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GEORGE BOGLE'S TREATY WITH BHUTAN (1775)

—A. Deb

Attention of several observers has been drawn by the lack of impressive results flowing from Bogle's mission to Tibet in 1774-75. Francis Younghusband wrote "as regards personal relationship he was eminently successful and that was about as much as he could have expected to establish at the start" (1). This obviously refers to the rapport Bogle had established with the third Panchen Lama who was held in high esteem by Emperor Chien-lung and who had admittedly a decisive influence over the Lhasa pontificate.

In the context of hopes raised by the "Design" of Warren Hastings (2) a sense of disappointment is understandable. Nevertheless a study of the impact of the mission in other respects is amply rewarding. Bogle's transactions in Bhutan is relatively a neglected episode though it merits more than a passing attention. Accompanied by Alexander Hamilton the envoy left Calcutta in the month of May, 1774. The mission travelled by way of Cooch Behar and Buxa to Tanki Chhodong. It was detained there till October while the Panchen Lama was seeking entry permits from the Tibetan Government. During his return journey Bogle concluded a treaty with the Deb Raja in May, 1775, conceding important privileges to traders from Bhutan. This commercial treaty with Bhutan can appropriately be looked upon as complementary to the Anglo-Bhutanesie treaty of April, 1774 which ended the First Bhutan War. The treaty of 1774 had already initiated the policy of wooing Bhutan in the interest of trans-Himalayan trade as is evident from the remarkable territorial concessions made to Bhutan at the expense of Cooch Behar.

On Bogle's recommendation Warren Hastings addressed a letter to the Deb Raja in November, 1774 and enclosed a "parwana" therewith. It reads:—

"Notice is hereby given to all merchants of Bhutan that the strictest orders have been issued to the officers at Kangpur and Ghuraghat dependent on the Suhah of Bengal (the paradise of nations) that they do not obstruct the passage of Bhutan merchants to those places for the purpose carrying on there trade as formerly, but that they afford
every assistance to their caravans. They are therefore required not to entertain the least apprehension and to construct the whole circuit of the whole circuit.

Three concessions were further elaborated by the treaty which Begle concluded with the Deb Raja in May, 1775. The treaty distinctly contained commercial relations with two countries. The preamble was extended for promotion of trade with Tibet. It runs: "Whereas the trade between Bengal and Tibet was formerly very considerable and that the merchants were allowed to trade into Nepal which was the centre of communication between the two countries and whereas from war and oppression in Nepal the merchants have in late years been unable to travel into the country; the Governor as well as the Deb Raja united in friendship, being desirous of removing these obstacles, so that merchants may carry on their trade free and secure as formerly" (4).

The operative part of the treaty with Bhutan contained the following provisions:

"That the Bhutanese shall enjoy the privilege of trading to Rangpur as formerly, and shall also be allowed to proceed either themselves or by their servants to all places in Bengal for the purpose of trading and selling their horses free from duty or hindrance.

"That the duty hitherto exacted at Rangpur from the Bhutan caravans be henceforth abolished.

"That the Deb Raja, shall allow all Hindu and Mussalman merchants freely to pass and repass through his country between Bengal and Tibet.

"That no English or European merchants shall enter the Deb Raja's dominions.

"That the exclusive trade in sandal, indigo, red skin, tobacco, betel nut and pan shall remain with the Bhutanese and that the merchants be prohibited from importing the same into the Deb Raja's dominions; and that the Governor-General shall confirm this in regard to indigo by an order to Rangpur". (5)

In his letter dated 4th June, 1775, from Cooch Behar addressed to the Governor General, Begle informed that he had "Settled matters with the Raja" excepting the "article of Europeans".
In later historical literature the treaty was regarded as an essay below expectation. Bogle failed to secure the Deb Raja's consent to allow Englishmen in his country and to that extent, as Cannan Schuyler says, his mission had "in a measure" failed. (51) But the envoy carefully explained that the entire trade with Tibet was in the hands of native agency "before Europeans had anything to do with it". (52) Bogle believed trade in this region could be promoted "without the establishment of English factories and the employment of English Agents". Trade through Nepal was in the hands of this native agency before the rise of the Gurkha power. Bogle would consider it an achievement to restore it "back to that point" and he believed that the "Connection" he had established with the Panchen Lama and the Deb Raja would accomplish it. (53) It might have been possible to secure access for Europeans when "they were settled in Hindustan merely as merchants but the "power and elevation to which the English have now risen render them the objects of jealousy to all their neighbours". (54) He foresaw that without soothing the misgivings of the hillmen about Europeans "it was impossible to obtain a communication with Tibet". Again, the sale of broad cloth, the most important commodity in the traffic with Tibet had decreased and... "what is now consumed a large portion is of French manufacture... I never could meet with any English cloth". (55) Conceivably, the French had more effectively utilised the native agency in getting to the Tibetan market and thus Bogle saw no reason to underrate it. An illuminating comment from Brian Hodgson is--- "Let the trade be in accustomed hands, and those hands be rendered more effectually operative by the co-operation at Calcutta of English merchants". (56)

Bogle noticed that the Deb Raja and his officers were "in fact the merchants of Bhutan". He had to calm their apprehension and it would appear that the exclusive privileges which he guaranteed in respect of the import of "valuable sorts of goods" including indigo and the abatement of duty on horses amounting to "six annas in the rupee" were aimed at removing official opposition.

In his treaty Bogle carried out the instructions he had received from the Governor General while at Tashi Chodzong. (57) Hastings had written......"You may even consent to relinquish the tribute or duty which is exacted from the Bhutan caravans which comes annually to Rangpur. To that place all their goods for trade, of whatever kind, may come at all times, free from any duty or impost whatever, and exempt from stoppage, and in like manner all goods shall pass from Bengal into
Blutan free from duty and exaction. This concession, Warren Hastings thought, was to be the "groundwork" of Bogle's commercial transaction in Blutan. Bogle was asked "to build such improvements on it" as his judgement and occasion may dictate. With an unwavering insight of the complications that make all the difference between success and failure the Governor General had another clear instruction. Bogle was to "discover" how "his (Deb Rai's) personal interests may be affected by the scheme" and to "encourage any hopes of advantages he may entertain" provided it did not interfere with the general plan. Thus a dramatic concession combined with an assurance to the non-politic commercial privileges of the officialism in Blutan were the two powerful levers with which Bogle was armed before his negotiations. The envoys extended the privileges further as he was 'aware' (11) that some of the Blutanese would wish to proceed further than Rangpur and even to Calcutta. The first Blutan War had "enlarged their minds" and they now hoped to purchase many articles on better terms and would be "glad" to get some grassroots at Calcutta. The privilege of permitting the Blutanese into the interior parts of Bengal, as Bogle confessed, was "one engine I hope to avail myself with some advantage. I shall have need of them all to bring me to a point in which their own particular interest is concerned". To put up the sale of English broadcloth (14), he thought it necessary to encourage the Kadamiri, Gosha, Blutanese and Tibetans to visit Calcutta in winter. These merchants would be "able to procure it at the lowest rate" and passports and army escort to the northern frontier would make them prefer the Company's cloth to any other. The treaty Bogle concluded aimed at "freedom and security" for traders; intended commercial intercourse would follow. As he put it: "Merchants left to themselves naturally discover the most proper manner of conducting their trade, and prompted by self-interest carry it on to the greatest extent". (15)

In 1739 Bogle himself organised the fair at Rangpur. Having 'excused all duties' there was a great concourse of Blutan merchants. "Who after buying and selling freely went away very well satisfied". (16) Bogle's treaty with Blutan ensured the continuance of ancient trade with trans-Himalaya through native agencies, though perhaps on a diminished scale, for the next half century. In 1833 a Zemindar (Subordinate Official) from Blutan narrated:—

"The Mongol Khans (Khachi?) trade a good deal at Hasa (Lhasa); they occasionally go to Rangpur in Bengal by the Phari and Pemdong routes for the purchase of otter skins." (17) Surgeon
Rennie says (1863) that the trade between Bhutan and Rangpur "gradually fell off" in the time of William Bentinck when the privileges enjoyed by BhutaneSE traders were abolished "for the sake of economy". Campbell, the Superintendent of Darjeeling, organised a fair at Titya which was a "great success while under his control". Subsequently Titya was included within Rangpur and the "fair then gradually languished and is now one in name only".(8)

Bogle's mission to Bhutan, according to Camman Schuyler, was to serve "as a commercial reconnaissance, concerned almost entirely with trade rather than diplomacy". The envoy also became seized with the task of probing the political situation obtaining in Bhutan. He recorded the "rooted enmity" and "opposition of interest" between the ruler and a "junto of priests" led by Lama Rinchochok. This resulted in a "revolution", which combined with the failure of Deb Jolpur's (Turner's Deb Terria) Cooch Behar expedition led to the flight of the latter to the neighbourhood of Lhasa. (9) The Deb Raja was entrapped with the secular affairs and "executive part of the Government" and had extended his grip more and more during the preceding two centuries and, as Bogle noted, the Deb Raja's authority "in the internal Government of the country appears to be very complete". (10) These observations were of great relevance in locating the de facto sovereignty in Bhutan and in prescribing British protocol in the following century.

Bogle elaborated on the futility of a military conquest of Bhutan. He thought that even if a military expedition to Bhutan were successful it saw no great advantage to the Company "beyond what it already enjoyed". The Anglo-BhutaneSE treaty of 1774 had secured the possession of Cooch Behar and was a guarantee against future BhutaneSE aggression. He ruled out possession of any part of Bhutan for the purpose of settlement unless done with the consent of the Bhutaneses. He believed this could never be obtained. Economically as well as militarily the policy of conquest of Bhutan would be blunderous: "two battalions, I think, could reduce the country. But two brigades could not keep communication and if that is cut off conquest could be of no use". (11) There is a view that "if conquest was effected, all the rest would follow of course; but that I am convinced would not be the case". (11)

Regarding the impact of these objective observations Camman Schuyler writes: "whether or not they actively influenced the English rulers of India, they expressed a point of view that was held towards
the northern states for many years to come. In fact they were the first
enunciation of what was to become almost a permanent policy’. It took
a few decades of raids faithfully recorded by British frontier officials,
two official missions to Bhutan and the humiliation of Ashley Eden at
Paraskha, to arrive at the conclusion that for security and the Bengal Diars
an invasion of the Himalayan Kingdom was worth undertaking (1664).

During Warren Hastings’ administration the importance of Bhutan
as a ‘Gate on the South that prevents entry’ (15) was never lost
sight of. The Gorkhas had already blocked the ‘passes through Mustang
and Demjong (Sikkim). The road through Mustang was ‘uneconomical
and distant’. Missions were sent to Bhutan under Alexander Hamilton
in 1776 and again in 1777. One of the duties of Hamilton was to
examine the claims of the Deb Raja on the districts of Ambser Falakas
and Jalspeh in the heart of the Bengal diars. He reported that if ‘the
situation was made he would probably be able to induce the Deb Raja
to fulfill his agreement with Mr. Bogle and only to levy moderate
transit duties on merchandise’ (16). Hamilton returned ‘after
insisting upon the agreement between the Deb Raja and Mr. Bogle being
faithfully observed’. Hamilton was sent on a third mission in 1777 to
conradulate the new Deb Raja. In April 1779 Bogle was appointed
as envoy to Tibet a second time. The journey was never undertaken as the
Panchen Lama had left for Peking to meet the emperor.

The policy between the third Panchen Lama and Chon-Lung
is an elegant comment on the wisely conceived plans of George Bogle.
Samuel Turner (1774) collected information about this historic meeting
from the Regent at Tashilhunpo. The Lamas, in Turner’s words, took
several occasions ‘of representing in strongest terms the particular
unity which subsisted between the Governor-General and himself’
(17). His conversation so influenced the Emperor that ‘he resolved upon
commencing through the Lama’s mediation an immediate correspondence
with his friend’. Such indeed was the confidence and esteem which the
Emperor manifested for the Panchen Lama that he ‘promised him a
full compliance with whatever he should ask.’

A similar account of the meeting was given by Parangir Gosain,
the friend and companion of Bogle and Turner in Tibet: ‘In
the country of Hinduastan, which lies on the borders of my country,
there resides a great prince or ruler for whom I have the greatest
friendship. I wish you should now regard him also, and if you will
write him a letter of friendship and receive his return, it will afford me the greatest pleasure, as I wish you should be known to each other and that a friendly communication should in future subsist between you'.

Gour Dutt Bysack points out that it is not known who translated the report of Pemang. A translation was with Warren Hastings from whom through various channels Alexander Dalrymple obtained it and published it in the *Oriental Repository.* (16)

The possibilities inherent in the relationship between the Panchen Lama and Emperor Chin-lung and in Bogle's accounts were denied, however by the Panchen's death at Peking in 1756 followed by Bogle's in 1784.

