THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE BUDDHIST AND THE NAIYÁYIKA PHILOSOPHERS:
A BRIEF SURVEY

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Philosophy is nothing but the human quest for truth. From very remote time Indians were blessed with the spontaneous curiosity about what truth is. The first literature containing the truth realized by the ancient Indians is the Vedas. The philosophy revealed in these literature was more or less tuned with human helplessness together with submission to nature Gods. This went unchallenged till the Buddha preached his new doctrine which afterwards brought about a head-on collision with the Vedic scripture, but the Buddha denied to give any positive answer to any Vedic approach and consequently in later period a gigantic philosophical system was built up against the Vedic philosophy or more accurately there rose a potent against the unchallenged doctrine. In the Brahmapujisatu of Dignākaraṇa, Kartrījñākaṇa and the Upaśrita we find that the philosophy has taken a challenging attitude by now. The people also were clearly divided into two major groups. On the one hand, the Brahmans were there with the Vedic philosophy and on the other, the Buddhists came forward with their new philosophical doctrines.

It was the beginning of the Christian era when such a situation was created that the Brahmin and the Buddha philosophers considered their respective philosophical views unsuccessful if those were not directed against the opponent and at the same time not victorious. It is obvious that the introduction of the debate system was largely responsible for the creation of this situation.

The fundamental difference in outlooks between realism and idealism led to mutual confrontations which continued in an unbroken line for generations of scholars resulting in the growth of a rich and vigorous literature. In this way a section of the Brahmin philosophers developed a philosophical system predominantly with the science of reasoning (nyaya). Later the system was known as Nyaya philosophy. The first systematic work on the Nyaya philosophy is the Nyaya-sūtra of Gangesa. It is supposed to be a work of about 150 A.D. Going through this work, we can undoubtedly say that much before the
composition of this work the Buddhists had already put forward a lot of strong arguments that helped their views to give birth to a concentrated self-sufficient system of philosophy.

We find in the Nyaya-sutra that Gautama refutes several doctrines of the Buddhist philosophy, such as the whole is not separate from its parts², momentariness of things³, denial of the external object⁴, voidness of everything⁵ and so on. But it should be kept in mind that these doctrines could not assume the highly sophisticated forms by that time. And Gautama’s refutation also does not show much complicity of thought to turn those down.

Then there is a century of silence. In this period the followers of these two schools obviously went on with their studies but, no remarkable work was composed.

Now came ahead a Buddhist scholar to protest against the views of Gautama. He is none other than Nagarjuna⁶, who is the first outstanding philosopher to propagate the fundamental philosophy of voidness (sunyavada). Dr. Schelbertsky seeks to explain the background of the advent of this school in this way, “... Monism took the offensive and finally established itself triumphantly in the very heart of a new Buddhism. Transplanted upon a fresh soil the old Monism produced a powerful growth of various systems. In the schools of Nagarjuna and Deva it received a dialectical foundation, in the way of a dialectical destruction of all other systems⁷.”

In the Mādhyamika-Kārikā, Nagarjuna tries to establish his theory of voidness by contradicting many of the actual Nyaya-sūtras. He composed the oldest Buddhist treatises on the art of debate, viz., Vīraka-vyāvahāra and Pramāṇa-vibhṛata. In Vīraka-vyāvahāra, going to prove the voidness of things, Nagarjuna has shown his daring attitude of uprooting even the existence of the Pramāṇas. As he was an exponent of a particular ‘ nihilistic’ theory, naturally he could not also check the temptation of sticking at the root of the categories proposed by Gautama. His Pramāṇa-vibhṛata is exclusively a refutation of the sixteen categories contained in the Nyaya-sūtras. By applying his critical axe of relativity he claims that all the sixteen categories are realtional and therefore ultimately unreal.

This Buddhist theory of voidness was one of the crucial points for a Nyaya exponent named Vatsayana. Going to prove his theory, the Buddhist Nāgārjuna started with demolishing even the existence of the instrument of valid knowledge. But Vatsayana started with a strong protest and a crucial defense of Pramāṇas and the very first line of his commentary reads Pramāṇasthāryā pratyakṣāt pratyakṣāt pratiyogitaḥ arthāt pramāṇam.

Gautama formulated the sūtras but Nāgārjuna flayed them mercilessly and Vatsayana who belonged to the lineage of the Naiyāyika was prompted to write a commentary on the Nyaya-sūtras in about the late 4th century or early 5th century. The commentary bears the title Nyaya-Kāratva.

In course of explaining the Nyaya-sūtras, Vatsayana raises objections against Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of voidness of things which is discussed in the Mādhyamika-Kārikā according to which our means and objects of knowledge are as unreal as things appearing in a dream or exhibited in a jugglery or as the city of the celestial choosing or as a mirage. Vatsayana argues against the Viśiṃśavāda philosophy (i.e., the theory of idealism) on the Nyaya-sūtras iv. 2. 26-7 and iii. 2. 11 and against the momentariness on the Nyaya-sūtras iii. 2.11-13.
To answer the objections raised by Vātsyāyana, a Buddhist philosopher, Vāsudandha (c. A.D. 410–490), composed three works, viz., Vāda-viśeṣa, Vāda-viśeṣāna and Viśeṣa-
viśeṣā. But unfortunately, all the works are lost.

This philosopher, however, became also famous for propounding a fundamental doctrine of some Buddhist, the doctrine of idealism (Viśeṣa-viśeṣa), as a sophistical philosophy. As to the advent of Viśeṣa-viśeṣa, Dr. Scharzhaf von says, "When Nāgāraja's standpoint of extreme relativism was forsaken, the brothers Amila and Vasudandha took up the study of Nyāya logic and the work of its adaptation in the idealistic foundations of this philosophy."

