fourth to early fifth century CE	Person
		without the seed	*vinā bījāt*		Term
		derivative	*viśeṣa*		Term
		classical Sanskrit grammatical tradition	*vyākaraṇa*		Term
		Which state of mind, that [is] an attitude of friendliness	*yac cetas taṃ maitraṃ cetaḥ*		Term
			Yāska	ca. sixth to fifth century BCE	Person
rigs pa drug cu pa	*Rikpa Drukchupa*	*Sixty Verses*	*Yuktiṣaṣṭikā*		Text
Chinese					
Wylie	**Phonetics**	**English**	**Chinese**	**Dates**	**Type**
		and so forth	*deng*		Term
			Dunhuang		Place
		further	*fu ci*		Term
			Qianlong	1711-1799	Person
		if	*ruo*		Term
		it is said	*wei*		Term
		It is said: intention, which is connected with the mental consciousness, is said to be mental action	*wei si yu yi xiang ying ming wei yi ye*		Term
		series	*xiang xu*		Term
		the series of the sprout and so forth	*ya deng xiang xu*		Term
			Zhanran	711-782 CE	Person
		seed	*zhong*		Term
		seed	*zhong zi*		Term

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