The second mission to Tibet was revived for the second time under Samuel Turner in 1781. Turner, like Bogle in 1755, fully appreciated that commerce with Bhutan and Tibet could be promoted only through his native agency. Turner sought to extend the scope of Bogle's treaty with the Deb Raja by securing a promise from the Regent of the Panchen Lama of "encouragement to all merchants, native of India, that may be sent to traffic in Tibet on behalf of the Government of Bengal" (23). Every assistance "required for the transport of their goods from the frontier of Bhutan" was assured. The merchants would be assigned place of residence for trading their commodities "either within the monastery, or, should it be considered as more eligible, in the town itself". Like his predecessor Turner thought that "security and protection were the essential requisites" in commercial intercourse and profit will prove "its best encouragement". It was necessary to "let merchants first learn the way, taste the profit and establish the intercourse..." "Turner did not insist on written treaty with the Regent at Tashilhumpo because such a treaty might become "revocable" by the new Panchen Lama when he came of age. Turner says that "regulations" for trade through Bhutan by means of native agency were "settled by the Treaty entered into by Mr. Bogle, in the year 1755, the Deb Raja having acknowledged to me the validity of the Treaty, it became unnecessary to insist on the execution of another." (28)

Warren Hastings not only prevented the opening made by Bogle from again being closed but also sought to preserve the losing results of Bogle's mission to Bhutan by settling legitimate interests of Cooch-Behar. As an unique event, the historian of Cooch Behar have cited the cession of tracts to Bhutan known as Ambari Fulakata and Jelpin
in 1785. (19) The transfer of these areas had been recommended by Hamilton to induce the Deb Raja to fulfill the agreement he had conclud-

ed with Bogle. These areas belonged to the Raikan (remerais) of Bikaaspur under Cooch Behar Raj (35). A temple dedicated to Siva stood at Jalpesh which was built by Maharaja Prat Narayan of Cooch Behar (1821-62). A recent article seeks to trace the story of the Site at Jalpesh back to the 7th Century A.D. (34). Ashley Eden, a later British envoy to Bhutan, "entirely failed to comprehend the reasons", and wrote: "I am afraid on this occasion the friendship of the Bhutanese was purchased at the expense of the Bikaaspur Zemindars". This historic transaction is an example of how the claims of history, geography, religion or language were subordinated to the company's own motive; securing access to Tibet and through Tibet to China.

Soon after the departure of Warren Hastings, in the words of a modern Tibet explorer, 'a convettempo occurred and all his work was undone'. (12) Prof. Sukhban Chandra Sarkar has pointed out that there was a "distinct severing" (32) of policy with the arrival of the Earl of Cornwallis. The humiliation of Nepal is the Gurkha-Tibet war of 1791 completed the disruption of the course of Anglo-Tibetan relations. A recent work on Tibet by a Tibetan scholar shows that under the "patron-Lama" relationship China's role in the war of 1792 was that of an "ally of long standing and that the imperial troops did not enter Tibet to attack Tibetans or to conquer their country" (34). Without going into the question of the status or authority of Tibet to pursue her own policy after 1792, it is necessary to underline that the Company's Government regarded Chinese exclusiveness as the prime reason for rendering infractions Bogle's pioneering work not only in Tibet but also in Bhutan. Indeed, Bogle's treaty with Bhutan was regarded as in a state of suspended animation. The following excerpt is a letter from the Agent to the Governor General, North East Frontier, to Government (34) is of peculiar relevance in this connection. The letter, dated 9th June 1816, runs thus——

"I believe, Bhutan is now as it was in the time of Turner's mission a dependency of Tibet, but I am not able to state any particulars as to their connection. Our subjects have been excluded from the trade of Tibet and Bhutan through the jealousy and influence of the Chinese Government against the wishes of the Lamas and inhabitants of either country and though the favourable commercial treaty settled by Mr. Bogle in 1775 and
subsequently admitted in 1785 by the Deb Raja has never been abrogated yet it has been rendered of no benefit and virtually set aside through the interference of the Chinese Government. An envoy might possibly be able to restore to our subjects the privilege of conducting their trade in Bhutan—- it will not be presumed that the Chinese will be long allowed to exclude British subjects from the privileges granted to other foreigners and to totally interdict them from all the vast possessions that acknowledge their authority".

Thus as late as 1846 it was found that the Company's treaty with Bhutan was never abrogated. Only Manchu exclusiveness deprived the East India Company the benefits of trade in a legitimate manner. Proposing a new mission to Bhutan the same letter stated that such a mission should be made the medium of conveying dispatches to the Daku Lama—-referring probably to the circumstances which broke off our intercourse with Tibet, the misunderstanding that our government was connected with the attack of the Nepalese upon Thabutukopu."

The next mission to Bhutan, in the words of R.S. Pemberton, the leader of the mission, tried to "ascertain the nature of the foreign relations of the Tibetan government." The envoy learnt from Tibetan merchants that "there were foreigners residing there" who "sat at tables and were constantly writing and reading books." He came to believe that agents of Russia had found their way to Lhasa. (36) Obviously diplomacy on the northern borderland of India had to concern itself with the meeting of three empires rather than two.

NOTES

13
A NEW APPROACH TO GAUĐAPĀDA KĀRİKA

— N. Aliyavami Sastri

Gaudapada’s work, that is, his Kārika in four chapters, may be regarded an important landmark in the development of the Advaita Vedantic thought. His exposition of Advaitism is unique and without parallel in the Vedantic literature. He does not follow the traditional line of argument for upholding his thesis. The language he has adopted is Buddhistic in many parts. He employed several expressions which are common to Buddhism and its philosophy and which create impression in the mind of readers that the author (Gaudapada) was a follower of Buddhism (e.g. V. Bhattacharya’s edition of the Kārika). It is mysterious indeed why Gaudapada should have at all adopted such an ambiguous language betraying his trustfulness to the Advaitic thought and tradition. He is traditionally regarded a disciple of the sage Sāka in the Svēta, up. bhāṣya ad 1.8, and a grandproceptor of Śrī Sankara through Gaṇāndhāvatāpa (e.g. R.D. Karmarkar’s edn. of the Kārika, introduction). He has, perhaps, been influenced by Buddhism, especially in its later developed form, because he was a native of the Gaṇḍhāra country where Buddhism was a prominent and popular faith in his days. He might have aimed at propagation of Advaitism in the popular language and style of Buddhism which might appeal to the lay as well as the learned men of the society in those days. This appears to be the most plausible explanation of the riddle why Gaudapada adopted such an ambiguous style which being improperly understood would convey the converse of what he intends to convey.

Thus we meet with two sets of interpretations of the text tending towards Buddhism and the other opposing it (e.g. V. Bhattacharya and R.D. Karmarkar). I shall content myself in the following pages mainly to clear off the wrong interpretations of the ambiguous expressions employed by Gaudapada in the course of upholding his fundamental thesis of Advaitism.

The text consists of four chapters, of which the first contains 29 verses explaining the Mandukya Upanishad. The central theme of the Upanishad is the description of four stages of Atman, Brahma known as Viva, Taijasa, Prajna and Turya (fourth) who is Sarvāttha, perceiver of
the whole. The first three stages are represented in the following states in order: Waking (Jagriti), Dream, and Deep Sleep. The fourth is the transcendental state. Atman in the first three stages generally stays in the three places of the body: the left eye, mind and heart respectively. The mystic syllable 'Om' while considered to be consisting of three parts: a, u and m represents the last three states of Brahman. While considered as pureless and one unit it represents the fourth Advaita state of Brahman (Karika, 19). Guatapala points out the distinction between the third and the fourth state thus: the non-grasping of dualism is common to both states, but the Atman in the third is under the influence of avidya, ignorance and sleep, while in the fourth Atman is relieved of both (K. 15). He says further that the living being who is caught in the slumber of inscrutable Maya (Illusion) gets awakened, then he realizes Advaita (Monism) which is freed from birth and sleep (K. 16).

This idea is common to Yogacara Buddhism. If we substitute Chitamatrika for Advaita the passage would turn into a Buddhist maxim. This chapter is rightly styled as Omkaraprakarana, an exposition of the Om syllable. Read for fuller contents of the chapter Karmakar, Introduction, X.f. The second chapter named Vaishalya-prakarana consists of 38 verses. The chapter starts with the elucidation of the external world and its futility on the analogy of dream phenomenon. The illusory character of our objective universe is a common doctrine of both the Vedantic and the Yogacara Buddhist and the dream analogy is also a common weapon to demonstrate their position. Reference to Vasubandhu’s Vinisitaka, verse 1 with bhaya. Another common example for the purpose is the illusory notion of the Serpent or the Rope in the twilight. Guatama says: Just as the idea of serpent is imagined on the rope in the dark, just so is the idea of ‘five Atman imposed on the Brahman. When true knowledge of the rope is gained the illusion of serpent disappears; likewise one Atman is discriminated as diverse through the influence of Maya and when the true character of Atman’s oneness is accomplished the discrimination disappears (K.F. 1, 9-17).

Then the author elaborates the views of different thinkers who answer erroneously as the ultimate reality things such as Prana, breath, elements, Gunas etc. Guatama does not omit to mention in the list the ultimate reality of Buddhist, viz. mind, mana, citta (K. 2). Here the absence of Jiva, Vijnana or Prajana is noteworthy because it is charac-
teristic of Atman, Brahma stated in the Upanisads. It has been in fine
remarked that the entire universe is to be considered by the Vedantin
as a dream, illusion or castle in the air. The highest truth is that there
is no annihilation, nor origination, no fettered prison nor aspirer of
truth and no desire of release nor released (K. 33). This utterance of
Gauḍa, resembles very closely to Nagajuna’s characteristic Nihilism.
If the sthana detached from the context one could hardly think that this
utterance comes from a Vedantin. Gauḍa, comes very close to Nagaju-
na because both of them plead for the unreality of the diverse world
and for one absolute Whole. They, however, differ in their approach
to the ultimate truth. Naga would designate it Sunya, or the highest
perfection of wisdom whereas for Gauḍa, it is Atman or Brahma,
an embodiment of the highest knowledge. Cfr. Sveta. up. bhāṣya,
Gita-pras, p. 46, citing the Brahmapurana.

Gauḍa closes this chap (II) with the declaration that Non-
dualism is auspicious (विनिर्विनिधि, K. 33) and the same as Advaita
or Tattva. He further says: Advaya which implies the negation of
plurality and of the mind’s constructive states has been revealed by the
Sages that have reached the yonder shore of Vedic lore (K. 33). The
Advaya doctrine is common to the Mahayana Buddhists. It’s probably
for this reason that Gauḍa adds in that his doctrine of Advaya has been
revealed by the Vedic Sages with the implication that he is not speaking
of the Buddhist doctrine. We may likewise find several times in
Sankara’s bhāṣya on the Upanisads the expression of Advaita in relative
mention to Brahma.

It is to be noted here that Amaratinda, the Sanskrit Lexico-
grapher has credited Buddha with preaching the Advaya doctrine proba-
ably for the first time. Both schools of later Buddhism, the Madhyamika
and the Yogacara proudly acclaim themselves as great champions of
the Advaya doctrine though the import of the term, advaya, is quite
different for each school. For the Madhyamika it conveys the idea
of middle path, Madhyama-pratipad whereas for the Yogacara it signifies
the absence of subject and object. अनात्मात्मात्मानात्मान
Though Gauḍa and Sankara characterize Brahma as advaya
they probably intend to convey the idea of advitya, “without
the second”, i.e. Advaita. Now I leave it to future studies to decide
which school initiated the doctrine and which one adopted it later.

The third chap (III) named Advaita-prakarana contains 48
verses. The exposition of Advaita in this chapter is quite logical in

17
succession after establishing the folly of the diverse world in the second chapter. This chapter may also be named as Akarpanya-prakarana as the author starts in the second stanza as स्वरूप सूक्ष्मज्यकतानां “I shall elucidate unpitiableness”. In the first stanza Gauda has stated that the worship, upasana, is related to the Karya-Brahman, Hiranya-garha etc. The worship being different from the worshipped occupies a pitiable state, krisna. In fact every body is Aja, unborn, i.e. Brahman prior to an illusion creation. For this reason, says Gauda—I shall elucidate Akarpanya, unpitiableness which is a quality of Brahmic state अकर्पायनस्तु स्वरूपम्. It appears therefore that Akarpanya may fittingly be equated to the Advaitic state. BrahmaUp. mentions krisna as opposed to Brahmana, v. passage cited below, comm. No. 16.

The main arguments of this chapter may be summed up as follows:

1. There is nothing born; some philosophers advocate the birth of what is unborn. The unborn is immaterial, how could it be reduced to mortality? (K.10) Nc. Jiva, person is born; this is the ultimate truth comprising an absolute non-existence of birth (K.49).

2. Relation between Jiva and Brahman is similar to that between the vast space and the space within the pot (ghata-akshana); that is to say the difference between them is made by the limiting adjunct (Upadhi-ghata). The moment the pot is destroyed the difference disappears (K.3-49). This illustration of space is made in respect of birth. So ghata-akshana is neither a produce nor a part of Akshana. Likewise are Jiva and Brahman (K.7). The aggregates (material objects) are creations of one’s own illusion, maya and similar to those in dream (K.10). Hence the identity of Jiva and Brahman is much extolled in the scripture Upanishads and their differentiation is severely censured there—which position is quite rational (K.11). Thus non-dualism is the Absolute Truth and dualism is only its variety (K.18). The same idea is echoed in the Vishnu-Dharmottara cited in Svetu_UP. bhashya, p. 48.