As all the logical works of Vasudandha have been lost, so the complete assessment of his view on logic is not possible at present. From the later works it is found that Vasudandha opposing the nature of perception and inference, the number and nature of the members of syllogism recommended in the Nyāya-sūtra, gave new definitions of them. He wrote his Vāda-viśeṣa challenging the laws regulating the debate as advocated by Gaṇatsa.

This dispute between the realism of the Nyāya school and the dogmatic idealism of the Viśeṣa-viśeṣa school of Buddhist philosophy went on. But it was the 8th century A.D. when India gave birth to her glorious philosopher-logician son, Dignāga. In his hand Buddhist idealism assumed a critical stage. Dignāga's Pramāṇa-samuccaya, perhaps the most outstanding one of his five works, shook the world of Indian logic. Now withstanding the tests the Buddhists realized, Buddhist philosophy was suffering from insufficiencies of defects in logic for their own to establish their realization. Now with Dignāga, Buddhist philosophy got the elixir of life. Dr. S.C. Vidyābhushana writes, "Both in matter and in manner his works marked a distinct departure from those of his predecessors. The keenness of his insight and the soundness of his critical sense combined to amaze him with an individuality all his own. No praise seems too high for him. Indeed he may fittingly be styled as the first and last of Indian logicians."

Pramāṇa-samuccaya is a logical work written in Angaṣṭi metre. In this work Dignāga explains his own theories of Buddhist logic. By this Erasgila pushed the Buddhist philosophy in the real ground where the Naiyāyikas were the chief opponents. He criticizes a Nyāya view: Nyāya-sūtra 1.1.2, enumerating the sense-organs, does not mention the mind, but the Naiyāyikas admit it as a separate sense-organ. In support of their view they say that the mind can unhappily be admitted as a sense-organ because nowhere in the Nyāya-sūtra the view is contradicted. Now Dignāga says, well, if absence of contradiction means admission, there would have been no necessity of all of formulating this sūtra because the group of sense-organs as mentioned there has not been contradicted anywhere in the Naiyāya-sūtra. A few more objections like the above can be found which are nothing but trivial.

The crucial point of dispute are the definitions of perception pramāṇa and inference anumāna also with the definitions of probans (teka) etc. given by Gaṇatsa. Restating those Dignāga formulated fresh definitions of them. Comparison (anumāna) and verbal testimony (lakṣa) are not separate instruments of valid knowledge in the Buddhist view. It is Dignāga who for the first time draws attention to the theory of Apoha, i.e., the law of contradiction. It contains the view opposite to the view of knowledge gathered in a direct way. According to the Apoha theory, the law of cognizance is explained as 'we can actively cognize or determine a thing only by opposing it to what it is not'.
A spark which ignited the criticism in the realistic philosophy is Dignaga’s ‘definition of perception’. If the difference in the very basis appears too serious then that in the consecutive stages of development obviously turns to not only doctrinal dispute but also bitter relation in life. And exactly this happened in the later period. In the Nyaya philosophy being a realistic philosophy ‘the knowledge resulting from sense-object contact’ also associated with terms is given the respect of nothing but perception and real knowledge. But actually, according to Dignaga, is incorrectly involved in causal efficiency. A fire which burns and cooks is a real fire. A fire which is absent, which is imagined, which neither really burns nor cooks nor sheds any light, is an unreal fire. A reality which is stripped off from every relation and every construction, which has neither any position in time and space nor any characterizing quality cannot be expressed because there is in it nothing to be expressed. If we express that sensation in words, the thing to be expressed must be attached with some kind of mental imagination which pushes it to the realm of unreality. Representing the view Dignaga’s definition of perception pravacyāparaka kalpa-vidgatiḥ has got the perpetuity.

In this way his observation of the truth rendered him into a perpetual enemy to the realistic group of philosophers. But whatever harm might have been to him, we have touched with a thrilling sensation of his revolutionary ideas. Unfortunately India could not protect any of the serious works of her worthy sons from being lost for ever

Time rolled on. Then came the seventh century. During this intervening period the Naiyāyika philosophers exercised with their philosophy and logic but there was no one to put pen to paper. A Bhadradeva Brahmacārī Uddyotakāra wrote an extensive commentary on Gautama’s Nyāya-sūtra and Vaiśeṣika’s Nyāya-dīgha under the title of Nyāya-vārikā. The very purpose of composing the work, as the author himself declared, was to write an exposition treatise on Nyāya-sūtra to remove the veil of error cast by the quibblers. These quibblers are none but Nyāya-sūtra, Vaiśeṣika, Dignaga chiefly and other Buddhist logicians. It is quite natural that there are many things to be said for and against both the realists and the idealists. Uddyotakāra carried out his duties as a realist. But he is much more vociferous against the Buddhist doctrines. His temper can only be compared with that of Udayana.

