A NEW APPROACH TO GAUDAPADAKARIKA

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Gaudapada's work, that is, his Karika in four chapters, may be regarded an important landmark in the development of the Advaita Vedantic thought. His exposition of Advaitism is unique and without parallel in the Vedantic literature. He does not follow the traditional line of argument for upholding his thesis. The language he has adopted is Buddhist in many parts. He employed several expressions which are common to Buddhism and its philosophy and which create impression in the mind of readers that the author (Gaudapada) was a follower of Buddhism (e.g. V. Bhattacharya's edition of the Karika). It is mysterious indeed why Gaudapada should have at all adopted such an ambiguous language betraying his truthfulness to the Advaitic thought and tradition. He is traditionally regarded a disciple of the sage Suka in the Svetas, up., bhasya 1.8, and a grand-preceptor of Sri Sankara through Grga-indakhagvatpada (e.g. D.K. Karanakar's edn. of the Karika, Introduction). He has, perhaps, been influenced by Buddhism, especially in its later developed form, because he was a native of the Gaika country where Buddhism was a prominent and popular faith in his days. He might have aimed at propagation of Advaitism in the popular language and style of Buddhism which might appeal to the lay as well as the learned men of the society in these days. This appears to be the most plausible explanation of the riddle why Gaudapada adopted such an ambiguous style which being improperly understood would convey the converse of what he intends to convey.

Thus we meet with two sets of interpretations of the text one tending towards Buddhism and the other opposing it (e.g. V. Bhattacharya and R.D. Karanakar). I shall confine myself in the following pages mainly to clear off the wrong interpretations of the ambiguous expressions employed by Gaudapada in the course of upholding his fundamental thesis of Advaitism.

The text consists of four chapters, of which the first contains 19 verses explaining the Manuskyupanishad. The central theme of the Upanishad is the description of four stages of Atman, Brahman known as Viva, Tajjna, Prajna and Turya (fourth) who is Sarvartha, perceiver of
the whole. The first three stages are represented by the following states
in order: Waking (Jagriti), Dream, and Deep Sleep. The fourth is
the transcendental state. Atman in the first three stages generally
stays in the three places of the body: the left eye, mind and heart
respectively. The mystic syllable ‘Om’ while considered to be consisting
of three parts: a, u and m represents the first three states of Brahman.
While considered as pureless and one unit it represents the fourth
Advaita state of Brahman (Kara, 19). Gaudapada points out the dis-
tinction between the third and the fourth state thus: the non-grasping
of dualism is common to both states, but the Atma in the third is under
the influence of avidya, noceience and sleep; while in the fourth Atman
is relieved of both (K-16). He says further that the living being who
is caught in the slumber of unceasing Maya (Illusion) gets awakened,
then be realizes Advaita (Monism) which is freed from birth and sleep
(K-16).

This idea is common to Yogacara Buddhism. If we substitute
Chitamatra for Advaita the passage would turn into a Buddhasit maxim.
This chapter is rightly styled as Omkaraprakaraṇa, an exposition of the
Om syllable. Read for fuller contents of the chapter Karmakara, Intro-
duction. X.f.

The second chapter named Vaśistha-prakaraṇa consists of
38 verses. The chapter starts with the elucidation of the external
world and its futurity on the analogy of dream phenomenon. The
illusionary character of our objective universe is a common doctrine of
both the Vedantic and the Yogacara buddhist and the dream analogy is
also a common weapon to demonstrate their position. Reference to
Vasishtha’s Vinñetaka, verse 1 with bhāvas. Another common exam-
ple for the purpose is the illusion notion of the Serpent or the Rope in
the twilight. Gauda says: Just as the idea of serpent is imagined on
the rope in the dark, just so is the idea of five atman imposed on the Brah-
man. When true knowledge of the rope is gained the illusion of serpent
disappears; likewise one atman is discriminated as diverse through the
influence of Maya and when the true character of atman’s oneness is
acquainted the discrimination disappears (K.F., 16-17).

Then the author elaborates the views of different thinkers who
assert erroneously as the ultimate reality things such as Prana, breath,
elements, Gunas etc. Gauda does not omit to mention in the list the
ultimate reality of Buddhist, viz. mind, mana, citta (K, 29). Here the
absence of Jnana, Vijñana or Prajñana is noteworthy because it is charac-
teristic of Atman, Brahman stated in the Upanisads. It has been in fine remarked that the entire universe is to be considered by the Vedantin as a dream, illusion or castle in the air. The highest truth is that there is no annihilation, nor origination, no fettered prison nor aspirer of truth and so desirous of release nor released (K. 31). This utterance of Gauda, resembles very closely to Nagarjuna’s characteristic Nihilism. If the stances is detached from the context one could hardly think that this utterance comes from a Vedantin. Gauda, comes very close to Nagarjuna because both of them plead for the unreality of the diverse world and for one absolute. Whole. They, however, differ in their approach to the ultimate truth. Naga, would designate it Sunyata, or the highest perfection of wisdom whereas for Gauda, it is Atman or Brahman, an embodiment of the highest knowledge. cfr. Svetas. up. bhasya, Gitapren, p. p, citing the Brahmapurana.

Gauda closes this chap (II) with the declaration that Non-dualism is ambivalent (अनुववन रिता, K. 31) and the same as Advaita or Tattva. He further says: Advaya which implies the negation of plurality and of the mind’s constructive states has been revealed by the Sages that have reached the yonder shore of Vedic lore (K. 31). The Advaya doctrine is common to the Mahayana Buddhists. It is probably for this reason that Gauda adds that his doctrine of Advaya has been revealed by the Vedic Sages with the implication that he is not speaking of the Buddhist doctrine. We may likewise find several times in Sankara’s bhasya on the Upanisads the expression of Advaita in relation to Brahman.

It is to be noted here that Amaratasha, the Sanskrit lexicographer has credited Buddha with preaching the Advaya doctrine probably for the first time. Both schools of later Buddhism, the Madhyamika and the Yogacara proudly acclaim themselves as great champions of the Advaya doctrine though the import of the term, advaya, is quite different for each school. For the Madhyamika it conveys the idea of middle path, Madhyama-pratipada whereas for the Yogacara it signifies the absence of subject and object अनुववातमम. Though Gauda and Sankara characterize Brahman as advaya they probably intend to convey the idea of advaita, ‘without the second’, i.e., Advaita. Now I leave it to future studies to decide which school initiated the doctrine and which one adopted it later.

The third chap (III) named Advaita-prakarana contains 48 verses. The exposition of Advaita in this chapter is quite logical in
succession after establishing the futility of the diverse worlds in the second chapter. This chapter may also be named as Akarpanya-prakara as the author starts in the second stanza as कृत्मि विद्यात्मकेयंम् “I shall elucidate unpitifulness”. In the first stanza Gauḍa has stated that the worship, upaṣṭana, is related to the Karṇa-Brahman, Hiranya-garbhā etc. The worship being different from the worshipped occupies a pitiful state, kepama. In fact every body is Aj, unborn, i.e. Brahmān prior to an illusory creation. For this reason, says Gauḍa—I shall elucidate Akarpanya, unpitifulness which is a quality of Brahmic state अर्थविषेष रमण्यो यत्. It appears therefore that Akarpanya may fittingly be equated to the Advaitic state. Brahmaṇa, v. passage cited below, comm. No. 16.

The main arguments of this chapter may be summed up as follows:

1. There is nothing born; some philosophers advocate the birth of what is unborn. The unborn is immaterial, how could it be reduced to mortality? (K.12). Nc. Jīva, person is born; this is the ultimate truth comprising an absolute non-existence of birth (K.49).

2. Relation between Jīva and Brahmān is similar to that between the vast space and the space within the pot (ghaṭa-akṣaṇa); that is to say the difference between them is made by the limiting adjunct (Upaniṣṭha). The moment the pot is destroyed the difference disappears (K.3-49). This illustration of space is made in respect of birth. So ghaṭa-akṣaṇa is neither a produce nor a part of Akṣaṇa. Likewise are Jīva and Brahmān (K.7). The aggregates (material objects) are creations of one’s own illusion, maya and similar to those in dream (K.12). Hence the identity of Jīva and Brahmān is much extolled in the scripture Upaniṣads and their differentiation is severely censured there—which position is quite rational (K.11). Thus non-dualism is the Absolute Truth and dualism is only its variety (K.18). The same idea is echoed in the Vidyadhararotttara cited in ViṣṇuP. Bhāṣya, p. 48.