3. In the light of non-dualism stressed in several Upanishads, the passages dealing with the process of creation of the universe are to be explained away as a devise for leading people to the ultimate purpose of identity of Jiva with Brahman (Kk.15,14-15).
4. Mind is a sole factor for dualism, अमलिल्लभाय इत्यादि when the mind is reduced to a non-entity (amalilabhaya) dualism vanishes (K.31). The mind is so reduced when one does not conceive anything as a result of realizing and experiencing the truth of Atman, Brahman (K.13). The same topic has been elaborated in Kk.14,18,49. In dreams sleep the mind is laid low and being controlled it is cut off from its activity; then it becomes Brahman which is embodied in an all-round illumination of knowledge (Kk.15,46). It is unborn, sleepless, dreamless, devoid of name and form, omniscient and flashing up once only (K.16, cp.Kk.37,40). One should therefore control the mind through proper means when it becomes distracted by pleasure and enjoyment. Recollecting that everything is miserable one should turn its back from pleasure and enjoyment, and recollecting that everything is unborn one sees nothing as born (K.43). When the mind becomes low-spirited it should be awakened; being distracted it should be pacified: being contaminated with impurities it should be watched with care, and being attained to the state of equilibrium it should not be shaken up. One should not enjoy pleasure out of concentration, but should get detached from it through his wisdom; the mind being steady and motionless one should with efforts free it from its dualistic tendency. When the mind is not laid low and not distracted, the mind which is now motionless and freed from its dualistic reflection turns into Brahman (Kk.44,46).

Comment. Now let us see whether any of the above topics of Gauda can be compared with ideas of the Buddhist authors.

1) Our comment on the Ajatavada is deferred to the next chapter on the same topic.

2) The space-example is also found in a Mahayana sutra cited in M. vrtti, p. 375 which insist on the identity of all entities on the analogy of space. The passage runs: तत्तपायिन्म न म द्वेशाः यत् युक्तकल्याणानां स्वस विज्ञानानविविधानां आकारानिर्देशितम। तत्तपायिन्म सदेव गत्याकारण

3) Gauda says that the Upanishadic doctrine of creation is a devise for some ultimate purpose (K. 25); this looks like an echo of Vasubandhu’s explanation of Buddha’s statements about skandha, ayatanas and dhatus (V. Vasubandhu’s Vimsatika, ver. 8-10). Buddha is regarded as Upaya-kusala, clever in employing devices suitable to convert people to his own faith (Cp. Satyanidhi, ch. 1.p.s.n.3). It is likely therefore that

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Gandhi was convinced in and convinced of the advantage of the Buddhist argument to explain away the sayings contradictory to their favourite conclusions.

4) "This dualistic appearance is a vision of the mind" साक्षात्स्य- मिवर हृदय (K. 311'), this expression seems to be resulted from the dream example employed several times in the Tāvastis by Gandhi (cp. K. 39 also). According to the Upaniṣadh a the mind that creates a new imaginary world in dreams, cp e.g. Pranāms up. IV, 5; अनिवर्ष द्वा; (सिद्ध.):

सह्योगी साधस्यगर्भिः प्रियाताः. Since the above axiom is applicable to the waking state the above expression "manomayam" has perhaps been coined. The Vedāntins would otherwise express it as सामस्यावले or माशात्सवक्षणान्ति etc. Since the Yogacara Buddhist also plead that the universe is imaginary and a creation of mind they would repeat the idea as मानोद्विविधायत तथा वीरण्तीस्य दे अन्तर्गवतां। ब्राह्मणकीर्तिसंपथित अनुस्यां त्व भवति तत्त्वात।

सर्व प्रकाश्वेन सत्यवेत्तां उपवेत्तां सत्यत्वात। अस्य वेदां भविष्यान्ति अविभाज्यान्ति। ज्ञानविभाजितानि वेदोऽपि गुणानि प्रयत्नानि।

It is interesting to note that the above ideas of Gandhi have some parallel in the Vaisnavism (in the group of six chapters) as follows:

अस्य वेदां भविष्यान्ति अविभाज्यान्ति।
"All actions are (the result of) nescience, (avidya) and vidya is regarded as knowledge. The creature takes birth as a result of its action and it gets released as a result of vidya, (knowledge). The ultimate truth is Advaita, (monism) and dualism is only its variety. The notion 'I' and 'mine' arises from the lack of wisdom; Advaita, on the other hand, is experienced as freed from conceptions and as unspakable. Dvaita is embodied in the mind's activities which are born of their causes, dharma and adharma, merit and demerit. They are to be made ceased and at their cessation dualism dvaitam becomes utterly irrational. This entire universe is imagined by the mind alone and the monistic state is secured when the mind becomes non-entity (anamalihava) or non-mind. The cognitive experiences arise in accordance with the resultant forces of action karma-vasanā, that is the consciousness arises in such a fashion as the forces assume and as soon as it is removed or stopped the ultimate Truth, Brahmaman shines forth of its own accord" (cited in the Svet. bhāṣya, pp 48-49, Gita press).

Note. Vijnana and Vijnapti are employed in the same import as in Yogacara Buddhism. The idea that at the stoppage of mind’s activities Truth shines forth can be compared with the Yoga Sutra I, 1.7: "तत् उच्यते स्वयं धर्माधिकाराम्" cp. Sankara bhāṣya on Gita, XVIII, 50: "वाचकभावारूपरुपवर्त्तिकापरिपूर्वतः: कार्यः"

K.35. The idea of Gauda that the mind being controlled and checked in its activity turns out into Brahman (cp. K.34) looks like the Yogacara’s favourite thesis that the mind being stopped in its creation of dualism गुणविकल्पः turns out into Dharma-bhūtah, i.e. Tathāgata (v. Trimsika, ver. 28 with bhāṣya). It does not, however, follow that Gauda formed his idea after the pattern of Yogacara Buddhism. The Vedāntin has his own reasoning for it. Sankara pleads once: मनस् (manas) is Brahman because the latter is the inner core of the former तत् प्रत्ययां भवति Kena. Up bhāṣya II, 74. The Vedāntin's definition of jiva is: conscious spirit circumscribed by the limiting adjunct, the inner organ, i.e. the mind, etc (Vedantaparibhasha.) When the inner organ is made deprived of its functioning it becomes pure consciousness, caitanya like Ghatakaas becoming the vast space at the destruction of the pot.

K.36. Sakri-vihatam, flushing up once. This expression again appears in chap IV, K. 81. Its synonym is Sakri-jyotis found in chap III, K. 37. Atman is also stated to be Svayamjyotis in Br.Up.
Gaund made it vayam-prabhatam (IV, 8.1). The Mahaacharama Buddha have also characterised their original mind as Prakriti-prabhavaram. The Sakri-vibhutam may be considered in relation to one particularity of the Vedanta, one moment’s intuition of Truth. This theory has been advocated by the Madhyamika and also in the Suya-siddhi (ch.14.17) as against the Vaishshikas’ theory of gradual intuition of the four Truths (anupavrshimana). The one moment’s intuition is advocated for the reason that the Truth is only one, viz. Cetan-Truth. Nirudha-saya. May we guess now that there may be some link between these two theories of the Vedantins and the Buddhist? Saksaka perhaps refers to this one moment’s intuition theory while commenting on the Keda. Up. II, 2.4: श्वस्त्रिविनङ्गित as श्वस्त्रिलिङ्ग तत्त्व व दात्मसर ‘according to some prati-bheda implies one moment’s consciousness’. We may also take note here of the Br. Up. I, 36: ‘. . . . श्वस्त्रिलिङ्ग’ शहर्विपूर्वेन देव स्वस्त्रिलिङ्ग य एव देवे न श्वस्त्रिलिङ्ग य एव देवे and Saksaka’s bhāsya thereon.

K 44. Gaund’s prescription of cure for the mind’s concentration-ills is comparable with that of the Buddhist authors. Gaund says that the mind gets distracted due to its inclination to enjoy the insinuous pleasures and it becomes low-spirited on account of some mental illness etc. Both the states are detrimental to the ultimate goal. So Gaund advises that the mind should be pacified when it becomes distracted, and it should be awakened when it becomes low-spirited.

According to the Buddhists mind’s stubbornness and low-spirits are two impediments to the Enlightenment. When the mind is stubborn one should cultivate calmness, concentration and equanimity because through these three factors the stubborn mind can easily be pacified. When the mind becomes low-spirited the yogin should cultivate analytical thinking, exercise and joy because through these factors the low-spirited mind can easily be awakened (Samyuta V, 12 ff). The S, Siddhi discusses this point in greater details. When it is distracted the act of controlling should be applied: when it is too shadowed the act of thickening should be applied. The godsmith, thus melts the gold, heats it, waters and keeps it on timely. If it is too heated it becomes fluid being too cooled it becomes thickened and being kept on it becomes explained Likewise is the yogin’s mind (ch. 19 ff). The tamed horse also may be compared here (Ibid).

The Togavata refers to about nine factors of distraction and their satellites about five in all (1, 38-37). In order to check them an exercise
of contemplation on Eka-tattva, single truth is advised; the mind may
again be appeased by means of contemplation of four devices Maitri,
love, Karuna, compassion, Mudita, joyfulness and Upeksha, indifference
(L. 13), or by some such other means (6, 14). The Yogasutra speaks
nothing about the kinds of unfavourable mental states as the Buddhist
sources or Gauḍa describe.

It is therefore most likely that Gauḍa was acquainted with the
Buddhist tradition regarding the Dhyana process and made use of it in
his own fashion to suit his favourite thesis. The mind’s distraction
(stubbornness in Buddhism) which arises due to sensual pleasure should
be checked by recollecting the affective axiom that everything is miser-
able, a formula quite popular in Buddhism (K. 43). Gauḍa says in the
same breath that by recollecting everything as unborn one does not see
anything as born. But the link between the first and the second state-
ment is not quite obvious and logical. Gauḍa probably adopts Patanjali’s
opinion of Eka-tattva-abhyasa, contemplation-exercise on single truth
(Yogasutra I. 13). It appears to us in that case that we should interpret
“aṁśa” unborn as Brahma and “jāta” born as illusory things. Cfr.
our remark on the title of the third chapter above.

K. 46. Our comment on this chapter may be closed with
Gauḍa’s instructive remark on the mind and ultimate reality. He
states: When the mind is not low-spirited and distracted, the same
which is now motionless and freed from its dualistic reflection turns
cut into Brahma—which statement may suggest to us that Gauḍa expresses
a Buddhist idea in the Vedantic terminology. How it could be justi-
fied from the Advaita Vedanta’s standpoint of view that has been made
clear previously v. our comment on K. 15.

Chap IV

The fourth chapter traditionally styled as Atitasanti prakarana
consists of just a hundred stanzas eight of which are repetitions from
the previous chapters. This chapter contains several puzzling and enigmatic
expressions which led some scholars to doubt whether the author was
truly an Advaita Vedanta. Hence the chapter is interesting to us in
more than one respect. Its theme is the same as that of the previous
chapter viz. elucidation of Advaitism in greater details.

The main topics may be summed up as below:—

1. Criticism of jati-kāda, theory of origination. The origination-
thoeryists are all dualistic thinkers, viz. Sankhya, Vaiseshika, the Buddhists

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with the exception of the Madhyamikas. They may be grouped into two: (1) Some plead for origination of what is non-existent, (b) others plead for the origination of what is clearly existent, thus they both dispute each other and lead ultimately to non-origination which we approve and never dispute with them.

The author refutes the theory of origination. Intuila as it does not stand a moment’s scrutiny; hence Ajitavada, non-origination is only rationally acceptable conclusion (Ks. 23, 24). The important factor that brings is not, non-origination is the non-acceptance of the order or sequence between the cause and the effect (Ks. 25). It becomes thus obvious that nothing originates from itself or something else, nor does anything originate whether it is existent or non-existent etc., (Ks. 22). cp. Nigrodha’s samyam in kshetre nityam paratara Madhu. Sutra.

Likewise the non-existence is not caused by the non-existent nor is the existent caused by the non-existent. The existent cannot be caused by the existent. How can the non-existent be caused by the existent? (Ks. 46). This looks like Nagarjuna’s dialectic. The origination, however, has been presented by the enlightened sage, Buddha, for those who are frightened at the doctrine of non-origination and those who believe in the true existence of things as illusory experience their activities (Ks. 49); viewing thus the wise enter into the truth of non-origination of the cause and the effect (Ks. 14).

2. Prajnapa. The empirical experience of prajnapa is conditioned by its cause; if it is not so, qualities or diversity (tho, is experienced by us) would be destroyed. Because the defilement is operative in causal production (parastanata) is accepted (in the empirical field of duality). Prajnapa (the worldly experience) is regarded as conditioned by causes (vacitra) from the viewpoint of logic. The cause, (vacitra) becomes non-cause (vacitra) from the viewpoint of Truth (Ks. 34-35).