The first thing to be mentioned is Uddyotakāra’s discussion and refutation of Nyāya-sūtra’s doctrine of voidness in Nyāya-vārikā under NS II. 1: 8-19. In our world of cause and effect we cannot think of such a situation where there is no pramāṇa. The all-powerful pramāṇa can by no means be discarded. Only what he has done is that he has set the pramānas as an invulnerable foundation. The definitions of perception and inference given by Vaiśeṣika and those as given by Dignaga are vehemently criticized in Nyāya-vārikā under NS I. 1: 4-5. Dignaga’s Pramāṇapramāṇāvatā exceeded a number of views regarding what actually is inferred in an inference and finally expressed his own view. All this is discussed and Dignaga’s views are criticized in Nyāya-vārikā under NS I. 1: 35-37. The definitions of proposition (pratītiḥ), pramāṇa (sabda) and example (dvaya) given by Vaiśeṣika and Dignaga are refuted in Nyāya-vārikā under NS I. 1: 35-37. Uddyotakāra criticizes the law of debate as suggested by Vaiśeṣika, in Nyāya-vārikā under NS II. 2. 1. Agama (nyāya) has been refuted by him in Nyāya-vārikā under NS II. 2. 5. He also criticizes the demim of the evidences of comparison (pratītiḥ) and verbal testimony (sabda) in Nyāya-vārikā under NS I. 1: 6-7. He is actually on criticizing spree
to refute the Buddhist theory in which the whole is viewed as identical with its parts, in Nyāya-viśiṣṭa under NS i. 1. 33. He also records a series of nātya-pradīpa arguments. The later Nyāya-viśiṣṭa logicians took up his Buddhist theory by the expression 'identity of quality and the qualified'¹⁰.

The essence of the Buddhist philosophy lies in the doctrine of momentariness. In Nyāya-viśiṣṭa under NS iii. 2. 10-17, Uddyotakāra shows his erudition to refute the doctrine.

In Nyāya-viśiṣṭa under NS iv. 2. 26-37, Uddyotakāra criticizes the Buddhist theory of "removal of the external objects". Some remarkable passages from this discussion may perhaps be quoted: "pleasure or pain is quite different from knowledge (vidyā), for pleasure or pain is an 'object to be cognized' (prakāra), while knowledge means its comprehension (prakāram). The object cognized and the act of comprehension can never be identical. Secondly, the admission of illusory knowledge necessarily entails the acceptance of its opposite, i.e., valid knowledge also. An object which is never known rightly can also be never known falsely. Thirdly, one who does not admit the reality of any object other than mere consciousness will not be in a position either to defend one's own position or to refute that of others, because one will not be able to communicate or explain anything to others with one's own mere consciousness which is intelligible to everyone else, just as the dream-experiences of a particular person are known to himself alone. To this, it may be replied that when a person defends his own thesis or refutes that of others he employs words and with the aid of consciousness as endowed with the word-form (śabda-kāya-cita) communication or explanation becomes possible, consciousness as endowed with the word-form is not intelligible to others. The reply however does not fit in, for the Viśiṣṭa-viśiṣṭa do not admit the reality of śabda as an external object and hence, they cannot speak of consciousness as endowed with the word-form. Fourthly, on the claim that no external object apart from consciousness exists really, no distinction can be made between the states of dream and waking, i.e., in that case, objects will be equally non-existent always."

What Uddyotakāra says against the soul theory of the Buddhist has been more or less followed by the Nyāya-logicians of later period.¹⁷

Uddyotakāra criticized the Buddhists a lot. But he never mentioned the name of any particular work or philosopher except in a single case where the name of the two works Viśiṣṭa-viśiṣṭa and Viśiṣṭa-viśiṣṭa are mentioned. Though in most of the cases we come to know whether a particular philosopher or logician is, he perhaps thought it would be sufficient to know that the refutation was directed against the Buddhist whoever he might be, an overtone or an ordinary one.

Some argue that the mode of Uddyotakāra's refutation of the Buddhists is concerned more with verbal trickery than with true philosophical insight. It is found that while refuting a Buddhist theory he poses a number of alternative as to the opponent's theory, as if he is asking the opponent in front to answer those. But, he tries to show, not a single alternative is permissible and the only alternative which is found leads does nothing but prove the Nyāya view. Probably this charge against Uddyotakāra is partly true. Though generally Uddyotakāra allows his kind of style and sometimes does not hesitate to distort the opponent's view, still in some cases he sticks to actual philosophical stand, which is found to be adopted continuously by the Nyāya logicians of later period.
But Nyāya-vāda could not reign unchallenged in the field of Indian philosophy for a long time. In the middle of the 7th century challenges came from one of the famous Buddhist philosophers, Dharanakirti.

This philosopher has written seven logical works, the celebrated "seven treatises", which have become the fundamental works for the study of logic in the Buddhist community and have more or less superseded the works of Dignaga. Among the seven works the Pratītyasamutpāda is the chief one, written in monastic verse; the next work Pratītyasamutpāda is an abridgment of the first, written in stanzaic prose, the Nyāya-kinda is a further abridgment of the same subject; Hetu-kinda is a short classification of logical questions, Saṃsāra-parijāna is an examination of the problem of relation in a small tract in stanzaic verse with the author's own comments. Vṛtti-nirguna is a treatise on the art of carrying on disputation and Gomukha-sūtra-uddhava is a treatise on the reality of other minds, directed against Dignaga.

The Pratītyasamutpāda was first in India but we are lucky enough that the manuscript of this work has been discovered by Rahul Sankrityayan from Tibet.

In this pioneering work Dharanakirti discusses his own philosophy of idealism, generally by denying the temptation of picking the opponent's view. Though some refutations of the Nyāya views are found there, still its own remarkable subtlety and logic spontaneously imitated the cast of Nyāya philosophy, built by Gomukha-kārī.

He criticizes the Nyāya view of the existence of God in the chapter called Pratītyasamutpāda (verse Nos. 12-19). The Nyāya view of perception is criticized in Prarabdha chapter (verse Nos. 136-40). The theory of generality (verse Nos. 143-48) and the theory of the existence of the whole also (verse Nos. 149-53) are rejected. The Nyāya definition of Pātaka is related in Pariṇāma-samāhāra chapter (verse Nos. 154-71). In the same chapter the definition of prajñā-pāda (verse Nos. 172-75) is criticized. But all these are matters of general logic.

