- The Bulletin of Tibetology seeks to serve the specialist as well as the general reader with an interest in this field of study. The motif portraying the Stupa on the mountains suggests the dimensions of the field—

EDITORS

GYALMO HOPE NAMGYAL
T. SHERAB GYALTSHEN
NIRMAL C. SINHA
CONTENTS

BAHYARTHA SIDDHI KARIKA
N. A. SASTRI

GREY WOLF IN TIBETAN TRADITION
MYNAK R. TULKU

Page
1
97
CONTRIBUTORS IN THIS ISSUE—

N. AIYASWAMI SASTRI Formerly Adhyapaka in Visva-bharati; leading scholar on Mahayana literature and author of publications on Tibetan and Chinese translations and commentaries.

MYNAK RIKHU TULKU Presiding incarnate of Rikhu, the leading Sakya monastery in Mynak (Kham); resident in Sikkim since 1959 and attached to the Namgyal Institute of Tibetology, first as a student of Sanskrit and English and now as a member of the staff.

———

Views expressed in the Bulletin of Tibetology are those of the contributors alone and not of the Namgyal Institute of Tibetology. An article represents the private individual views of the author and does not reflect those of any office or institution with which the author may be associated.
Bahiyaṃthasaiddhikārikānāma

Bahiyaṃthasaiddhikārikānāma

Bahiyaṃthasaiddhikārikānāma

N. A. SASTRI
We have in the collection of Tibetan Tripitaka Tangyur five works attributed to Bhadanta Subhagupta in the following order: (1) SarvajnāsiddhiKarika, (2) Bhavyarthaśiddha Karika, (3) Sruṣṭiparīkṣa, (4) Anyopade-vicara, (5) Isvarābhimānakārikā. Of these the second, viz. Bhavyarthaśiddha, Tib. phyi rol gyi don grub, pa is the most valuable and interesting. It consists of about 190 verses (anustup) counted for convenience into 188 verses.

The purpose of the treatise, as its title implies, is to refute the Yogācāra idealistic philosophy and to prove the reality of the external universe from the standpoint of the Saṁvatsarādhyāya-Vaiśhākikā. Vasubandhu, for example, in his Pramāṇa elaborated a good deal to demonstrate the impossibility of atomic theory of the Vaisēśikās. Dīnagupta again in his Alambanavāpaṭikā confirmed Vasubandhu's opinion on the basis of his logical and epistemological foundations.

Next the upholder of the Idealistic School of Buddhism was Dharmakirti who embarked on the task of establishing his philosophy of absolute Idealism by enumerating several logical arguments. Of those, the argument of Udbhāsanāna-mīyāna, concomitance of co-cognition is most powerful and proverbial with all the posterior writers of Indian philosophy. Now the uphill task of reviewing all the arguments put up by the above masters of Idealism rests with Bhadanta Subhagupta, a renowned master of the Vaiśhākikā school of Buddhism. Subhagupta, in the present treatise takes up to examine in detail all the points raised in favour of Idealism and succeeds in presenting his case, the case of the Vaiśhākikā masters (on the subject) so brilliantly and vehemently that still later some masters, like Santarakṣita and Kamalasila could not remain without making another attempt to vindicate their own positions in opposition to Subhagupta's premise. In course of their examination into Externalism (Bhāvanāśāstra) they quote Subhagupta's passages verbatim and refute his arguments one by one. Thus we have about 11 verses of Subhagupta cited all of which are traced in the present treatise (see verses Nos. 29, 35, 44, 66, 68, 71, 81, 87, 89, 95, 101). Kamalasila cites also some prose passages (v. Panjika, p. 574, 20) from Subhagupta giving rise to a surmise that Subhagupta might have also written some commentary on the treatise which is not translated into Tibetan.
This appraisal of the treatise may give a fair idea of when the author Subhagupta must have flourished. His time must be fixed between Dharmakirti (650 A.D.) and Santarakshita-Kamalasila (700-80 A.D.). He must be also anterior to Akalanka, a Jain author (c. 700 A.D.) since the latter quotes the former in his Nityavimsayya the ver: saka-sahadesa lokamis, etc. (Bhajyarthya, ver. 71). We may therefore place him during 650-700 A.D. (Cf. T. Sangnaha, Intro. XXXIV).

**REVIEW OF TOPICS**

Now let us make a brief survey of the whole contents of the treatise. One of the most powerful arguments in favour of idealism is the example of dream experiences. Subhagupta refutes it by pointing out the differences between the waking experiences which are never contradicted and the dreams which are always contradicted. To the contention of the Yogacara that all our knowledge and experience are illusory, the author replies that some knowledge may exist on account of some defect in our cognitive apparatus but to say that it exists even in the absence of such defects creates an absolute darkness in the universe (v. ver. 31 with note).

Dignaga holds that because each atom is not separately cognized there could be no atoms at all; the author points out in reply that the reason, i.e. non-cognition of atoms in isolation (saka-apariścēde) is not conclusive; mind and mental phenomena, though not separately experienced, exist (v. ver. 33, 34). He maintains further that atoms cannot appear in life in isolation; when they appear in association with others they lose their atomic characteristics; how, then, could each of the atoms be reflected in our consciousness?—he asks (ver. 43). On an external material object which is constituted of several atoms, we have an idea of ‘one’ but this idea of oneness is illusory and is produced as a result of cognition of the uninterrupted and homogeneous atoms (ver. 35) and that is our mental construction (36). The atoms being conglutinated into an integrated form discharge a uniform action and therefore they cannot be designated as non-substances (40).

Vasubandhu’s criticism of atomic theory on the basis of spacial distinction (ādhiṣṭhā) which contradicts the theory itself is not at all reasonable; for we hold that there is no space apart from the atoms themselves. When we talk of space we mean the atoms themselves spread in certain fashion (45-46). The conception of one whole (anayāraṇa) is also illogical. If you
consider it possible as a result of the atoms being closely knit together in a large number, you may better also conceive one time-units on the moments that are proceeding and succeeding in an uninterrupted succession (50). Atoms have a peculiar relationship amongst themselves due to which no intruder could enter in the midst of atoms; by the virtue of this relationship the covering of atoms by other atoms has been upheld and therefore there is not any reason to presume the atoms have parts (52). The atoms, though mutually unrelated and partless become coalesced and accomplish the gross things like the globe of earth, etc. on account of some excellence of mutual efficiency (amgraha-vritesa) (56-57). Certain number of atoms alone enter into combination by virtue of that substance-efficiency (duvar-sakti) but there are many others which could not do so on account of their meagre power (58-59). The atoms could be counted by some spiritually advanced saints alone and therefore conceive them to be existing even though we do not cognize them. (65).

Next the author taking up to examine the maxim of Sāhagata-ambhagatavana remarks that the knowledge is only cognizer and that too is only in the presence of some visible object and therefore they are cognized simultaneously but this fact does not testify their identity (67). Then the sadhāraṇa reason has been pointed out to be defective in several respects; sometimes it is indefinite, sometimes contradictory and sometimes unproved and so on. The term sahā 'together' always implies a companion and if there is really Sāhagata-ambhagatavana 'together-cognition', the reason will obviously prove the contrary to what is cherished. The object felt by some other person in his own mind cannot be denied by us because it is far removed from our cognizance. The meaning of Sāhagata-ambhagatavana according to the author is that when the knowledge-factors, sense-organ, etc. being present previously produce the sense-consciousness in the next moment, then it may be termed Sāhagata-ambhagatavana (82). Speaking truly, the knowledge is not at all cognized, but it is said to be cognized figuratively since it cognizes its object by the law of nature. But the object is indeed cognized since it gives rise to its knowledge (85). To the question: How a knowledge cognizes, the author replies: the knowledge functions as if it measures the external thing (90-92).

We have to take note here that the author does not pretend, as the Sautrantika does, that the knowledge cognizes through the process of asuming the image of its object. Therefore he says: The image which you presume as existent in the object-
knowledge truly exists in the external things alone and not in the knowledge (95). This image-theory is not favoured by the advocates of Citravideya, idea alone in the ultimate plane of existence. The point becomes evident from the following statement of the author: "You plead that the knowledge which, in fact, is imageless experiences its unreal images. I, likewise, advocate that the imageless knowledge experiences real things (102). He makes his position further clear by saying that the consciousness which is imageless and formless comprehends (paricool) through the agency of material sense-organs like the eye, etc. (105). The author turns the image theory as an unfavourable proposition to the opponent thus:

When a consciousness-form is accepted to be shared by the form of an object, how does it mean that the consciousness comprehends it? (90). When we maintain that consciousness flashes up in the presence of its object, your query as to how it does so is an irrelevant question (91). The consciousness is not creator of its object; nevertheless people on its simple awareness of its content, attribute to it a creative function (92). The author's realistic outlook is quite obvious in his solemn declaration that the process of cognizing the external things is the same with the saints as with the worldly, with this much difference that the former is characterized by his detached and comprehensive vision (Sarvavidyā dhīya) whereas the latter by coveous observation of things (94). Immediately after this assertion however, the author concedes a special privilege to Buddha whose power of knowledge cannot be incogitated whether it comprehends simultaneously or in succession and whether it assumes the image of the object or does not (95). This opinion may not be shared by the Sautanika who is not in favour of allowing any exception to the general law of knowledge operating always in a gradual process. Note Vasubandhu's clear-cut exposition of this law: Sūtraena samanatras vata' gnih sarva-bhog. maṁ/Tatha sarvarād evaya na sakri sarvā-videka/Kāśikā, IX, 1.

The Kramavedana is also the opinion of Harivarman.—Satya-siddhi, Chaps 15, 76, etc. Cp. Pancavastika-Vibhisa, p. 27 (Vivara-Bharati Annals, X).

It is interesting to note that the well known lamp example cited in favour of Śvāsa-somvedata theory has been turned by the author to his advantage thus: As you hold that the lamp illumines itself as well as others, just so I hold that a knowledge illuminates the selves of two or more alamkāras of the same kind.
Therefore according to Subhagupta, the visual consciousness, e.g. can comprehend simultaneously several visible things falling within its range: thus our cognition of several colours in a carpet (cittasthana) is quite reasonable.

The Yogacara maintains that knowledge cognizes its own aspect as its objects and hence what is cognizable (grahya) is only a part of knowledge. On this point the author remarks that the Tathagata’s sayings like everything is impermanent etc. do not at all disclose that things meant there are the aspects of consciousness itself (104). Some doctors maintain that a knowledge of previous moment serves as the object-cause of the next following knowledge; this view is not acceptable to the author; for, no knowledge necessarily follows immediately after another knowledge (118-119). Some other doctors consider that some force (sakti) productive of knowledge is regarded as the object-cause; this too is not appropriate for the reason that not any Sakti is experienced in our sensuous consciousness (120-21). It has been stated finally on the authority of the world and scripture that the external things alone are reasonable to be upheld as the object-cause of our cognitive experiences (123-24). The author further states that the external things are established not merely on account of their simple efficiency in their presence but also on account of such efficiency being experienced even in the case of their mistaken knowledge (viparitaya-jhana) (129-31); that is to say, when we mistake a snake for rope and tread upon it we are at once startled by its reaction.

According to this author the knowledge of the discerner of others’ thought is not untrue but it is quite natural. The others’ mind could be comprehended just as any other external things are comprehended. The grasping of an object by our mind is not an act of running towards its objects, but simply an act of measuring (pariccheda). The Buddha is omniscient because he comprehends the entire universe through the agency of his cognizing knowledge (147-48). In the absence of external things none can become omniscient (150). The author has not accepted what Dignaga states in regard to an indescribable form of the object being cognized in the first moment (149-49). Nor does he subscribe his opinion to Dignaga’s theory of construction-free mind in the first moment. (115). Dignaga’s theory of Samanvedana, introspection is also not favoured by this author, who constantly maintains that knowledge is always a cognizing agent and never becomes cognized. The theory of intro-cognition is generally believed to have been propounded by the Sautrantikas on the strength of memory of the knowledge in a later
period (v. Madh. Avatara VI, ad. 72 Tib. p. 167, my Skt. text p. 60) and to have been followed by Dignaga and his followers (v. Pramanas, 1, 11). Subhagupta though not in favour of Svatsamwelana explains the memory as merely a mind directed towards the past thing; therefore it is not a cognition (graha) since it does not flash up from its cause (145-48). The Vaibhavika is not only the school that refuses to certify Svatsamwelana, the Madhyamika too does the same. The memory however is possible, says the Madhyamika, since the consciousness as a cognizer is related to the past thing (Bodhicar. panjika, p. 401, 46).

The author further points out some more flaws in the system of the Yogacaras. When we assume some entity existing externally then alone the contemplation upon it as no-soul becomes possible; but no such contemplation is possible in the case of Idealism (159). The Buddhahood which is according to you, completely an inactive state can be secured without making any efforts (161). The person who conceives the charity, etc. as mere thoughts is not able to release any person from poverty even by repeated practice of the charity-mind (168). These are some of the objections that are levelled against Idealism; and therefore the scriptural passages which speak of cittematrata must not be interpreted quite literally. Their interpretations, according to Subhagupta are as follows: The Buddhha has declared (cittematrata) with reference to the imaginary aspects of the external things but that does not at all imply that the external things are absolutely non-existent (179). Likewise the doctrine of no-soul has been preached with reference to the imaginary aspect of things in order to remove all the passions in the mind of worldlings addicted to sexual pleasures (180). It has also been stated in some place that the external things do not exist in such forms as the ordinary worldlings entertain in their mind (181).

In fine the author sums up his constructive conclusion of his system as follows: There is something inferred (kalpita), something fancied (vikalpita) and Dharmata. The inferred (kalpita) is nothing but bhava, some basic entity, atoms; the fancied is diversity of the former (like the earth, etc.) and Dharmata finally is the self-substance (Svabhakshan). Of these three the author probably views the first and the last as real and the second, i.e. Vikalpita as unreal. This explanation may quite accord with the opinions of the Vaibhasikas.
Text and Translation

The Tibetan text that is presented in the following pages is based on *Bstan 'gyur* collection of the Tibetan Tripitaka preserved in our Visva-Bharati Library (Narthang edition) and then it was collated with the same in Peking Edn. recently printed in Japan and preserved in the Library of the Sahitya Akademy, New Delhi. Different readings are all noted in the foot-notes to the Tibetan text.

The Tibetan text has been preceded by its English translations with copious annotative foot-notes supplying all the available references and informations on the topics discussed in the text. A tentative rendering into Sanskrit of each verse of the treatise has also been provided in the foot-notes with a view to making the trend of discussion more understandable to the readers who may be familiar with Indian philosophical texts and their styles. Indian (Sastraic) texts are generally not very easy to interpret without having recourse to some commentary. The present text being not provided with any commentary, the task of interpreting it properly has become much tough. I have, however, endeavoured to understand the text with the sole aid of my limited experiences and studies in Buddhism and its philosophy. My Tibetan-Sanskrit glossary contains only those words that are found in the original Sanskrit verses arranged in a separate page 9. My thanks are due to Geshe Byam pa (tsul khrim, a Tibetan refugee Lama working in the Visvabharati for supplying me with a transcript of the Tibetan text included in this publication.

N. A. Sastrī
The original Sanskrit verses of the Bāhyartā Siddhi identified so far

भीमभित्रेन संसारे गए शराबादित साधनम्।
विजातीतिमविषाज्ञगः सर्वेऽषेष्कुलवः।। २२।।

सुपुष्पणयागोदयादिक च निर्धारितिक्षुरः।
असविन्दुस्नातीनो वृंदव नीरविन्दितः।। २३।।

श्रवणनामस्वरूपानि स्वामेयामत्वागमस्व।
अस्तेश्वररामः स्वरूपानायतनमानस्व।। ४४।।

नन्दोदृष्टि यात्रों शान्तात् सजस्विनायतनं।
आत्म सहस्रप्रचंदनम् भवत् नन्दोदृष्टिको।। ५५।।

पञ्चात्मिकेऽशाश्वस्तः स्मर्युधानेनधर्मस्त।
पर्याचरेऽसऽहेः मनस्यायतनको नमः।। ६६।।

सहायताम पादेरिपुः संसारे नित्य विनविनिष्ठः।
विसंघोऽसः ततोऽसः हेतुग्रान्ति नायेरस्ट।। ७३।।

पूपविवेक सूत सामाय यावन निपालणम्।
सामायाध्यक्षम् कुण्यः यें सत्य सहायनम्।। ७५।।

साक्षाद्यात्मवेदोऽ तत्त्वरिवियवेदेऽवेदत।
तत्त्वार्ज्जोऽ ह समस्योऽ विनविनायताः भोक्त॥ ५७॥

कथा कथाप्राकर सप्तवेदि तत्त्वाध्यक्षभरतम्।
पिनान्त तेन नायेयः कथा लश् फः प्रविज्ञित॥ ६५॥

साक्षारं च निर्मायं तत्त्वाध्यक्षभरतम्।
इति सुङ्गकृतं निर्मायं फः च नित्य वेदीः॥ ५९॥

यथा हैः सप्तवेदि तत्त्वाध्यक्षभरतम्।
वेदिन भाजमार्गकरं भरतम्य तयाः॥ ६१॥
1. One who fulfilled in every aspect all duties beneficial to his own person (Ghartha) as well as duties beneficial to other living beings; to Him I salute in order to achieve the success (artha-siddhi) and demonstrate the truth of the objective universe.