3. Dream. The dream-example is elaborated and applied to things experienced by the waking state (Ks. 31, 32, 33, 41, 61-68). Waking experience is applied to dream state in K. 44. Just as one experiences the unthinkable objects (saivyata) as real in the waking state, just so one experiences things in dream; perversion (viparyaya) is the causing factor in both cases.

4. Ayta and Namabala. The magic elephant is regarded as real because it moves and causes experiences; likewise are the external
things (K. 44). Buddha (Gautama) preached: "Things are originated on account of causes and conditions"; this origination is comparable with magic, and the magic too does not at all exist (K. 48). The illusory person is born and dies; likewise the living beings are existent (born) and non-existent (die) (K. 69). The same is repeated with the illustration of Nirmataka, created being (K. 70).

5. Alata, firebrand, whirling of the firebrand causes the appearance of a wheel, so the vibration of consciousness gives rise to the appearance of the subject-object notions. When the firebrand is stopped it causes no such appearance but remains in its unborn state. While the firebrand is whirling the appearance of wheel does not come from the outside and enters into the firebrand, nor does the wheel appearance go out of the firebrand, because it is not a substance; so is the case with Vijnana being at vibration, the appearance of the subject and object does not come from the outside and enters into Vijnana, nor does the appearance go out of it because the subject-object appearance is not a substance. The appearance is always unthinkable (nimitya) because no law of causation between the two (Vijnana and appearance) is operative (K. 47-52).

6. Citta and artha. Mind does not touch the object nor does it reflect the object, because the object is unreal and so is its reflection. The mind teaches no cause (nimittta) in all three times: Perversion is caused by itself, how will it cause the appearance? Hence the mind has no birth, nor does the mind’s vision have it. The person who perceives its birth will also perceive the foot-point in the sky (K. 36-38). The mind and its object have no birth; the person who understands this fact will never fall in perversion (k. 46). Dualism of subject and object appearance is the result of the mind’s vibration, citta-upaditta. The mind in fact is object-free; hence it is proclaimed to be contact-free, atanga (K. 73) cp. k. 48.

7. Samsara and Moksha. For samsara which is beginningless, no end can be achieved and for release, moksha which has a beginning, no endlessness can be achieved (k. 10). As long as one has obsession with cause and effect, so long will he have the causal production. The obsession being removed the causal production ceases to exist. As long as one is obsessed with the cause and effect, so long will his samsaric life continue; his obsession with the cause and effect being removed he will not be caught in samsara (K. 35-36).

8. Mahat. All entities are by nature freed from decay and death. Those who conceive their decay and death are dropped from their goal.
due to their wrong conception (K.14). All entities are beginning-
less and to be understood as similar to sky by nature. All entities by
nature are confirmed as enlightened from the beginning; one who
his perseverance to the effects will become worthy of immortality
(K.91-92).

9. Samatoschededhankak. Everything is born in the empirical
plane of existence, hence they are not permanent. Everything is
unborn as they exist (for all time); hence they are not annihilated
(K.57). From a magic seed springs up the magic sprout, then the latter
is neither permanent nor impermanent. The same rule is to be applied in respect
of all entities (K.59). No talk of eternal or non-eternal is possible
with reference to the unborn things. Where no letters (i.e. words)
are applicable, no discrimination of permanence or impermanence can
be applied thereof (K.69).

10. Abaya, non-dual. Consciousness which is in fact unborn, un-
moving, object-free, calm and non-dual appears as though having birth
movement and object (K.45). Everything is unborn; its birth is a
vision of our mind. The mind being causeless, its non-birth, anu-
patti is inevitably non-dual (K.79). The mind being detached and
inactivated, its status is motionless; this state which is invariable, unborn
and non-dual becomes the sole domain of Buddhas, the enlightened
ages (K.89).

11. Kalpasannato. What exists in the imaginary sphere of
existence (samvasa) does not exist in the absolute sense. Something
may, perhaps, exist from the viewpoint of empirical law of causation,
that too does not exist in the absolute sense. The absolute may be
unborn from the viewpoint of imaginary spheres of existence.
Kalpasan
nato, it is not at all unborn in the absolute. It takes birth from the
view point of empirical law of causation (K.72-74).

12. Abhinivesa. There is adherence to a false idea of dualism, but
that dualism is not there. Realizing the absence of dualism one takes
no birth as he has no cause for the birth (K.75). The mind on account
of adherence to false idea of dualism, activates itself in an apparently
similar object (e.g. the idea of alow on the neck) but when one realizes
the absence of the mistaken object he renounces himself from it and becomes
detached from it (K.79).

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15. Citakta: by apprehending some or other object the noble Atman is perpetually concealed as being happy, but disclosed as being miserable. The ignorant encompasses Him in four attributes; Existence, non-Existence, both Existence and non-Existence and neither Existence nor non-Existence, which attributes signify four ideas in order; 'unchanging,' 'steady' and 'the absence of both'. These are four extreme points by which the noble Atman is perpetually concealed. The person who recognizes Him as being unaffected by these attributes becomes omniscient! (K., 87-88).

14. baddha, suddha-baddha, and sattetara-baddha. The empirical knowledge (badika-jnana) is what consists of two objects and its experience; pure empirical knowledge is what has the phenomenon of experience but is deprived of its object. The transcendental knowledge (baddha) is considered as what is deprived of both the object and its experience. The Enlightened Sages, Bodhisattvas, have always proclaimed that the knowledge and the knowable (jnana, jnayata) are to be understood well. When the three-fold knowledge and the knowable are understood in their order the wise will acquire omniscience in respect of everything (K., 87-89). Those who are convinced in respect of brightness and identity (of all things) are indeed possessed of the highest knowledge in the world and in this fact the world does not delve (K., 89).

15. Apayana. What is to be discarded, what is knowable, what is to be acquired and what is to be measured are all to be understood from the apayana, the highest Upanishadic path. Of these the ignorance-oriented experience has been accepted in the three states except in the cognizable-sunya state (K., 90).

16. Brahma-ya. Having realized the complete omniscience, Brahma-ya, and a non-dual position not amenable to the beginning middle and end, what more can this one may render for? This discipline of Brahmans is spoken of as their innate calm state. It is also stated as done because they by nature are controlled in their senses; the wise knowing thiswise should acquire the calm state (K., 85-86).

17. Vaishrava. Having realized truly the absence of causation and not finding any distinct cause for anything one secures the fearless state which is devoid of grief and desire (K., 75). All entities are calm from the beginning, always, very quiet by nature and undifferentiated; their identity (satyam) is unborn (i.e. Brahmans) and fearless, satyam. Those who walk in things' differentiation have no fearlessness. All
different doctrines are deeply bent on differentiations; therefore they are pitiable (Kx. 93-94). Having realized the state which is hardly visible, too deep, unform, undifferentiated, fearless and freed from diversity, we recite our preceptor to the best of our ability (K.105).

18. Apana: If there is even a subtle notion of diversity of things lingering in his mind the unwise will have no detachment.

What to speak of that he will slip away his veil of negligence? All thence (i.e. sentient beings) are never covered by any veil, free from impurities by nature, enlightened and liberated from the outset thus understand our teachers (K1.97-98).

19. Janmatva or Brahma: Buddha’s knowledge does not cross over into entities, nor do the entities likewise cross over into knowledge —this has not been declared by (Gautama) Buddha (K.99). The unborn knowledge is not regarded to be crossing over into unborn entities. Since the knowledge does not cross over into entity it is declared as relationless (K.106 cp. 72 under the head ej).

20. Asama-jnana: I salute him who has preached yoga freed from contact, which is pleasant and beneficial to all sentient beings, dispute-free and contradiction-free (K.1), cp. III. 19: the contact-free yoga is hardly experienced by any mediator who is frightened from this yoga thinking that is dreadful, though it is in fact otherwise.

Comment. 1. Asama-jnana: This is the most characteristic feature of Gauḍa’s philosophy. Nāgācāyu (hereafter referred to as Naga) too as made use of this thesis as one of the most powerful weapons to uphold his favourite philosophy of Nihilism, Samyojana. Though Gauḍa and Naga concur in pleading very strongly for non-origination of things their ultimate purpose is quite different. Gauḍa by devoting the separate non-existence or non-origination of things aims at upholding Aumun or Brahman as one sole principle, Advaita. Whereas Naga aims at an absolute voidness, nisvarga. Though our modern minds tend to identify them as one and the same neither Gauḍa would say that he also at voidness, nor would Naga say so at the Upāniṣādik Brahman. They differ thus in their purposes which oppose each other.

The circumstances which led them to their different conclusions must also be different. Since Gauḍa cites on several occasions instances from the Upāniṣādik and other Vedic sources we may fairly be sure that
he has been inspired by those sources. We find in the Upanishads several passages to the effect that one Atman or Brahman alone is true and other phenomenal things are untrue or false; e.g. Aranyak. Upi. 1.1.1, 2.5.1: भावता स इपषश्य भावतु नाशय विवेचनविनितु।

When things other than Brahman are declared untrue they deserve to be termed non-existent and their apparent existence and appearance are to be explained away as the effects of our mind's illusion like a notion of the serpent on the rope. When the notice of the serpent disappears on a close observation the serpent and the rope become one and the same and the serpent has not a separate existence. Likewise to say that things other than Brahman are untrue and false implies that they have no separate existence and to be viewed as identical with Brahman itself. To confirm this idea the Sveta Upanishad says:—

This Brahman that remains always within is knowable. There is nothing other than this Brahman realisable. The enjoyer, enjoyable and commandeer. All these three are stated to be this Brahman alone. 1.1.2.

On the basis of this identity all the attributes that are applicable to Brahman can also be applied to other phenomenal things. This is the reason why Gauda declares that things (dharmas) are adi-santa, adi-buddha and adi-niruddha (wetren, released and enlightened from the outset) etc. The most characteristic of all attributes is aja, ajata 'unborn'. Upanisads always prefer the expression: aja, ajata, na jyeste, etc. to qualify Brahman or Atman. It may now appear quite obvious why Gauda generally calls phenomenal things as ajä, ajata, ajati, etc. This is perhaps the background on which Gauda's ajati-randa has been worked out.

In the case of Naga's ajati or antapattvadã non-origination proposition the following facts may be considered as basis: Avajit, one of the foremost disciples of Buddha, has credited his master with the discovery of a true cause of things that are brought about by causes in this stana.

वे तथागतवासु भेजु हृदयं समाधिः द्वांति।

"Tathagata (Buddha) has proclaimed the true cause of things that arise on account of their causes" (v. Sastivadana sutra, p.26, note on p. 31 more particulars about the stana).

It is called there as Pratitya-samapada-groha implying thereby a formula
of Dependent Origination. The formula is said to contain twelve members such as Artha, Samanta, Upasna and others arranged in a progressive order to show that the first member causes the second, the second causes the third and the latter causes the fourth and so on. The formula explains how a human being comes into existence from its embryonic stage to full grown up stage. In other words it makes plain how the truth of origin of misery, Samadaya says operates. The same formula is said to lead to the cessation of truth, Niradha-saga by a cessative process, i.e. the cessation of the first member leads to that of the second member and so on. This doctrine obviously proves that both the origin and cessation are conditioned by causes. The law of causation, Pratitya-samutpada, thus forms a central theme in early Buddhism explaining how the phenomena of world originates and how it ceases to originate at the end.

This position turns to be quite different when Buddhism assumes Mahayamic form and introduced a monistic teaching. The Mahayamic headed by Naga and a large number of Mahayana Sutras credited no more Buddhism to be the discoverer of the law of causation in its early form. The doctrine of Pratyasa-mutpada implies for Naga the reverse of origination, i.e. non-origination and non-cessation. Note the first stanza of this Mahayamaka Sutra:

मेधरामालकायति

This idea of non-origination is confirmed in the Mahayamic scripture. यथा श्रावण्णिति स प्रकाशि: “What is originated through causes is not originated in fact’’ cited in the Madh., vi., p. 239 from the Anuvatapta Sutra. The reversal of origination into non-origination was necessitated in view of changing pattern of the Mahayamic outlook in respect of universe and their declared monistic principle. Now the Pratyasa-samudhada gatha has no more its original value, it has been since then relegated to an obsolete position. Gauta has also noticed this gatha and its principal idea of origination (v.N, 57).

Thus once a monistic principle becomes a declared motto, a nihilistic attitude towards other things is inevitable. This background offered Naga a great opportunity to wield his critical acumen and demolish the entire structure of dualistic thinking solely of his co-religionists, Abhidharmikas, Sarvavisvakas and Vaibhaika. His polemics against these schools met with his Mahayamaka sastra and Dharmasamikas, etc. Naga being the foremost in the field of dialectic logic, the pattern
of his critique would not have but served as model to the monastic thinkers like Guṇḍa. Though Guṇḍa and Nāga plead for non-originating theory we should not however, ever lose their fundamental differences. As we clearly noticed, Nāga upholds Śāṅkyaśāstra whereas Guṇḍa advocates Advaita-vāda. The latter’s criticism of origin is directed against the Śāṅkyaśāstra in the main (Kr. 3-29). cp. मूल भविष्यवादः एकः “...Śāṅkyaśāstra; the Vaiśeṣikas’ avasthitasvāda is discussed only in one or two places (Kr. 3-29, etc.). As we correctly stated, the central theme of all dualists has been criticised on several occasions (Read verses under topic No. 6-7: citta, etc. and saṁsāra, etc.). The origin theory of the early Buddhists as stated in the Pratītya-samutpāda-gaṇa has been referred to and ridiculed, read IV, 38: वर्ण न दृष्टि जानते न वैद्यता विश्वाची रूपन्.