"Although produced by a stimulus coming from an external object, but from an antecedent property-less pure object, it is indeed a reality? It is supposed to be absolutely stripped off from every vestige of an imagina-tive or constructive element. But is it not pure imagination? No. A single moment, just an absolute particular, is not something reprehensible in an image, it cannot be reached by our knowledge, that is to say, it is not something empirically real. But it is the element which imparts reality to all the other. It is the indispensable condition of all real and consistent knowledge, it is phenomenological, but it is the metaphysical, it is not a "smear in the sky"... Dharanakirti propounds to prove in reality by an experiment in the way of interjection. The metaphysical entities are metaphysical just because they are pure imagination, just because there is no point of reality, no moment of pure sensation to which they could be attached. They are "sustainingable as inplace, time and sensible quality". But this point and this sensation are present, directly or indirectly, in every act of empirical reality and empirical cognition. This we can indirectly prove by introspection, Dharanakirti says. This intuition is something quite different from productive imagination -- can be proved just by introspection. Indeed, everyone knows that an image is something attainable (capable of coalescing with a name). Now, if we begin to state at a patch of colour and withdraw all our thoughts on whatsoever other objects, if we thus reduce our consciousness to a condition of rigidity, and become as though unconscious, this will be the condition of pure sensation. If we then, (awakening from this condition), begin to think, we notice a feeling of
remembering) that we had an image (of a patch of colour before us), but we did not notice it whilst we were in the foregoing condition, (we could not name it) because it was pure sensation. This consecutive observation has given Dharmakirti immortality in the history of Indian philosophy.

sakṣaipaṇḍhānaśamādaśubhāsthānadhiviśvāsāni bhāvanāṃ rājasīyāṇām dharmakīrtinām, a verse of Pramāṇa-viniścaya is one of the most remarkable representations of the idealistic philosophy of Dharmakirti. Practically there is no opponent philosopher who did not criticize this verse.

Even then Dharmakirti was not unaware of the danger to which Idealism may ultimately lead in the shape of its direct consequence, solipsism. He therefore singled out this problem from his great work and devoted to it a special tract under the title Sānātana-rāja-siddhi, i.e., Establishment of the existence of the other minds. This work contains a verification of the whole of Dharmakirti’s epistemology in its application to a special complicated case. Dharmakirti makes a gift to us of this brilliant piece of document narrating the realistic and Buddhist position in a problematic matter in the day.

He however did not want to discuss about a metaphysical entity, which is a compulsory matter of discussion for the Nyāya logicians. It is said that Dharmakirti, when studying under Śvarasena wrote the chapter on Dvikāla in Pramāṇa-viniścaya. But this religious part was dropped in all the other textbooks and he himself most emphatically and clearly expresses his opinion in the concluding passage of Sānātana-rāja-siddhi, “... our knowledge being limited to experience, we neither think nor speak about anything definite about Him, we can neither assert nor deny His existence.”

For a century, from Dharmakirti’s time down to the 1st quarter of the 8th century, Buddhist philosophy was conspicuous by the absence of any remarkable original work due to absence of any talented philosopher in their school. At last a brilliant composition from the Buddhist school came to light. It is the Tatvasaṃgṛaha, its author Sānātakaśīta (A.D. 705-85) was a professor at Nalanda. He visited Tibet at the invitation of king Khe-aron deu-tsan (8th cns.). The king with the assistance of Sānātakaśīta built in 749 A.D. the monastery of Sam-yè in Tibet, and Sānātakaśīta was its first abbot. It is sure that Tatvasaṃgṛaha was composed before its author had gone to Tibet. He as elaborately explains the Buddhist doctrines of his own line as he vehemently criticizes the Nyāya views.

Dharmakirti’s Pramāṇa-viniścaya was then inaccessible. The Tatvasaṃgṛaha throws literally a flood of light on Buddhist metaphysics of the Sautrāntika-Yogacara school and logic and epistemology. The most remarkable feature of this work is its reproduction of the views of scholars who otherwise would have remained in perfect oblivion. Kamalākara gives the names of the authors and quotes from them. From the study of this work along with Tatvasaṃgṛaha’s Nyāya-viniścaya and Kumāraśīla’s works one can fruitfully gather some ideas about the philosophical activities of the centuries. The attack on realism, on the Soul theory and on the infallibility of the Vedas, provoked simultaneously the Nyāya, and Kumāraśīla’s Mimamsa schools. This counter-criticisms of the orthodox stalwarts succeeded in undermining the prestige of the Buddhist monastery. But the Buddhists were not supine and reacted with vigour and nerve. The Tatvasaṃgṛaha prominently represents this phase of the Buddhist reaction. In fact, Dharmakirti started to criticize directly the Mūnāṣṇa school and as a result Kumāraśīla tried
to take revenge on the Buddhists. Naturally it was not possible for Sāntarakṣita and his disciple Kāmapāla, to keep silence against Kāmarāja’s criticism.

We are here concerned with the conflict between the Nyāya and the Buddhist. Therefore from Sāntarakṣita’s criticism of the Nyāya views, particularly of Uddyottakāra, it appears that as Sāntarakṣita and Kāmapāla (c. A.D. 793) accepted Saṁvatsaravāsa’s view in which the external object exists (though this existence can be proved only by inference), it has been easier for them to criticize the realist’s objections.