3. In the light of non-dualism stressed in several Upaniṣads, the passages dealing with the process of creation of the universe are to be explained away as a devise for leading people to the ultimate purpose of identity of Jīva with Brahmān (Kk.15,14-15).
4. Mind is a sole factor for dualism, निद्राभास इत्यादि when the mind is reduced to a non-entity (amamibhava) dualism vanishes (K.31). The mind is so reduced when one does not conceive anything as a result of realizing and experiencing the truth of Atman, Brahman (K.5). The same topic has been elaborated in Kk.14,18,49. In deep sleep the mind is laid low and being controlled it is cut off from its activity; then it becomes Brahman which is embodied in an all-round illumination of knowledge (Kk.15,46). It is unborn, sleepless, dreamless, devoid of name and form, omniscient and flashing up once only (K.16, cp.Kk.37,40). One should therefore control the mind through proper means when it becomes distracted by pleasure and enjoyment. Recollecting that everything is miserable one should turn its back from pleasure and enjoyment, and recollecting that everything is unborn one sees nothing as born (K.43). When the mind becomes low-spirited it should be awakened; being distracted it should be pacified; being contaminated with impurities it should be watched with care, and being attuned to the state of equilibrium it should not be shaken up. One should not enjoy pleasure out of concentration, but should get detached from it through his wisdom; the mind being steady and motionless one should with efforts free it from its dualistic tendency. When the mind is not laid low and not distracted, the mind which is now motionless and freed from its dualistic reflexion turns into Brahman (Kk.44,49).

Comment. Now let us see whether any of the above topics of Gauda can be compared with ideas of the Buddhist authors.

1) Our comment on the Ajatavada is deferred to the next chapter on the same topic.

2) The same-example is also found in a Mahayana sutra cited in M. vrtti, p. 175 which insists on the identity of all entities on the analogy of space. The passage runs: तत्तथापि नाम दैवत्कर्त्ता यत्र स्वतःसंसारिन्यायकाः यथा एकांतक्लिशाधिकांशाक्षानात्मकाः। शरणाश्रयं न विद्वतम् सागराश्रयं । । । । । । ।

3) Gauda says that the Upanishadic doctrine of creation is a devise for some ultimate purpose (K. 45); this looks like an echo of Vasubandhu’s explanation of Buddha’s utterances about sakantha, ayatana and dhatus (V. Vasubandhu’s Vimsatika, ver. 8-10). Buddha is regarded as Upaya-kusala, clever in employing devices suitable to convert people to his own faith (Cp. Satyasiddhi, ch. 1.p.5, n.33). It is likely therefore that
Gautama was convinced in his conviction of the advantage of the Buddhist argument to explain away the syllogisms contradictory to their favorite conclusions.

A) "This dualistic appearance is a vision of the mind" मात्रायणम् किर्ति मम (K. 31)\textsuperscript{1}, this expression seems to be resulted from the dream example employed several times in the Treatise by Gautama (cp. K. 20 also). According to the Upanishads it is the mind that creates a new imaginary world in dreams, cp e.g. Pramana up. IV, 5: भवते यत्वं (स्म) यथाविद्यते मनोनामनमुच्छितम्. Since the above axiom is applicable to the waking state the above expression "manomayam" has perhaps been coined. The Vedántins would otherwise express it as मात्रायणम् etc. Since the Yogacara Buddhists also plead that the universe is imaginary and a creation of mind they would reject the idea as मात्रायणम् सर्वं व्युखः instead of "delusion". The above statement would also result authentically into another axiom: सर्वं व्युखः शरीरम्. The end of misery is brought about by the mind's control (K. 46).

It is interesting to note that the above ideas of Gautama have some parallels in the Vishnuśarman (in the group of six chapters) as follows:\textsuperscript{2}:

अनेकं न किंचलम् शर्यते विद्यते ममः।
करणं बाले कालविद्यम् च विधित्।
अहं तमोवाचः हि उव तापः बलवे।।
आनंदसहायस्य अहं तस्माद भूषणः।।
यत् लोकसन्ति नानेकविद्युष्टो भविष्यति।

महामहायः हि दह्यः पताकाः।।
नमस्ते यथा नानात्मा परमविष्कृताणवः।
विद्यताः: शरीरस्य इत्यादोऽविष्कृताः।।

नमस्ते हांसोद्योऽविष्कृतास्य तपस्या त्यथद्विपि।।
नमस्ते तच्चस्य न स्त्रावं स्त्रावस्य शरीरः।

तस्य तथा: पर श्रुत्वा स्वपनम् स्वप्नाः।।

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"All actions are (the result of) nescience, (avida) and vidya is regarded as knowledge. The creature takes birth as a result of its action and it gets released as a result of vidya, (knowledge). The ultimate truth is Advaita, (monism) and dualism is only its variety. The notion \"I\" and \"mine\" arises from the lack of wisdom; Advaita, on the other hand, is experienced as freed from conceptions and as unspokenable, Dvaita is embodied in the mind's activities which are born of their causes, dharma and adharma, merit and demerit. They are to be made ceased and at their cessation dualism dvaivam becomes utterly irrational. This entire universe is imagined by the mind alone and the monistic state is secured when the mind becomes non-entity (amanibhava) or non-mind. The cognitive experiences arise in accordance with the resultant forces of action karma-rasna, that is the consciousness arises in such a fashion as the forces assume and as soon as it is removed or stopped the ultimate Truth, Brahman shines forth of its own accord\" (cited in the Svet, bhashya, pp 48-49, Gita press).

Note. Vijnana and Vijnapti are employed in the same import as in Yogacara Buddhism. The idea that at the stoppage of mind's activities Truth shines forth can be compared with the Yoga Sutra I, 12: तत् इत्यादिचक्षुः | cp. Sankara bhashya on Gita, XVIII, 50: गाढः गाढः गाढः गाढः गाढः गाढः गाढः गाढः

K.35. The idea of Gauda that the mind being controlled and checked in its activity turns out into Brahman (cp. K.46) looks like the Yogacara's favourite thesis that the mind being stopped in its creation of dualism ध्वनित्वादिचक्षुः turns out into Dhammadhatu, i.e. Tathagata (v. Trimska, ver.28 with bhashya). It does not, however, follow that Gauda formed his idea after the pattern of Yogacara Buddhism. The Vedantin has his own reasoning for it. Sankara pleads once: मनस् (manas) is Brahman because the later is the inner core of the former चाक्षुषात्वादिचक्षुः Kena. Up bhashya II, 14. The Vedantin's definition of Jiva is: conscious spirit circumscribed by the limiting adjunct, the inner organ, i.e. the mind, etc (Vedanta-paribhasha.) When the inner organ is made deprived of its functioning it becomes pure consciousness, caitanya like Ghatakaas becoming the vast space at the destruction of the pot.

K.36. Sakrt-vibhatam, flushing up once. This expression again appears in chap IV, K. 81. Its synonym is Sakri-jyotis found in chap III, K. 37. Atman is also stated to be Svayanyojitis in Br.Up.

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Gauta made it vyanam-prabhatam (IV, 81). The Mahaanshika Buddhists have also characterised their original mind as Prakriti-prabhavaram. The Sakri-vibhatam may be considered in relation with some Buddhists' theory of Ekakshara-abhamsanksha, one moment's intuition of Truth. This theory has been advanced by the Mabhyamika, as also in the Saya-siddhi (ch.10-17) as against the Vaibhavakas' theory of gradual intuition of the four Truths (anuprasabhasamayam). The one moment's intuition is advocated for the reason that the Truth is only one, viz., Cetan-Truth, Niruddha-saya. May we guess now that there may be some link between these two theories of the Vedanta and the Buddhist? Sakara perhaps refers to this one moment's intuition theory while commenting on the Kena. Up, II, 24: ध्यातिविद्विद्वित as सहस्राद्ध महायोगिनि शाक्ति ‘according to some pratibhāda implies one moment's consciousness’. We may also take note here of the Br. Up, II, 36: दोषा काल निधिविद्वित य स्म मय ध्यातिविद्वित व एव वेदि and Sakara's sādhana thereon.

K 44. Gauta's prescription of cure for the mind's concentration-ills is comparable with that of the Buddhist authors. Gauta says that the mind gets distracted due to its inclination to enjoy the sequacious pleasures and it becomes low-spirited on account of some mental illness etc. Both the states are detrimental to the ultimate goal. So Gauta advises that the mind should be pacified when it becomes distracted, and it should be awakened when it becomes low-spirited.

According to the Buddhists mind's stubbornness and low-spirits are two impediments to the Enlightenment. When the mind is stubborn one should cultivate calmness, concentration and exactitude because through these three factors the stubborn mind can easily be pacified. When the mind becomes low-spirited the yogin should cultivate analytical thinking, exercise and joy because through these factors the low-spirited mind can easily be awakened (Samyutta V, 12 II). The S. Sādhana discusses this point in greater details. When it is distracted the act of controlling should be applied: when it is too confused the act of thickening should be applied. The gambhira, thus meets the gold, heats it, waters and keeps it on timely. If it is too heated it becomes fluid being too cooled it becomes thickened and being kept on it becomes explained Likewise is the yogin's mind (ch. 159). The tuned mind also may be compared here (Ibid).