As previously remarked Nāga’s target of attack is in upholding the non-originating theory in the main the early Buddhist who followed the Pratītya-samutpāda-gaṇa closely is better. His criticism against the Śāṅkyaśāstra and the Vaiśeṣikas can be found in the Dvārakā-mukha (my translation, ch. II). It is a well-known fact that the Mahāyānas do not profess any proposition of their own; they simply ridicule the opponents’ propositions (cf. Vargālayavyutpāda, ver. 29, and Madh., vṛtti, p. 6). The question whether Śāṅkyaśāstra, Nibbāna is adhered to or Nāga replies emphatically. We declare clearly.

“it is not stated as void or non-void, nor is to be stood as both or non-both; it is however stated as void in order to convey an empirical understanding.”

M. Sātra, XXII, II.

Likewise an exclusive abhā or anupāda theory is not acceptable to Nāga, cfr. this point in his Dvāraka-mukha, ch. I. later portion. Guṇḍa on the other hand sticks to the non-originating doctrine throughout the treatise and hints sometimes that āsā or āsā samādhis for Śākhara or Atman. We should not nevertheless mis to take note of some common expression between Guṇḍa and Nāga. Read e.g. Guṇḍa’s verse.

यस्मि का पत्रेषु नानां न अविन्यस्तः कृतः।

कर्मशास्त्रोपरि व विन्यस्तकृतं कारणः॥
with Naga's
not very satisfactory as they are obscured in unfamiliar expressions
which are not understandable by our ordinary intellect. Gauḍa has
employed here apparently some Buddhist expressions like Pratīṣṭha
and Prajñāpāramitā. Though the latter term can be traced in the treatises of
the Sāṅkhyā and Saṃkhya the former can hardly be traced in the Brahmanical
literature. It appears therefore that Gauḍa adopted it from the Buddhist
sources and made it of his own. The Buddhists employ the term pra-
jñāpāramitā in the sense of ordinary talk or philosophically in empirical reality
of existence, V. Satya-sūtra, ch. on this topic see cp. also Saddhā-
prajñāpā, Loka-jñāpī, etc., which are some of the tīkas in Buddhist
literature. Its synonym in later Buddhism is Samyutta-sāyas, empirical
truth.

Prajñāpāramitā is also Buddhist expression conveying the idea of
origination dependent on causes and conditions. In Yogacāra Buddhism
the term conveys the sense “the mental and mental states dependent
on causes and conditions”. In fact it is not at all a Buddhist term when
it signifies anything that depends on some ultimate cause in contrast with
which is independent, Saṃsāra. For example, the evolutes in Sāṅkhyā
system are pratīṣṭha because they are evoluted from Prakṛti which is
pratīṣṭita because it does not evolve from anything else (V. Sāṅkhyakārikā,
10). Sri Sankara also employs pratīṣṭha in connection with our body,
kāya-karana-saṃghaṅha “the aggregates of effects and senses”. So Gauḍa’s
sense is quite obvious, viz. pratīṣṭha, causal product i.e., the saṃsāric
process continues and persists until saṃsāra, deluding forces are present.
It is an established fact in every system of thought that the deluding forces
necessarily give rise to their effects, i.e., saṃsāric life as empirical ex-
istence.

In the next verse the author speaks of Yoke-dūrśana and Bhūta-
dūrśana. The firm is concerned with the empirical experiences and
their conditioning factors whereas the latter with the absolute. Bhūta-
dūrśana, as insight into the absolute truth turns out the conditioning
factors into non-factors. The term *abha-dararana* looks like a Buddhist expression, note Asvaghosha’s *stava*:

"Perceiver of Truth, perceiving the Truth as Truth becomes released!"

3. Dream. Example on dream analogy read our remarks on ch.II (beginning). The only point to be noticed here is avayu, “unthinkable”. This term is again spoken of in connection with the universe of subject and object in K.47 and 52. Read comment on the fire-brand example, topic no.5.

4. Daya, etc.: Maya example is common to both Buddhists and Vedanta. Nirnabaka example is more likely a Buddhist one. Sinhara however, refers to the idea of a magician creating himself as walking in air etc.: ‘यया भयाय्यी विषाणान आयामांकेयाणां महादेविनः विनिमित्ययात्र’ (Atitareya. Up.bhashya, Gita Press, p.37). The important verse to be noted here in this section is Gauḍa’s refutation of Bodhad’s renowned Gathaka on Pratitya-arutpadha doctrine. Gauḍa says that Buddha’s teaching on the origination of things has not been stated from the absolute point of view. The origination of those things resembles a magic act which by itself is unproved as existent. Read comment on jati-yada for more details.

5. Fire-brand. This is a well-known example in Indian philosophica literature. The whirling fire-brand causes the appearance of wheel which is unthinkable, avayu, because it does not exist in the fire-brand, nor does it come from the outside or go out of the fire-brand. The wheel-appearance is unthinkable, because it is not a substance, i.e. it cannot be regarded as the actual effect of the fire-brand. Likewise the appearance of the subject-object universe on the consciousness is unthinkable, because the said appearance is not a substance; hence there cannot be a causal relation between the appearance and consciousness वाचकस्वरूपांकोऽविशिष्टम्. It seems that Gauḍa expounds the Vedantic idea in the Yogeśara Buddhist terminology.

Our author on a previous occasion has also spoken of the unthinkable in K.44. The person with waking state perceives, as a result of
perverse, the unthinkable external elements as real (bhuta), etc. Ref. Dream-example No. 3. Here for Gauḍ, the phenomenal universe is unthinkable, because it is an impressed appearance on Brahman like the wheel appearance on the fire-brand. The wheel appearance is neither a substance nor the effect of the fire-brand. Likewise phenomenon of universe is neither substance nor the effect of Brahman but it is unthinkable (acitrya); magic or lie. There cannot be a causal relation between the universe and Brahman because the universe is not at all a substance.

The idea of unthinkable is also common to the Yogacara Buddhists. The Ratnakota, thus refers to four unthinkable acitrya: Samala Tatāvata, Nirmala Tatāhita, Vinabāda Buddhaguna and Jina-ārya. Here acitrya appears to signify their characteristics inexplicable in the terms of ordinary reasoning.

The Satya-siddhi again defines the sense organ as anitya-karma-bhārata of the four great elements. It is acitrya because it cannot be stated as either one with or other than the four great elements. According to Digna the sense organ is sort of Sakti inhered in the Abya consciousness. He also refers to it alternately as anitya-rupa, probably an opinion of the S. Siddhi (v. mg dhvambhupariksha, ver. 7-8).

The Madhyamika’s doctrine of voidness which may be posited as a parallel of Velanta’s doctrine of illusion, mayyada appears to have sprung up as a result of their speculative thoughts about the existence of the in-describable character. The Madhyamikas affirm that the phenomenal world is indescribable because it does not stand its logical test. We have several reasons to make us believe that the movement of the Madhyamika analysis was not started with Nāga but it must have been initiated from the early period of the Mahayana scriptures. We may cite here a few examples. The Bh-samkramantiva says: The consciousness of new birth is something indescribable. The last consciousness when it ceases, does not go anywhere and the first consciousness, when it arises does not come from anywhere else. For, they have no reality of their own and are void of their self-substance (pp. 4, 11). It may now be plain that the relation between these two elements of consciousness not be specified in terms of logic. The idea is that the same consciousness does not cross over to the new birth and continues for the time (na samhitam). The same position is confirmed in the Suntabho-sūtra dealing with the Paramā-sāmutpada doctrine, p. 6, Na samhramah ... The Mahā-vrtti (p. 112) cites a Mahāyana sūtra bearing on this topic:

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The indescribable character of the relation between the cause and the effect has been argued by Naga in several places as a basis of his Sunyata doctrine. He pleads for example:

प्रौढ़व्यावाचकः नाहि विद्यादेवः ततो।
न नान्यापि ततै तथावतः नैसिद्धतः नाहि शा०यम्।

M. Sutra XVIII, 10

Cp. M. vṛtti, p. 129 reference from the Anavatapta Sutra:

यो ज्ञानविविधत्वं न राजसोऽनुवत्तात।
इति याग्नी तस्य तदं राजस्वैरसीव।
यो वै विविद्धत्वं स वै होपावेदत।
यो वै तस्मात् वै तदं वै स्वत:।

This topic will continue in the comment on Sunyata, etc. No. 9.

6. Citta and artha. Naga introduces in his sastra chap. III. on a critical examination of sensory perception which leads him to the conclusion that none of the senses could possibly discharge its function with which concurs Gauda's contention that the mind does not contact with its object, etc. It is worthwhile to take note of the verse from the Bhavavasimsranti Sutra:

न वर्ण. ज्ञाते कर्म न मे वाच्यवर्तनां न वै भै।
परं सुरवेण सर्व स यस्य सोऽत्स: न मृगे।।

Cited in M. vṛtti, p. 130.

Gauda's statement that the person who conceives the origination of things will see the footprint in the sky is comparable with the verse cited in Madh. vṛtti p. 90: सुन्दरविनाश नाहि विद्योर्कर्षित सत्यविनाश या पदाम्। (Ratnakaraśrta) cp. also Madhavacarita p. 119. Dhammapada, VIII. 4 and Theragatha, 92. Sankara also cites the simile along with others: स नूतन वचनं च न न वेशयुपासिञ्ची।

Suryavaniḥ च द्वीपवाहिकोऽस्मे वेश्यो मृगो वाहि च विवेशस्त।

Atareya bhashya, p. 76-77 (Gita Press), Here Gauda might have in his mind the Yogacara Buddhists who hold that the mind though momentary continues in succession.
Cirajipandita (ver. 23). The vibration of the mind has already been spoken of in IV, 29 as being happened in dream as well as in the waking state on account of maya. The Buddhists also speak of the minds nodding as resulting in false assumption. Bodhidharma says: I mention in the mind’s nodding, vibration and elaboration, etc. (Samyutta, IV, 207-7 cited also in S. Sthiti, ch. 84). Note also the passage cited in Madh. vrtti p. 540 l. 132. निर्बृम्पितमस्य अवस्था ० व मया। संपन्नतास्मातद्वितिः। सर्वचन्द्रकालाधिकम्। तद्यथा। “Nirvāna is a purification and stoppage of all causing factors and of all distraction and shaking”. This idea may possibly tally with Gauda’s conception of the universe as a vibration of the mind.

7. Samuara and Madh. Gauda makes clear here that he keeps the same attitude towards Samuara as Naga, and his predecessors maintain. They plead that the belief and adherence to law of causation leads to a great sequence of one being haggled down in a turbulent empirical life. The best means to get rid of it is to be detached from the false notion of causation law. The causation law is false because it falls to the ground when it is put to a critical analysis. The Madhyamikas declare that things that are valued on the basis of causal relations are absolutely valueless and hence void, maya. Gauda and his followers as a result of the same logical absurdity call the empirical things as maya or avayā. Things are acintya unthinkable because their causal relations are impossible to be made satisfactorily intelligible to our reasoning. Gauda has in a specimen, shows how absurd it is to talk about the causal relation in respect of the fire-breed and its wheel like appearance (v. Comm. Ne. Q). Naga has on the side of Mahāyana Buddhism done the same job throughout his Madh. Sutra.

8. Kshara. This concept is much favoured by the Buddhists and found in a specific context, cp. jana kshanta in Buddhism. Gauda seems to have generalized the term in a broader sense of perseverance. How the entity is free from decay and birth, beginningless and enlightened by nature have already been made plain in the comment on Aptivada No. 1. Their companionship with sky is also common to the Buddhists. The comparison implies that the entities are identical and changeless, and in addition, they are void for the Madhyayikas. For the Mahayanic idea of kshanta read the Samudibirja Sutra:

The Bodhisattva does not dispute with anybody nor does he talk about any purposeless topic and remains constantly in his objective and dhārma; this is the description of the first kshanta.
He understands all things as comparable with pāyā and grasps no nimitta. The characteristic marks of the perceived object, nor does he run astray from his cultivated knowledge. These are specifications of the first kṣānti. (v. Buddhagosananga, p. 213).