2. (The Idealist says:) The external thing that serves as the object of consciousness in the person of perfect eyesight does not exist (as real); (Reason): because it is a mere idea and because the idea manifests itself as external thing, (example) just like a dream-thought and the double-moon idea.  

3. Thus the advocate of Idealism (theory of mind alone) proves the non-existence of the external thing. Now, we at the outset prove that the external things on the basis of experience never contradicted in our daily life (avisanvvaladraśi).

4. The alternative proposition, that either the object-cause (gūmbara) is unreal because its knowledge is contradicted in our daily experience, or it is so, because the material and other things are not fit to exist, is, both unsatisfactory.

5. One experiences in dream one's own body chopped up into pieces; but this act of chopping is utterly unreal. If externalism is untrue in dream, does it apply to the waking stage?

6. If you mean (lit. desire) that the beheading of a waking person and his bodily extermination resemble a dream experience, why are you then so much care-laden about your gain and loss.

7. If you say that every human activity is guided by illusion; but there is no perversion in naming things, A knowledge which is non-illusive is never contradicted. What is contradicted is always illusive.

8. A knowledge of a material thing which differs from neither space nor time is never contradicted; hence it is non-illusive (abhraṇa). This alone is the characteristic of non-illusive knowledge and nothing else.

9—10a. The person who comprehends the extremely long things as well as the extremely small things is distinguished as the Saint (Yogin). (In case of absolute denial of external things)
the Buddhist Saint would not be omniscient and not get double sided release* (abhayatobha-vimukti) and thus Buddhahood would also be contradicted.

10. *bd. (The Idealist continues)* Even our truly apprehension (vijñānavipraṅg) that every thing exists absolutely resembles the experience of things in dream.

Now, why does it not become possibly contradicted (as a dreamy thing does)?

11. If* (things exist) on account of deep-rooted impressions (vasana), why are not the dreamy things also explained (in the like manner)? Hence the cognizable things like village and garden, etc. are true and become visible.

12. The mere thought bereft of sense-data and its impression (vasana) are all momentary; (thus) the gain of their resultant fruits is interrupted. (Therefore) the sense-data (be admitted) as the stable causes of fruition.

13. For him who opines that the knowledge of one taste does not at all arise from any sense-datum, the nature of that knowledge (we ask) is whether permanent or impermanent.

14. If it is similar to a dream (lit. sleep) will it not produce its resultant fruit? The cause of fruition (vipaka) being present, the destruction of fruition is improper.

15. Just as something seen by a sleepy person in his dream does not appear the same in the next moment, and hence becomes impermanent; likewise the destruction of the matured fruition is possible.

16. In whose opinion the sense-data are non-existent and hence there is no occasion (lit. cause) for preaching, (for him) the fruition will repeat endlessly even after its destruction.*

17. Why do you view that a man does a religious action by virtue of his deep-rooted impressions (vasana) of non-contradiction? If you say: because the material and other external things are unit to be real, to this point we shall reply (later on).

18. If non-contradiction in the waking state persists on account of the maturation of arsye (=Alayaviśaya) why is it
not (like this) that as long as there is eye-disease (śimitra) as basis (āsraya), so long there is non-contradiction?

19. Suppose the Yogacārin acts (pravrṣiti) on the notion of mind alone (Cittamāraṇa) and on the presumption of the all alamāraṇa as false; when in the interval the notion of Cittamāraṇa is absent, even then the act is not contradicted (avīsamāraṇa) and therefore the act is not caused by that notion.

20. The sakta matured (patipaka) for aparāya assumption is produced from some other external thing and not from the self just like the sesame seed produced is from its flower.

21. And the seed from the water, etc. What is produced from a cause, that product is similar to its cause. No vasana is to be assumed on account of the genesis of the fruit as one infers the fire at the sight of the smoke.

22. Things are made fragrant on account of an act produced from some other thing; for example, the sesame seed becomes fragrant on its contact with the jata flowers.

23. Here the seven kinds of consciousness are produced from their upadana consciousness and their seeds being previously imputed there and dormant become matured into such consciousness under favourable conditions.

24. Therefore the theory of vasana needs not to be assumed (as the Idealist does) on the presumption that no entity is produced from another entity, declare the advocates of sakta.

25. Nevertheless, if you say: the knowledge of uddhāsa (vajra-pa), definite perceptual experiences arises of its own accord (vattantarpak) and this my opinion may be compared with the act of the seed which being sowed matures of itself.

26. This opinion too is not acceptable. Again your plea that its dependence on its upadana consciousness is common to us both, is not valid as it inures a logical fallacy of mutual reliance (aypya asraya).

27. This defect is absent in the system which holds that sakta that are imputed (aropa) by the knowledge produced by the sensuous objects get nourished and matured into seven kinds of sensuous consciousness by dint of some visesa, excellence of favourable conditions, like the object, time, individual, etc.
28. b-d. But there is a system of thought which maintains that there is not any cause (of our objective experiences) other than the knowledge itself named upadana (Alaya-vijnana) and this is quite irrelevant.

29. When the proposition of Cittamratra that is to be established the proof or argument (sadhana) is the knowledge itself (jnanata); this proof is non-contradictory to any heterogeneous case (vijjatiya) and therefore the said proposition is declared to be sesa-vair (i.e. sesa-and-azamno).

30. A close scrutiny of legs-dhyana) joyfulness (sah myur) engagement (pravriti) gain of the good and rejection of the bad; all these activities of the wake-up person never exist in dream.

31. Certain sensuous knowledge errors on account of some impediment (this is possible). But to say that even in the absence of an impediment there is an error creates an absolute darkness in the universe.

ATOMIC THEORY PROVED.

32. Others say: Everything is nothing but consciousness; the notion that there is an external object (corresponding to the sensuous consciousness) is a mental illusion. The knowable (object) is what is produced internally from one’s own mind but it is not a visible object (rupa) (existing externally outside of the mind).

33a-c. The proposition that there exists no object is to be maintained (samahtiya); because each atom is not separately cognized, atoms do not appear in knowledge. —So says Dinnaga.

33d-34. (Hetu-Reason) would become doubtful (sandhy-dha) when it is applied to Citta and Caitta, mind and mental phenomena.

Just like momentary things are not cognized in their discrete moments, the atoms would be undetermined even by the understand ing of Tathagata.

35. (The author continues:) Just as the illusive idea of permanence appears to us as a result of continuous rise of homogeneous moments (momentary atoms) in succession, just so the illusive idea of a patch of blue appears as a result of cognition of the uninterrupted and homogeneous atoms.
36. When\(^{60}\) we cognize in our mind the uninterrupted and homogeneous atoms, our constructive thought constructs their oneness\(^ {41}\).

37. Therefore\(^ {62}\) the theory (of the Idealists) that the atoms in their self-substance are not reflected in our\(^ {63}\) consciousness is totally unfounded.

38. What\(^ {44}\) a form of object is reflected in a knowledge, from that object-form its knowledge does not arise, and this object-form is not a substance (dreyya) and resembles the double\(^ {65}\) moon: (says-Dinnaga). This conclusion is not a sound one because its hetu, prekams is not at all proved as valid one.

39. The\(^ {46}\) atoms which being integrated, discharge a uniform action are termed Sancita,\(^ {57}\) integrated:—to the upholder of this opinion how do the atoms become non-substances (adraya)?

40. They\(^ {48}\) (atoms) are spoken of as one but they possess no oneness. For, the import of all words being investigated is not at all reflected in the sensuous consciousness.\(^ {59}\)

41. The\(^ {70}\) philosopher (i.e. Idealist) who states that one part of the mind reflects as the object-image in consciousness must have witnessed a piece of carpet with pictures in varied colours\(^ {53}\) (Citrapatila).

42. In\(^ {72}\) certain place, when an image of certain object (rupa) is cognized, that image being related to higher and lower areas (asraya) appears divided (to form) a picture in varied forms.\(^ {57}\)

43. A\(^ {44}\) atom which may manifest its own single knowledge cannot appear in life as separated from other atoms. When it appears associated with other atoms it loses its atomic form, how then could each of the atoms appear to our knowledge?\(^ {25}\)

44. Atoms\(^ {76}\) cannot each individually and independently appear in life and this is also the reason why each of the atoms never flashes out in our consciousness.

45. Vasubandhu’s\(^ {59}\) criticism of the atoms on the basis of their spatial distinctions is pascence.\(^ {59}\) For, the term, space (dlaksana) is employed on the atom itself that is associated with some other atoms.
46. Hence by the spacial distinctions the atoms themselves are meant when surrounded by several other atoms but never the atoms are constituted of parts.

47. When one atom is situated at the bottom and the other on the other side they so situated never become double on account of these two sides.

48. Where the atoms are situated in the midst of several atoms, they are imagined as many and likewise by the process of reverse of the one they are assumed as many.

49. A form distinct from its own, for example, is witnessed on the atoms as a result of their mutual combinations (Lit. one depending upon another) but this gross form does not at all exist there just like a distinction of the front and the back made on the atoms.

50. If as a result of atoms being uninterrupted knit together in a large number, one substantial whole (avayavān) is conceived, why will not the moments that are preceding and succeeding in an uninterrupted succession be conceived so (i.e. one indivisible time-unit) ?

51. Since knowledge continues to exist for two moments its uninterrupted existence (nārāntarya) is possible, yet the form of one unit (avayavā-nipa) is not permissible on the knowledge; the same principle is likewise applicable to the atoms also.

52. By virtue of a peculiar relationship (pratyāsattā) amongst atoms the entry of a moving body into the aggregated company of atoms is hindered and by the same device the covering of atoms by other atoms is accepted, but not due to their constituent parts.

53. The shadow is produced when there is a covering of the sun, but that shadow is not proper to be accepted as existing in between the two atoms of the sun.

54. Just as the power of producing the shadow and covering is the phenomenon of several united things so also is the case with several atoms but no single atoms can produce such phenomenon.

55. Therefore what is stated by Vasubandhu that a lump (pinda) is impossible to exist since the distinction between the
atoms and the lump is not available, may perhaps be accidental (kadaicitka) if there is any propriety in maintaining the atoms as stagnant (i.e. never transformed into any other form under any circumstances).  

56. The atoms, (though) they are mutually un-related (ananyaya) and devoid of parts, nevertheless become integrated and accomplish (the gross things like) the globe of earth, and others.  

57. By virtue of some excellence of mutual efficiency (ananyaya) the atoms become transformed and likewise they never become scattered (i.e.) of the diamond (vajra) and other such things.  

58. Certain atoms become integrated by virtue of their peculiar substance-efficiency (dravya-ukti) just like the evil spirit (pisaca) the serpent and others are subdued by force of mantra-ukti.  

59. But there are many other atoms having very little power and strength (to appear in life).  

The person endowed with a sharp intellect and living in a mountain (acala) and such other places could count the atoms of the hell (and the heaven), etc. with their numbers and other distinctions.  

60-61a. Therefore it is not proper to declare that the atoms do not at all exist. If you say that the affirmation of the atoms has been made due to some illusion (bhramati) then your understanding that everything is nothing but the activity of the sixth knowledge (= intellect) would be much more illusory resembling an illusory knowledge of the number 'eight' on the aggregate of eight atoms.  

61b-62. If you plead that the conception of the atoms is a notion mistaken for some other basic thing for these two considerations, viz. (1) that things like the hell, etc. are known as nothing but condemned living beings and (2) that the atoms are never cognized directly (in our perceptual experiences), then why do you not state likewise (as illusory) of the number form and other characteristics of Prādhāna and Purusa, etc.?  

63. You may say: The same remark holds good with regard to such things also because Prādhāna is regarded in the terms of some excellence of characters (gunaitsaya) (like saltva,
rajas and tamas). I now reply: though the conception of Pradhana, etc. is illusory, this does not warrant us to forsake our previous contention (about the atoms).

64. Therefore the atoms are existing really. They are not cognized by any body other the sages living in a mountain and other places. The atoms are conceived because the saints cognize them.

Saha-vedana, co-cognition possible

65. When two persons (look at an object) in a place, it is an invariable rule that they have simultaneous cognition of it; it is also the law of nature that knowledge with its content (lit. knowable) are invariably cognized at once.

66. There is no cognizer other than knowledge and the visual knowledge is no more cognizer in the absence of visible objects, and therefore their cognition is simultaneous but this co-cognition is not due to the identity between the object, i.e. patch of blue and its cognizer.

67. If the consciousness is not in the mood of cognizer or the knowledge is bereft of an object, then only that could reasonably be stated so and not otherwise.

68. If the term saha is employed to signify one and the same time the reason (i.e. Sahu-palambha) becomes indefinite in all respects (anukantika) when it is applied to the Buddha's knowledge which co-exists with its content, other's mind (jnayacetas) and the mind that co-exists with mental properties (citta-caitalasca).

69. If the mental properties are not illusory as they are sanctioned in the scriptures; how do you then say that the knowledge of the ghost, hell and others is an illusion?

70. If, even in the absence of any relevancy some distinction (between the idea of the hell, etc and the mental elements) saves your difficulty (lit. serves your purpose), that distinction is absolutely unproved, yet you cherish it proved; thus your rejoinder is based again on illusion.

71. The term 'saha' co-existence is never employed in the world in any place where a companion is not available. The reason (hetu—Sahu-palambha) will then be a contradictory one if there is really a co-cognition.
72. If the term *Sāha* ‘co-existence’ is taken to mean one and the same thing (*ekartha*) then *hetu* would be unproved (*asiddha*) for other party \(^{125}\) for example when some common things are present, how does only one person look at them?

73. If every mind of other living beings is cognized by the knowledge of the omniscient being, then, where is it proved that only one person experiences it (*ekena upalambha*)?

74. The \(^{126}\) object-cause felt by a person internally in his own mind cannot be denied by any other person, as there can be no evidence for doing so.

The reason (*hetu*) further becomes doubtful and unproved on the ground that it is, in its very nature, far removed, i.e. beyond the reach of other’s cognizance (*svabhava-viprakāsa = na-prthima-bhūta-bhāga*).

75. If the reason (*hetu*) considered to be proved as a result of the denial of external things and (thus leading to the conclusion) that one aspect of the consciousness itself is cognizable, then the reason would be known to only one party \(^{128}\) who pleads for the doctrine of mind alone (*cittamatraka*).

76. If you consider it a proven fact that the knowledge and the knowable flash out as identical (*apriyakāha*), then the reason would simply prove what is already proved. Even the advocate of knowledge having the capacity to assume the image of the object (*sakara-pramāna-dharmatva*) would not dispute here in this matter \(^{29}\) (thus leading to *siddhasadhanata*).

77. If you \(^{121}\) conceive the object-cause as identical (with its knowledge) how is it that the object-cause is cognized distinctly from the knowledge?

78. Suppose \(^{132}\) for example, a man, while experiencing an external object (*artha*), has joyful feelings in this wise: this shell is black, if these feelings are regarded as coming from the knowledge itself this will be improbable in the absence of experience of the object in that fashion.\(^{133}\)

79. If \(^{124}\) certain imaginary form (*kalpti-rupa* i.e. black) of knowledge is experienced, then its real form is not experienced; therefore the reason (*Sakṣapalambha*) is not proper to set up.

80. For \(^{125}\) this reason two forms \(^{39}\) of the knowledge are to be experienced in the same manner as the double moon is
looked at by some. Thus the author's (=Dharmakirti) statement of "one" (ahśeṣa) becomes unfounded.

81. The two causal factors (pāpyati) of the preceding moment give rise to a full cognition of the object in the next moment just in the same fashion as a visible object (rupa) in association with the light produces its cognition, due to which fact a successive cognition (ahśavodana) would become justifiable.

82. When the knowledge and its sense-organ happen to be just one after another (puravapara) the term co-cognition (ahśavodana) is used by way of similarity (with a simultaneous phenomenon) but never there is literally co-cognition (ahśavodana na arthaṇa).

83. Since the knowledge-content is felt internally, it is no entity other than the self of knowledge; to the advocate of the system of maintaining the knowledge possessing a knowable aspect to itself the reason becomes undetermined.

84. Since it is the law of nature that a knowledge cognizes its content (jñanam vetti), the knowledge is said to be cognized; since the content produces the knowledge as reflector of itself it is considered as cognized.