In Ratnadvīpaṇḍita, Uddyottakāra’s views on the part and the whole (verse Nos. 550-62, 383, 593-98), on momentariness (verse Nos. 370-84, 388, 466-67, 471-75, on Apuṇa (verse Nos. 981-99, 1184-99), and on Soul (verse Nos. 180-84, 195-216, 220) are criticized.

There were other famous logicians also in the intervening period. They were Bhāṣyakara, Avidyōkṣaṇaka and Saṁkṣāramāṇa. Bhāṣyakara may be prior to Uddyottakāra, Bhānavīkṣaṇa’s Bhāvyakṛt and Avidyākṣaṇaka’s Ratnadvīpaṇḍita are known to us only by name. Anyway, those Nyāya school logicians were ‘pillars’ of the system. Sāntarakṣita and Kāmapāla naturally attacked them. Many minor views of these scholars are found mentioned and criticized in Ratnadvīpaṇḍita and Kāmapāla.

How one among many of the objections can be mentioned to prove Sāntarakṣita and Kāmapāla as to how far the objection was justified. What we call existence, they are never tired of repeating, is always related to an action. “Existence in work” says Sāntarakṣita. It is an anthropomorphic illusion to suppose that a thing can exist only, exist plastically, exist without acting, and then, as it were, suddenly rise and produce in action. Whatever exists is always acting. The conclusion this whatever really exists in a cause is urged upon the Buddhist by his definition of existence quoted above, existence, real existence, is nothing but efficiency. Consequently what is non-existent or what is a non-cause, does not exist. A ‘non-cause’, says Uddyottakāra, addressing himself to the Buddhist, is double, it is for you either something non-existing or something changeable. Kāmapāla corrects this statement of Uddyottakāra and assures him of not sufficiently knowing the theory of his adversaries, “because”, says he, “those Buddhists who are students of logic maintain that a non-cause is necessarily a non-reality.” This means that to be real is nothing but to be a cause, whatever exists is necessarily a cause.

The growth and development of the idea and the sentiments of these two different groups of philosophers have been reflected in a rich literature which can make the subject extremely interesting.

Now with Sāntarakṣita and Kāmapāla, the Buddhist philosophy is in a safe situation, but on the contrary the Nyāya philosophy was rather pushed to the wall without any brilliant logical production up to the middle of the 9th century from the time of Uddyottakāra. In this situation, Vaiśṇavīdśāstra, c. A.D. 841-29, a Buddhist logician wrote elaborate glosses on the Nyāyaśāstra under the title Nyāyasūtraśāstra-dīyaśāstra.

In the writing of Vaiśṇavīdśāstra we find his exemplary observation of the logical nuances which can rarely be found in others. He possessed the rare qualities of erudition and faultlessness in representing the opponent’s view. As a Nyāya exponent he followed Uddyottakāra in rejecting the Buddhist doctrines but not always without some differences of opinion. His refutation is much more deep and subtle in comparison with Uddyottakāra’s.
refutation, being pugnacious and aggressive. Under NS i. 1, 4-5, Tika shows us Vīçāspaṭi’s clear understanding about the nature of the Buddhist perception and inference.

Vīçāspaṭi quotes the relevant verses of Dignāga while explaining Uddvyotakāra’s refutation of Dignāga. He found the fresh scope of relating Dharmakārtu’s views of perception and others. He quoted verses of Pramāṇa-vārttika and Pramāṇa-viniścaya. The verse of Tatvasaṃgṛaha is found to have been quoted in Tika but it seems that Vīçāspaṭi did not give much importance to that text.

Up to the time before Vīçāspaṭi, God was not so much considered to be a matter of dispute in debate with the Buddhists. But starting with him, to prove or to refute the existence of God became a prestige issue.

Generally it is found that a philosopher having faith in a certain philosophical system cannot show his adherence to another philosophical system. When a philosopher in course of explaining seeks the permanent justification of the doctrine containing in the philosophy of his own life and tries to adopt those in thought and practice, it is very difficult for him to make his mind agree to give importance to another system of philosophy. Vīçāspaṭi is rather a conspicuous exception. He wrote three commentaries, Nyāya-vārttika-sāparā-ṭikā on Nyāya philosophy, Saṅkhya-sattra-kaumudi on Saṅkhya philosophy and Dhīnī on Vedānta philosophy. We do not know which one of them he preferred, but in all the three commentaries, his conclusive explanation of the different doctrines makes us believe that none, in actuality, is negligible. Now even after a long journey we are struck with doubt if the objections against the Buddhist philosophy actually forbid us to believe in it.

Now the objections against the Buddhists came from a new direction — Kashmir. After Vīçāspaṭi there flourished another talented Nyāya logician named Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (A.D. 840-900) who was the younger contemporary of Vīçāspaṭi. He wrote an independent commentary on the Nyāya-sūtra, called Nyāya-mālājāri.

He was an orthodox Brahmīn who zealously defended the authority of the Vedas and saw the refutation of Buddhism as a religious cause. Yet he was no fanatic. He was capable of retaining his sense of humour under adversity. He tells us that as he writes Nyāya-mālājāri he is being held prisoner in a cave and "I have beguiled my days here by this diversion of writing a book." A rare virtue which is indicative of true greatness in his humility in declaring that he could lay no claim to origination.

Many of the Buddhist views are mentioned and refuted in Nyāya-mālājāri, such as, there are only two instruments of valid knowledge, perception is conceptual construction which is free from determination by the imagination and is non-illusory, Apākha, momentariness, two theories of illusion — asaṅkhya (of the Madhyamikas) and śaṅkhya (of the Vijnānavādins), etc. Among these the Buddhist theory of momentariness exhausted Jayanta’s maximum energy.