9. Savata and Ichchāda. Buddha’s doctrine is based on the middle path, mādhyamagratipadā avoiding two extreme ends: afflicting one self with the bodily torture and indulging in the sensuous pleasure (v. Dharmacādikappavittanā Sutta) which ends are stated later as existence and non-existence (Samyutta III, 155 cit. in S. Siddhi, ch. 28, No. 131).
The Mahavaca equated bhava-vrihi (भवव्री) with Savata and vībhava-vrihi (विभवव्री) with ichchāda (v. Poussin, M. vṛtti, p. 1, n. 4 and p.127, 5). Naga then declared that Buddha’s doctrine freed from eternalism and Nihilism (Savanachi-dru in his Vedhi, sutra XVIII, 11-Buddha introduced Prajñā-samāsādā, law of causation with a view to avoiding the two ends, so says a Sutta: “The view of non-existence (Nihilism) disappears when one understands the origin of things (Samadaya-sayya) and the view of existence (Eternalism) disappears when one understands their cessation, Nidānā-sayya”’ (Samyutta, III, 14 cited in S.Siddhi ch. 195). Naga comments: The law of causation helps to avoid those two flaws in the doctrine. He says: Whichever arises due to causes and conditions is neither identical with nor different from its cause; hence it is neither perished nor preserved (M. Sastra XVIII, 10 cp. comm. No. 5 above). The Salastambho Sutta states that the formula of causation should be viewed on the background of five aspects, the first two of which are: na savata and na ichchāda and explain them in the same fashion as Nage does v. verse cited above).
The Lalitavistara also expresses similar view: को नाग सठो बधामुक्तं न य व श्रेयस्वतवांशि भो जीवेत तथा न व जीवदत्तमेव अन्यायस्य भो (Lav. 829).

“For example, the sprout springs up from the seed; they are neither one and the same nor different from each other; thus their nature is neither permanent nor impermanent” (cited in M. vṛtti p. 177).

Aryadeva elucidates the topic in a simpler manner: Because an element comes into being there is no Nihilism. Because an element goes out of existence there is no Eternalism (Cited Bod., p. 379).

Being examined of this grand idea of the Buddhists Gauda thinks his Advaita doctrine should also be made freed from those two flaws.
So he says: Because things take birth, i.e. change into another form in the empirical sense, they are not permanent, but because they are in fact unborn, i.e. do not change in their aspect of existence an inherent Brahmanic state, they are eternal. Gauḍa’s statement: “in regard to unborn things no talk is possible of ‘eternal’ or ‘non-eternal’” (K.60) may be compared with Naga’s verse: With reference to void things what is the same, what is different, what is eternal and what is non-eternal... (XXV, 11). Note the difference between Gauḍa and Naga in their metaphysical outlook: for the former “things are unborn” and for the latter “things are void”.

Gauḍa next says (60 c-d) Where no letters are applicable, no discrimination is possible applicable thereto, which saying implies that Truth is abhikṣhet, inexplicable in letter; cp. Naga’s idea: Abhikṣhetrotram. Discrimination is rooted in letters, words; cp. the following idea: sources of discrimination are words and the latter is the source of the former, निब्बिन्दितत्वहि निविन्दितत्वम्।

Gauḍa’s expression: illusory things create illusory things; likewise are the phenomenal things (K.59) is comparable with Naga’s verse: void things arise from the void things: सूक्ष्मावर्जितस्ववर्जितकार्यम्। Pratītya-samutpada-ḥrdaya, ver. 4. 10. Advaya: Gauḍa seems to speak of the individual Atman by vijana (which is identical with Brahman) when he refers to it as motionless and without second. The consciousness appears in the empirical plane of existence as though having birth, motion, etc. The idea may be compared with Dharmakīrti’s saying: "अविचारात् दिन सूक्ष्मावर्जितकार्यम्। गुत्स्याद्वस्मिनेनेतरतिविविद्या।" Pra. var. 3. 154

Gauḍa says (K. 77) that the mind’s non-born anupattī, is advaya and that the non-born state is possible when there is no sonoma, mind’s activating cause, pravrtti-nimittā. At this stage the mind becomes one with Brahman, Brahmi-bhava (v. our comment on III, KK. 35. 46 above and Vyasutra 1, 1, 3). The same idea is expressed in different fashion (K. 89), i.e. the motionless state which is the same as Brahmic non-dual position is declared to be the sole domain of Buddha’s highest knowledge. Here “Buddha” is in a general sense meaning an enlightened sage, v. our remark on advaya in br. II, end).

11. Kalpa and Paramatmā. Those two verses are the most enigmatic and misunderstood. The terms Kalpa and Paramatmā are the yogacará expressions adopted by Gauḍa and grafted to his Vedantic
ideology. Before we try to understand them we have to bear in mind the following background. Mahayana Buddhists admit two kinds of samvit: Tathaya and Mithya-samvit. For example, the sight of water in the mirage is supplied in the next moment on a close observation. Here the sight of water is Mithya-samvit, and the observation of the mirage is Tathaya-samvit (c.f. my paper: Madhyamakarika Samgahan in FORM, IX, p. 151). Gaṇi’s kalpi samvit corresponds to Mithya-samvit (cfr. Ibid, ver. 9) and Paratantra to Tathaya. Samvit i.e. Lokasamvit or atma. Kalpi-samvit is the imagined water in the mirage and the Paratantra-samvit is the experience of the worldly objects which are products of causation law. For the yogacara Buddhists kalpi aspect is non-existent and false and the paratantra aspect i.e. the mind and the mental state is existent and real. For the Madhyamikas it is also unreal and void.

Now we can very well understand what Gaṇi means to convey in these two verses. In kalpi-samvit i.e. in our sole imagination something appears as if real, e.g. the water in the mirage, but it turns to be unreal in the Tathayasaṃvit-Loka-samvit which Gaṇi calls Paratantra and which has a bit of reality (paramarthika). The objective universe may be real from the viewpoint of the law of causation, Paratantra-samvit but it is unreal from the absolute point of view (K. 73). The next step must be understood that so-called ultimate principle, Pradhana, etc. of other philosophers is conceived as unborn from the viewpoint of kalpi-samvit imaginary experience (Kalpi-samvit-Mithya-samvit, but it is not unborn from the viewpoint of the highest Truth. It takes birth etc. from the viewpoint of Paratantra-samvit-Tathaya-samvit. Paratantra-samvit is so called because the law of causation is admissible in the empirical plane. It is an interesting coincidence that Candrakīrti (100 in his Mūla, avatāra illustrates Mithya-samvit by quoting the Satkhyā and others and their so-called ultimate principles (v. my paper: Mūla, samghāra cit. p. 46). It is strange that the Tathya-samvit on the verse attributed to Udayana interprets paratantra into pannavāra (v. comm. No. 2: more about paratantra). In the light of above finding R.D. Karradkar’s much laboured explanation and note are not admissible (v. his notes on pp. 130-131).

17. Abhinivesa. The first line of K. 75 is a citation from the Madhyante-vidhāga of Maitreyā ch. I, 1: ver. 1: ab. (समस्त-समस्तो-धारितिः इत्यत्त न विवस्ती) (Shiramati comments: there is a foundation i.e. Paratantra-mind mental state and on it kalpi, false ideas imposed) in which (paratantra) exists no duality, subject and object, etc. We are not to understand
Gautama in this manner. He probably means: there is abhinivesa (wrong adherence) for abhava-dhatus, duṣkrama but there is no duṣkrama in fact. If we divide the verse into two sentences all the grammatical difficulties would be solved. The K. 79 avokes plan that Gautama does not intend to express the Buddhist meaning in k. 75 a-b because he says in this verse that an account of abhinivesa or false idea of duṣkrama, abhava a man engages himself in an apparently similar object. Here the subject of the verb "varamitvam" is "sah" a p-person, not the mind.

3. Cānditā. This is the most characteristic feature of the Mahayāna philosophy. Nāgārjuna proclaims that the highest Truth of his conception is free from any atributie. existence of non-existence etc. He inherited this doctrine from buddha's doctrine to Agṅgacchha about the Tathāgata's status after death which (status) has been described as "hant, na hant, hanti ca na ca hanti, nāma na tanti na hanti". Then Buddha gives out his opinion about the point thus: Tathāgata in Nirvāna is incomparable like the great ocean (Mahāsamudrā, No. 73). It is therefore appropriate for the Mahayāna to qualify the Truth as free from existence etc; but would it be justified on the part of Gautama who is an Advaita Vedanta and whose ultimate truth is Bhūman and essentially not existence in character? For this reason probably Gautama states that the four attributes signify in order: unceasingly, steadily etc. Thus Gautama appears to refer by satvās, existence-theories to the multiple principles of the dualists like the Sāṅkhyā, Vaiśeṣika and the early Buddhists. Their principles being more than one the existence trait does not remain attached to one principle. For the materialists (māṇḍalika) the highest principle being the non-existence trait is fixed. The meaning of abhaya and abhaya-sāṅkhya may be understood appropriately in relation to other theories is order.

14. Labhita-jana etc. The varieties of knowledge, labhita, etc. are are quite common to the yogic Buddhists though their interpretations are somewhat different. No difference can be noticed with reference to the first variety, vi. Labhita and its meaning because it is concerned with the ordinary sensing experience. The difference is to be noted in the second variety, i.e., Sādhu-labhita. For the Buddhists (i.e., yogica) it is a pure empirical knowledge which is the prati-kshetra's-jana, i.e., a knowledge acquired subsequent to the concentration Samadhi and reflects things in their own nature namely as the reflections of the mind and the mental states, pratyakṣa-pratarpā. The Yogin should perceive the pratyakṣa-trait through this knowledge after rising up from the samādhi, Tākṣara, the highest transcendental knowledge.
known as *Anuparastan*, i.e. state when Alaya-consciousness is turned into Tathata, or Dharmadhatu, etc (v. Trimikle, ver. 18-19).

It appears that Gaṇḍa employs these apparently Buddhist terms to convey his own ideas. His commentator explains the *Suddhālayikā* and *Lokottara* as *ātman* state and deep sleep consciousness respectively, in the *Āvāma* state the mind whose experiences unreal things, so it is without objects there are experiences-avastha sūtyāmbha. In the deep sleep even the mind ceases to operate, hence it is considered to be empirical of both, objects and their experiences.

The *Lokavatara Sūtras* speaks of the three kinds: *Laudha*, *Lokottara* and *Ludantatāma* and describes them as three stages of development. The first is related to other philosophers who advocate different ultimate categories of existence and non-existence. The second is concerned with all *naikas* and *patyekas*; Buddhist knowledge and the third with *Buddhas* and *Buddhas*’s developed knowledge (i.e. the text cited by Karmaker in his notes, p. 138).

The second line of this K. 88 is the most ambiguous. The *Bhashya* of Śaṅkarā commentates: The knowledge through which the above said three states are understood is knowable; cognizable, *vijaya* is known as the fourth state (turiyākhyam), the Absolute Truth.....This interpretation appears to be somewhat uncertain in the next verse, 89 which does not mention the fourth state in a plain language. The verse reads: When three-fold knowledge and the knowable (pañca) are understood well in their order one becomes omniscient. According to the *Bhashya*, *Suṣujata*, *omnescent* stands for the fourth state (i.e. the text cited in the notes p. 140). So apparently there is no incoherence on the part of *Bhashya*, so Karmaker’s criticism of *Bhashya* seems to be unfair.

15 *Agājana*. This term is also a Buddhist expression meaning Mahāyāna, generally understood as very great. According to the *Upanishads*, *yanas* mean “path” in the expressions like *Dīnapya* and *Pṛṇāya* etc. In Buddhist there are three yanas: *Prajñā*, *Pīryāka* *Buddha-yana* and *Mahāyāna* also called *Agrājana* sometimes. Of the Brahmanical side two yanas are well known, viz, *Pīryāya* and *Dīnapya* (v. Br. Up. VI, 1, 2, Pratim. 1, 9 and Mundaka III, 1, 6) which are concerned with the field of *karma*, *yeda* rites and the worship of lower Brahman (upāsana). It is most likely that Gaṇḍa accepted here as it elsewhere the Buddhist expression, agrājana to convey his Vedantic idea i.e. the highest *Upaniṣadic* path. The *Buddhist* call *Mahāyāna* sometimes
Buddhavasa. As its counterpart the Vedanta may also call his path as Brahman-vana like Brahma-nirvana of the Gita, V. 24-26. II, 72.

Now we have to explain the Haya etc. on the basis of the Upatihads. Heya, ’to be abandoned’ is aparayidya, knowledge of the lower Brahman (cf. Sankara’s Bhasha on Muktika, I, 275). The knowable isparayidya, knowledge of higher order leading to Brahman-realisation (v. ibid). Or it may indicate the knowable first stated in the vers. 58 (v. context on it above). Apya, ’to be acquired’ is the fruit effected by Karman, Samavaphala (v. Bhasha on Muktika 1, 217; Sarvan Karti-karyam upadhyayam, apyan, samshayayam viharyay sa). Fathyam, ’to be matured’ is the realisation of Atman and its identity with Brahman on the matura- tion of one’s intellect (v. Sankara’s Bhasha on Tattti, I, 11. p. 90 Gita Press, tr. the explication, pada in Zetra, Up. V, 8 and Sankara’s Aparoksanabhuti, ver. 81. नेवे तत्त्वमेव सत्त्वनात् परिष्कृतव्य स वा पुनः ते वेनेवेव ज्ञेयं ज्ञातां ...) II 133 II

Here viti is Brahman-viti, thinking of Brahman.

An illusory experience of these four may happen in all three states, leela, etc. (K, 88) except in the fourth vijnana state. This interpretation may sound well. But the difficulty we encounter here is that the interpretation clashes with Gauḍa’s description of the third state, deep sleep as dream of objects and their experiences.