85. Thought the term 'cognized' (ahśavodana) is applied equally to the knowledge and its content, its import is quite different. For, the wild cow, etc., e.g. are not regarded of the (same) forms, visenī, horned figure on account of less the usage of the term, cow, etc.

86. There are certain dharmas which are contemplated in the minds of other streams of elements (sauṇḍaṇāna) are perceived by the knowledge of the Omniscient (Sarvajña). Then the reason (when it is applied to those dharmas) becomes uncertain. anaśīrtāntika (because they are perceived simultaneously, yet distinct from the knowledge of the Omniscient). If he does not comprehend them, how can he be an Omniscient?

87. In the system of the image-invested knowledge (of the Sautrāntika) the knowledge is perceived only when it reflects the image of an object. If you desire to prove the identity of the knowledge with its reflected image the reason would then, simply achieve what is already achieved (siddha-śādhana).  

88. The external thing (arthā) produces in the knowledge an image similar to itself and as a result of this fact it is
considered as perceived figuratively. The external thing is not as all perceived and hence its identity with knowledge will not be proved.

89. If you ask: How is the knowledge (or consciousness) considered to be the cognizer of its object? (we answer:) the consciousness is characterized as (if it is) measuring the object (\textit{yat pari\'echeda lak\'sana}) and therefore no query should be made as to: how is it and what like it is?

90. \textit{(in} the system of \textit{the Sautranika-Yogacar\'a}) an image is aroused and imprinted in consciousness by the external things; how could it be said that the consciousness is a measurer of the external thing (\textit{artha-pari\'echedaka})?

91. Consciousness (by law of nature) is considered to be entirely a comprehending agent and hence it is irrelevant to ask how the consciousness would comprehend its own object.

92. The consciousness is not creator of any thing and in fact, it is functionless. Its characteristic, however, is mere awareness of the presence of an object (\textit{vittimatra}), but the act of creation, is attributed to it by imposition (\textit{samaropa}).

93. Just as a saint of detached vision enters into the self of knowledge (\textit{prama\'r\'upa}), etc. so also the person of a meagre vision enters into it.

94. No distinction exists between the Saint and the worldling so far as their knowledge alone is concerned. But the great souls however, are distinguished by their knowledge of varied aspects (\textit{Sarvak\'ana\h\'adi}).

95. Do we enquire into the knowledge of the Buddha whether it assumes the image of the object or does not, and again whether it comprehends the object simultaneously or successively.

\textit{A\'kara-v\'ada disapproved}

96. What image according to you, presumably exists as pertaining to an object-knowledge, that image exists in fact only in the external thing like the visible element (\textit{rupa}), etc. but it is assumed to exist in the knowledge.

97. It is irrelevant to say that not any cognizable thing exists for the Saint who has given up all obstructions (\textit{avatana}); for, he is anchored in this cognizable (world); how can it be substituted and equalized to the mind alone (\textit{\'\text{Atman}\'\'asa-mana})?
98. Our, *intellect is sole demonstrating agent whether the external thing exists or does not exist. There really exist the external objects to which fact no contradiction is experienced, for example in the case of eye-disease, etc. some figure is observed even when there is not any figure.

99. Likewise one thinks that he experiences in the knowledge a patch of blue and accordingly imposes upon the knowledge the presence of the blue image but in fact no such image exists in it.

100. The assumption that the image exists in the knowledge or does not exist is a type of consciousness in the nature of a productive imagination (Kalpanatma). The consciousness, however, becomes differentiated due to visesa, individual characteristic of the observed object.

101. You plead that the knowledge which is in fact imageless experiences its unreal image, I likewise, advocate that the imageless knowledge experiences the real external thing.

102. There is not a distinct self of the knowledge (in the form of a separate knowable aspect); for, to assume it would contradict the non-dual essence of the knowledge (advayajñana). No unreal image could be experienced by the knowledge; (if the image is experienced) it would turn to be non-illusory.

103. If (you argue that) the above arrangement has been made in accordance with the presumption under the influence of the deep rooted illusion, then the image of the knowledge ought to be viewed as illusory; otherwise how could it be an assumed image?

104. Hence consciousness which is imageless in truth, would comprehend (particulal) through the agency of the material eye, etc. all the fitting things whether existent or non-existent.

105. If you say that just as the lamp illuminates the self as well as others, just so the consciousness (illumines) the selves of two alambhanas (of one kind); then, there would be no contradiction at all.

106. However the various objects, visible, sound etc. are domains of various sense-organs; hence they cannot be experienced by one sense-organ.
107a-b. (According to you) even when different causes are absent the knowledge is experienced as (in the presence of) alambana.

107c-9a. A knowledge arises from an external object as similar to it and that knowledge in the immediately next moment bears an image similar to that external thing—this contention is a simple illusion; for, the knowledge does not exist as permanent (to assume the image of the object). Further there is not any experience of the self of the knowledge similar to the object at the moment when the object becomes illuminated.

107c-10a. In every mind the knowledge form is uniform if this view is favoured, it could not be stated particularly, it is similar to this object.

107b-d. When this (knowledge) illumines the cognizable thing no knowledge immediately after that would appear, because it becomes entirely assimilated with its context (vijaya).

111-12a. If while the knowledge lights up last a patch of blue, etc. the knowledge lighting up the patch of blue, etc. exists immediately after that, and then, if it exists having the patch of blue as its content, then at that time the knowledge is not similar to the object. True, it exists indeed, but never similar (to its content).

Grahya aspect criticised

112c-13. The Tathagata's saying, for example, that all is impermanent and sorrowful does not exhibit as content the cognizable aspect of knowledge (grahya-vrthaka).

If you are inclined to plead that since the object-cause (alambana) is not fit to exist in the external, the cognizable aspect of the knowledge is accepted as the content, then the characteristic of the content cannot appropriately be applied to it (as content).

114. How does the mind exist as separated from its act of construction? That idea is only a faculty of your mind ( cittavivekha). There does not exist the mind shedding light on its content, because the latter is not available (for you) other the mind itself.

115a-b. If there is nothing productive (of the knowledge), how is it at all derived (as content)?
Discussion on the actual object

115c-166. The simple atoms and the co-agulated atoms (in your system) are not the object-causes, because they lack one requisite (arga) each. How is the denial of both (simple and co-agulated atoms) cherished?

116c-176. The knowledge in the form of cognizer is devoid of two characteristics (of alambana, viz. objectivity and causality). Then if there is no object-cause (alambana) (for you) the cognizable aspect of knowledge is also not accepted (by us).

117c-186. The opinion that a similar knowledge of the previous moment serves as the object-cause (of the next following knowledge) is also improper: for, no knowledge flashes up (bhati) immediately after a similar knowledge.

118c-196. If the knowledge in the form of a visible object (rupa) arises due to contact with the knowledge of the sound, how will that knowledge of rupa be similar to the alambana, i.e. sound?

119c-206. Some consider that a force (sakiti) producing a knowledge akin to its content is the object-cause. This opinion is also improper; for, no force, sakiti is reflected in the sensuous knowledge.

120c-216. If (you again argue that) the objectivity lies in the cognizable part of knowledge and that alone remains invariably as the object, (we may reply that) the external thing (artha) (as the object) has been proved from the standpoint of the world and therefore its characteristic as alambana exists indeed though not expressly stated.

121c-226. If you say that the knowledge of knowledge is also quite familiar with the world, it is not definitely proved as the content (artha). If it lacks the characteristic (of alambana) how can it be alambana?

122c-236. (Thus) it is proper to maintain on close scrutiny that the external object-cause alone is desirable on the authority of the world and scripture, but never the cognizable aspect of knowledge by any means.

123c-246. The objects like desirable and undesirable never exist in the external in truth and hence all this is nothing but mind; this contention is absolutely irrelevant.
124c-25b. On certain unpleasant material object if one meditates as good (he experiences it as good); for, the result becomes distinguished with some benefit on account of varied causes.  

125b-26b. Certain knowledge relating to an object (artha) reflects (the same object) as a patch of blush (vishala) and immediately after that (the object) turns to be in the form of unpleasant thing, etc. (vikkharaṇa) on account of meditation; likewise it may become otherwise on account of other causes.

126c-27b. Feelings like joy, sorrow and dullness are all become differentiated by virtue of kinds of meditation but they never arise from any kind of external things—& this is your contention; how is it proper?

127c-28b. (The Idealist continues) All your refutations are made on the assumption (of external things) (arpāṇa); Why is it unreasonable to accept the truth of no alambuna in the external things? The external things we establish by virtue of their efficiency (artha-ākāra) and we negate them when there is no efficiency.

128c-30c. If you say, even in the absence of the external things the purposive action is achieved and therefore the external things are not accepted, then we may reply that we establish their existence not merely on account of their efficiency, but also on account of efficiency being witnessed even in the case of their perverted knowledge (sīkṣāpyayā-jana).

130b-31c. But again as a result of seeking the external things good or harm could be afflicted to the body; some sort of simple efficiency (kriyāmatra) is experienced even in the case of a mistaken notion (vibhūrama) of some thing present for something absent.

131d-132c. As to the argument based on the sexual act (kāma-cāritra) in dream, we may say that the semen-discharge is a necessary phenomenon. If one has not that phenomenon, how can he be considered to have gained the sexual pleasure (one of the four purposes of human actions)?

132d-133c. Since the semen-discharge and the extreme passion (rage) are specially related (to each other) the former happens also on the occasion other than the dream; for example when one embraces a woman out of extremes love no contradiction is felt to the phenomenon of semen-discharge.
133d-134c. If in the presence of a woman, the discharge happens out of extreme passion why does one not discharge the nail, the tooth, etc. as he discharges semen in dream?

134d-135c. If in the absence of a woman, the discharge happens out of extreme passion, why does he not discharge the nail, the tooth, etc. as he discharges semen in dream?

135d-136b. The semen being discharged out of extreme passion (vāra) the purpose of life is fulfilled—this idea is not a happy one.

136d-137b. For example, when it is not spoken even as a simple act, the gain of the son, etc. that are experienced in dream as realities are all contradicted to the actually perceptual experiences.

137c-138e. Since there really exist the keepers of the hell, etc. as produced from the said acts, the system of everything as a reflected image of consciousness is neither admirable nor is any purposeful action in dream possible. Therefore the doctrine of Cittamāraṇa "mind alone" becomes unproved.

138f-139e. When different living bodies are evident for proving the existence of other minds, the existence of the hell also may likewise, be (entertained). On what evidence then do you deny the existence of other living beings?

139d-140c. Similarly the god (i.e. Garuda) bestowing the boon of reviving the life (ānugraha) on the person who is dead on account venom poured out from the hood (of a serpent) remains true in his promise.

140d-141b. In the absence of preliminary rites efficient act cannot be accomplished; therefore that (efficient act) is not a simple creation of the mind.

141c-d. Why is the knowledge of the others' thought-discerner is untrue (ayathārtha)?

142. When other's mind being present our knowledge enters into it (that knowledge is considered to be its cognizer). (or) when some object being present, the knowledge assumes the image of that object, then the knowledge is considered to be its cognizer.

143b-c. The grasping of an object (by the mind) is not an act similar to that of running towards its object, just immediately after which the knowledge would arise.
144d-144b. So also is the case with the knowledge of one's own mind. In both cases the mind is regarded as cognizer in the manner above described (i.e. pariccheda-lakṣaṇa).

144a-145b. The memory is a mind being directed towards the past thing. What is directed towards the past (bhaṣa = yan-daśa) is not a cognition (graha) because that mind does not flash up from its cause.

145c-146d. The non-dual form (advaya-rupe) which is (supposed to be) domain of the well-awakened (Sambuddha) is not cognizable to us and therefore untrue (ayathārtha). What is said to be untrue, is unsatisfactory because of the non-dual nature (advayatva) of the knowledge.

146c-147d. The Buddha is Omniscient because he comprehends the entire cognizable universe through the agency of his cognizing knowledge, and not because he does so in a non-dual form.

147c-148c. To what is said (by Dignaga), viz. a non-describable form is cognized (by one's own self, we now ask) What is cognized by other person, is it possible to describe because the other's mind can be comprehended?

148d-49. Then there exists definitely the object-cause in the external and therefore every mind is not at all (proved to be) objectless (nirālambha). If the mind has not any cognizable in the external anywhere, how could one become omniscient?

150-151b. By comprehending one's own mind alone there may be nothing but the self-knowledge of the mind (svasamvedana).

If any one is supposed to be omniscient by merely comprehending one's own mind and he is known to be a separate individual then there would be no realization of the mind alone (cittratva-darsana).

151c-152b. If you think that this defect is obviated in view of the fact that the knowledge is non-dual in its nature, how, then does that (non-dual) knowledge comprehend its content?

152c. If you say again, that when the knowledge becomes freed from every kind of dual form then it comprehends the universe in all aspects—this saying is indeed a matter of great wonder. Therefore there is one (i.e. omniscient) in the nature of comprehending (graha-rupe) the entire universe.
153. There is not any person known to us as omniscient—say self-styled wiseman amongst the so-called learned persons: but this saying reveals his dull intellect (sva-durmai) being engrossed in it.

154. As the actual experiences dictate it is possible that as a result of contemplation on certain definite antidote the whole group of desire and other delusions are entirely destroyed.

155. But there is hardly any possibility of applying an antidote in the case (of the Yogacara conception of emancipation; for the Yogacara holds) that the mind of all wordings is under the firm grip of dual forms (subject and object) and this idea of dual form may be destroyed by contemplation on some object.

156. The knowledge which flashes out in the form ‘this is void (sunya)’ is related to (lit. entered into) to the said dual forms and such knowledge being associated with dual forms; how can it serve as an antidote?

157. Just as one meditating on a desirable object does not destroy his desire, just so a man meditating on a thing in dual form does not destroy the idea of dual form.

158. Assuming that an idea of entity one contemplates upon it of no-soul. But the principle of non-duality, a mere word has not any purpose (swartha) and hence a contemplation upon it will be quite unnecessary.

159. The contemplation upon impermanence frees one quickly from the delusion of permanence (a reasonable proposition). (But in your system) by discarding every kind of perceptual experiences one necessarily secures Buddhahood (not a reasonable proposition).

160. The person who is free from every kind of perceptual experiences is completely inactive. Thus Buddhahood is desired (by you) without making any effort and practice.

161. Therefore the state of well-faring (saugata-paisa) i.e. Buddhahood is secured on constant practice of compassion towards the sentient beings, doing good for them, and meditating on every manifested elements of existence as impermanent (samas kri-antitya).
162. When one entertains the idea of mind alone, how could he fulfill the preliminary duties such as charity, etc. In the absence of charity there is no possibility of one obtaining the Buddhahood.

163. If you argue that under the influence of mutual causation and on the principle of mind-alone thought arises in the form of acts like giving and taking the charity. That cannot be proved either by perception, inference or reliable scripture. Such system is only a presumption and it is nothing but a verbal eloquence.

165. When one practices repeatedly and several times mentally a charity-thought (i.e. the thought in the form of charity) it never releases anybody from poverty.

166. Even if innumerable thoughts (manaskara) of Yogins are meditated upon (by us) neither happiness is gained nor misery is removed in reality.

167. In doloing out everything (material) to all living beings and in fulfilling the charity of compassion there exists no distinction in the nature of things (arthamana=arthasvarupa) however, in practising the compassion-charity we have a prohibitive injunction not to give certain things (viz. three garments, etc).

168. There was great Decease of the Buddha in the world and we have his relic now as his mortal remains. The mansion and monastery, etc. are with us; how can they be products of the mind-alone (lit. pararatra)?

169. These things have no existence of their own how can we infer therefrom the great events of the past? If the past events are not inferred, the whole system would be reduced into an extreme materialism (lokapata).

170. A man witnessing the relics of the Saint who is purified through emancipation of the Sravaka, disciple becomes free from passions. If he has no recollection (lit. inference) of the past event, how can he entertain the faith (in his relics)?

171. (you say) it is produced by succession (prabandha) of people the life is seen to be cut off. If you again say that one continues to exist due to other, how would there be complete and last deliverance (parinirvava)?
172. It is the sealed fact in the worldly system that from the seed, etc. come up sprout, etc. and therefore there is not any sound reasoning for the plea that the whole universe is nothing but the mind.

173. When a knowledge arises immediately after a knowledge, the subsequent knowledge is the result of the previous knowledge-cause. This rule is also not permissible (in your system).

174. Thus (e.g.) there would arise the knowledge of smoke in the absence of the knowledge of the fire, and also the knowledge of the sprout would arise from non-knowledge of the seed.

175. If you plead that mind perfumed by the knowledge of the fire produces (lit. is the cause of) the knowledge of the smoke; when there are several potentialities (sakti) in the mind, from where would arise the thought of distinction?