The Tapanāra refers to about nine factors of distraction and their satellites about five in all (I, 30-32). In order to check them an exercise
of contemplation on Eka-tattva, single truth is advised; the mind may
again be appeased by means of contemplation of four devices Maitri,
love, Karuna, compassion, Maditta, joyfulness and Upaksha, indifference
(L. 11), or by some other means (L. 14). The Yoga-sutra speaks
nothing about the kinds of unfavourable mental states as the Buddhist
sources or Gauda describe.

It is therefore most likely that Gauda was acquainted with the
Buddhist tradition regarding the Dhyana process and made use of it in
his own fashion to suit his favourite thesis. The mind's distraction
(=stubbornness in Buddhism) which arises due to senseless pleasure should
be checked by recollecting the affective axiom that everything is miser-
able, a formula quite popular in Buddhism (K. 43). Gauda says in the
same breath that by recollecting everything as unborn one does not see
anything as born. But the link between the first and the second state-
ment is not quite obvious and logical. Gauda probably adopts Patanjali's
opinion of Eka-tattva-abhyasa, contemplation-exercise on single truth
(Yoga-sutra L. 12). It appears to us in that case that we should interpret
"aja" unborn as Brahman and "jata" born as illusory things. Cfr.
our remark on the title of the third chapter above.

K. 46. Our comment on this chapter may be closed with
Gauda's instructive remark on the mind and ultimate reality. He
states: When the mind is not low-spirited and distracted, the same
which is now motionless and freed from its dualistic reflection turns
cut into Brahman—which statement may suggest to us that Gauda expresses
a Buddhist idea in the Vedantic terminology. How it could be justi-
fied from the Advaita Vedanta's standpoint of view that has been made
clear previously v. comment on K. 15.

Chap IV

The fourth chapter traditionally styled as Atatasanti prakarana
consists of just a hundred stanzas eight of which are repetitions from the
previous chapters. This chapter contains several puzzling and enigmatic
expressions which led some scholars to doubt whether the author was
truly an Advaita Vedanta. Hence the chapter is interesting to us in
more than one respect. Its theme is the same as that of the previous
chapter viz. elucidation of Advaitam in greater details.

The main topics may be summed up as below:—

1. Criticism of jati-vada, theory of origination. The origination-
theteors are all dualistic thinkers, viz. Sakhyas, Vaiseshika, the Buddhists

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with the exception of the Madhyamikas. They may be grouped into two: a) Same pixel for origination of what is non-existent; b) others plead for the origination of what is clearly existent, thus they both dispute each other and lead ultimately to non-origination which we approve and never dispute with them.

The author ridicules the theory of origination. Istatvad eva ity does not stand a moment's scrutiny; hence Ajitavada, non-origination is only rationally acceptable conclusion (Kk 3.3.1,2). The important factor that brings us to the non-origination is the non-recognition of the order of sequence between the cause and the effect (Kk 3.1); it becomes thus obvious that nothing originates from itself or something else, nor does anything originate whether it is existent or non-existent etc. (Kk 2.2), cp. Nagaśrīnā's maddhellers on 'सत्ताके' ज्ञाति जाति Madh. Sutra.

Likewise the non-existent is not caused by the non-existent nor is the existent caused by the non-existent. The existent cannot be caused by the existent. How can the non-existent be caused by the existent? (Kk 4.4). This looks like Nagaśrīnā's dialectic. The origination, however, has been pronounced by the enlightened sages, Realists for those who are frightened at the doctrine of non-origination and those who believe in the true existence of things as illusory experience their activities (Kk 4.9); viewing thus the wise enter into the truth of non-origination of the cause and the effect (Kk 4.14).

2. Prakāśa. The empirical experience, prakāśa is conditioned by its cause; if it is not so, plurality or diversity (the, is experienced by us) would be destroyed. Because the different is operative in usual production (parānāsya) is accepted (in the empirical field of dualism). Prakāśa (the worldly experience) is regarded as conditioned by causes (mārga) from the viewpoint of logic. The cause, (mārga) becomes non-cause (śaunaka) from the viewpoint of Truth (Kk 3.4.23).

3. Dream. The dream-example is elaborated and applied to things experienced by the waking state (Kk 3.31,37,39,61-68). Waking experience is applied to dream state in Kk 4.1. Just as one experiences the unthinkable objects (śaunaka) as real in the waking state, just so one experiences things in dream; perversion (viparyaya) is the causing factor in both cases.

4. Maya and Nāmaśtava. The magic elephant is regarded as real because it moves and causes experiences; likewise are the external
Buddha (Gautama) preached: “Things are originated on account of causes and conditions”; this origination is comparable with magic, and the magic too does not at all exist (K. 58). The illusory person is born and dies; likewise the living beings are existent (born) and non-existent (dies) (K. 69). The same is repeated with the illustration of Nirmātaka, created being (K. 70).

5. Alata, firebrand, whirring of the firebrand causes the appearance of a wheel, so the vibration of consciousness gives rise to the appearance of the subject-object notions. When the firebrand is stopped it causes no such appearance but remains in its unorn state. While the firebrand is whirring the appearance of wheel does not come from the outside and enters into the firebrand, nor does the wheel appearance go out of the firebrand, because it is not a substance; so is the case with Vijnana being at vibration, the appearance of the subject and object does not come from the outside and enters into Vijnana, nor does the appearance go out of it because the subject-object appearance is not a substance.

The appearance is always unthinkable (anitiya) because no law of causation between the two (Vijnana and appearance) is operative (K.47-52).

6. Citta and artha. Mind does not touch the object nor does it reflect the object, because the object is unreal and so is its reflection. The mind teaches no cause ( cittartha) in all three times. Perversion is causeless by itself, how will it cause the appearance? Hence the mind has no birth, nor does the mind’s vision have it. The person who perceives its birth will also perceive the foot-print in the sky (K. 16-28). The mind and its object have no birth; the person who understands this fact will never fall in perversion (K.46). Dualism of subject and object appearance is the result of the mind’s vibration, citta-apandita. The mind in fact is object-free; hence it is proclaimed to be contact-free, atanga (K.77) cp. k. 54.

7. Samsara and Moksha. For samsara which is beginningless, no end can be achieved and for release, moksha which has a beginning, no endlessness can be achieved (k. 39). As long as one has obsession with cause and effect so long he will have the causal production. The obsession being removed the causal production ceases to exist. As long as one is obsessed with the cause and effect, so long will his samsaric life continue; his obsession with the cause and effect being removed he will not be caught in samsara (K. 55-56).

8. Kahani. All entities are by nature freed from decay and death. Those who conceive their decay and death are dropped from their goal.
due to their wrong conception (K.14). All entities are beginning-
less and to be understood as similar to sky by nature. All entities
by nature are confirmed as enlightened from the beginning; one who
his perseverance to this effect will become worthy of immortality
(K.91-92).

9. Samata-kaccheddhiha. Everything is born in the empirical
plane of existence, hence they are not permanent. Everything is
unborn as they exist (for all time), hence they are not annihilated (K.57).
From a magic seed springs the magic sprout, then the latter is neither
permanent nor impermanent. The same rule is to be applied in respect
of all entities (K.59). No talk of eternal or non-eternal is possible
with reference to the unborn things. Where no letters (i.e. words)
are applicable, no discrimination (of permanent or impermanent) can
be applied thereon (K.60).

10. Aadya, non-dual. Consciousness which is in fact unborn, un-
moving, object-free, calm and non-dual appears as though having birth
movement and object (K.45). Everything is unborn; its birth is a
vision of our mind. The mind being unchangeable, its non-birth, amal-
patti is inevitably non-dual (K.77). The mind being retraced and
inactivated, its status is motionless; this state which is invariable, unborn
and non-dual becomes the sole domain of Buddhas, the enlightened
sages (K.89).

11. Kalpa vimutti. What exists in the imaginary sphere of
existence (saṃsveta) does not exist in the absolute sense. Something
may, perhaps, exist from the viewpoint of empirical law of causation,
that too does not exist in the absolute sense. The absolute may be
unborn from the viewpoint of imaginary spheres of existence.
Kalpa-
sveta, it is not at all unborn in the absolute. It takes birth from the
view point of empirical law of causation (K.77-78).

12. Abhinivesa. There is allowance to a false idea of dualism, but
that dualism is not there. Realizing the absence of dualism one takes
no birth as he has no cause for the birth (K.73). The mind on account
of adherence to false idea of dualism, activates itself in an apparently
similar object (e.g. the idea of alms on the nectar) but when one realizes
the absence of the mistaken object he reverts himself from it and becomes
detached from it (K.79).

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13. Citta-ketu. By apprehending some or other object the noble Atman is perpetually concealed as being happy, but disclosed as being miserable. The ignorant encompasses Hira in four attributes: Ensemble, non-Ensemble, both Ensemble and non-ensemble, and neither Ensemble nor non-ensemble, which attributes signify four ideas in order: "constancy", "steadiness" and the absence of both". These are four extreme points by which the noble Atman is perpetually concealed. The person who recognizes Hira as being untouched by these attributes becomes omniscient (K.S. 81:84).