It is needless to say that Dharmakārtu among the Buddhists is no doubt the main opponent of Jayanta. Numerous verses from Dharmakārtu’s Pramāṇa-vārttika have been quoted and refuted in Nyāya-mālājāri. Dignāga also is occasionally mentioned. Dharmottara (c. A.D. 820) also is criticized by Jayanta in a few places.

It is a perennial matter of dispute whether knowledge is like the eye or a candle. The philosophical discussion, however, about knowledge has been divided into two groups on
the basis of these two differences. And this stretched long. Naturally to refute the Vijñānavāda we find this kind of discussion multi in a great detail in Nīlāyavalli.

After Dharmakṣīrti, the Mīmāṃsā school turned up against the Buddhists. Kāṇḍāra (c. 5th cent.) a great Mīmāṃsaka scholar asserted great success in refuting them and establishing his opinion. But it was a fact for the Nāyāyikas that an old enemy is vanquished by a new enemy.

Prabhākara (c. late 5th cent.) another strong Nāyāyika scholar played the same role. So the Nāyāyikas scholars thought it necessary to stop the group of these new enemies.

Properly going through Nīlāyavalli, it however appears that Jayanta was also attentive to the refutation of the Mīmāṃsā views of Kāṇḍāra as well as of Prabhākara. Actually with the decline of Buddhism in India the doctrinal and logical conflict was shifted to between the Nīlāyika and the Mīmāṃsā schools of philosophy. It will not be improper to say that Jayanta accelerated the criticism against the Mīmāṃsā school though it is found to have been started long before by Uddottakārti and rather promptly by Vācaḍapati. In fact, Jayanta had to protect the Nīlāyika philosophy from the attack not only of the Buddhists but also of different groups of other philosophers. In spite of this Jayanta has retained his renown by faithfully representing the opponent’s views.

Over and above, the activities of the Buddhists are not consistent with what they say. That is why Jayanta also was very much aggressive against them. He says “You, Buddhists, hold that there is no soul, yet you construct cuttīs (houses) to enjoy pleasure in paradise after death. You say that everything is momentary; yet you build monasteries with the hope that they will last for centuries; and you say that the world is void, yet you teach that wealth should be given to spiritual guides. What a strange character, the Buddhists possess, they are weily a monument of conceit.”

In the 10th century the Nīlāyika system of philosophy is divided into two courses. One flowed in the old line and the other course started with Bhaṭavāraṇa. To put it clearly, Bhaṭavāraṇa was the first known proponent of a number of doctrines which diverge boldly from the accepted traditional views. A Kauśīmārīν like Jayanta, Bhaṭavāraṇa must have been a forerunner of a lot of later. (c. A.D. 850–930)

Nīlāyavalli is a monumental work composed by him. It is an exo-commentary of the Nīlāyika. It was supposed to be the last for a long time, but it is a miracle that perhaps the only manuscript of Nīlāyavalli has been suddenly discovered from the personal custody of Saya Swarup Shastri in 1939.

Prose quotations and verses from Dharmakṣīrti’s Pramanayavrittika and Prabhākara’s Pramanāvrittika are found in this work. He criticizes the views of Nāgārjuna, Vasubandhu, Dignāga, Dharmakṣīrti, Prabhākara, Dharmottara, Sāntarakṣita, Karmādihis and many others. Prabhākara (c. A.D. 940) started the philosophical school of interpretation of the Pramanāvrittika. He wrote a voluminous commentary on Pramanāvrittika under the title Pramanaviścaya-alakāra.

Now appeared in the field a great Buddhist scholar named Bhāmaśrī. He was associated with the Vikramāditya maurya which was established by the famous Buddhist emperor Dharmagupta (c. A.D. 730–810) and flourished under the liberal patronage of his successors. In the 11th century, we find it in the form of an international University attracting scholars from other parts of Asia. All the Shastras were taught in it. Buddhism
received priority among them. There were six great Ennities there. Four of them were called keepers of the four gates – Dvīpaprajñāpas of the sea of learning that was the mahābhaṭha and the two others, still greater, were called the two “Great Pillars” of wisdom. We find Jñānaśīla in the second Great Pillar of the University. He tried to revive the Buddhist philosophy against the attack of the Nyāya logic.

He criticizes the views of Trīlocana and his disciple Viśvanātha, Bhaṭaśravajña and a few other Nātyaśīla logicians with the utmost strength of his intellectualism. His writing on the one hand secures the acme of intellectual analysis and on the other hand unvels the background of Udayana’s arguments. Among those who were refused by him, Trīlocana was a significant figure between Kamalālāla and Viśvanātha to receive the special attention of Jñānaśīla. Anyway, Jñānaśīla was more concerned with the views of Bhaṭaśravajña, a strong opponent who ﬁnisheded immediately before him. It is known that Trīlocana composed a work under the title Nyāya-pradīpana. We do not know whether this work is the same as the Nyāya-bhāṣya-būṣa, composed by him. One Nyāya-bāṣya also was attributed to him. But unfortunately we do not ﬁnd any of his works.

Vīnuśa must have been a Nyāya author of considerable importance. His views on Tīravāda alone have been recorded by Jñānaśīla and his disciple Ramakṛtika. It seems that he wrote a treatise on Tīravana.

Śaṅkungra is the last Nātyaśīla whose view on the līva alone has been quoted by Jñānaśīla.

It appears from his writing that being a teacher at Nalanda, Jñānaśīla directly realized the insult coming from the Nyāya logicians. But though Jayanta and Bhaṭaśravajña criticized the Buddhist doctrines very strongly, the warmness of opposition cannot be realized on their body. But Jñānaśīla and after him Udayana boiled over the dispute. They directly perceived the heat of hostility.