16. Brahman sa Gauḍa calls the Upatihadic consciousness a non-dual Brahmanhood (Brahvanaya) probably in order to distinguish his Advaita doctrine from Buddhism. The Bhadaratlya describes who is Bhramara and who is Kepana: यो यो एतवार्त्तानां नात्मस्वरूपं तत्त्वेऽक्तं स ज्ञातां ब्रह्माणं भ्रमरा तथा एतस्तार्यात् नात्मस्त सर्वसः स ज्ञातां तत्त्वादिनां मेवः प्राकृतिः। (III, 8, 10). It is worthwhile to remember here that a counter-claim has also been made by Buddha and his disciples. Their claim is that their faith alone leads to Brahmanhood, cf. Dhammapada, Brahmanavagga, 36 and my paper, Message of Buddha and reference on pp. 5-8, Prabhadiabhavana, 1970, May.

17. Vairanadiva. This is also a Buddhist expression. It is one of the most important attributes of Buddha like Dassala etc. The Sutra-udadhi state Buddhi deserves our homage because he is superior to all other religious teachers in respect of his sublime qualities like Vairanadiva, etc. (ch. 3 and my paper on this subject in Sino Indian Studies, vol. I, pp. 3). Now Gauḍa appears to have generalised the expression.
and claimed that the Realizer of Brahman and Aum may also deserve to be characterized as 'Vishnud' just like Buddha claiming to be Brahman.

18. Avatara. This is a common concept of all schools of Indian philosophy though its content may differ in each school. The more characteristic feature of avatara, well acceptable to the Vedanta and the Buddhists is anitya, a transience which is amplified into Raga, dvinda and nisaya, 'lust, indigination and intoxication', Gaudi says these are simply anitya or maya but its effect, i.e., the notion of diversity in identity, things, in fact, are truly one, pure by nature, etc. Thus our leaders understand. (Ref. our comment on Ajeti no. 1). Here again a generalization of Buddha's epithet 'Nayaka' has been claimed by Gaudi, cf., Anusasana's synonym of Buddha 'Nayaka' and 'Vasayaka'.

19. Jamana-krama. Gaudi states why knowledge does not cross over into entities in K, 96. Because both knowledge and entities are unborn, 'aj' and essentially identical character of Brahman one does not cross over into other. The thing other than Brahman is a myth in the highest sense of Truth. This is the reason why the knowledge is frequently declared to be fixed from any relation with its relatives. Gaudi has already stated that the mind never crosses its object since the latter is unborn (K, 72). He now speaks about that point has not been admitted by Buddhists. Buddha on the other hand, proclaimed in his first sermon: In me a knowledge arose in respect of dharmas, entities: वेदयु कालसुदर्थिन नित्यान्त निरध्यानित्व, etc. which claim has been challenged by Gaudi in this verse, this challenge will set at rest all speculations about Gaudi and his professed faith.

20. Apara-yoga. This seems to be absolutely a new expression coined by Gaudi. It has no parallel either in Buddhism or Brahmanism. It is a paradoxical combination joining yogas in the absence of contact, para. What does it signify? The classical definition of yoga in Buddhism is to concentrate one's mind on a particular object. This is definitely a aparaya-yoga. The Buddhists admit nine grades of dhyana: four rupa-dhyanas; four arupa-dhyanas and the last: Nirvada-gupta which is literally a sparsha-yoga. For in the previous 8 dhyanas the mind is operating and engaged in one or other object; it is in the last sarvaduta the mind ceases to operate; the yogin has only the body to get into contact with the object. Gaudi's aparaya-yoga is unknown to the Buddhists.

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The Kathopanishad defines yoga as follows: When the five sensual knowledges together with mind cease to operate and the intellect too does not act, that state is the highest position (guj). That position is considered as yoga in which the senses including the mind and the intellect are controlled and held up steadfast (III, 2, 10-11). This is the yoga that Gauḍa has in mind. Since in this state all the senses, the mind and the intellect cease to operate, there is nothing that comes into contact with any object. This position may appropriately be termed “Apara-yogha”. Sankara’s remarks in this context are noteworthy. He says: तत्संसारीतः सत्त्वानं वांगिस्रिः अत्रं न किलक्षितः मात्राः।

That saṁsāra state the wise consider as the yoga which in fact is only a disjoining (viyoga) i.e. contact-free, because this state of yogin, silt is characterized as an absence of contact with all sorts of evil affairs’.

This statement of Śrī Sankara makes it quite obvious that the yoga described in the Upanishad here is truly Apara-yogha of Gauḍa.

Let us see whether the Gita sheds any light on this topic. The following passage probably helps us a good deal to resolve the riddle:

वास्तवर्णी प्रकृत्वाय विनियोगार्जन कर कुष्ठः।

स वहुगुणधत्यत्वम् अवस्थानस्तप्यात्।।

The yogin who is being detached from the external touchables obtains the happiness in his self; he is merged in Brahma-yoga and experiences the inexhaustible happiness’.

This stanza simply demonstrates that Gauḍa’s Apara-yoga is no other than Brahma-yoga of the Gita. The expression, Apara-yoga with reference to Brahma-yoga is the most appropriate, since Brahma being identical with the yogin’s Atman, self has no contact even of the minutest degree could be imagined.

11. Arivada and Ayapartha. Buddha has stayed on several occasions that he does not dispute with the world and that he follows what the ordinary people talk about the worldly affairs (v. Sarvatth, III, 138, Majh. l. and S. Siddhi, ch. 3, p. 17).

Gauḍa likewise says that we approve quite happily the thesis of no-birth, ajainada which results from the quarellsome dispute elaborated by other schools of thought about sanakya and sanakya etc (IV, 5). Nagi would not concur with Gauḍa in this respect because the former
could not have any dogma of his own as a settle' fact, hence he disputes every dogma of his opponents.

Sri Shankara is more eloquent in disclosing the Advaita's attitude towards the controversial issues set forth by other philosophers. Note his statements cited below:

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\text{अत्यदानादिश्रस्योक्तिः केवलात्मकतः सत्यं भास्कराणि मयुषम भूषितः महत्तिर्मिष्कन्तयमकार्याः सिद्धियतुप्तते अस्वमतः; न तु ऐस्मकस्वतास्यमकार्याः सत्यतिर्मिष्कन्तयमकार्याः, नित्यरहितस्य विषयं करोङ्जुरुक्तमाः।}
\[
\text{तः: विद्वत्सामसुधः मुख्य निर्मिति वैपद्य।}
\]

"Therefore the person desires of Belcane, discarding the legi-
cian's system should take good care in respect of the doctrine of identity of Atman-Brham. For this reason, we shall dis-
close some lapses in their systems but not be entangled in
the systems. The following has been stated in this context:
The Vedantin placing the entire burden of points of dispute,
their origin and cause upon the disputants and being protected
by them in our decision about the thesis of existence passed
peacefully and happily". (Prama-Boodhya VI.3, Gita Press p.111)

Note on the last verse. Gauḍa pays homage to his preceptor though not expressed, after understanding and realizing the fearless deep and undifferentiated state of peace in order to show his gratitude to his preceptor. This is quite in keeping with the tradition deserved in the Upanishads, e.g. Praise. Up. last verse, Mundaka and Brah.Up etc. A similar tradition is noticeable on the Buddhist side e.g. Sundarananda where Nanda acknowledges his gratitude to Buddha. Naga's homage to Buddha in the last verse of his Sasta keeps the tradition quite alive.

Finally a Note on Dipadama vara. Gauḍa's paying homage to Dipadama vara in ch. IV, stanza 1, has given rise to some controversy amongst scholars regarding the identity of the person so designated. Some scholars of Buddhism believe that Gauḍa refers there to Buddha while others on the Brahmanical side believe otherwise. It appears to us that though Gauḍa adopts the Buddhistic terminology and pattern of argument to uphold his Advaita philosophy, he cannot be stated to have saluted Buddha in the stanza. Our reason for this surmise is that Buddha is prominently spoken as "the Superiormost teacher of all men and gods" (पारल्ल नेपालकानिः) but not Dvip-
padam varə, “best of all men”. Naga accordingly pays homage to
Buddha as Varəm varə, “best of all speakers or wachers” (v.the first
stanza of his Sastra... तें करे वदन बर्तमा). Gauda’s object
of reverence is the best of bipeds, i.e. Purushottama, “best of all
persons” which obviously refers to God. Vimar, ref Gira. उत्साम:
पुरुषोत्तमः पुरुषोत्तमादित्यिः. Ch. XV, 17, “the Supreme Person is diffe-
rent (from the lower Brahm) and known as the Supreme Self which
passage speaks of the Supreme Being penetrating three realms of exis-
tence (bhava-bhuma). We should not confuse between ‘Bipadam varəm’
and ‘Varəm varəm’ which two terms signify two distinct theological
concepts.

It does not matter very much whether Gauda refers to Buddha
or Purushottama. None can nevertheless gainsay that Gauda adopted a
great deal of dialectics from Naga and other Buddhist authors and
adapted them suitably to the needs of upholding his Upanishadic Moxism
Advaita darśana.
GILGIT (AND SWAT)

—NIMAI C. SENHA

The previous issue (Vol VII, No 3) of Bulletins of Tibetology has a learned paper entitled "Gilgit in Ancient Times". This study, as stated in its concluding paragraph, "shows how important Baltistan and Gilgit have been in the political, diplomatic and military history of Tibet, China, Kashgaria, Tashkistan, Kapisa, Gandhara, Kasmir and North India in ancient times". Tibet heads the list of countries enumerated here. The reason for this is to be found in the cultural history as recorded in Tibetan tradition and not in the political history as narrated in Chinese Annals or in Sanskrit River of Kings. I thus propose to present the cultural relations of Gilgit (and Swat) with Tibet in ancient times.

Gilgit as a strategic summit is a comparatively modern affair and may be traced from 1860s when Britain and Russia were nearing each other in lower Asia. I have no on-the-ground knowledge of Gilgit or Swat; the nearest point I have been towards Swat is Taxila. For geographical data of Gilgit and Swat I depend on the observations of explorers and scholars like Alexander Cunningham, Frederic Drew, Reginald Schomberg, Clarmont Skrine, Olaf Caree, KPS Menon and above all Aurel Stein. Inferences drawn are mine. For cultural history of Gilgit (and Swat), I add my own observations to the findings of authorities like SCHLATZTENET, EAACKE, THOMAS, TUCO, DUFFT AND STEIN.

GILGIT LOCATION & AREA

Gilgit township is on the river Gilgit near northerm latitude 35° 55 and eastern longitude 74° 15; Gilgit river joins Indus thirty miles down SE. A much larger area that the township has from time to time been known as Gilgit. Ever since the occupation of Gilgit by Pakistan raiders (1947-48), few scholars have been permitted to Gilgit. Arnold Toynbee visited in 1966. Vidal Bedman Onas and Janaa (Oxford 1965) pp 121-4. Toynbee however is not a specialist in inner Asia or Buddhism. In 1965 summer, a specialist scholar of Tibetan-Burman languages, Richard Keith Sprigg was issued permit for Gilgit-Baltistan but eventually returned from Rawalpindi. That was on the eve of Pakistan’s War on India.

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For a description of Gilgit Agency of Kashmir State prior to Pakistan occupation, the account from the then current edition of official publication "Allahabads frontier" (Vol XII 1972) in a gazette to British withdrawal in 1947 is extracted:

"The Gilgit Agency comprises the following districts:

1. The Gilgit Wazarat, which includes the Taluk of Gilgit (including Daskit) and the Taluk of Astor.
2. The States of Hunza and Nagar.
3. The Shinauki republics of the Chilks district in the Indus valley.
4. The Governorship of Pindar.
5. The Governorship of Yasin.
7. The Governorship of Ishkoman.

The Gilgit Wazarat is administered by Kashmir State officials. Hunza and Nagar enjoy an internal autonomy which is complete, and the other states are varying in degree. These districts have all acknowledged the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir as their suzerain, and they all pay him some form of tribute."

Gilgit Agency thus stretches from Baltistan-Tibet in the east to Swat-Dir-Chitralt in the west. In lajman's language Gilgit Agency is situated between Tibetan and Pahari areas. The political boundaries of Gilgit Agency do not by any means suggest its ethnolinguistic frontiers. From ethnolinguistic considerations it is difficult to demarcate Gilgit's eastern frontiers and its western frontiers. Eastern parts of Gilgit are in Tibetan world while its western parts are in Pahari world. In ancient and medieval times Gilgit was the transit post between Ilam (Tibet) and Sutlej (Swat). It was a transit post in both commercial and cultural context. Gilgit's strategic importance is a fact of modern history. Alexander of Macedon made a push upto easternmost Swat (Azirin's Acres identified with Pir-Sar by Steinh) but had no reason to probe towards Gilgit, though the land of Hyperboreans would be due north of Gilgit.