14. Lakṣaṇa, Suddha-lakṣaṇa and Lokottara-lakṣaṇa. The empirical knowledge (lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇa) is what consists of two objects and its experience; pure empirical knowledge is what has the phenomenon of experience but is deprived of its object. The transcendental knowledge (lokottara-lakṣaṇa) is considered as what is deprived of both the object and its experience. The Enlightened Sages, Buddhas, have always proclaimed that the knowledge and the knowable (lakṣaṇa, lokottara-lakṣaṇa) are to be understood well. When the three-fold knowledge and the knowable are understood in their order the wise will acquire omniscience in respect of everything (K.S. 87:59).

Those whoever are convinced in respect of selflessness and identity (of all things) are indeed possessed of the highest knowledge in the world and in this fact the world does not delve (K. 89).

15. Apraṇaya. What to be discarded, what is knowledgeable, what is to be acquired and what is to be measured are all to be understood from the apraṇaya, the highest Upanishadic path. Of these the ignorance-oriented experience has been accepted in the three states except in the cognizable-form state (K. 99).

16. Brahmāna. Having reached to the complete omniscience, Brahmānahood, and a non-dual position, not amenable to the beginning middle and end, what more than this one may yearn for? This disciple of Brahmāna is spoken of as their innate calm state. It is also stated as done because they by nature are controlled in their senses; the wise, knowing this wise should acquire the calm state (K. 8:89).

17. Vaisnava. Having realized truly the absence of causation and not finding any distinct cause for anything one secures the fearless state which is devoid of grief and desire (K. 35). All entities are calm from the beginning, unborn, very quiet by nature and undifferentiated; their identity (sattva) is unborn (i.e. Brahmāna) and fearless, viṣṇava. Those who walk in things' differentiation have no fearlessness. All
different doctrines are deeply bent on differentiation; therefore they are pitiable (Kk. 93-94). Having realized the state which is hardly visible, too deep, unborn, undifferentiated, fearless and freed from diversity, we omit our preceptor to the best of our ability (Kk. 109).

18. Avatana. If there is even a subtle notion of diversity of things lingering in his mind the unwise will have no detachment. What to speak of that he will slip away his veil of grossness? All thereon (i.e. sentient beings) are never covered by any veil, free from impurities by nature, enlightened and liberated from the stout-thus understand our teachers (Kk. 97-98).

19. Janam na tejana. Buddha’s knowledge does not cross over into entities, nor do the entities likewise cross over into knowledge—this has not been declared by (Gautama) Buddha (K. 99). The unborn knowledge is not regarded to be crossing over into unborn entities. Since the knowledge does not cross over into entity it is declared as relation-free (K. 106 cp. 72 under the head ej).

20. Ananta-yoga. I salute to him who has preached yoga freed from contact, which is pleasing and beneficial to all sentient beings, dispute-free and contradiction-free (K. 1), cp. III. 39: the contact-free yoga is hardly experienced by any meditator who is frightened from this yoga thinking that is dreadful, though it is in fact otherwise.

Comment. 1. Avatana. This is the most characteristic feature of Gauda’s philosophy. Nagajuna (hereafter referred as Nga) too has made use of this thesis is one of the most powerful weapon to uphold his favourite philosophy of Nihilism, Smavada. Though Gauda and Nga concur in pleading very strongly for non-origination of things, their ultimate purpose is quite different. Gauda by declaring the separate non-existence or non-origination of things aims at upholding Atma or Brahman as one sole principle, Advaita. Whereas Nga aims as an absolute voidness, suyata. Though our modern mind tends to identify them as one and the same neither Gauda would say that he is at voidness, nor would Nga say so at the Upashabdha Brahman. They differ thus in their purposes which oppose each other.

The circumstances which led them to their different conclusions must also be different. Since Gauda cites on several occasions instances from the Upanishads and other Vedic sources we may fairly be sure that
he has been inspired by those sources. We find in the Upanishads several passages to the effect that one Atman or Brahman alone is true and other phenomenal things are untrue or false; e.g., Avacya. Up. 1,1,1.

When things other than Brahman are declared untrue they deserve to be termed non-existent and their apparent existence and appearance are to be explained away as the effects of our mind’s illusion like a notion of the serpent on the rope. When the notice of the serpent disappears on close observation the serpent and the rope become one and the same and the serpent has not a separate existence. Likewise to say that things other than Brahman are untrue and false implies that they have no separate existence and to be viewed as identical with Brahman itself. To confirm this idea the Sveta Upanishad says:—

This Brahman that remains always within is knowable.
There is nothing other than this Brahman realisable.
The enjoyer, enjoyable and commandeer.

All these three are stated to be this Brahman alone. 1,12.

On the basis of this identity all the attributes that are applicable to Brahman can also be applied to other phenomenal things. This is the reason why Gauda declares that things (dharmas) are api-sat, api-buddha and api-muktas (sorene, released and enlightened from the outset) etc. The most characteristic of all attributes is api-ajata, 'unborn'. Upanishads always prefer the expression: api, ajata, na yastra, etc. to qualify Brahman or Atman. It may now appear quite obvious why Gauda generally calls phenomenal things as api, ajata, ajati, etc. This is perhaps the background on which Gauda’s ajata-sastra has been worked out.

In the case of Naga’s ajati or amantrattuvada non-origination proposition the following facts may be considered as basis: Avajit, one of the foremost disciples of Buddha, has credited his master with the discovery of a true cause of things that are brought about by causes in this sthata.

ने भवे रेषसमस्तमुखा कूते उपाधिथानां हस्त्वातः

"Thagata (Buddha) has proclaimed the true cause of things that arise on account of their causes" (v. Salistamba sutra, p.26, note on p. 31 more particulars about the sthana).

It is called there as Pratitya-samutpada-gdha implying thereby a formula

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of Dependent Origination. The formula is said to contain twelve
members such as *Arodha, Samudgata, Kipena* and others arranged in
a progressive order to the effect that the first member causes the second,
the second causes the third and the latter causes the fourth and so on.
The formula explains how a human being comes into existence from its
embryonic stage to a full grown up stage. In other words it makes
plain how the truth of origin of misery, *Samudgata* says operates. The
same formula is said to lead to the cessation-truth, *nirvana-saya* by a
cessation process, i.e. the cessation of the first member leads to that of
the second member and so on. This doctrine obviously proves that both
the origin and cessation are conditioned by causes. The law of cessation,
*Pratitya-samutpadadha* therefore forms a central theme in early Buddhism explaining
how the phenomenal world originates and how it ceases to originate
at the end.

This position turns to be quite different when Buddhism assumes
Mahayamic form and introduced a monistic teaching. The Madhyamaka
headed by Naga and a large member of Mahasana Sutraas credited no more
Buddha to be the discoverer of the law of cessation in its early form.
The doctrine of *Pratitya-samutpadadha* implies for Naga the reverse of origination,
*.e. non-origination and non-cessation*. Note the first stanza of this
Mahayamic Sutraa:

> तद्भवित्तत्त्वादि न तद्भवित्तत्वादि न्यायम्
> तद्भवित्तत्वादि न तद्भवित्तत्वादि न्यायम्

This idea of non-origination is confirmed in the Mahayamic
scripture: यथा तथाकारानि स तस्मात्: “What is originated
through causes is not originated in fact” (cited in the *Madda*, vrti, p. 239
from the Asvatata Sutraa). The reversal of origination into non-
origination was necessitated in view of changing pattern of the Madhyamikas’
outlook in respect of universe and their declared monistic principle.
Now the Pratitya-samutpadadha gatha has no more its original value, it has
been since them relegated to an obsolete position. Guatama also noticed
this Gatha and its principal idea of origination (v. iv, 57).

Thus once a monistic principle becomes a declared motto, a
nihilistic attitude towards other things is inevitable. This background
offered Naga a great opportunity to wield his critical acumen and demolish
the entire structure of dualistic thinking solely of his co-religionists,
Abhidharmikas, Sarvastivadins and Vaishshikas. His polemics against
these schools we met with in his Mahayamic sutraa and Drishtasamiksha,
etc. Naga being the foremost in the field of dialectic logic, the pattern
of his critique would not have but served as model to the monastic thinkers like Gauda. Though Gauda and Naga plead for non-originating theory we should not however, ever look their fundamental differences. As we clearly noticed, Naga upheld Sannyasa whereas Gauda advocates Advaita-vada. The latter’s criticism of origination is directed against the Sankhyas in the main (Kr. 3-2). Cf. Jyotisārāma: ‘... sannyasyavada; the Vaiseshikas’ svayamprakāsa is discussed only in one or two places (Kr. 1, ed. etc.). Here in Caṇamāna Kāraṇa-kāya-vada is the central theme of all dualists and has been criticised on several occasions (Read verses under topics No. 6, 7, c.f. citz., etc. and saṅgara, etc.). The origination theory of the early Buddhists as stated in the Pratītya-samutpāda-gaṇa has been referred to and ridiculed, read IV, p. 7: ‘Iṣṭa ya haṁ iti ādhe tathaṁ tathākē haṁ’.