176. If the cause immediately preceding knowledge (or mind) of fire is the cause of the mind of the smoke, that also is not good; for, the mind of fire is not definite (=concomitant) with the mind of smoke.

177. When the concomitance is completely unproved how do the people talk in the unmixed terms about the cause thus: this result arises from that cause?

178. Therefore the doctrine that the whole universe is Chittamatra, 'mind-alone' has been declared (by the Buddha) aiming at the imaginary or assumed aspect of the external things (kalpitam asriya) but not because the matter, etc. are improbable to exist.

179. For what (object) one may display desire and other passions. Buddha viewing that object as merely an imaginary (kalpita = Vikalpita) has preached the doctrine of no-soul with reference to these (the assumed) things in order to remove all such passions (dosa) of the worldings.

180. Similarly in other places too the Buddha has stated that the external things do not exist in such forms as are assumed by the ordinary worldings. Why is it so? (Buddha's knowledge) is superior to (that of ordinary worldings).

181. Since some sort of agent has been just previously stated and the duties are understood alongside of the attachment
towards an agent as real the idea-of agent as real is necessarily to be negated.34

182-183. In35 other places it has been likewise declared thus: There is something inferred (kalpita) and some other thing fancied, vikalpita (= parikalpita). The true form of dharmata (dharmata=rupa=guna=form=svarupa) has been explained thus: dharmata is svataksana, self-essence. What is kalpita is no other than a basic reality (bhevanatra), and the vikalpita is its diversity (bhedha). This diversity of dharmata will be inappropriate in the absence of bhava36 (some basic entity, i.e. atoms).

184. If37 the Rupa is declared to be rupa (devoid of rupa-nature) how the term rupa is employed on it ? If you argue that it is done so on the assumption of the rupa-nature, what is the ultimate objective (phala) gained38 (therefrom) ?

185. Of39 what object any contradiction is impossible to exist that object thereby is verily existing.39 (But, for the opponents) since everything is non-existing their experiences are not really there as is the dream.40

186. The41 advocates of the external reality point out to the Idealist (citta-matrata-vadin) thus: Let the men of erudition investigate whether this (my conclusion) is just appropriate or not.

187. But42 I have no wonderfull (wise) knowledge suited to investigate what is right and what is wrong; I have however stated in brief the truths propounded by other masters.

188. The43 wise men realize the destruction of ignorance darkness by means of the lustre of their true knowledge. Henceforth let the unlearned get purified in the path of the great men.
1. This verse may be rendered into Sanskrit:

2. In accordance with the tradition the author speaks of the Buddha as possessing two qualities, *svarga and parartha* as done by Vasubandhu (Kosa, I, ver. 1), Dignaga (Práma. Sam. 1, ver.-1, with *vritth. v. my Review in A.L.B.*) and the author of the Sutralankara (=Kalpanamandatika), Chap. I (v. my Sanskrit text, published in the journal of Sri Venkata Institute, Tirupati, 1941).

3. र्थश्चरीरार्थविकाराः पद्धती ।

4. This is the conclusion arrived at in the Vimśatika and the Alambana-parikṣa.

5. आलंका: साप्तो नेति विश्वासवचनादिना ।

6. Dharmakirti’s definition of *premanā* is: *प्रमाणा विश्वास अविश्वासादान्तः*....[Pram. varтика, I, ver. 1, Subhagupta’s one of the arguments to prove his externalism is *svamadivita*; cfr. Tatt. San. panjika. p. 574, II, 20, ff.]

7. The Realists, while opposing the extreme idealism, generally raise such objection as the present one to prove its absurdity. It may be interesting to compare a European parallel: Dr.
Johnson is said to have expressed his opinion on Berkeley's philosophy by kicking a stone with his foot and saying: No, Sir, I prove it wrong (Sir James Jean, Mysterious Universe, the Bridge series, p. 71).

11. ब्रह्मान्तेऽपि चक्रविविभाजितं न हिंसा नानांविचारः।
अप्रायमणिविचारं च हि अपि चक्रविविभाजितं ॥ ९ ॥
a - बिचक्षणार्थः प्रायमणः।

12. In the illusion there is always a perversion in naming things; e.g. in rope-snake illusion the snake-name is mistaken for the rope-name.

13. विद्ययो ज्ञानानवस्थानमेव स बिचक्षणेः।
परास्त्रानां गुणानां नानाविचारानवस्थानमेव ॥ १० ॥

14. The idea meant here is this: Time and space are not different from the material things, i.e. atoms; cp. Nya. binda-pradipa p.24. नीलमेव हि मात्रेन देवो नागो वेदः कविकाव्यम्। and Pram. va. bhaya. p. 188: न देवो नागो वेदः कविकाव्यम्। The Buddhists including the Sarvasthi-vadin maintain that every thing is momentary and the moment is no other than the thing itself.

15. विदेशाक्षरात्मानमपि योगिनिः न विमोचित्तः।
अतिलक्ष निन्ययोवचारानवस्थानः। ॥ ११ ॥
हेतुविचारं दुयुक्तम्।

16. A partly definition of yogin.

17. This is explained in the Puggalapannati, p. 145: स्वयमेव पुनः ज्ञात मित्रो निन्ययोवचारानवस्थानः। पञ्चरत्न पञ्च विद्यक्षरात्मानमपी डिब्बित्तः। अतः दुयुक्तम् दुयुक्तम् एवो विचारविचारः। Abh-kosa (Poussin, VI, p. 276): One who is entered in Nirikshayanasti is named 'doubly delivered', because by force of prajna and Samadhi he is delivered from klesa-avarana and vinoaka-avarana (cp. 11mokas in VIII, p. 205) Satya siddhi, chap. 163 (Eng. Summary). If he gains both, he is ubhayaga-bhagya-vimuktija; for the delitement is one part and the element hindering dhvanya-concentration is another part. (also chap. X, end) V. Magga (XXI para 78). Aparokshanam eva abhidayanam chahi. उजळः भालो विश्वसः तिः द्वितो मानविविषीत्।
18. राजवसिंहो||वननां | 
स्वनत्विक निकृतम्||विवाहस्वनम्: हुकः: ||२२ || 
अः—संहीति वनवासासिद्धि ||

19. देवाचरणं वेषु स्वम्भं उत: ||स्वव्य नै कृतेष्ठ ||
ब्राह्मणस्वनत्वं स्वव्यासास्वम्: पुषः: ||२५ ||

20. अनिवार्यायसोऽविवर्तनावसानसंस्कारं। 
विषाकृतिविवेशितं वाक्याय नमस्ते: ||१२ ||

21. It is difficult to understand the author's intention here. According to Abh. kosa theory of momentariness is applicable to the elements both internal and external. It is the Theravadin who makes a distinction in applying it to the elements and pleads that the material elements continue to exist for 17 thought-moments (v, Abh. Athasan, IV. 86, Kosambi's Tika, p. 67). Despite the momentary-theory the Vaiśhāsika maintains that karman produces its fruits through avijñapti which continues to exist on the support of four great elements (v. kosa, I. 11). This may not hold good in the Yogacara system.

22. यथा भाषार्थवासनस्मिरयानां अयोऽभि ||
तथा तथा स्वव्याः [2036] सि भू गोम्याः ||११ ||

23. Ekarās-jñāna-advayajñāna of the Yogacara which is dichotomized into subject and object due to premordial force, (anadi-vastava). It is somewhat similar to the Śūtrantika’s ekarāsa-skandha-jñāna, v. Masuda, sects p. 68 with note 1.

24. निदर्शितासम्भवाच्य विज्ञानकरो न विरूचि ||
विद्याित्रो न विद्यानुसारे न बुद्ध समस्याः: ||१६ ||
�—Jñāna-विज्ञानकरो.

25. इति निद्राय नैवेद्येण भूतम्: ||संप्रभारी गम्य तेन परिवर्तन्त: ||१५ ||
�—Tib. de-ma-phair-mi-brtse-shin.

26. उपयोगित्वार्थकालं संस्कारं ||मेदन्तकारणं न च ||
(तत) पुनःकृतिलक्षणं स्वभाव परिवर्त्तत: ||२२ ||
�—Read in Tib, gan.gi for gan-gis.
27. The idea seems to be this: when the Yogacara deities the external things, there will be no occasion for preaching dharma or listening to it and arousing the right view which leads to the destruction of Vipaka. Dharmakirti, however, defends his position thus: बेलं नोद्वृक्तं बाहुःविका प्रस्तरं। Pram., va. ver. 220.

28. ह्रतासाधारकांवते नि कर्ती चूँक तत्। भाविसवनासात्ववस्थायते वेद धार्मिकायतमां। ॥ १५ ॥

a=सर्वात्मक सदा विन्दुपम।
b=See the verse 29.

29. परिन्तकांविकारिणं वादं योगश्रेयं। गविन्त्यासाते नायवानुसारं वादं। कृता न च ॥ २१ ॥

a=सर्वात्मक अतिरिक्तात्मक।

30. The knowledge of the eye-diseased person (taitirika) is, however, contradicted at once.

31. नारायणं तु हृदये श्रावातालक्षीयते। नारायणं तु हृदये दुःखालक्षीयते। ॥ १६ ॥

31a. cp, Nya, bindu-Tippani, p. 19: स्नेहालक्षारं सत्त्वक्त्वसाते सत्त्वक्त्वसा यथागतं। Every perceptual knowledge is illusive so far as its object is concerned.

32. भावाविनिबन्धनसाते बृजोऽक्षकावरोऽक्षक। भावाविनिबन्धनसाते बृजोऽक्षकावरोऽक्षक। ॥ २० ॥

33. This Sakti, according to the Idealist comes into existence from the self of consciousness and not from some other external causes.

34. बताविनिबन्धनसाते बृजोऽक्षकावरोऽक्षक। बताविनिबन्धनसाते बृजोऽक्षकावरोऽक्षक। ॥ २१ ॥

35. This is probably anadikatika-nasana accepted by the Idealists to account for the universal causation cfr, Madhavata, VI, ver. 46 with Bhasya, my sanskrit text, p. 42-43; Bud. Logic II, p. 367 with note 3 and p. 400 Jinendrabuddhi's comment: Every notion of causation is produced by Biotic Force; and Alambanapariksa, ver. 8.
36. वनक्तरोद्धाराः कार्यरूपम् कर्मयोऽसि भया।
साधुसुकौमल संयुक्तम् गच्च आस्मायाऽत्रितम् \textsuperscript{22}\textsuperscript{23}

37. Jati flower as a factor in producing fragrance is a common example in Indian Sāstras literature. \textit{cp.} Kosavī. II p.39, 22

38. साधूप्रवेशाधिकारीगोऽसि सम्भवम्।
तह स्वतः आरोपयो निवारणिः विचारे। \textsuperscript{22}\textsuperscript{23}

39. अस्ति साधयोऽविभाजितो भावो नाश्यते च वातसा।
नात्रेयं बपोऽविभाजितं इववच शास्त्रविवेचनं। \textsuperscript{22}\textsuperscript{23}

40. Here Sakti-vadin is the Saurūtrik. According to him seven kinds of consciousness (five sensuous, one nonsensuous consciousness and one mind) are produced from their \textit{spadana} consciousness, a subtle mind in possession of all seeds, something resembling the Alaya-consciousness of the yogacarins. The Sautrantika contradicts the vacsna theory postulated by the latter on the assumption that nothing is produced from anything but the mind = Alaya-consciousness, or the Sautrantika's subtle mind, \textit{v. E.} Lamotte, \textit{Histoire du Bouddhisme}, p. 673; and Masuda, \textit{Sects} p. 68. The kosa speaks of the seven types of \textit{vijñana} in this line: शक्तिसन्तानस्य यथा/ (१, १६).

We may note here a parallel discussion between the Yogacara and the Sautrantika as reproduced by the Stcherbatsky from Vaccaipari's \textit{Nyaya-Kamika}: (The Yogacara:) The external object is superfluous, there is in the (internal) Biotic force which accidently becomes mature and evokes an idea; this is also accidental (and changing continually with a change in cause). (The Sautrantika:) But, is it not your Biotic force in this case simply the force of the subject thought contained in one continuous stream, the force to produce out of itself, a corresponding the objective thought, \textit{Bud. Logik}, II, p. 367-68. One interesting reference to the Sautrantika may be noticed here: \textit{शैलिविह्रमणं त्वतिरिवेच्या।} रघुदास्य सर्वविभाजिताः समस्तम् भायाः संकालपरिवर्त्तिकं न निर्विभाजितान्वितस्य। \textit{Archāvīnicayā} Sutrātika. The idea probably meant here that the six consciousness-bodies are conditioned by Samskāra, a subtle Sakti formed from the experience of external things; \textit{cp.} the ver. 27 below the same idea.
38

41.  
42. 
43.  
44. Pravrtti-vijnana depends on upadana-vijnana and the latter again on the former to produce it.
45. 
46. This is the Sautrantika’s standpoint, v. ver. 24, 76.
47. 
48. This is the system of the Yogacara. Alaya is named upadana, cfr. Trisamati, ver. 3 with Bhaya of Sthiramati.
49.  
This verse is cited in Tatt. pan p. 582.
51. 
52. According to the Yogacara every human knowledge is illusive with reference to its object (v. note 31a above). The author asserts that knowledge can be illusive if it is vitiated in a later stage.
53.  
54. Any other vibhakashastra-natrasana accordingly.

38

41.  
42. 
43.  
44. Pravrtti-vijnana depends on upadana-vijnana and the latter again on the former to produce it.
45. 
46. This is the Sautrantika’s standpoint, v. ver. 24, 76.
47. 
48. This is the system of the Yogacara. Alaya is named upadana, cfr. Trisamati, ver. 3 with Bhaya of Sthiramati.
49.  
This verse is cited in Tatt. pan p. 582.
51. 
52. According to the Yogacara every human knowledge is illusive with reference to its object (v. note 31a above). The author asserts that knowledge can be illusive if it is vitiated in a later stage.
53.  
54. Any other vibhakashastra-natrasana accordingly.

38

41.  
42. 
43.  
44. Pravrtti-vijnana depends on upadana-vijnana and the latter again on the former to produce it.
45. 
46. This is the Sautrantika’s standpoint, v. ver. 24, 76.
47. 
48. This is the system of the Yogacara. Alaya is named upadana, cfr. Trisamati, ver. 3 with Bhaya of Sthiramati.
49.  
This verse is cited in Tatt. pan p. 582.
51. 
52. According to the Yogacara every human knowledge is illusive with reference to its object (v. note 31a above). The author asserts that knowledge can be illusive if it is vitiated in a later stage.
53.  
54. Any other vibhakashastra-natrasana accordingly.

38

41.  
42. 
43.  
44. Pravrtti-vijnana depends on upadana-vijnana and the latter again on the former to produce it.
45. 
46. This is the Sautrantika’s standpoint, v. ver. 24, 76.
47. 
48. This is the system of the Yogacara. Alaya is named upadana, cfr. Trisamati, ver. 3 with Bhaya of Sthiramati.
49.  
This verse is cited in Tatt. pan p. 582.
51. 
52. According to the Yogacara every human knowledge is illusive with reference to its object (v. note 31a above). The author asserts that knowledge can be illusive if it is vitiated in a later stage.
53.  
54. Any other vibhakashastra-natrasana accordingly.

38

41.  
42. 
43.  
44. Pravrtti-vijnana depends on upadana-vijnana and the latter again on the former to produce it.
45. 
46. This is the Sautrantika’s standpoint, v. ver. 24, 76.
47. 
48. This is the system of the Yogacara. Alaya is named upadana, cfr. Trisamati, ver. 3 with Bhaya of Sthiramati.
49.  
This verse is cited in Tatt. pan p. 582.
51. 
52. According to the Yogacara every human knowledge is illusive with reference to its object (v. note 31a above). The author asserts that knowledge can be illusive if it is vitiated in a later stage.
53.  
54. Any other vibhakashastra-natrasana accordingly.
55. This and the following are the opinions of Dignaga, v. Alam. pariksha, ver. 6.

56. अतः नात्तथानिति सत्याविकल्पारिहितः।
तत्ततानिती नातः।

57. This is the main argument set up by Dignaga in favour of his idealism, v. Alam. par. ver. 1.

58. विश्वास्तिकारभियो ५२३ एकाक्य नात्तथानितिमधुः ५२३ विविधितानि नात्तथानितिमधुः।
This verse is made of 5 lines, the next four lines being traced to the original Sanskrit. The implied heur is ekākya-dyantaricchāda.

59. तत्ततानितिस्वतं सुधार्थित्विनि।
सार्थाविविधिनिष्ठितिमहति।
Tatt. san. p. 552 cites this verse with the reading शुद्धिविनि for शुद्धितिः. The Punjika further quotes his comments thus: सार्थाएव शुद्धिविनिष्ठाति। The Āvācarāsaṃgraha notes that the change is due to a literal mistake. (Cp. p. 199 and ver. 589).