The biggest tract composed by him is on momentariness. To establish the theory of momentariness, the verse: yat sat sat kṣaṇam kṣaṇāḥ jalastra ṛṣaṇāca bhūva ime saṁsāra ... fraktiḥ prakṛtaṁ viṣṇumatraḥ śādhyāca śādhyāca vānāpūrṇaḥ or arte as emanated from his pen and got the honour of fulcrum of the theory. Apoka, anupadāthi and invariable concomitance (vyapati) were discussed in a great detail. On God, Jñānaśīla made such a burning discussion under the title Tīravāda, that practically this aroused in Udayana’s writing an assaulting attitude, later.

Ramakṛtika, a worthy disciple of Jñānaśīla, in his ten small treatises on different topics, tried to refute the Nyāya philosophy. He gave more attention to refute Trīlocaṇa and Viśvanātha rather than Bhaṭaśravajña. A close scrutiny reveals that Ramakṛtika has summarized the works of his guru in many cases and the debt has also been eloquently acknowledged. But the fatal thing that Ramakṛtika did, is his writing a treatise Sundhānavara-adhikāra and it is a great triumph of religionism which scared Bhaṭaśravajña and him write Saṁścīpanāsādha. But Ramakṛtika was daring enough to compose a work refuting the crucial view of their honoured-by-all preceptor.

Jñānaśīla made his last try to uneliorate the injuries inflicted by Viśvanātha and Bhaṭaśravajña on the Buddhist philosophy, but their philosophy again got a mortal hurt, when a Hindu logician Udayana (A.D. 984) composed two pungent works under the titles Nyāya-kasaraṇāyati and Amäsaṭvatrasūvaṇa.
The fundamental philosophy of momentariness and the denial of the existence of God are challenged in these two works. Ānātattavāviveka is mainly devoted to the refutation of the Buddhist doctrines of Soul. It criticizes several Buddhist views like those of Universal flux, Apoha, Universals, unity of knowledge and its object, Cittāvastu, Vijñānavāda, identity of the quality and the qualified, self as knowledge alone, Ātmanāvāda, Saryāṇāvāda, etc. In most of the topics Ānātattavāviveka's works supply the puravapādikā. Jātthāśāhīmātha has been quoted and referred to by name. Everything is obviously to prove the existence of God. It can humorously be said here that God will himself intend to exist no more. If He comes to know that his existence depends on so much painstaking efforts done in Ānātattavāviveka. In fact, Itthāṃ śrīda gave a heavy jerk to the Niyāya view of the existence of God as for which Udayana had to compose a separate work against this. In the practical life the bitterness travelled so penetratively between the Buddhists and the Niyāyikas that a controversy was despaired of (So goes the story) even by way of jumping from a palm tree. Udayana was very much proud of thinking himself as a protector of God. Here is his utterance: “Oh Lord, you have been puffing up with pride as you are now illustrious (when I have made you safe after defearing the Buddhists) and dare ignore me. But (be sure) when the Buddhists come again, your existence will depend upon me”.

The continuous hurt inflicted by the Niyāya logicians made the Buddhist philosophy helpless to survive in the common mind. It is also a point that after Itthāṃ śrīda there was no Buddhist scholar who could confidently hold up their philosophy. Many works undoubtedly were composed but those lacked sharpness of original thinking. In fact, from the 11th century the struggle for existence of the Buddhists in India due to Muslim aggression over the Buddhist education centres was the main cause of unproductiveness of a brilliant philosophical literature for them. But the gradual fall of Buddhism in India was noticed much before. Dr. Sircar has written, “Nothing standing the great scope and success of his propaganda he (Dhammakīrti) could only regret, but not stop the process of decay which befell Buddhism on its native soil. Buddhism in India was doomed. The most iltented propagandist could not change the run of history. The time of Kumbrīla and Saṅkarācārya, the great champions of Brahmanical revival and opponents of Buddhism, was approaching. Tradition repressed Dhammakīrti as having combated them in public disputations and having been victorious. But this is only an after-thought and a pious desire on the part of his followers. At the same time it is an indirect confession that these great Brahmin teachers had met with no Dhammakīrti to oppose them”.

But in the Niyāya line two commentators at least on Udayana’s Ānātattavāviveka (alias Baddha-dhikkāra), one Baddha-dhikkāra: one by Saṅkarā Meḍa (A.D. 1450) and the other Baddha-dhikkāra: Śrīromaṇi by Raghunātha Śrīromaṇi (A.D. 1477-1547) extinguished the last hope of the Buddhists to escape from the trap of the Niyāya logic. In Saṅkarā Meḍa’s Vidyāvijñāna Mānūṣá’s nāmes found in the list of the foremost Buddhist logicians. Yet during Saṅkarā’s time the Buddhist works lost much of their importance as they were historical documents rather than part and parcel of living faith in India.NOTES

1 Brahmasūtra: vide A History of Indian Logic, pp. 227-29
2 Kañca-vatī: vide ibid, pp. 236-40
3 Upaniṣads: vide ibid, pp. 3
2 NSS iv. 2.6-11
10 Definition of perception: tathatā-vijñānam pratyakṣaṁ, i.e., Perception is cognition coming from that same object.

11 Prasenje-sāntana (Tib. Thad-ma Kmi-la bsta-pa), Nyen-pranav (Tib. Thad-ma sgrub pa'i dpag-ppa'i bsgal), Het-pa-sun-ma (Tib. "Zla-sde b'i Ilyin gcen mo mdzad pa, Aču-ma-sper-pa (Tib. dbigs-pa btsang pa) and Tilaka-pa (Tib. Dza gsum btsang pa).