As previously remarked Naga’s target of attack is in upholding the non-originating theory is in the main the early Buddhist who followed the Pratītya-samutpāda-gaṇa closely is better. His criticism against the Sankhyas and the Vaiseshikas can be found in the Dvārakā-mukha (my translation, ch. II). It is a well-known fact that the Mahāyānikas profess no proposition of their own; they simply ridicule the opponents’ propositions. Cf. Vāraṇa-vyavhyāsa, vol. 29, and Madhva, vṛtti, p. 56. To the question whether Sannyasa-Niñḥiṁ is adhered to Naga replies an emphatic ‘no’. He declares explicitly: 

‘Utpāditaṁ na bhavaṁ viṣṇuvatitāṁ ya bhavati.

Upādāya samutpade prakāryāyāṁ tū hāpyaṁ.

‘It is not stated as void or non-void, nor is to be stated as both or non-both; it is however stated as void in order to convey an empirical understanding.’

M. Sastra, XXII, II.

Likewise an exclusive ati-saṁyagā or ati-saṁyagā theory is not acceptable to Naga; cfr. this point in his Dvārakā-mukha, ch. 1, later portion. Gauda on the other hand sticks to the non-originating doctrine throughout the treatise and hints sometime that ekaṁ or aṣṭaṁśeśa labels for Śrāvaka or Ārya. We should not nevertheless miss to take note of some common expression between Gauda and Naga. Read e.g. Gauda’s verse.

‘Ekāṁ u pradāte sāvitrā kāśyapāvaśaḥ.

Kāraṇekāro vai prakāryāyāṁ bhavate.’

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with Nagas' \[ \text{न नाचि गैयिद दरारि न द्रामिा नादूहस्ति} \]

\[ \text{उन्तथा वातो वेनदि पाठि; ब्रह्म नेवन} \]

M. Satra 1,1, and

\[ \text{न स्तुत नत्तरे न मण्डुषा परि तिके कं ठि} \]

\[ \text{वय विमलेके हृदय स्त्रि हि कुरे} \]

Ibid, 1,1.

1. Prājnapti and Pratāpatra. Our reading of these verses may not be very satisfactory as they are contained in unfamiliar expressions which are not understandable by our ordinary intellect. Gaṅga has employed here apparently some Buddhist expressions like Prājnapā and Pratāpatra. Though the latter term can be traced in the treatises of the Sāṅkhyā and Samkhya, the former can hardly be traced in the Brahmanical literature. It appears therefore that Gaṅga adopted it from the Buddhist sources and made it of his own. The Buddhists employ the term prajnapā in the sense of ordinary talk or philosophically in an empirical realm of existence. V. Satra-sūdhi, ch. 3, on this topic and cp. also Vedic prajnapā, Loka-jatpā, etc., which are some of the tīkas in Buddhist literature. Its synonym in later Buddhism is Sanvṛtti-saya, empirical truth.

Pratāpatra is also Buddhist expression conveying the idea of origination dependent on causes and conditions. In Yogācāra Buddhism, the term conveys the sense "the mental and mental states dependent on causes and conditions". In fact it is not at all a Buddhist term when it signifies anything that depends on some ultimate cause in contrast with which is independent, Sanvṛtti. For example, the events in Sāṅkhyā system are pratāpatra because they are evolved from Prakṛti which is pratāpatra because it does not evolve from anything else (v. Sankhyasūtra, 10). Sri Sankara also employs pratāpatra in connection with our body, kāyo-karaṇa-ukāraṇa "the aggregates of effects and senses". So Gaṅga's sense is quite obvious, viz. pratāpatra, causal product i.e., the sanātana process continues and persists until sanātana, defiling forces are present. It is an established fact in every system of thought that the defiling forces necessarily give rise to their effects, i.e., sanātana like an empirical existence.

In the next verse the author speaks of Yoke-dāsana and Bhūta-dāsana. The firm is concerned with the empirical experiences and their conditioning factors whereas the latter with the absolute. Bhūta-dāsana, as insight into the absolute truth turns out the conditioning
factors into non-factors. The term shate-dararam looks like a Buddhist expression, note Avaghotha’s work:


3. Dream. Example on dream analogy read our remarks on ch.1 (beginning). The only point to be noticed here is avastha, "unthinkable": This term is again spoken of in connection with the universe of subject and object in K. 47 and 52. Read comment on the fire-brand example, topic no. 4.

4. daya, etc.: Maya example is common to both Buddhists and Vedanta. Nirnataka example is more likely a Buddhist one. Simhara however, refers to the idea of a magician creating himself as walking in air etc.: यदा मद्यसंवये निर्मातन आययामये क्रिया अवस्थायिते। (Atitapram. Up. bhashya, Gita Press. p. 37). The important verse to be noted here is in this section is Gauda’s refutation of Buddha’s renowned Gatha on Pratitya-amrutpada doctrine. Gauda says that Buddha’s teaching on the origination of things has not been stated from the absolute point of view. The origination of those things resembles a magic act which by itself is unproved as existent. Read comment on jati-vada for more details.

5. Fire-brand. This is a well-known example in Indian philosophic literature. The whirling fire-brand causes the appearance of wheel which is unthinkable, avastha, because it does not exist in the fire-brand, nor does it come from the outside or go out of the fire-brand. The wheel-appearance is unthinkable, because it is not a substance, i.e. it cannot be regarded as the actual effect of the fire-brand. Likewise the appearance of the subject-object universe on the consciousness is unthinkable, because the said appearance is not a substance; hence there cannot be a causal relation between the appearance and consciousness वाच्चकात्मकताध्यक्षताः। It seems that Gauda expounds the Vedantic idea in the Yogacara Buddhist terminology.

Our author on a previous occasion has also spoken of the unthinkable in K. 44. The person with waking state perceives, as a result of
perversion, the unthinkable external elements as real (ūtisat), etc. Ref. Dream-example No. 3. Here for Gauḍa, the phenomenal universe is unthinkable, because it is an imputed appearance on Brahmā the wheel appearance on the fire-brand. The wheel appearance is neither a substance nor the effect of the fire-brand. Likewise phenomenon of universe is neither substance nor the effect of Brahmā but it is unthinkable (acintya); magic or idee. There cannot be a causal relation between the universe and Brahmā because the universe is not at all a substance.

The idea of unthinkable is also common to the Yogacāra Buddhists. The Ratnagotra, thus refers to four unthinkable activities: Samāla Tattvā, Nirūta Tattvā, Vinuṛa Buddhaguna and Jina-ākṛti. Here śaṅkara appears to signify their characteristics inseparable in the terms of ordinary reasoning.

The Śaiva-siddhi again defines the sense organ as anūtta-krama-bahūropsa of the four great elements. It is acintya because it cannot be stated as either one with or other than the four great elements. According to Dignaga the sense organ is a sort of Sakti inherest in the Abya consciousness. He also refers to it alternately as anūtta-nīya-nīya, probably an opinion of the S. Siddhi (v. mg dharmapariksha, ver. 7-8).

The Madhyamika’s doctrine of voidness which may be postulated as a parallel of Vedānta doctrine of illusion, nyuo dyado appears to have sprung up as a result of their speculative about things in their indescribable character. The Madhyamikas affirm that the phenomenal world is indescribable because it does not stand their logical test. We have several reasons to make us believe that the movement of the Madhyamika analysis was not started with Nāgāraja but it may have been initiated from the early period of the Mahāyāna scriptures. We may cite here a few examples. The Bhūsvarakumārasūtra says: The consciousness of new birth is something indescribable. The last consciousness when it ceases, does not go anywhere and the first consciousness, when it arises does not come from anywhere else. Pers, they have no reality of their own and are void of their self-substance (pp. 4, 112). It may now be plain that the relation between these two elements of consciousness not be specified in terms of logic. The idea is that the same consciousness does not cross over to the new birth and continues for the time (na tattvāsakti). The same position is confirmed in the Sūryāvatā-sūtra dealing with the Prāthītya-prasūtra doctrine, p.6, Na samkatātthā ..

The Madh. vṛtti (p. 171) cites a Mahāyānic sūtra bearing on this topic:

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The indescribable character of the relation between the cause and the effect has been argued by Naga in several places as a basis of his Sunyata doctrine. He pleads for example:—

Nāstītraṇo dharmān naḥkṣetraśca

M. Sutra XVIII,10

Cp.M. vṛtti, p.149 citation from the Anavatapta Sutra:

This topic will continue in the comment on Sarvata, etc. No.9.

6. Citta and artha. Naga introduces it in his sastra chap. III. on a critical examination of sensory perception which leads him to the conclusion that none of the senses could possibly discharge its function with which concurs Gauḍa’s contention that the mind does not contact with its object, etc. It is worthwhile to take note of the verse from the Bhavasakranti-Sūtra:

Nā vṛṣṭiṇaṃ gosām ānāśaṃ n bheti vṛṣṭiṃ.