60. तत्ततानिति सुधार्थित्विनि धनिः।

61. The idea of oneness as illusive is explained in Tatt. san. ver. 598-9. Similarly the idea of grossness as illusive is in ver. 592-4 (ibid). This latter position is of the Sautrantika.

62. यह स्वत्त्वावलीन विविधान वाचित्यः।

63. The opinion of Vassabandhu, Vimañca, ver. 11, and also of Dignaga, Alam. par. ver. 1.
64. यदानं तत्ती [204] तन्त्रित अन्यायामांकर्म कर।
हि वियव विनितो गृह् ना च दर्मेन हुर्विविलेक। ॥ १५ ॥


66. सुन्दरा देंख। सत्यं सर्वज्ञानाविकारण।
ते सिद्धात्त। हि पृथणु हृदयस्याभिप्तिः क मूलः ॥ ३८ ॥

67. a = Tib. hidus pa.

68. The author thinks that संतित्व a stems are दीव्य, substance since they discharge a uniform function. The same opinion in his अन्यमप्तिविकर, ver. 2. The logical school of Dignaga following the Sautrantik stand point defines दीव्य as one capable of discharging a perceptive action: अविन् के-कालिन सागु-कालिनम् v. Tatt. pan. p. 730, (18; Nya. bindu Tika p. 76-77) cp. pram. var. III, ver. 195.

69. अन्यायामान्कत्व्याय न नवस्याभिनीतत्व गृह ॥ २२ ॥

70. The same idea in the author's अन्यमप्तिविकर, ver. 7. cp. Tatt. van. ver. 870.

71. The very instance compels the Yogacara to declare that the images which are reflected in our consciousness are all false (alika) v. Tatt. pan. ad ver. 2037: सामान्यविविकारकानां नोत्वा। ताम तद्विविलेक नामवेष्टितभोजस्तु॥ जातारमार्तिरविविलेक नोत्वा ना क्रोण्ड भिन्नेऽ। अन्यः कष्ठानविरेत्वानां परिक्रियां। विविलेक्ष्मानां एकानां अन्या-विविलेक्ष्मां सत्यं क्षमस्वर्गाणां सुहुतं न साध्यता।

72. एवमार्थार्थविविकारकानां ज्ञात्मविद्यानेत्र ज्ञातस्य। ॥ २८ ॥

73. p. 271, cp. p. 181,
A thorough examination of this topic from the Yogacara standpoint has been made by Ratnakirti in his *Citra-adhastapa-pakasa-rada* (v. Ratnakirtinimbodha. K. P. J. Instituts. Patna, 1957).

Dharmakirti from the standpoint of his logic offers this explanation: Our practical experiences dictate that several non-sensuous consciousnesses can arise simultaneously; v. Pram. var. śāntinirmāna māyā, sammātu, vidyātāvibhāṣita. vidyātā-vibhāṣita nāgānandā bhāsita. v. vers; ibid., 197-201; Tatt. san. vers. 1253; mat. sāntā śāntā śāntaṃ yāpane śāntāṃ pramāṇā. śāntāṃ māyāṃ māyāṃ bhāsitaṃ śāntāṃ śāntāṃ, etc.

Another explanation is offered in the following lines:

कर यथा जन्मने जन्मने तत्तत्साधुनुसारे।
हति नागानन्दास्य यतं सन्दर्भावमण्ये।

Pram. var. III, 222. Bhāsya: तस्मात् जन्मन्त्रिकीला साध्यत्व एवं बुद्धिर्बीकरणं बिस्माते; p. 290.

Dharmakīrti further argues as another solution that several things can produce simultaneously one cognition; को श विरू-

ध्वं संज्ञासानां वहत। बहु: वामा तु वृद्ध वृद्धमान्यमात्र वध।

Ibid., 224. Bhāsya: वृद्धायमेवभवन्तारा शिल्पात्वम्यविद्यकाराः काव्ये कृती-कृतिविकारणम् विभक्तित। तथा बहुमात्रात। को विरूपः p. 296.

Kosz (IV, 10) also refers to the *Citra-adhastapa* problem. v. Note, 178 for the author's solution.

72. विष्णुः कर्तविष्णुपरिमेकरकरस्ते महा।

त जन्मन्त्रिकीलां दैविकाधिकारेन नागानन्दाः॥ १२ ॥

a—Tib. kha-ba—चिन्त. vartikātāt.

73. A similar explanation in T. Panji. p. 371, l. 16. e. note 178 below the passage।

74. एवं अन्य संशोधनां विनियोगयं नृपुरुषः

सर्वात्मकयः विकृष्टं एवं खण्डयो मनो वस्तुः॥ ४३ ॥

75. Atoms appear and disappear together: खण्डयो एवं विकृष्टः

This is what the Sarvastivāda-Vaiśeṣika concludes. It is further made clear in the next verse, cp. kosa, I. p. 35, ll. 18-20, and Vis. Mag.: परे नृपो खण्डोणा खण्डोणा अवगाहो।

यहीं अविनाश्या एवं कृत्या खण्डम्॥
a. my paper on Nilakshi, Annals of Research Institute, Tirapati, IV, p. 61. Tatt, sangraha dhenus that the atoms though invisible individually, become the object of perception; o ver 570.

76. यथेष्ठाय ऐतिहासिकैरसैनिकसत्वन।

This verse is cited in T. Panji. p. 551, 1. 21: अमादेश सूक्षमः एवंजन्यगत्वा विशालिन आतियिस विषयवक्ते कौशाराग्निशक्ते कौशाराग्नि निवलित।

77. अति विषमनिष्ठैर गीति गतु तत्साधु।

The second line of this verse is cited in prose in T. panji. p.356, cp. n. 79 below.

78. The author refers here to Vasubandhu’s criticism of atomic theory in his Vimsa. ver. 12, 14:

परकेल मूलपात्रु तरपायां परमात्मा।

Some similar criticism has also been made by him in the kośabhāṣya, I. ver. 43. Tīb. pp. 81-84. and the Vaiśhnavī’s defence.

79. तद्वादेशनेतरत्: ब्रह्मस: परहारिता:।

The same idea in the ver. 8 above, cp. note 14.

81. एकाः गुरुः भगवदीशोऽवर्धित: परमात्मा।

The present verse answers this objection.
82. The idea of this verse is also included in the prose passage above cited in n. -79. This explanation suggests idea of manifoldness on the atom is imaginary as the idea of the oneness on the aggregate.

83. The explanation is made here of how an invisible atomic form becomes a visible gross form.

84. If the latter proposition is acceptable, the former one also will be so.

85. The advocate of knowledge of two and more moments, duration is probably the Naiyayika. The Theravadin pleads that it exists for three moments, \( V \), Abh. San. IV.

86. Atoms, though existing is an uninterrupted series are not conceived as one arayavda on the analogy of knowledge.

87. In reply to Vasubandhu's criticism: Sandhi, gacchita, kramam. This answer implies that the author is a Sautara-paramanu-vadin.
95. कों भेदाय नानाइवातु रिको नानीति यथा।
काराकोरी भेदातनेंद्र अपरीक्षो न गुणान्ते न हृदये a=parinama=
hgyur. ba.

96. cp. Vimśa. 12d. भिन्न: ज्ञानधार्मिकः।

97. अवयोग्यतायां मन्त्रयोग्य: अपरिवर्त्तः अपरिवर्ततः।
भाष: दशेकुक्त मन्त्रयोग्य सूक्ष्मधार्मिकः।

98. This makes clear that the author holds the opinion that atoms do not contact with one another. Read in Tib. reg. pa for rig. pa.

99. ययातेतहस्य विघनात: अपरिवर्त्तः।
पराक्श्य निवार्येऽन्तमच्छ अपरिवर्त्तः न हृदये।

100. विद्याक्षेत्रज्ञोक्तिन्योन्यक्तिहृदये।
a=bṛgyus. pa. लिखत S. Das, Dictionary.

101. ब्रह्मदेवसचन्द्रका: सूक्ष्मधार्मिकः।
संसारादित्योत्तमेन सूक्ष्मधार्मिकः।

102. It appears that there are millions of atoms having no capacity strong enough to come into combination and to form any visible object.

103. The Yogan can count the number of atoms even of the hell, etc. remote objects. The expression: acaladīgha is again used later in ver. 64 below.

104. कों नानीतित सो हृदय: इत्यभिधिकाविदर।
मानसिककावों पो a महाकाव्यां महाकाव्या।
काव्यां भिन्नधिकाविदर। a=अभिधिकां द्रव भिन्न।

105. The idea may be amplified thus: If my apprehension of atoms by outer senses is illusive, your understanding of the mind alone with equally be illusory. Here the author’s reference to the mind as the sixth sense is suggestive of the fact that the mind understands always what is apprehended by the outer senses. Cp. the Saying: दृष्टिको चालु गुणेऽव परिवर्त्तित तत्ताहृदये सूक्ष्मधार्मिकः। cited in Nya-Tippani, p. 26.
106. धर्मितार्थम् यश तथा ।

विद तत्तत्सामकेः गर्भाविविवेच्यों कल्पत् ॥ १७ ॥

प्रामाण्योपाध्यायम्, धर्मितार्थम् कर्तव्य ।

तत्त च अभिविवेच्यों मये। प्राप्तं गुणवाक्षरं ।

कर्माद्विकुलं प्रवर्तित गृहावासार्थार्थं ॥ १८ ॥

$a=lit$. विशेष ब्रह्म केवल वहील की ह बेहद बेहद बेहद बेहद बेहद बेहद बेहद बेहद बेहद बेहद बेहद बेहद बेहद बेहद बेहद बेहद बेहद बेहद बेहद

107. The Yogacara conceives the mind as the basis of illusion of the whole universe; thus the mind is a real entity while the objective universe is illusory.

108. The Yogacara's conception of the hell is well explained in the Vimalakirti ad. 4. Read my English translation of the treatise and a bilingual edition of the text with notes from Vinitadeva's comments (Institute of Tibetology, Cangtok, 1964).

109. The author thinks; As you (opponents) declare the atoms, etc. as illusory, why do you not say likewise of the Pradhana and Purusa as illusory?

110. तत्सः च गृहावासार्थार्थं गृहावासार्थार्थं ॥

भानु विशेष ब्रह्म केवल वहील केवल वहील केवल वहील केवल वहील केवल वहील केवल वहील केवल वहील केवल वहील केवल वहील केवल वहील केवल वहील केवल वहील केवल वहील केवल

111. अभिमुक्तम् सत्तात्सामकेः अभिमुक्तम् सत्तात्सामकेः अभिमुक्तम् सत्तात्सामकेः अभिमुक्तम् सत्तात्सामकेः अभिमुक्तम् सत्तात्सामकेः अभिमुक्तम् सत्तात्सामकेः अभिमुक्तम् सत्तात्सामकेः अभिमुक्तम् सत्तात्सामकेः अभिमुक्तम् सत्तात्सामकेः अभिमुक्तम् सत्तात्सामकेः अभिमुक्तम् सत्तात्सामकेः अभिमुक्तम् सत्तात्सामकेः

112. तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं

113. तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं

114. तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं

115. तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं तत्सः च नाधाराकुलं

This is cited in T. Panjii. v. note. 1/4. end.
116. अपायवेदनयें संस्कारन वाण वा संवेदनाय।
तत्त श्रुतिः तथा तस्मन मुनने नामवा पुनः ॥ ६७ ॥

a) lit. अपायहँ。

117. What is implied in the previous verse is made clear here, viz.
in the absence of either of the two, knowledge or the object
no cognition flashes out and that is the reason why they are
felt simultaneously.

118. एकाकालविवेकायं संस्कारनविनिदयात्।
विविधवस्ति एवं नष्टवेदनाविनिदयात्

This verse is cited in T. Panji (p. 558 l, 4) in prose: अव
साक्ष्य एकाकालविवेकायां तथा धृतिनिद्यैनवेदनी नष्टवेदनाधृति
समयायः कालविवेकित्वे नष्टवेदनास्वेदनी नष्टवेदनाधृति
समयायः कालविवेकित्वे नष्टवेदनास्वेदनी

119. अनुसोप्यमण्डलान वंस्ततावभावनां भावताः 
विशेषरकारीभी श्रीम इति भगवान् ॥ ६७ ॥

120. The author probably intends to say thus: The ghost, the hell,
etc. are equally spoken off in the scripture, why do you
say that our knowledge of these things is an illusion?

121. अपायवेदनयें स्बवेदनप्रोदयकालविवेकायं
तथावैतत्त्वानमिदाश्रितं प्रोद्यताः पिणादाः ॥ ६८ ॥

122. सहभागवकालविवेकायायं द्वार्यमान भवताः कालविवेकायमुल्लालः
विद्विक्षोऽयम् तस्ती एवं द्वार्यविवेकायमुल्लालः ॥ ६९ ॥

Kamalasita introducing this verse remarks: 'स्तर संस्त्रंथुमुल्लालः
विद्विक्षोऽयम् हेषु पदम् सुस्त्रंथुमुल्लालः'। This objection is also noticed
by Dharmapala in his comment an Alam. par.

133. एकास्यं सहभागस्त्रितेऽयमि तत्
न यथार्थस्य भव एकास्यं च यद्यतः ॥ ७० ॥

124 T. Panji. refers to this idea of oneness and its implications thus:
पुत्रः तस्माद्वय यथार्थस्य तस्माद्वयःहेषु पुत्रः

T. Panji describes the following verse: 'सम्बन्धवेदनात्वेदनतः
नष्टवेदनात्वेदनतः

T. Panji refers to this idea of oneness and its implications thus:
पुत्रः तस्माद्वय यथार्थस्य तस्माद्वयःहेषु पुत्रः

T. Panji refers to this idea of oneness and its implications thus:
पुत्रः तस्माद्वय यथार्थस्य तस्माद्वयःहेषु पुत्रः
The idea expressed in this verse is well stated in T. Panjia, as quoted in a previous note. The idea of this verse has been summed up in T. Panjia, as quoted in the note 124.

Thus the reason becomes nyatara-avidhā. For the advocate of sakti jnāna, the image is a part of the knowledge. To prove it is useless.

The author appears to mean this: If the experience of the black shell consist, in the nature of knowledge alone, the knowledge should then be experienced as black. Since the black colour cannot be attributed to the knowledge, there ought to be something black material other than the knowledge. The classical example is: pitah sāndhā. This example of bhūtrā jnāna seems to be purposely employed in order to point out that there are two aspects of the object, viz., black and the shell which cannot be accommodated in the only knowledge.

The ideā are different, and must be different. The word word means...

Thus...

137. पुरुष न्यून भावना भगवतं कथाः।

This verse is cited in T. panji, p. 569, ii, 16-17 along with the verse, न कर्मसिद्धि । न हि । n. 114.

138. Savasagri, according to early Buddhist includes three factors: (1) vijaya, (2) indrika, and (3) sampanna, naming and it gives rise to a sensation, spasa, which is followed by feeling, vedana, and then image, samjña, v. Bud. logic, ii, p. 31), Table, Cpr. Kosa, III, p. 65, 23.

139. Here the term saha is in the sense of immediate succession; cf r. the next verse.

140. पूर्णर्थ वश तपस्यां निर्भयं देवसे ।

141. केस्तं देवहि विनान्तरायनामाथोऽस्मि वहामणामहि ।

142. That is, the reason is doubtful, (v. ver. 74 above.) Sandhyā-śuddha.

143. भावनाभवेत् जैवते जैवते ब्रम्हते ।

144. The idea is made clear in T. Panji, p. 570, l, 18, ff.

145. संपुर्ववस्थानभोजति शर्य पूर्वसं ।

a lit. masters,

145a. The idea of this verse is also referred to in T. Panji, p. 570, l, 30, ff.
तास्म यह मुख्य संबंध हेतु वेदांकेव थियो। तथा बुधोस्विंटित। अस्थायी 
स्वाभिमान मूलक चि्वास हे वेदान्तवाल्यालालमण। तथापि न ताधावाचित्तित। नहीं 
मशिम न दुःखालण्यात् समवायोत्तिता। अचार्य इत्यादितित। \textit{Mukhya samvedana above} 
referred to is also implied in the following passage: सेवालमण देव नामा 
संहेतायोषितात विशेषणाम साहसविद्वानान्तराय। (T. Panji. p. 568, I. 
12) \textbf{The Bayyarthavadin of this passage is probably, the} 
\textbf{Vaibhavika (?)}

146. समंहेतायोषितात् साहसविद्वानान्तराय। विशेषणाम साहसविद्वानान्तराय। विशेषणाम विशेष 

146a. This defect of \textit{anaikitika} is explained in \textit{T. Panji. v. note on} 

146b. \textit{cp. T. Panji. p. 573, I. 15 ff}, making this same prasanga in a 

different context.