Though as a place name, either in Sanskrit or in Tibetan, Gilgit is not much ancient, the confluence of the rivers (Gilgit and Indus) obviously made it an important point from ancient times; besides
the site was a convenient stage between passes in the north and the south. A part of the Central Asian traffic through the Indus valley would therefore halt at Gilgit. It would not be unreasonable to associate Gilgit with the products and wares of Central Asia (and Tibet) found in the pre-historic sites like Harappa and Mohenjo-daro. In later times Gilgit was more important as a transit post in cultural intercourse of peoples. In propagation as well as development of Mahayana, Gilgit (and Swat) had a distinct role. Earlier Aryan missionaries to Khotan possibly passed through Gilgit.

SINDHU RG.

Among the tributaries of the Indus are rivers Gilgit and Swat and the two adjacent valleys are the westernmost extension of Tibetan world till Mahayana came in an end first in Swat and then in Gilgit. For pilgrims from Chin., GaLaLata (Gilgit) to Swat (Swat) was the convenient route for entry into Gandhara. The "mounting passage" and "impassable gorge" of Chinese accounts may be identified with similar spots between Gilgit and Swat. Vide Pecho (L.): Northern India according to the Shui-chung-ju (Rome 1956). The hazardous journey was obligatory if Uddiyana in Swat was not to be omitted.

Indus river has a special sanctity for the Tibetans. Of the four legendary rivers arising near Kailas (Manasarova), Indus is a constant mention and a firm fact. Vide Wylie (T.V.): The Geography of Tibet etc (Rome 1961). The river, or the valley, must have been Tibet’s link with Sindhu par excellence, viz, the ocean, from earliest times, ideas as well as articles might have moved between Indus Valley and Western Tibet. Avalokitesvara as well as Tara could have come to Tibet via Swat and Gilgit.

Avalokitesvara’s seat Potala, as described in Mahayana Sanskrit literature, is generally located in South India and is so corroborated in Tibetan tradition. There were however several places called Potala. One such was Tatta a town in Sind not far from the mouth of the Indus. Tatta as ‘potala’ (harbour) could be reached from Western Tibet via Gilgit and Swat. This port of Sindhu Sauria was earlier known as Patala and was noticed by Greek geographer Agatharchides (c. 150 B.C.). A new name, with perhaps a new site, was al-Baybu at the time of Arab conquest of Sindhu Sauria. Vide Hourani (G.F.): Arab Seafaring in the Indian Ocean in Ancient and Early Medieval Times (Princeton 1951) pp. 18-13, 52 and 65. Potala (or Potala) was by then a mystic spot for

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those who adored the sanctity of Sindrha. For Patala and Sindrha Suvira in Saka-Kushan times see Roychoudhuri (H.C.): Pethical History of Ancient India (Calcutta 1957) and Stier (D.C.): Cartography and Geography in Early Indian Literature (Calcutta 1957).

The northern regions of Indo Valley are also known to be the homeland of Tara. Ladakh, Baltistan, Gilgit and Khotan are suggested as the provenance. Vide Hirasanda Shores: The Origin and Cult of Tara (Archaeological Survey of India 1975). I would add Swat to this list of sites as Uddiyana was undoubtedly an equally famous centre of Tara and Tara worship; Uddiyana's antiquity was as great in Tibetan tradition as that of Pataka. For Devi (Tara) in Suvira see Roychoudhuri, op. cit.

UDDIYANA

Uddiyana or Urgyan is generally located in Swat valley. In Tibetan tradition the Buddha Sakyamuni made a prophecy at the time of his Nirvana that a much wiser and a more powerful Buddha would be born in a lotus in the Usanakote lake of Urgyan. Guru Rimpochhe Padmasambhava, who preached Tantrik Buddhism all over the Himalayas and in Tibet in the eighth century of Christian era, is admitted to be the same incarnation. As late as the seventeenth century pilgrims from Tibet did visit Swat valley in quest of Padmasambhava's birthplace. This pilgrimage ceased altogether when Bursham disappeared from the west of Ladakh, that is, from Baltistan and Gilgit. When active contacts ceased between Uddiyana and Urgyan became "a kind of magic land for many Tibetan pilgrims" not unlike Shambhala. Vide Tucci (G): Travels of Tibetan Pilgrims in the Swat Valley (Calcutta 1940).

Like Shambhala, Uddiyana, was transformed into a fairyland of which the geographical and historical reality faded and decayed" (Tucci). While the historical reality of Uddiyana remained obscure till the archeologist's explications of this century, the geographical reality was alive in Pashan poems of later days. To Kshemakul Kshat, Swar was a paradise on earth, lovelier than Kshet and more like Kashmir.
"In climate it is glorious, lovelier far than Kabul,
Bleak is Kabul, Swat is mild and gentle,
Its air and verdure are like unto Kashmir,
Though it spreads not out so finely;
In every home there are cascades and fountains,
Fine cities there are, fine dwellings, and fair markets,
Such a country, with such a clime and such streams,
Wherein every place is by nature a garden of flowers."

Trans. Caroe

BRU-ZA बूँझा

"Bru-za in Gilgit" is how Ladakhi chroniclers would locate another mystic land. Vide Francke (A.H.): Antiquities of Indian Tibet, Vol II (Calcutta 1916), pp 172-3. Gilgit in Ladakhi tradition would include besides Gilgit Wazzat, the States of Hunza and Nagar and perhaps even some western States towards Swat. A leading authority on history and culture of Tibet, Hugh Richardson, narrows down the area of Bru-za to Hunza.

Gilgit, spelt Gyiil-grid by Cunningham and Gyilt-grid or Gyl lid by Francke, is derived from the river with same name also spelt Gyiyg-yol. Francke: op.cit., pp 136-7. The river valley has no doubt several times changed its dimensions and terrain through centuries. As a link between Tibetan areas on the east and Pathan areas on the west, the river valley continued its own role till the seventeenth century.

Gilgit was also a link between Tokhar-speaking men in the north and Sanskrit-speaking men in the south. When in Kushana times Buddhism commenced its voyage across the Pamirs, the valleys of Swat and Gilgit were on the route. So Bru-za was a centre for propagation of Buddhism a few centuries before Buddhism established itself in Tibet. Bru-za, along with Zhang-zhung and Li-jul, was an ancient centre of civilization as recorded in pre-Buddhist tradition of Tibet. Before the monks and scholars from Kashmir would begin their missionary travels for Khotan, Kashgar or Kucha they must have made Bru-za itself a centre of Buddhism. In this process many pre-Buddhist ideas and rituals might have been accommodated as did Padmasambhava later. Thus Bru-za, the mystic land, is celebrated both in Bon and Buddhist traditions of Tibet. Thus we are presented with the curious fact that
in the eighth and ninth centuries. Christian ene fugitive Buddhist monks from Khotan as well as fogenite Bon priests from Tibet sought asylum in Bru-zu.

Helmut Hoffmann has worked on the literature concerning Bru-zu and a part of his work is found in his English publication The Religion of Tibet (London 1962). It may be noted here that both Udhyana and Bru-zu are associated with the wanderings of Padmasambhava, that many Nyingma texts are known to be translations from originals in the languages of Udhyana and Bru-zu, that some obscure contents of Kanjur are claimed to be from Bru-zu scripts and that Saky Paditta (1182-1231) had among his accomplishments "mastery of Bru-zu idiom".

Tibetan documents discovered in Tan Thong contain significant references to Bru-zu. Yale Thomas (1964) Tibetan Literary Texts and Documents Concerning Chinese Tibet (5th ed. 2 vols. London 1953-1955) The Prophecy of Samghsungadhana says that the monks of Tibet and Kashmir being vexed by unbelieving will go to the Bru-zu country. The Mirror depicting the Royal Lineage refers to the Bon priests of Bru-zu and Zhang Zhong. Some references suggest that Bru-zu might have extended to Khotan for sometime. There is also a reference to Padmasambhava's visit to Bru-zu.

GILGIT MANUSCRIPTS

Discovery of archaeological objects and antiquities in the State of Jammu and Kashmir began towards the end of the nineteenth century. An account of the archaeological explorations and preserved monuments till 1939 will be found in K.C. (R.C.); Ancient Monuments of Kashmir (London 1933).

The discovery of the Gilgit Manuscripts was announced by Mr. A. Stein in the Calcutta Statesman of 24 July 1931. Some shepherds "watching flocks above Naupur village, about two miles west of Gilgit Cantonment, one said to have cleared a piece of timber sticking out on the top of a small stone-covered round. Further digging laid bare a circular chamber within the ruins of a Buddhist stupa filled with hundreds of small votive stupas and relief plaques common in Central Asia and Tibet...In the course of the excavation a great mass of ancient manuscripts came to light closely packed in what appears to have been a wooden box...The palaeographic indications of some of the manuscripts suggest that they may date back to the seventh century A.D."
The great savant Sylvain Levi evinced much interest in this discovery and another Central Asian antiquarian Hackin visited the spot of finds. The Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, Dewan Bahadur (later Sir) Gopalaswamy Ayyangar, entrusted Professor Nalinaksha Dutta, the eminent Buddhist scholar of Calcutta University, with the work of deciphering and publishing the manuscripts. Dutta’s work came out in eight books, Gilgit Manuscripts (Srinagar 1939—Calcutta 1939). The contents, with extensive notes, constitute an important source for the history of Buddhism, particularly about the interrelation between Mahayana and Hinayana before the spread of Buddhism in Tibet.

It is reported that the Government of Pakistan found several manuscripts after its occupation of Baltistan and Gilgit. Pakistan archaeologists having no interest in reading such manuscripts, these new finds were handed over to Lettine Italiano per il Medio et Estremo Oriente in Rome. Dr Edward Come has edited some.

NOT FOR SILK

In medieval times Gilgit lost much of its importance as a trade post.

There is a current notion that both in ancient and medieval times Gilgit was a point on the famous Silk Road. This notion is altogether due to a misconception about Silk Road; the caravan routes branching out of the Silk Road are often erroneously called Silk Roads. Gilgit-Kashgar (& Yarkand) road was a southern feeder of the Silk Road which crossed through Yarkistan, without detour, between Yumen (Jade Gate) in the east and Marakanda (Samarkand) in the west. Gilgit-Kashgar (& Yarkand) road thrived on wool, dry fruits and sadu. Even then Gilgit was not attractive to the British traders in the first half of the nineteenth century. In the opinion of an Indian authority on the British Period of Indian history, explorations of Moorcroft and Trebeck in the Western Himalayas did not promise as much as the earlier probes of Bogle and Turner in the Eastern Himalayas. Vide Sinha (Narendra Krishna): *The Economic History of Bengal 1753—1848*, Vol III (Calcutta 1970), p 50. Right from beginning the British probes for trade across the Himalayas were, in my submission, intended to reach China overland. If Gilgit was on the Silk Road, the East India Company and later the British Crown would not have ignored an opening through Gilgit, Kashgar and Yarkand. Instead the British authorities in India engaged in a systematic penetration through Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan for trade.
with China. Much information on this aspect of Anglo-Chinese relations from the middle of the nineteenth century will be found in the forthcoming works of two young scholars of Calcutta University: Arabinda Deb and Jahan Sen. I need not anticipate their findings here in my words. I would however emphasize that Gilgit gained importance in British esteem in the second half of the nineteenth century for strategic reasons and not as an ancient post on the Silk Road.

Russian expansion in Turkestan, followed by Russian visitors to the Pamirs, was not a welcome situation for the British Empire in Asia. In addition to the Resident for Jammu & Kashmir at Srinagar, the British stationed in 1833 an Agent at Gilgit and developed the roads towards Swat-Dir-Chitral. Kashgar and Yarkand routes were also developed. In 1893 a Special Assistant to the Resident for Jammu & Kashmir was stationed in Kashgar. In 1904 the post was upgraded to His Britannic Majesty’s Consul; in 1911 redesignated as Consul General. The Consulate at Kashgar continued till the British withdrawal from India.

From 1893 to 1947 Gilgit flourished as a transit post for Central Asian trade but never lost its strategic value. Gilgit was useful for obscure, though respectable, purpose also. In the third decade of this century, the tribal gun smugglers in the pay of His Britannic Majesty’s Consul General, roamed through Swat and Gilgit, British arms for the Chinese Governor of Sinkiang. These arms were used to suppress the native Moslem rebellion against the Chinese rule. The Gilgit highway had then become so strategic that in 1935 the Maharaja of Jammu & Kashmir was obliged to grant a sixty years’ lease of Gilgit Agency to the British Crown.

In 1947-48 Pakistan invaded and occupied Gilgit and Baltistan. The raiders came from Swat-Dir-Chitral following the ancient tracks improved by the British. The contending World Powers in the Cold War promptly recognized Gilgit as a strategic summit. Its Tibetan past is now recalled in the usage Chos for Islam in certain dialects of Gilgit and Baltistan.

For modern history of Gilgit see Fisher (M.W.), Rose (L.E.) and Hurtenback (R.A.): Himalayan Battleground (New York 1961) and Bicari (P.N.K.): A History of Kashmir (Delhi 1961). For ancient history, the monumental works of Aurel Stein are the indispensable authority; two particularly The Ruse of Desert Cathy (London 1912) and kaoom Aso (London 1928) describe the routes and passes in a
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