Pūchāvāryaṃ gosām vṛṣṭiṃ n çvāpi vṛṣṭiṃ.

Cited as M. vṛtti, p. 120.

Gauḍa’s statement that the person who conceives the origination of things will see the footprint in the sky is comparable with the verse cited in Madh. vṛtti p. 90: ‘Gosām vṛṣṭiṃ nāśaṃ bheti vṛṣṭiṃ; gosām vṛṣṭiṃ yāhāṃ syām.’ (Ratnakarasutra) cp. also Madhavikutubhāva caryā yodhāya nivedita Dhammapada, VII, 4 and Theragatha, 92. Sankara also cites the simile along with others: ‘S tūrti bhavantā yānāṃ kavyātvamānāhāṃ, gosām vṛṣṭiṃ nāśaṃ bheti vṛṣṭiṃ; gosām vṛṣṭiṃ yāhāṃ syām.’ (Sankara Bhasya caryā padhāya) Dhammapada, VII, 4 and Theragatha, 92. Sankara also cites the simile along with others: ‘S tūrti bhavantā yānāṃ kavyātvamānāhāṃ, gosām vṛṣṭiṃ nāśaṃ bheti vṛṣṭiṃ; gosām vṛṣṭiṃ yāhāṃ syām.’ (Sankara Bhasya caryā padhāya).

Atatreyā bhāṣya. p. 76-71 (Gita Press). Here Gauḍa might have in his mind the Yogacāra Buddhists who hold that the mind though momentary continues in succession.
Cittapandita (ver. 73). The vibration of the mind has already been spoken of in B. 29 as being happened in dream as well as in the waking state on account of maya. The Buddhists also speak of the mind's nodding as resulting in false assumption. Buddha says: 'Nodding is the mind's nodding, vibration and elaboration, etc. (Samyutta, IV, 267; cited also in S. Suddhi, ch. 84). Note also the passage cited in Mahāv. vatti p. 549.

112. निर्वाणसिद्धि सत्यन्यस्य सध्यस्य सभांवल्लभसन्नम्: निर्वाणदेशलवपिनः।।

Nirvana is a purification and stoppage of all causing factors and of all distraction and shaking. This idea may make possibly tally with Gaudā's conception of the universe as a vibration of the mind.

7. Samyutta and Mahāv. Gaudā makes clear here that he keeps the same attitude towards Samyutta as Naga, and his predecessors maintain. They plead that the belief and adherence to law of causation leads to a great sequence of one being hogged down in a turbulent empirical life. The best means to get rid of it is to be detached from the false notion of causation law. The causation law is false because it falls to the ground when it is put to a critical analysis. The Mādhyamika declares that things that are valued on the basis of causal relations are absolutely valueless and hence void, maya. Gaudā and his followers as a result of the same logical absurdity call the empirical things as maya or avaya.

Things are acintya unthinkable because their causal relations are impossible to be made satisfactorily intelligible to our reasoning. Gaudā has as a specimen, shows how absurd it is to talk about the causal relation in respect of the fire-bred and its wheel like appearance (v. Comm. No. 6). Naga has on the side of Mahāyana Buddhism done the same task throughout his Mahāv. Sutra.

8. Khāregi. This concept is much favored by the Buddhists and found in a specific context, cp. Pratikshābhanta in Buddhism. Gaudā seems to have generalized the term in a broader sense of perseverance. How the entity are free from decay and birth, beginningless and enlightened by nature have already been made plain in the comment on Aptivads No. 1. Their companions with sky is also common to the Buddhists. The comparison implies that the entities are identical and changeless, and in addition, they are void for the Mādhyamikas. For the Mahāyānic idea of kshanti read the Samudābhiraj Sutra:

The Bodhisattva does not dispute with anybody nor does he talk about any purposeless topic and remains constantly in his objective and dharmas; this is the description of the first kshanti.
He understands all things as comparable with naya and grasps no nimitta. The characteristic marks of the perceived object, nor does he run astray from his cultivated knowledge. These are specifications of the first kshanti. (v. Buddhagosa-sangha, p. 218).

9. Savata and Achcheda. Buddha’s doctrine is based on the middle path, madyamapratyaksha avoiding two extreme ends: afflicting one self with the bodily torture and indulging in the sensuous pleasure (v. Dharmarakka-pavavattana Sutta) which ends are stated later as existence and non-existence (Samyutta-Jiii, 155 cited in S. Siddhi, ch. 28, No. 113). The Mahavacca equates bhava-dhāra (अभावधारा) with Savata and vikaraṇdhrā (विकारन्दृत्त) with achcheda (v. Poussin, M. vrtti, p. 1, n. 4 and p. 127, 4). Naga then declared that Buddha’s doctrine freed from eternalism and Nihilism (Savata-achcheda-dhāra in his Māthā, sātra XVIII, II-Buddha-introd-ecol Pratītya-samupadā, law of causation with a view to avoiding the two ends, so says a Sutra: “The view of non-existence (Nihilism) disappears when one understands the origin of things (Samadaya-saṁyut) and the view of existence (Eternalism) disappears when one understands their cessation, Nivedana-saṁyut” (Samyutta, III, 14 cited in S. Siddhi ch. 196). Naga comments: The law of causation helps to avoid those two flaws in the doctrine. He says: Whichever arises due to causes and conditions is neither different from nor different to its cause; hence it is neither perished nor preserved (M. Sastra XVIII, 10 cp. comm. No. 5 above). The Salistambha Sutra states that the formula of causation should be viewed on the background of five aspects, the first two of which are: na savata and na achcheda and explain them in the same fashion as Nage does v. verse cited above).

The Lalitatāstara also expresses similar view: केवलं संसारकालं संसारप्राप्तं न प न वो बृहदं नवसेव अनुसरणं। न प अन्य नस्तो न च नवस्य नेववसेवं अनुसरणं।

“For example, the sprout springs up from the seed; they are neither one and the same nor different from each other; thus their nature is neither permanent nor impermanent” (cited in M. vrtti p. 177).

Aryadeva elucidates the topic in a simpler manner: Because an element comes into being there is no Nihilism. Because an element goes out of existence there is no Eternalism (Cited Bod., p. 178).

Being examined this grand idea of the Buddhists Gauda thinks his Advaita doctrine should also be made freed from these two flaws.

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So he says: Because things take birth, i.e. change into another form in the empirical sense, they are not permanent; but because they are in fact unborn, i.e. do not change in their aspect of existence an inherent Brahmanic state, they are eternal. Gauda's statement: "in regard to unborn things no talk is possible of 'eternal' or 'non-eternal' (K.60) may be compared with Naga's verse: With reference to void things what is the same, what is different, what is eternal and what is non-eternal... (XXV, 11). Note the difference between Gauda and Naga in their metaphysical outlook: for the former 'things are unborn' and for the latter 'things are void'.

Gauda next says (60 c-d) Where no letters are applicable, no discrimination is possibly applicable thereto, which saying implies that Truth is anabhara, inexplicable in letter; cp. Naga's idea: AnabharaNetram. Discrimination is rooted in lettering, words; cp. the following idea: sources of discrimination are words and the letter is the source of the former, विवक्षप्रभावः भवति विबक्षः: यद्योऽयमः।

Gauda's expression: illusory things create illusory things; likewise are the phenomenal things (K.59) is comparable with Naga's verse: void things arise from the void things: स्थूलतद् न श्च श्चाया परमाय: अभावितम्। Praśnita-samuccāda-hridaya, ver. 4.

10. Adhyāyā. Gauda seems to speak of the individual Atman by viṣṇa (which is identical with Brahma) when he refers to it as motionless and without second. The consciousness appears in the empirical plane of existence as though having birth, sensation, etc. The idea may be compared with Dharmakīrti's saying: अत्याचारो हि सत्यायत्ना क्योऽसिददेखितः। सत्यसङ्क्षेपितानां अभ्यासिनितः। Pra. var. 3, 354

Gauda says (K. 77) that the mind's non-birth snegūtta, is advaya and that the non-birth is possible when there is no samādhi, mind's activating cause, pravṛtti-nimitta. At this stage the mind becomes one with Brahman, Brahmī-bhava (v. our comment on III, KK. 35, 46 above and Yogasūtra 1, 1, 3). The same idea is expressed in a different fashion (K. 85), i.e. the motionless state which is the same as Brahmic non-dual position is declared to be the sole domain of Buddha's highest knowledge. Here "Buddha" is in a general sense meaning an enlightened sage, v. our remark on advaya in to, ii, end).

11. Kalpita and Panañcāna. Those two verses are the most enigmatic and misunderstood. The terms Kalpita and Panañcāna are the yogacara expressions adopted by Gauda and grafted to his Vedantic

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ideology. Before we try to understand them we have to bear in mind the following background. Mahayana Buddhists admit two kinds of samvrti: Tathya and Mithya-samvrti. For example, the sight of water in the mirage is supplemented in the next moment on a close observation.