147. साहसविद्वानान्तराय। \textit{This verse is cited in T. panji p. 570, I. 20-4 with this introductory 
remark: अथ तत्साधारण नीतिवाचार्य सम्बन्धार्थम् चिलिम्बिनिष्ठ विशेषणाम साहस 

148. \textit{साहसविद्वानान्तराय। अथाय सम्बन्धार्थम्} \textbf{I. 20}}

149. कथानं तत्साधारण तथात् [206d] \textit{कथानं तत्साधारण तथात्} \textbf{I. 20}

150. \textit{कथानं तत्साधारण तथात् [206d]} \textit{कथानं तत्साधारण तथात्} \textbf{I. 20} 

\textit{a—Definition of pariccheda, v. ver. 92. below.—}
151. This is probably the author's criticism of the *savya* theory of the Sautrantika-Yogacara.

152. अभ्यासः प्रथमवत्सलविद्वान विद्वानांत्तरतः समाधी।

कर्म यथेतयं शर विद्वानविद्वानापि तर्कभेदः ॥ ५१ ॥

153.

154. विद्वानः त्यां विद्वानं विद्वानांत्तरातः।

विद्वानां सन्यस्तः समाधा यथेचः ॥ ५२ ॥

155. Thus the above stated *panicchade* of the ver. 89 is simply *vijñānabhadra*.

156. अभ्यासः तत्त्वतः न किंतु विद्वानं विद्वानः यथा।

विद्वानाः तत्त्वतः न विद्वानांत्तरातः।

a=सत्त्वं, gzugs=knowledge-form,

157. सर्वकारारभिधि स्वम ब्रह्मान्यो विद्याभिधि ॥ ५३ ॥

158. This is very important to note that the author denies an apparent distinction between the Saint and the ordinary man in respect of their grasping the external things. The Saint has an additional virtue of penetrating into different aspects of things; *savya* is one of the qualities attributed to the Buddha, r. kosa. IX, ver. 1.

159. यक्तार यो विद्वानेन विद्वानांत्तरातः।

इच्छाकारोऽविद्वानं विद्वानं किं त्सतोऽविद्वानं।

सत्त्वं यथेचः सत्त्वं यथेचः सत्त्वं यथेचः ॥ ५४ ॥

160. *Sakyasvāmin* is the Sautrantika, and *nirakara-vadin* Vaibhav-sikṣa. The *Yogacara* is tulya-kāla-vadin and the *Vaihāsika* and Satyasiddha are *aditya-kāla-vadin* = *Krūma-vadin*. Similarly *Vasubandhu*, a follower of the Sautrantika school pleads for *aditya-kāla-vadin*, a Successive comprehension even of omniscient Buddha thus: *Satya-vadin* and *sukha-vadin* are also pleaded. *Vasubandhu*, a follower of the Sautrantika school pleads for *aditya-kāla-vadin*, a Successive comprehension even of omniscient Buddha thus:

सात्मण्डिल्यकालान्तः सत्यविद्या ।

तत्त्व सत्यस्थित्यो न गौतमविद्यातः। Kosa. IX. 1.
161. अन्तररमण्य वस्तु नामोऽविद्येः तद्भवः।
अतरि स न प्रभृती पुनर्परिम्मणि।" ॥ ५६ ॥

162. We experience different things in different shapes. Some long, some short, some square and so on. These shapes according to the Vaibhasikas are external and real belonging to the conglutinated atoms. The Sautrantika and Dignaga school on the other hand, hold that they are internal and unreal as they are merely our mind's construction.

163. लोकानांविकारसः पुनररमण्य न केवलं न न नञ्जस्त।
बः यस् समस्याकल्पनाम।" ॥ ५७ ॥
a = lit. तन्त्राकल्पम्।

164. The Mahayanists think that the yogin, having removed the two kinds of obscuration, klesa and jneya-avarana would not have any idea of external things. The author ridicules this point, cp. T. Panjé. p. 574 ad. ver. 2048.

165. एवं नात्तिक्षिणः स्वरूपः वेदाक्षरान।
द्रव्यमप्याजिलोकसंबादः।
a = lit. अस्मात्तिक्षिणः नान्नात्तिक्षिणः।

166. नात्तिक्षिणः लोकानांवकारसः। केवलः।
वेदाक्षरः स न िचित्राकल्पम्।
बः येस समस्याकल्पनाम।" ॥ ५७ ॥
a = िचित्राकल्पम्।

167. ततो दक्षिणे बहुतादिविनीभवति वेदाक्षरान।
वेदाक्षरमिदं िविधानं वेदाक्षरान।" ॥ ५७ ॥

168. The author probably means to say what constitutes distinction of one knowledge from another in his theory of imageless knowledge.
169. यदि भा भयं भावं नित्यायां तासकं।
वेदत्र यज्ञवादायाः सुभवं त्वमेव न।५ १० १

This verse is cited in T. sm. p. 572.

170. For the Yogacara the true knowledge is non-dual, advayā as stated in the next verse and imageless, cfr. T. Panjì. p. 182:

ज्ञात्सामास्ये नित्याभचाराद्वितीयाः।
भव्यसत्यं भवस्मि तत्त्वं न। १० २

2 2 In the sense of a separate image, prthvī akara.

171. असाधारणाय नामस्य निरुपयोगायामायायां।
अत्रतृतः यज्ञं प्रस्तुतायाः प्रत्येकसंवेण्। १० २ २

172. गामगृहीताः प्रात्मा अन्वयोः प्रत्येकसंवेण्।
[2072] प्रात्मानेतरावैपेक्षिक न गण्यं गणिताः प्रकृतं। १० २ ३

173. This is exactly what the Yogacara says; this is accepted by the author himself, note वेदत्र यज्ञवादायाः in the ver. 101.

174. भावाद्वारा उद्घाटिताः गणिताः।
[2074] गणितार्तरनेतरे देवताः। १० २ ४

175. This is the basic conclusion of the author. The sense-organs, for the Vaiśhālika, are derivative material elements; but for the Yogacara they are some forms of Sakti, v. Alambanānap, ver. 7, with Vinitadeva's tika, cfr. Sayasyidhu, chap. 45, they are nominal. Paścimendra is explained in ver. 89-92 above, Yoga-an object that falls within the range of senses and not a remote one.

176. श्रीमत्स आचार्यस्य सम्बन्धोऽभागवः।
विशेषं विविधचारणंहरूक्तं तथा विश। १० २ ५

This verse is made of 5 lines in order to complete the sense.

177. The lamp-example is cited by the Sautraṇa-ka-Yogacaras in favour of their theory of otanvedana which is criticised in Mad. lirika, VII, 7 and Madh. avatara, my Sanskrit text,
178. This implies that the simultaneous grasping two and more colours, e.g. is possible. Therefore the cognition of several colours in the case of citrasanrana is quite permissible, e.g. T. Panjpi, p. 571: द्वारा वस्तुचिन्तनशास्त्र शास्त्राणि विशेषतः द्विशास्त्राणि.

179. सांसारिक औषधिक ग्रन्थीयमयोपसरसः केवल तीन स्थलाशास्त्र संबन्धम्.

180. cp. M. I. 295; S. V. 218, cited in kosa IX, 242; Sayajyothi, chap. 35. The different kinds of objects, such as colour, sound, etc., cannot be simultaneously cognized by their respective sense-organ—says the Vaibhasha. The Yogacara on the other hand, think that simultaneity of different non-construcrive consciousness is possible as T. san, says सतीर्थिरिज्ञमयाबधवं भिक्षु सतीर्थ:।

181. प्रज्ञालारः भृज्य: विचिन्तायं रेण भाषनं तत्॥

182. The same in Pron. var. III, 186-37.

183. प्रज्ञालारः भृज्य: विचिन्तायं रेण भाषनं तत्॥

185. cp. Ibid. 208: सात्त्विके मन्त्रे सात्त्विके मृदुर्विश्वास्याभ्यासितः

186. किं प्रज्ञालाराः भृज्य: विचिन्तायं रेण भाषनं तत्॥

187. Pragnalara’s Bhaya: विचिन्तायं रेण भाषनं तत्॥
The last sentence makes clear that the Yogacara bans the simultaneity of different constructive thoughts. cp. again T. san: अनिवृत्तम् इति सहस्रः पान्य. p. 241: न केवल विविध वल्ले तुण्डनिल-लाभाः संसारिन्। See also note 71 above.

181. अतः तु || 109 ||

विशेषभाषानि नानासाधनां वस्तुम् ।

अद्-क्रियागते पु. ।

182. वस उपसने सत्त, भानं तस्य तत्त्वतत्त्वम् ॥ १०७ ॥

विषयालक्षणवस्तुरं च। भानन्तो भस।

लतु हिः स्निया न न, विशेषभाषाश्च वस ॥ १०८ ॥

साधनानुसारवाचः।

183. Here and onwards the author criticises the opinion of some Sautrañjika masters who hold that our consciousness while grasping an external thing, moulds itself into an image similar to that of the external thing and that this moulding is effected in just immediately next moment after the external thing falls within the ken of the sense-organ. According to Dharmakirti a non-constructive mental perception intervenes in the second moment and the synthetic cognition (saṃvikalpa) is effected with the image-formation in the third moment (v. Bud. logic. II, p. 312, the Table) our author here, without taking notice of the second stage mental perception speaks of the image-invested knowledge as immediately following the first moment’s pure sensation.

184. शास्त्रवादः साधनः।

साधनामिति भवति तत्सपि विशेषः ॥ १०६ ॥

न साधनं नानासाधनां वस्तुम् [वैभव] ।

185. Jnanakara, for this author, is grabakakara, cfr. n. 165n.

186. असिद्धस्य प्राध्यायादयां।

साधनं वैभव विशेषं न एतेऽपि ॥ १०७ ॥

187. cp. T. San. ver. 2039. साधनान्ति स सत्तीन्द्रे नानासाधनानि केवलः।

188. नीतिविविधाचारं स भानं नीतिविविधाचारं।

तत्त्वान्द्रायेत्तत्र तत्र तत्त्वान्तः हि वस ॥ १०९ ॥

तत्र तत्त्वसाधनं अविन्द सत्स न तुष्पम्।
189. **Causality and objectivity are two characteristics of the content.**

190. **The kind of nirvikalpa mind that is pleaded by the Saunter-tika-Yogacara school is not accepted by the author. The Valabhasika conception of nirvikalpa is explained in kosa.**

191. **This argument is set up by Dignaga**

192. **This argument is set up by Dignaga.**

193. **Here ‘similar’ is with reference to the objective element. The idea seems to be this: the knowledge first becomes similar to its object and this similized knowledge becomes the object of its immediately following knowledge. The author objects to this because no knowledge flashes up immediately after its predecessor. In Tib. or after suo-sea stands for objective case governed by the verb hidol, pa.

194. **The author’s objection appears to be this: Suppose in the first moment there is a knowledge of the Sound and in the next**
moment a knowledge of rupa arises in its continuity. This second knowledge must bear the image of the sound according to your Saropya theory. Therefor it is not well founded.

202. केवलिकारुणिकान्य अस्फल: बि वि विशिष्टित ॥ १५४ ॥

203. See T. San. ver. 2083: साधारणतः ज्ञाते भावातः विविधितः ।

204. रागायो नित्याय निशायार्थ विविधित: ॥ १५५ ॥

205. ॥मानसार्थी शौष्ठिकी केवल गतिजेते त्यो निहितः ॥ १५६ ॥

206. The Characteristics as stated before (note 190) are causality and objectivity. Sakti may fulfil the first but not the second.

207. केवलियायाय शैव बाह्यातालम्बकम् हि ॥ १५७ ॥

208. This is the fundamental doctrine of the author, Vaihaskika.

209. द्वाभिराधिकारण सुधारी बाह्यमयित न ॥ १५८ ॥

210. The opponent thinks that there cannot be any thing in the external like desirable or undesirable; for, what is desirable for one person is undesirable for another, v. Bhavasatika, p. 39.

211. षुद्धार्थसनानी केवलित शृणुते अभासातः ॥ १५९ ॥

a = lit. भावायो नित्याय निशायार्थ विविधित:—The case-ending is not in Tib.
212. The idea here and in the following seems to be this: The Yogacara thinks that the yogin can change any thing into another form by dint of his deep meditative power of adhikarika, cp. Madh. Avatara, VI, 69. के घोर भिक्षु, जिस मेंलि इस न कुद्यात हूँ, सून्दरसुप्रसारितिसंयोग, २८।

213. एवं अन्वीक्तमिश्रित व्यालं तथापिनं. ४ १२२ वि
अन्तर्यावात्-अधिष्ठितस्य तथापितिः, सूनुः।

214. दृष्टिका नवनिवात्सामन्ताभावसिद्धार्थम्, २६ ३ १२४ वि
अविकसरे, उवोद नवक्षेत्रे का पुत्र, देव।
त: तिब्बत् ब्ये-२२ गृह्य-२२ गृह्य, ब्ये-२२ गृह्य।

215. भारतेश्वर दुनो से ते सूनु प्रभास्वतन्त्र वि १२७ वि
ब्रह्म पुनिर्गमना, स्मिर्यमंकितत्त्वोऽवि
तदानुवने व ताप्यीं।

216. अवकाशे भ्वयोगस्वलं, ५ १२८ वि
किया अस्मारकस्वातामकानितेप्रलोके: पुरुष।
ब्रह्माद्ये विवेकानित्त्वानि का सूर्यासारः ५ १२९ वि
महाभाषिकम् व बृहस्पतिज्ञातमः कृदं सूनुरुपनिहारः।
तिब्बत् द्वि-वर्गपरस्परा: वि ६: तिब्बत् लोकपरस्परा, तिब्बत् का लोकपरस्परा।

217. Nyagromphutam, s. note 221 below. The Sautrantika-Yogacara’s definition of reality is: नियमकान्तमेज्ञुणिष्ठान सय। न्यायविद्या, i, 15 : T. Penji p. 730, l. 16 : सूनुक्वालिकः . . . . . .
अक्षेत्रान्तरे तेज सर्वत्रेन्त्र सर्वंत्रे, सर्वत्रेन्त्र . . .

218. सूनुक्वालिकः

219. This is already pointed out in the previous verse.

220. [208a] तत्त्वे कारणं कोलोकः, ५ १२५ वि
तत्त्वादविद्या देविको निश्चितसुतथाविभावकों।
ब्रह्म पुनिर्गमन। सत्य, . . .

221. This is given as an example to disprove externalism by Vasubandhu in his Yimaśāra 3 ओऽ: क्लोणासंदर्भे, क्लोणासंदर्भे। Bhesya- सत्यां सत्यां कोलोकाहस्यादः, सत्यां सत्यां कोलोकाहस्यादः.
222. Sākṣaṅgaḥ guṇa-ātāntā: \( \text{a} \ 132 \) ॥

233. कामिका यथा लघुः \( \text{a} \ 132 \) ॥

234. बिद्धचारिः \( \text{a} \ 134 \) ॥

235. सामाजिक व्यवहार \( \text{a} \ 134 \) ॥

236. बिद्धचारिः \( \text{a} \ 134 \) ॥

237. बिद्धपुरुषः \( \text{a} \ 134 \) ॥

238. The definition of action is: बिद्धता कर्म चारियाः \( \text{a} \ 134 \) ॥

239. बिद्धपुरुषः \( \text{a} \ 134 \) ॥

240. The author refutes the Vīmaṇa, ver. 4, \( \text{a} \ 134 \) ॥

241. नतानात्त्वभाषाम् \( \text{a} \ 134 \) ॥

242. नतानात्त्वभाषाम्बी नक्षत्रः किरणेन नु।

परंपर: कृपे नामिते.
232. Vasubandhu and other Yogacaras deny the existence of other living beings *cp.* Ratnakirti’s Santanana-dāsana, K. P. F. Institute, 1959. Dharmakirti however, does reverse it in his Santanana-Siddhi; s. Bud.-logic I, P. 221, P. 521 ff.

233. तथा निन्यूनस्वास्तवात् ॥ १३२ ॥

234. Reference is probably a Caruda-mastra promising the boon.

235. पुरुस्तन विनय मद्यः ॥ १३३ ॥

236. Parvatāntra, rituals containing the Buddhist Tantric rites described in Tantric literature as to how one may ward off the influence of the evil spirits and gain earthly prosperity. Here reviving the dead person cannot be accomplished without the assistance of such rituals.

237. परिवर्तिनो आलमकार्य नयं वेदेः ॥ १३४ ॥

238. Vasubandhu contends that pāra-citta-jñāna is untrue, s. Yimsa ver. 20, but is true for the author, s. ver. 148. below.