12 A History of Indian Logic, p. 270

13 Na rashahi prameyam na rājvicchühljuvatam/ anántah kṣatpam ca nyoṣādhistvam vahel/

Quoted in NYTT, vide Ccut, pp. 255-6

14 "Digongse-lang at Vatsyayana by saying that the Niyaputra (akṣarapada) takes pride in borrowing his definition of perception (pratyakṣa) from the Sutra of the Vaśekūkas, viz., that perception is knowledge which arises from the intercourse of the soul with the mind, the mind with a sense-organ, and the sense-organ with the object. The Niyaputra is however careful not to connect his perception with the intuitivity (nāmāyatā), particularity (viveka), substance (stūpyā), quality (guna) and action (karma) on which, as pointed out by Digongse, the Vaśekūka’s ariyakacca is dependent. Oh! what a strange consistency!"

A History of Indian Logic, p. 279

15 Definition of perception: pratyakṣaṁ bijāpyamadhitah, i.e., perception is that which is free from mental construction. Definition of inference: asamuccayaṁ tadatma mukhāvanī-tāni, i.e., inference is that which is present in the subject of inference and also in things similar to it and which is absent from where the infallible property is non-existent. Definition of proof: gṛbhasūkṣmatadāteṣu yantrāḥ bhūtaḥ.

16 The controversy regarding comparison as a separate instrument of valid knowledge is very ancient. We find certain references of this in Nyaya-mānatā and Nyaya-Karmamangal, e.g., NM, pp. 110-30; NRM, pp. 195-204

G. Jos in his ‘The Nyayamānta of Ganges’ (Wp. p. 194) says: In chapter IV of his Prasenje-sāntana Digongse adopts a separate instrument of cognition; he includes it under perception. Usualy he says that comparison does not differ from perception and work (but agent is not admitted as a separate instrument of valid knowledge by the Buddhists) (vide Ccut, p. 350). Vaśekūka accepted agent as a separate instrument of valid knowledge, (vide BL, I, p. 72)

Sukhāpahārya: ‘the Buddhists from the time of Digongse fall in line with the Vaśekūkas. They admit only two different sources of insight, which they call perception and inference. Verbal testimony and reasoning by analogy are for them included in inference. (BL, I, p. 72)

Though the Vaśekūkas and the Buddha advocates for two instruments of valid knowledge, perception and inference, still the Niyaputra argued to touch thinkingly towards the Vaśekūka as they are against the Buddhists. Only it was Udayana who gave a strong objection to the theory of two ‘instruments of valid knowledge’ of the Vaśekūkas.

17 Chapter V of Prasenje-sāntana contains the doctrine of Apaṇa.

18 Fragments from Digongse have been found in several logical texts of Indian philosophy. Besides, also a large number of reconstruction works of Digongse’s texts have been done by a number of scholars of different countries. Translations in different languages from the original Chinese and Tibetan translations are also available. vide The Encyclopedia of Indian philosophy, vol I, pp. 51-55
Collections of different views of Tattvasastra from the works of Jaimini and others can be a valuable contribution to the Indian philosophical studies.

37 Vaisakha is mentioned several times in Jaiminat. A. Jaiminat mittamhaddhavali, pp. 235, 237, 243-9, 255, 260. Also see Ratanakirtimahavali, p. 47

38 The name of this scholar does not actually occur in these works. Jaiminatmimśa introduces his views as those of a "leader of scholars" (aśravakara) (tattvasastra, pp. 237, 255). The marginal notes supply the lacunae. Now what we could gather about this scholar is this: Jaiminat wrote some treatises on Naiyayika philosophy in which the refutation of the Buddhist position was to be regarded in it. The views in opposition against the Buddhist position by him have been proved ineffective in the later works.


39 The "Jaiminatmimśa" had to face a number of scholars who excluded considerable importance at his time. Many important scholars consulted are now lost and perhaps impossible. In the Naiyayika system the works of highest importance only have been preserved. Those interchanging between two such works are lost. Jaiminatmimśa views were quoted anonymously in later works. Thus some of the earlier views on Jaiminatmimśa are known to be quoted in Naiyayika-samanjasa of Udayana, but the Buddhist and Jain authors have preserved passages from ancient masters with proper reference to their authors. Jaiminatmimśa is responsible for preserving school passages from the works of many important scholars that came between Bhadradri and Udayana and thus his Jaiminatmimśa became an important document to a student of Indian Logic.


40 ≤sūvāya vānandadvabhittu vai atyutanta va-sūvāya/

purnahuddhante samayam marutānān tve eva sāhitaḥ

41 In the 11th century the Buddhists, Jaiminatmimśa, Ratnakirtim, Jaiminatmimśa, contributed voluminous writing on Buddhist thought and logic. In the Naiyayika line from the beginning of the 13th century the Naiyayika logicians were much engaged with the philosophy of the New school of Naiyayika logic, i.e., with Tattvasastra of Gaṇapati.

42 BL. j. p. 35

ABBREVIATIONS
BL. - Buddhist Logic.
Caz. - Cetayavishāsikā.
NKM. - Naiyayikamahavali.
NR. - Naiyayika-vānanda.
NMS. - Naiyayikavānta Samyuktamardha-vīyavādikāya et al.
NS. - Naiyayikavānta.
NV. - Naiyayika-vānta.
NVTT. - Naiyayikavānta-tatparya-dīka.

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Tīkā ma nāt-pan-se jñāpana-viścāra (Sanatan-vandana) maDo xcv 11.230b, 6-329b, 1.