Here the sight of water is Mithya-samvrti, and the observation of the mirage is Tathya-samvrti (cf. my paper: Mahâyàna-mahà-stâhisa in FORM, IX, p. 151). Gauḍa’s kalpita samvrti corresponds to Mithya-
samvrti (cfr. Bud, ver. 9) and Paratantara to Tathya. Sam. i.e. Lokasamvrti or
satya. Kalpita-samvrti, is the imagined water in the mirage and the
Paratantara-samvrti is the experience of the worldly objects which are products
of causation law, for the yogacara Buddhists kalpita aspect is non-
existent and false and the paratantara aspect i.e. the mind and the mental
state is existent and real. For the Madhyamikas it is also unreal and void.

Now we can very well understand what Gauḍa means to convey in these two verses. In kalpita-samvrti i.e. in our sole imagination something appears as if real, e.g. the water in the mirage, but it turns to be unreal in the Tathya-samvrti-Lokasamvrti which Gauḍa calls Paratantara and which has a bit of reality (paramarthás). The objective universe may be real from viewpoint of the law of causation, Paratantara-samvrti (see my paper: Mahāyāna-mahā-sthānsāra in FORM, IX, p. 151). The next must be understood as the so-called ultimate principle, Pradhana, etc. of other philosophers is conceived as unborn from the viewpoint of kalpita-samvrti imaginary experience (Kalpita-samvrti-Mithya-samvrti, but it is not unborn from the viewpoint of the highest Truth. It takes birth etc. from the viewpoint of Paratantara-samvrti-Tathya-samvrti. Paratantara-samvrti is so called because the law of causation is admissible in the empirical plane. It is an interesting coincidence that Candrakirti (p. 10) in his Mādhavavitarānī by quoting the Saṁkhya and others and their so-called ultimate principles (cf. my paper: Mahāyāna-mahā-sthānsāra in FORM, IX, p. 151). It is strange that the filth of the verse attributed to Sūkra interprets paratantara into paratantara (cf. comm. No. 2. more about paratantara). In the light of above finding R.D. Karmadāra’s much
laboured explanation and now are not admissible (cf. his notes on pp. 150-3).

17. Abhidharma. The first line of K. 75 is a citation from the Madhyantarā-vibhoga of Maitreya ch. 1, 1. ver. 18a-b: अपूर्वानुभूतिहृदयं तत्तवमिवान्। Shīramathā comments there is a foundation for. i.e. Paratantara-mind
mental state and on it kalpita, false ideas are imposed in which (paratantara) exists no dual, subject and object, etc. We are not to understand
Gauta in this manner. He probably means: there is abhinnasa (wrong adherence) for abhuta-bhava, duṣṭam but there is no duṣṭam in fact. If we divide the verse into two sentences all the grammatical difficulties would be saved. The K. 79 asserts plain that Gauta does not intend to express the Buddhist meaning in k. 75 ab because it says in this verse that an account of abhinnasa or false idea of duṣṭam, abhuta a man engages himself in an apparently similar object. Here the subject of the verb 'vāsana' is 'he' a p-son, not the mind.

1.3. Gauta. This is the most characteristic feature of the Mahāyānā philosophy. Soge eloquently proclaims that the highest Truth of his conception is free from any attributes: existence or non-existence etc. He inherited this doctrine from Buddhā's doctrine to Aggavaccha about the Tathāgatā's status after death which (status) has been described as 'bhūt, na bhūt' hoti ca na ca hoti, naiva na bhūt na hoti'. Then Buddhā gives out his opinion about the point thus: Tathāgata in Nirvāṇa immovable like the great ocean (Mahāvibodhika, No. 72). It is therefore appropriate for the Mahāyānās to qualify the Truth as free from existence etc; but could it be justified on the part of Gauta who is an Advaita Vedāntin and whose ultimate truth is Brahman and essentially is existence in character? For this reason probably Gauta states that the four attributes signify to order: unceasing, steady etc. Thus Gauta appears to refer by satvāta, existence-theories to the multiple principle of the dualists like the Sādhis, Vaishešikas and the early Buddhists. Their principles being more than one the existence trait does not remain attached to one principle. For the materialists (mārtikas) the highest principle being nīśa the non-existence trait is fixed. The meaning of abhuta and abhagabhava may be understood appropriately in relation to other theories is order.

1.4. Lābhaka-prapāta etc. The varieties of knowledge, lābhi, etc. are are quite common to the yogāca Buddhist though their interpretations are somewhat different. No difference can be noticed with reference to the 1st variety, vā. Labhi and its meaning likewise it is concerned with the ordinary volition experience. The difference is to be noted in the second variety, ie. lābhaka-labhi. For the Buddhā (i. yugāca) it is a pure empirical knowledge with the paścita-lābhaka-prapāta, i.e. a knowledge acquired subsequent to the concentration Samadhi and reflects things in their own nature namely as the reflections of the mind and the mental states, paramātman. The Yogin should perceive the parama-trait through this knowledge after rising up from the samāti, tathātā, the highest transcendental knowledge.
known as *Angyaparana*, i.e. state when *Alaya*-consciousness is turned into *Tathāra*, or *Dhiya-Dhiya*, etc (v. Trim higher, ver. 18-90).

It appears that Gaṇḍa employs these apparently Buddhist terms to convey his own ideas. His commentator explains the *Sukhāvatikā* and *Lokottara* as *bhūmi* state and deep sleep consciousness respectively. In the *Sukhāvatī* the mind (these experiences unreal things; so it is without objects there are experiences-amana khalanīthka). In the deep sleep even the mind ceases to operate, hence it is considered to be neutral of both, objects and their experiences.

The *Lokavatāra Sūtra* speaks of the three kinds: *Laudha*, *Lokottara* and *Lokottaranama* and describes them as three stages of development. The text is related to other philosophers who advocate different ultimate categories of existence and nonexistence. The second is concerned with all *māyākas* and *pratyeka-Buddhā* knowledge and the third with *Buddha* and *Buddhāvīrti's* developed knowledge (i.e. the text cited by Karmakin in his notes, p. 138).

The second line of this K. 88 is the most ambiguous. The *Bhāṣya* of *Sankara* comments: The knowledge through which the above said three states are understood is knowable; cogizable, *vijaya* is known as the fourth state (torṣakhyam), the Absolute Truth......This interpretation appears to be somewhat ventures in the next verse, 89 which does not mention the fourth state in a plain language. The verse reads: When three-fold knowledge and the knowable (phāta) are understood well in their order one becomes omniscient. According to the *Bhāṣya*, *ṣaṃjñājana*, 'conscience' stands for the fourth state (i.e. the text cited in the notes p. 140). So apparently there is no incoherence on the part of *Bhāṣya*, so Karmakin's criticism of *Bhāṣya* seems to be unfair.

15 *Agamana*. This term is also a Buddhist expression meaning *Mahayana*, generally understood as very great. According to the *Upanishad* *prama* means "path" in the expressions like *Dhyāna* and *Pārāśā* etc. In Buddhism there are three *prama*: *Vipartikā*, *Pārāśā* *Buddha-yantra* and *Mahayana* also called Agamana sometime. On the Brahmanical side two *prama* are well known, *viz*., *Pārāśā* and *Dhyāna* (v. Br. Up. vi. 1 2; Pramāṇa 3 9 and Mundaka III. 1 4) which are concerned with the field of *karmayā*, *yeda* theories and the worship of lower *Brahman* (upanish). It is most likely that Gaṇḍa accepted here as *el elsewhere the Buddhist expression, agamana to convey his Vedantic idea i.e. the highest Upanishadic path. The *Buddhists* call *Mahayana* sometimes
Buddhavāna. As its counterpart the Vedanta may also call his path as Brahma-vana like Brahma-nirvāṇa of the Gītā, V, 24-26, II, 72. Now we have to explain the Haya etc on the basis of the Upānanuṣṭā. Haya, 'to be abandoned' is aparāvidya, knowledge of the lower Brahmā (cf. Sankaśa's Bhāṣya on Mūrtika, 1, 25). The knowable is aparāvidya, knowledge of higher order leading to Brahmā-calāyana (v. ibid). Or it may indicate the knowable first stated in the ver. 58 (v. comment on it above). Apya, 'to be acquired' is the fruit effected by Kamas, Samaprapāla (v. Bhāṣya on Mūrtika 1, 2, 7). Svara Kāraṇa-kāyana (upayogam, aparājan, sanmāyaṇān viyogam 1). Padyam, 'to be matured' is the realisation of Atma in and identity with Brahma on the maturation of one's intellect (v. Sankaśa's Bhāṣya on Tattvā, I, 11, p. 99 Gītā Prat, tp. the exposition, sāyā in zweta. Up. V, 5 and Sankaśa's Aparokṣāsaṃbhāiti, ver. बॉय तुः सन्ततिः सति तत्त्वं हि तथा दयाम.)

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Here vṛtti is Brahma-vṛtti, thinking of Brahmaan.