239. वाल्मीकिनः नानेभ्य विविधो वि वस्तु ॥

240. This is said from the standpoint of the Sañvatika-Yogacaras.

241. एव वाल्मीकिवलिपियाः वाल्मीकिनः न ज्ञाते ॥

242. The author probably refers to the Naiyayika’s theory of of rasa: moving towards the object much criticised in the Satya-siddhi, Chap. 49-50 what is termed, आन्द्र (vyanra) for Dignaga, Pram-sam J 9, T. Panj. p. 399:

243. स्वातं ज्ञातं ज्ञेयं ॥ १३५ ॥

244. Sva-citta-jñāna, knowing one’s own mind is possible in the same manner as pāra-citta-jñāna is. This is not, however,
swa-samvedana, self-knowledge of the Yogacaras, but simply one mind knowing the other mind.

240. आत्माच्छेन | सम्यक्कार्यमाहीति | न || १४४ ||
तथा ईश्वरेऽ विषयाचलनं स हुः।

246. Memory is not a perceptual cognition (graha), v. Pram. Sam. 1.6: Read Bodhi, Panji, p. 40-42 explaining it without accepting swa-samvedana, cp. Satyasiddhi chap. 91, same explanation of memory.

247. सत्सम्यक्कार्यमाहीति पूर्वः || १४४ ||
अम्र वासंत | यरूः | सत्सम्यक्कार्यमाहीति
a=Tib. don-ba-ston-min. The same expression in Vimsa.
Tib. version.

248. cp. Vimsa p. 10: ....... यथा। तथ्यितिसम्यक्कार्यः।
अस्तनामात्र: इत्यस्मातः। २२। तथा विषयसिद्धांसत्यमेव विषयालक्ष्यम। तथा
सत्सम्यक्कार्यः। यथा वासंतादि विषयसिद्धांसत्यमेव विषयालक्ष्यमाहीति

249. यथा सत्सम्यक्कार्य यथा अस्तनामात्र इत्यस्मातः।
Translation: The same expression in Vimsa.
Tib. version.

250. This is the Vaibhasika’s conception of Sarvajna.

251. अतिन्द्रभूमिप्रवेदी यथा अस्तनामात्र: || १४५ ||
अतिन्द्रभूमिप्रवेदी यथा अस्तनामात्र: || १४५ ||
अतिन्द्रभूमिप्रवेदी यथा अस्तनामात्र: || १४५ ||
अतिन्द्रभूमिप्रवेदी यथा अस्तनामात्र: || १४५ ||

252. Dignaga’s theory of anīrdeśa in Pram. Sam. 1.5: सत्तात्मा प्रवेदिते अतिन्द्रभूमिप्रवेदीसः

253. तथा अस्तनामात्र: || १४५ ||
तथा अस्तनामात्र: || १४५ ||
तथा अस्तनामात्र: || १४५ ||
तथा अस्तनामात्र: || १४५ ||

254. In the absence of an object nothing could be regarded as cognizer of it v. n. 249-50.

255. विषयालक्ष्यप्रवेदमेव सत्तात्मा प्रवेदिते || १४५ ||
सत्तात्मा प्रवेदिते || १४५ ||
सत्तात्मा प्रवेदिते || १४५ ||
सत्तात्मा प्रवेदिते || १४५ ||

256. सत्तात्मा प्रवेदिते || १४५ ||
सत्तात्मा प्रवेदिते || १४५ ||
सत्तात्मा प्रवेदिते || १४५ ||
सत्तात्मा प्रवेदिते || १४५ ||
257. यद्यपि इसमूलक सांख्यविचारम् ॥ १२ ॥
इस कारण में सांख्यी विद्या की आधारधारा ॥ १२ ॥
विशेष उल्लेखितः ।
a z lit. सांख्यविद् ।

258. अथ नैन्ति कठभन ।
स्वामी यज्ञवाला-भुदिनिर्दिष्टः न कैलास ॥ १२३ ॥
a z Th. der. sdugs. so.

259. This probably refers to Kumarila’s objection.

260. गणानुग्रहीताणां ६ अशासकोश्युज्ञान ।
राजाविद्वारसंगमः विश्वासः ६ परिवर्तने ॥ १४४ ॥
a z lit. विश्वासानुग्रहीताणां विद्वारसंगम ।
b z lit. विश्वासानुग्रहीताणां विद्वारसंगम ।

261. �-indent
इस कारण इसका उपयोग ।
विश्वासानुग्रहीता विश्वासः ६ अशासकोश्युज्ञान ॥ १२४ ॥
a z विश्वासः ६ अशासकोश्युज्ञान ।

262. युक्तिः परं परं चाल कृत्वा गुप्ताः ॥ १२५ ॥
सांख्यविद्या नस्ति विश्वासः ॥ १२५ ॥
a z lit. युक्तिः परं परं ।

263. This probably refers to the Sunyata-meditation as interpreted by the Yogacara.

264. गणानुग्रहीताणां ६ अशासकोश्युज्ञान ॥ १२५ ॥
इस कारण इसका उपयोग ।
विश्वासः ६ अशासकोश्युज्ञान ।

265. इस कारण इसका उपयोग ।
विश्वासानुग्रहीताणां ६ अशासकोश्युज्ञान ॥ १२५ ॥
a z युक्तिः परं परं ॥ १२५ ॥

266. It is interesting to note that the author’s statement to the effect that our idea of one entity (bhava) is an assumption on the discrete atoms.

267. युक्तिः परं परं ॥ १२६ ॥

268. युक्तिः परं परं ॥ १२६ ॥
विश्वासः ६ अशासकोश्युज्ञान ॥ १२५ ॥
a z add. युक्तिः परं परं ॥ १२५ ॥

269. युक्तिः परं परं ॥ १२५ ॥
विश्वासः ६ अशासकोश्युज्ञान ॥ १२५ ॥
a z add. युक्तिः परं परं ॥ १२५ ॥
269. It is historically true that the Buddha obtained his enlightenment as a result of long practices and effort. That enlightenment can not be obtained very easily and in a moment by the Yogis.

270. The author has summed up here how Buddhahood should be secured in the system of the Vaibhasikas.

271. They have summed up here how Buddhahood should be secured in the system of the Vaibhasikas.

272. The author has summed up here how Buddhahood should be secured in the system of the Vaibhasikas.

273. "cp. Vimsa. ver. 18: क्योर्सामार्गमात्मकम् क्योर्सामार्गमात्मकम्"

274. "cp. Vimsa. ver. 18: क्योर्सामार्गमात्मकम् क्योर्सामार्गमात्मकम्"

275. "cp. Vimsa. ver. 18: क्योर्सामार्गमात्मकम् क्योर्सामार्गमात्मकम्"

276. "cp. Vimsa. ver. 18: क्योर्सामार्गमात्मकम् क्योर्सामार्गमात्मकम्"

277. "cp. Vimsa. ver. 18: क्योर्सामार्गमात्मकम् क्योर्सामार्गमात्मकम्"

278. "cp. Vimsa. ver. 18: क्योर्सामार्गमात्मकम् क्योर्सामार्गमात्मकम्"

279. "cp. Vimsa. ver. 18: क्योर्सामार्गमात्मकम् क्योर्सामार्गमात्मकम्"

280. "cp. Vimsa. ver. 18: क्योर्सामार्गमात्मकम् क्योर्सामार्गमात्मकम्"

281. "cp. Vimsa. ver. 18: क्योर्सामार्गमात्मकम् क्योर्सामार्गमात्मकम्"

282. "cp. Vimsa. ver. 18: क्योर्सामार्गमात्मकम् क्योर्सामार्गमात्मकम्"
283. Tib. nan-thos-grol pas-min-dag-gi... *Savaraka-noksa* is the highest perfection attainable by any disciple of the Buddha.

284. यदि प्रमाणोऽपि, परमहंसः [209A] विषय इत्यते।

285. अत्यन्त पूर्वाधिकीर्तिपरं यथा पर्याय परिवर्धितम्।

286. एव तत्त्वाच बोधिप्रथाम चेतात्मिनन्दनकारादिकृतम्।

287. यथा हेर्मेस तत्लों, अय्यधिपतिः न विशेषः।


289. तथाद्यवाक्यारसः हृदि विशा पूर्वाधिकिषे।

290. This *prasanga* has been made, because the knowledge of smoke is not commensurate with the knowledge of fire; this will become clear from the just next verse.

291. भाषाप्रधानिन्तिः विषय पूर्वाधिकत्वं धर्म।

292. भयावहारिनीमेवचैव पूर्वकिष्णः यदि।

293. प्रतिस्पर्धारिः लक्षणाधिकारिः।

294. भयावहारिः विशालप्रधानिः पूर्वाधिकिषे।

295. The author, from here, attempts to offer his own interpretation of those passages which speak of *cittamārāja*.

296. यज्ञप्रथाश्रमे ज्वलं तदपि विषयं च विषयं।

297. येव यज्ञप्रथायेतुः तत्प्रज्ञाता नस्ति कर्मयोगः।

298. *az. lit. विषयं।*

299. This is the author’s explanation of *Dharmacairātya*, a Mahayanic idea of the external things. Thus, according to
hin all the passages declaring *dharna-nairatmya* are to be understood in the manner indicated here.

297. कार्यकारी विद्वान् गोरः यथा वातीतिकिरितिसः

हूँपूर्वत्काल बनालम बिंदत; वैतम, विकिरितसः [१५०]

298. *cp. ver.* वाते न विद्वान् गोरः यथा वातीतिकिरितिसः

वातावरित् विकरितावरम्यम् वैतम [१५१]


299. कार्यकारीस्तिवाट वातावरितकिरितसः

हूँपूर्वत्काल बनालम, वातावरितकिरितसः [१५२]

300. *Pudgala-nairatmya* is also accepted by the Sarvastivadi-Vai-bhasikas. The author here puts forth the reason for accepting it.

301. दलोपेतमाण्यम् कार्यकारी विकिरितसः

वातावरितत्र विकिरित; तु वातावरितम् [१५३]

वातावरित; कार्यकारी [कार्या] जैसे विकिरितसः

वातावरित; प्रभेद्येव बनालम नृपति [१५४]

302. It is well-known that the Yogacara accepts three characteris
tics, (laksana), viz. *Parikalpita, paratantra* and *parinipanna*. Likewise this author enumerates three things, viz. *kalpita, vikalpita* and *dharmata*, of which the last one is explained as *svalaksana* corresponding to *Parinipanna* of the Yogacara. *Kalpita*, a basic entity, i.e., *bhavanatraya* may correspond to *Paratantra* and *Vikalpita*, a false aspect imputed on may correspond to *parikalpita*. Thus according to this Vaibhasika author as in the case of the Yogacara, two things, *Kalpita* and *dharmata* are true whereas vikalpita like parikalpita of the Yogacara is untrue. That the *vikalpita* is untrue has already been pointed out in the note 297 above. It is entirely false in as much as fancied by worldly. *cp. ver.* 40. विकिरितसः वातावरित; नृपति [१५५]

*DHARMATA* is an everlasting truly true as it is the same as *svalaksana*, an everlasting *svabhava*. (svabhava: *svayamvadi casti* . . . ) *Kalpita* that is explained as *bhavanatraya*, a basic entity probably implies atomic foundations on which the various things are fancied. Atoms are *kalpita*, i.e. inferred. *ver. 64, (n. 111):* why the separate atoms are not cognized is made clear by the author in the verse 44 (n. 76), though the aggregate atoms are cognized in their *svalaksana*, *ver. 37. (n. 62)*
303. गवि र्यथा सुवृक्ष्य भ्रमण:- क्रयविदुः।
क्षरस्वन्याच्छेदलेले चेत्तु वंपल्त्त्वार्त्त्त्वातः॥ १५४॥

304. This is said probably with reference to the Madhyamika standpoint.

305. ताबागारे यथा (२१०५) राको चैत्य सत्य भव एव सः।
अभावादित्व समस्या भीष्म पञ्चवायलु वचनास्॥ १५५॥
a. Tib. dnigs smayin.

306. The author’s repeated argument of reality of the external things is avadannvada, a non-contradicted experience, v. vev. 5, (n. 5) 19 (n. 31) and 99. (n. 165).

307. This refers to the Madhyamika’s position. The sentence may also read thus: their experiences resemble the dream, and [therefore] are non-existent.

308. ताबागारे यथा अभावादित्वम्।
क नाभोपल्लु सो च विश्वास्तत पल्लुम्॥ १५६॥
a=lt. विश्वास्तत।

309. याबागारे संसारारहे मेण्ठु सुपारीरः।
विश्वास्तत साधनाम खर्त्रविन्ह वेदार्थम्॥ १५७॥

310. अतः भीष्म भीष्माधिपतिः तथा भीष्माधिपतिः भीष्म।
अभावादित्व महाराज पञ्चवायलु भीष्म कौसः॥ १५९॥
a. Tib. mon nzed. chen=साधक–
b. Tib. stye. ba glen=इकसः।
c. Tib. dkar po轰 dkar-paṅg-sig.
THE TIBETAN TEXT
1.  "གུན་ལོང་པ་རྩོམ་ཕྱིར་" (2021) ཨ་ཤེལ། རྲ་ཐོབ་དོན་བརྡ་བཀྲག་པརྒྱུད།
   དུས་རབས་ཀྱི་ཐོག་ཕྲོུ་ཏུ་ཁྲིམ་

2.  "བུ་བཟང་ཕྱི་གྲོ་སྡོད་པ་དྲི་" རྩ་ཐོབ་དོན་བརྡ་བཀྲག་པརྒྱུད།
   དུས་རབས་ཀྱི་ཐོག་ཕྲོུ་ཏུ་ཁྲིམ་
   ཁུ་བཟང་པོ་བཅུ་གཏོང་འོང་

3.  "དུས་རབས་ཀྱི་ཐོག་ཕྲོུ་ཏུ་ཁྲིམ་" རྩ་ཐོབ་དོན་བརྡ་བཀྲག་པརྒྱུད།
   དུས་རབས་ཀྱི་ཐོག་ཕྲོུ་ཏུ་ཁྲིམ་

4.  "པྲུ་བཟང་ཕྱི་གྲོ་སྡོད་པ་དྲི་" རྩ་ཐོབ་དོན་བརྡ་བཀྲག་པརྒྱུད།
   ཁུ་བཟང་པོ་བཅུ་གཏོང་འོང་
   དུས་རབས་ཀྱི་ཐོག་ཕྲོུ་ཏུ་ཁྲིམ་

5.  "བུ་བཟང་ཕྱི་གྲོ་སྡོད་པ་དྲི་" རྩ་ཐོབ་དོན་བརྡ་བཀྲག་པརྒྱུད།
   ཁུ་བཟང་པོ་བཅུ་གཏོང་འོང་