An illusory experience of these four may happen in all three states, laksika, etc. (K, 88) except in the fourth viyog states. This interpretation may sound well. But the difficulty we encounter here is that the interpretation clashes with Gauḍa's description of the third state, deep sleep as devoid of objects and their experiences.

Brahma-vat Gauḍa calls the Upānanuṣṭā coniscience a non-dual Brahmānhood (Brahmaṇya) probably in order to distinguish his Advaita doctrine from Buddhism. The Bhadarāṇyaka describes who is Brahmātta and who is Kṣaya: यो त स प्रात्सात्त नात्मविविधता बहस्तां ब्रह्माकां वै त स क्रमः स्वस्व नात्मविविधताः सबोहात्त ब्रह्मान् म ।

(III, 8,10). It is worthwhile to remember here that a counter-claim has also been made by Buddha and his disciples. Their claim that their faith alone leads to Brahmānhood, cfr. Dhammapāla, Brahmānaya, 36, and my paper, Message of Buddha and reference on pp. 5-8, Prabhuddhābhāsā, 1970, May.

17. Vaiṣṇavāya. This is also a Buddhist expression. It is one of the most important attributes of Buddha like Daśānada etc. The Sāvatthī state Buddha deserves our homage because he is superior to all other religious teachers in respect of his sublime qualities like Vaiṣṇavāya etc. (cb. 3 and my paper on this subject in Sino Indian Studies, vol.1,pp. 3). Now Gauḍa appears to have generalised the expression
and claimed that the Realizer of Brahman and Aman may also deserve to be characterized as 'Vishwak' just like Buddha claiming to be Brahman.

18. Astara. This is a common concept of all schools of Indian philosophy though its content may differ in each school. The most characteristic feature of Astara, well acceptable to the Vedanta and the Buddhist is avyaya, nonexistence which is amplified into Raga, avyaya and Avidya, 'lust, indiscrimination and hallucination'. Gauḍa here speaks of no avyaya or avery but its effect, i.e., the notion of diversity in identity. Things, in fact, are free from well, pure by nature, etc. Thus our leaders understand. (Ref. our comment on Ājītī no. 1). Here again a generalization of Buddha's epithet "Naya" has been claimed by Gauḍa, cp. Atmanatma's synonym of Buddha "Naya" and "Vishaka".

19. Janaṁ na kramate. Gauḍa states why knowledge does not cross over into entities in K. 96. Because both knowledge and entities are unborn, 'aja' and essentially of identical character of Brahman one does not cross over into other. The thing other than Brahman is a myth in the highest sense of Truth. This is the reason why the knowledge is eloquently declared to be freed from any relation with its relata. Gauḍa has already stated that the mind never touches its object since the latter is un럴 (K. 72). He now speaks about that point has not been admitted by Buddha. Buddha on the other hand, proclaimed in his first sermon: In me a knowledge arose in respect of dharma, entities: वर्णम् अनन्तरसत विश्व द्विविद्य, etc which claim has been challenged by Gauḍa in this verse, this challenge will set at rest all speculations about Gauḍa and his professed faith.

20. Aparasa-yoga. This seems to be absolutely a new expression coined by Gauḍa. It has no parallel either in Buddhism or Brahmanism. It is a paradoxical combination joining, yoga in the absence of contact, aparasa. What does it signify? The classical definition of yoga in Buddhism is to concentrate one's mind on a particular object. This is definitely a aparasa-yoga. The Buddhists admit nine grades of dhyanā: four rupa-dhyānas, four arupa-dhyānas and the last: Nirvāṇa-samāpattih which is literally aparasa-yoga. For in the previous 8 dhyanas the mind is operating and engaged in one or other object; it is in the last sarvadhi the mind ceases to operate; the yogin has only the body to get into contact with the object, kayena aparasa viṣāṣati. This fact makes clear that Gauḍa's Aparasa-yoga is unknown to the Buddhists.
The Kathopanishad defines yoga as follows: When the five senses knowledges together with mind cease to operate and the intellect too does not act, that state is the highest position (gati). That position is considered as yoga in which the senses including the mind and the intellect are controlled and held up steadfast (III, 2, 10-11). This is the yoga that Gauḍa has in mind. Since in this state all the senses, the mind and the intellect cease to operate, there is nothing that comes into contact with any object. This position may appropriately be termed "Aparasa-yoga". Sankara's remarks in this context are noteworthy. He says: Sanyasī cit tadvedyam oṣṇitā tu brahman eva nileṣaḥ śāntām. Svarūpa-śamānashāṣṭri māyā-sandruṣṭa śrotuḥ. (Katha. Bhashya, Gita press, p. 164).

"That state-wise the wise consider as the yoga which in fact is only a disjoining (viyoga) i.e. contact-free, because this state of yogin, sinit is characterized as an absence of contact with all sorts of evil affirms'". This statement of Sri Sankara makes it quite obvious that the yoga described in the Upanishad here is truly Aparasa-yoga of Gauḍa.

Let us see whether the Gita shed any light on this topic. The following passage probably helps us to a good deal to resolve the riddle:

वायुवधसुपवेदनं विभस्यरूपं रुपादिकला किरुपम् ।
स ब्रह्मविद्याभ्यानं बुद्धिसमप्रवृत्तम् ॥

"The yogin, who is being detached from the external touchables, obtains the happiness in his self; he is merged in Brahma-yoga and experiences the inexhaustible happiness'."

This stanza simply demonstrates that Gauḍa's Aparasa-yoga is no other than Brahma-yoga of the Gita. The expression, Aparasa-yoga with reference to Brahma-yoga is the most appropriate, since Brahma being identical with the yogin's Atman, self has no contact even of the minutest degree could be imagined.

33. Arivada and Arivindhi. Buddha has stood on several occasions that he does not dispute with the world and that he follows what the ordinary people talk about the worldly affairs (v. Sarvayuta, III, 138, Majh. I. and S. Siddhi, ch. 3, p. 17).

Gauḍa likewise says that we approve quite happily the thesis of no-birth, ajārārtha which results from the quarrelsome dispute elaborated by other schools of thought about sankhya and sāṅkhyā etc (IV, 5). Naga would not concur with Gauḍa in this respect because the former
could not have any dogma of his own as a settled fact, hence he disputes every dogma of his opponents.

Sri Sankara is more eloquent in disclosing the Advaita’attitude towards the controversial issues set forth by other philosophers. Note his statements cited below:

"Therefore the person desirous of Belice, discarding the legician’s system should take good care in respect of the doctrine of identity of Atman-Brabman. For this reason, we shall disclose some lapses in their systems but not being entangled in the systems. The following has been stated in this context: The Vedantas placing the entire burden of points of dispute, their origin and cause upon the disputants and being protected by them in our decision about the thesis of existence passes on peacefully and happily."

(Pract-Viseshya VI,5,Gita Press p.111)

Note on the last verse. Gaunda pays homage to his preceptor though not expressed, after understanding and realizing the fearless deep and undifferentiated state of peace in order to show his gratitude to his preceptor. This is quite in keeping with the tradition deserved in the Uparshals, e.g. Prasne. Up. last verse. Mundaka and Brah.Up etc. A similar tradition is noticeable on the Buddhist side e.g. Sundareshana where Nanda acknowledges his gratitude to Buddha. Naga’s homage to Buddha in the last verse of his Sutra keeps the tradition quite alive.

Finally a Note on Dipadana varga. Gaunda’s paying homage to Dipadana varga in Ch. IV, stanza 1, has given rise to some controversy amongst scholars regarding the identity of the person so designated. Some scholars of Buddhism believe that Gaunda refers there to Buddha while others on the Brahmanical side believe otherwise. It appears to us that though Gaunda adopts the Buddhist terminologies and pattern of arguments to uphold his Advaita philosophy, he cannot be stated to have saluted Buddha in the stanza. Our reason for this surmise is that Buddha is prominently spoken as “the Superiormost teacher of all men and gods” (देवमुखस्वामिः) but not Dui-
padam vara, "best of all men". Naga accordingly pays homage to Buddha as Vadattam vara, 'best of all speakers or teachers' (v. the first stanza of his Saster. . . . तः करे बदान वर्णे). Gauḍa's object of reverence is the best of bipedi, i.e. Purusottama, 'best of all persons' which obviously refers to Good, Vismum, ref Gita. उपन: पुरुषोत्तम: पारमाणव:पुरुषुकु:।

Ch. XV, 17, 'the Supreme Person is different (from the lower Brahmun) and known as the Supreme Self' which passage speaks of the Supreme Being penetrating three realms of existence (kāla-kāyā). We should not confuse between 'Dvipadām varan' and 'Vadatdam varan' which two terms signify two distinct theological concepts.

It does not matter very much whether Gauḍa refers to Buddha or Purushottama. None can nevertheless gainsay that Gauḍa adopted a great deal of dialectics from Naga and other Buddhist authors and adapted them suitably to the needs of upholding his Upanishadic Mādāvīj darśana.