6.  "དུས་རབས་ཀྱི་ཐོག་ཕྲོུ་ཏུ་ཁྲིམ་" རྩ་ཐོབ་དོན་བརྡ་བཀྲག་པརྒྱུད།
   ཁུ་བཟང་པོ་བཅུ་གཏོང་འོང་
   དུས་རབས་ཀྱི་ཐོག་ཕྲོུ་ཏུ་ཁྲིམ་
17. ལུགས་པ་བོ་ཆེན་པོ་བོ་མི་བོ་ཕུལ། མཐོ་འཚོ་བོ་ཞེ་བར་ལེབ་པར་ཉེ་ཟིན། ལུགས་པ་བོ་ཆེན་པོ་ལེབ་པར་ཉེ་ཟིན། ལུགས་པ་བོ་ཆེན་པོ་བོ་མི་བོ་ཕུལ།
18. ལུགས་པ་བོ་ཆེན་པོ་བོ་མི་བོ་ཕུལ། ལུགས་པ་བོ་ཆེན་པོ་ལེབ་པར་ཉེ་ཟིན། ལུགས་པ་བོ་ཆེན་པོ་ལེབ་པར་ཉེ་ཟིན། ལུགས་པ་བོ་ཆེན་པོ་བོ་མི་བོ་ཕུལ།
19. ལུགས་པ་བོ་ཆེན་པོ་ལེབ་པར་ཉེ་ཟིན། ལུགས་པ་བོ་ཆེན་པོ་ལེབ་པར་ཉེ་ཟིན། ལུགས་པ་བོ་ཆེན་པོ་ལེབ་པར་ཉེ་ཟིན། ལུགས་པ་བོ་ཆེན་པོ་ལེབ་པར་ཉེ་ཟིན།
20. ལུགས་པ་བོ་ཆེན་པོ་ལེབ་པར་ཉེ་ཟིན། ལུགས་པ་བོ་ཆེན་པོ་ལེབ་པར་ཉེ་ཟིན། ལུགས་པ་བོ་ཆེན་པོ་ལེབ་པར་ཉེ་ཟིན། ལུགས་པ་བོ་ཆེན་པོ་ལེབ་པར་ཉེ་ཟིན།
21. ལུགས་པ་བོ་ཆེན་པོ་ལེབ་པར་ཉེ་ཟིན། ལུགས་པ་བོ་ཆེན་པོ་ལེབ་པར་ཉེ་ཟིན། ལུགས་པ་བོ་ཆེན་པོ་ལེབ་པར་ཉེ་ཟིན། ལུགས་པ་བོ་ཆེན་པོ་ལེབ་པར་ཉེ་ཟིན།
22. ལུགས་པ་བོ་ཆེན་པོ་ལེབ་པར་ཉེ་ཟིན། ལུགས་པ་བོ་ཆེན་པོ་ལེབ་པར་ཉེ་ཟིན། ལུགས་པ་བོ་ཆེན་པོ་ལེབ་པར་ཉེ་ཟིན། ལུགས་པ་བོ་ཆེན་པོ་ལེབ་པར་ཉེ་ཟིན།
23. ལུགས་པ་བོ་ཆེན་པོ་ལེབ་པར་ཉེ་ཟིན། ལུགས་པ་བོ་ཆེན་པོ་ལེབ་པར་ཉེ་ཟིན། ལུགས་པ་བོ་ཆེན་པོ་ལེབ་པར་ཉེ་ཟིན། ལུགས་པ་བོ་ཆེན་པོ་ལེབ་པར་ཉེ་ཟིན།
24. ལུགས་པ་བོ་ཆེན་པོ་ལེབ་པར་ཉེ་ཟིན། ལུགས་པ་བོ་ཆེན་པོ་ལེབ་པར་ཉེ་ཟིན། ལུགས་པ་བོ་ཆེན་པོ་ལེབ་པར་ཉེ་ཟིན། ལུགས་པ་བོ་ཆེན་པོ་ལེབ་པར་ཉེ་ཟིན།
25. ལུགས་པ་བོ་ཆེན་པོ་ལེབ་པར་ཉེ་ཟིན། ལུགས་པ་བོ་ཆེན་པོ་ལེབ་པར་ཉེ་ཟིན། ལུགས་པ་བོ་ཆེན་པོ་ལེབ་པར་ཉེ་ཟིན། ལུགས་པ་བོ་ཆེན་པོ་ལེབ་པར་ཉེ་ཟིན།
26. ལུགས་པ་བོ་ཆེན་པོ་ལེབ་པར་ཉེ་ཟིན། ལུགས་པ་བོ་ཆེན་པོ་ལེབ་པར་ཉེ་ཟིན། ལུགས་པ་བོ་ཆེན་པོ་ལེབ་པར་ཉེ་ཟིན། ལུགས་པ་བོ་ཆེན་པོ་ལེབ་པར་ཉེ་ཟིན།
27. དངོས་སོགས་དེ་རིགས་བཞི་བཞིར། དེ་བསྟན་ལ་བོད་རིགས་ཤེས་བཤེས།
   ཁུན་པོ་སྔོན་མ་ཚོས་བཤད་སྣོན།།
   དེ་བསྟན་ལ་བོད་རིགས་ཤེས་བཤེས།།
28. དེ་བསྟན་ལ་བོད་རིགས་ཤེས་བཤེས།
   དེ་བསྟན་ལ་བོད་རིགས་ཤེས་བཤེས།
29. ཁུན་པོ་སྔོན་མ་ཚོས་བཤད་སྣོན།
   ཁུན་པོ་སྔོན་མ་ཚོས་བཤད་སྣོན།
30. དེ་བསྟན་ལ་བོད་རིགས་ཤེས་བཤེས།
   ཁུན་པོ་སྔོན་མ་ཚོས་བཤད་སྣོན།
31. དེ་བསྟན་ལ་བོད་རིགས་ཤེས་བཤེས།
   ཁུན་པོ་སྔོན་མ་ཚོས་བཤད་སྣོན།
32. དེ་བསྟན་ལ་བོད་རིགས་ཤེས་བཤེས།
   ཁུན་པོ་སྔོན་མ་ཚོས་བཤད་སྣོན།
33. དེ་བསྟན་ལ་བོད་རིགས་ཤེས་བཤེས།
   ཁུན་པོ་སྔོན་མ་ཚོས་བཤད་སྣོན།
34. དེ་བསྟན་ལ་བོད་རིགས་ཤེས་བཤེས།
   ཁུན་པོ་སྔོན་མ་ཚོས་བཤད་སྣོན།
35. དེ་བསྟན་ལ་བོད་རིགས་ཤེས་བཤེས།
   ཁུན་པོ་སྔོན་མ་ཚོས་བཤད་སྣོན།
36. དེ་བསྟན་ལ་བོད་རིགས་ཤེས་བཤེས།
   ཁུན་པོ་སྔོན་མ་ཚོས་བཤད་སྣོན།
37. ཞེས་བསྡུས་པའི་དགོས་པོ་བསྡུས།  བསེ་བསྡུས་སངས་སོགས་བསྡུས།

38. མ་གས་པ་དེ་དེ་མི་འཐོར།  བསེ་བསྡུས་བསྡུས་སོགས་བསྡུས།

39. ཏོན་མ་ནག་བསྡུས་སོགས་བསྡུས།

40. དབང་ཆེན་འཆེད་དཔལ་བྲེལ།  དབང་ཆེན་འཆེད་དཔལ་བྲེལ།

41. དབང་ཆེན་འཆི་བའི་གཞོན་དཔལ།

42. དབང་ཆེན་འཆི་བའི་གཞོན་དཔལ།

43. དབང་ཕྱིན་རྐྱེན་བའི་སྨན་དཔལ།

44. དབང་ཕྱིན་རྐྱེན་བའི་སྨན་དཔལ།

45. དབང་ཕྱིན་རྐྱེན་བའི་སྨན་དཔལ།

46. དབང་ཕྱིན་རྐྱེན་བའི་སྨན་དཔལ།
47. གཞི་ལུང་ཐོབ་མཐོང་ཐོས་ལུང་། ལ་དོན་གྲོས་བན་པར་བཞི་།
    བོད་ལུང་ཕྱིར་ཐོས་བཅས་ལྟར་། 1

48. བོད་པོ་ཤི་བར་གཙུགས་དོན་གྲོས་ལུང་། ར་དོན་གྲོས་བན་པར་བཞི་།
    བོད་ལུང་ཕྱིར་ཐོས་བཅས་ལྟར་། 1

49. རིང་གཞི་བཟང་བསམ་བྱུས་པ་དོན་གྲོས་ལུང་། ར་དོན་གྲོས་བན་པར་བཞི་།
    བོད་ལུང་ཕྱིར་ཐོས་བཅས་ལྟར་། 1

50. འབྲོ་བོ་ཤི་བར་དགུ་བཞིའི་དོན་གྲོས་ལུང་། ར་དོན་གྲོས་བན་པར་བཞི་།
    བོད་ལུང་ཕྱིར་ཐོས་བཅས་ལྟར་། 1

51. ཀུན་ཤི་ཤི་བུ་རིག་པོ་བདེ་བས་དོན་གྲོས་ལུང་། ར་དོན་གྲོས་བན་པར་བཞི་།
    (2005) གཞི་ལུང་ཐོབ་མཐོང་ཐོས་ལུང་། ལ་དོན་གྲོས་བན་པར་བཞི་།

52. འབྲོ་བོ་ཤི་བར་དོན་གྲོས་ལུང་། ར་དོན་གྲོས་བན་པར་བཞི་།
    བོད་ལུང་ཕྱིར་ཐོས་བཅས་ལྟར་། 1

53. རྡོ་ཤི་ཤི་བུ་རིག་པོ་བདེ་བས་དོན་གྲོས་ལུང་། ར་དོན་གྲོས་བན་པར་བཞི་།
    བོད་ལུང་ཕྱིར་ཐོས་བཅས་ལྟར་། 1

54. ཤིང་གཞི་ཤི་ཤི་བུ་རིག་པོ་བདེ་བས་དོན་གྲོས་ལུང་། ར་དོན་གྲོས་བན་པར་བཞི་།
    བོད་ལུང་ཕྱིར་ཐོས་བཅས་ལྟར་། 1

55. རྡོ་ཤི་ཤི་བུ་རིག་པོ་བདེ་བས་དོན་གྲོས་ལུང་། ར་དོན་གྲོས་བན་པར་བཞི་།
    བོད་ལུང་ཕྱིར་ཐོས་བཅས་ལྟར་། 1

56. འབྲོ་བོ་ཤི་ཤི་བུ་རིག་པོ་བདེ་བས་དོན་གྲོས་ལུང་། ར་དོན་གྲོས་བན་པར་བཞི་།
    བོད་ལུང་ཕྱིར་ཐོས་བཅས་ལྟར་། 1
57. བརྟོས་པ་འབྲི་བརྙས་ཐོགས་བདག

58. ཤིག་ཕྲུལ་གྲོང་བྲོའི་ཞབས་འཛིན་མི།

59. སྤྱད་ཚོགས་བཙོ་བློ་བཟང་བཞི་

60. ཤིག་ཕྲུལ་གྲོང་བྲོའི་ཞབས་འཛིན་མི།

61. སྤྱད་ཚོགས་བཙོ་བློ་བཟང་བཞི

62. རྫོ་བུས་སྤེལ་བསྟན་འབྲི་བཞི་

63. ཤིག་ཕྲུལ་གྲོང་བྲོའི་ཞབས་འཛིན་མི།

64. སྤྱད་ཚོགས་བཙོ་བློ་བཟང་བཞི

65. ཤིག་ཕྲུལ་གྲོང་བྲོའི་ཞབས་འཛིན་མི།
76. མ་པོ་བུ་བབས་བསྟོད་པའི་(2004) ོང་ས་བབ་གཞན་འཐོབས།
བོད་རིགས་བཟང་པོ་ལྷན་རི་[ཤེལ་དོན་བཟང་པོ་]་

77. དད་པོ་ཁ་ཏ་གཞན་གཞུང་སློབ་[ཤེལ་མ་མངོན་ཞིབ་] དེ་བསྡུས་བཟང་པོ་ལྷན་རི།
བོད་རིགས་བཟང་པོ་ལྷན་རི་[ཤེལ་དོན་བཟང་པོ་]་

78. རིན་ཆེན་མའི་སྐད་པོར་བདེན་[དབང་ཕན་བཤེན་སྲོག] དེ་བསྡུས་བཟང་པོ་ལྷན་རི།
བོད་རིགས་བཟང་པོ་ལྷན་རི་[ཤེལ་དོན་བཟང་པོ་]་

79. རི་འཕྲིན་བོད་རིགས་བཟང་པོ་[ཤེལ་དོན་བཟང་པོ་]
བོད་རིགས་བཟང་པོ་[ཤེལ་དོན་བཟང་པོ་]་

80. རླིང་གིས་དང་དབང་སྡེ་བུ། [ཤེལ་དོན་བཟང་པོ་]
བོད་རིགས་བཟང་པོ་[ཤེལ་དོན་བཟང་པོ་]

81. ནང་གི་གྲངས་ཀྱི་ཤེལ་དོན་[ཤེལ་དོན་བཟང་པོ་]
གུང་གི་སྨད་ལམ། མཐོ་བོ། [ཤེལ་དོན་བཟང་པོ་]

82. ནང་གི་གྲངས་ཀྱི་ཤེལ་དོན་[ཤེལ་དོན་བཟང་པོ་]
གུང་གི་སྨད་ལམ། མཐོ་བོ། [ཤེལ་དོན་བཟང་པོ་]

83. ནང་གི་གྲངས་ཀྱི་ཤེལ་དོན་[ཤེལ་དོན་བཟང་པོ་]
གུང་གི་སྨད་ལམ། མཐོ་བོ། [ཤེལ་དོན་བཟང་པོ་]

84. ནང་གི་གྲངས་ཀྱི་ཤེལ་དོན་[ཤེལ་དོན་བཟང་པོ་]
གུང་གི་སྨད་ལམ། མཐོ་བོ། [ཤེལ་དོན་བཟང་པོ་]

85. ནང་གི་གྲངས་ཀྱི་ཤེལ་དོན་[ཤེལ་དོན་བཟང་པོ་]
གུང་གི་སྨད་ལམ། མཐོ་བོ། [ཤེལ་དོན་བཟང་པོ་]

86. ནང་གི་གྲངས་ཀྱི་ཤེལ་དོན་[ཤེལ་དོན་བཟང་པོ་]
གུང་གི་སྨད་ལམ། མཐོ་བོ། [ཤེལ་དོན་བཟང་པོ་]
88. | གཞི་བར་འེལ་བུ་མི་ཞིགི། | དྲུག་རབ་བོའི་བུག་ནུས།
   | གཞི་བར་འེལ་བུ་མི་ཞིགི། | དྲུག་རབ་བོའི་བུག་ནུས།
   | གཞི་བར་འེལ་བུ་མི་ཞིགི། | དྲུག་རབ་བོའི་བུག་ནུས།

89. | ཁུག་རྟོན་བོད་ཨོ་ལུང་དོན། | འཁོར་བཤད་གུ་ལུང་དོན།
   | ཁུག་རྟོན་བོད་ཨོ་ལུང་དོན། | འཁོར་བཤད་གུ་ལུང་དོན།
   | ཁུག་རྟོན་བོད་ཨོ་ལུང་དོན། | འཁོར་བཤད་གུ་ལུང་དོན།

90. | མི་ཐོག་དྲུག་འི་དབང་ལྡན། | འབྲས་བྲུག་བློ་ལྟོང་བུ།
   | མི་ཐོག་དྲུག་འི་དབང་ལྡན། | འབྲས་བྲུག་བློ་ལྟོང་བུ།
   | མི་ཐོག་དྲུག་འི་དབང་ལྡན། | འབྲས་བྲུག་བློ་ལྟོང་བུ།

91. | འབྲས་བྲུག་འི་དབང་ལྡན། | འབྲས་བྲུག་འི་དབང་ལྡན།
   | འབྲས་བྲུག་འི་དབང་ལྡན། | འབྲས་བྲུག་འི་དབང་ལྡན།
   | འབྲས་བྲུག་འི་དབང་ལྡན། | འབྲས་བྲུག་འི་དབང་ལྡན།

92. | འབྲས་བྲུག་འི་དབང་ལྡན། | འབྲས་བྲུག་འི་དབང་ལྡན།
   | འབྲས་བྲུག་འི་དབང་ལྡན། | འབྲས་བྲུག་འི་དབང་ལྡན།
   | འབྲས་བྲུག་འི་དབང་ལྡན། | འབྲས་བྲུག་འི་དབང་ལྡན།

93. | འབྲས་བྲུག་འི་དབང་ལྡན། | འབྲས་བྲུག་འི་དབང་ལྡན།
   | འབྲས་བྲུག་འི་དབང་ལྡན། | འབྲས་བྲུག་འི་དབང་ལྡན།
   | འབྲས་བྲུག་འི་དབང་ལྡན། | འབྲས་བྲུག་འི་དབང་ལྡན།

94. | འབྲས་བྲུག་འི་དབང་ལྡན། | འབྲས་བྲུག་འི་དབང་ལྡན།
   | འབྲས་བྲུག་འི་དབང་ལྡན། | འབྲས་བྲུག་འི་དབང་ལྡན།
   | འབྲས་བྲུག་འི་དབང་ལྡན། | འབྲས་བྲུག་འི་དབང་ལྡན།
95. ལུས་བཞིན་བ། ལུས་བཞིན་བ།
    ལུས་བཞིན་བ། ལུས་བཞིན་བ།

96. ཞྱིས་ོགས་པ་བཟི། ཞྱིས་ོགས་པ་བཟི།
    ཞྱིས་ོགས་པ་བཟི། ཞྱིས་ོགས་པ་བཟི།

97. ཞྱིས་ོགས་པ་བཟི། ཞྱིས་ོགས་པ་བཟི།
    ཞྱིས་ོགས་པ་བཟི། ཞྱིས་ོགས་པ་བཟི།

98. ཞྱིས་ོགས་པ་བཟི། ཞྱིས་ོགས་པ་བཟི།
    ཞྱིས་ོགས་པ་བཟི། ཞྱིས་ོགས་པ་བཟི།

99. ཞྱིས་ོགས་པ་བཟི། ཞྱིས་ོགས་པ་བཟི།
    ཞྱིས་ོགས་པ་བཟི། ཞྱིས་ོགས་པ་བཟི།

100. ཞྱིས་ོགས་པ་བཟི། ཞྱིས་ོགས་པ་བཟི།
    ཞྱིས་ོགས་པ་བཟི། ཞྱིས་ོགས་པ་བཟི།

101. ཞྱིས་ོགས་པ་བཟི། ཞྱིས་ོགས་པ་བཟི།
    ཞྱིས་ོགས་པ་བཟི། ཞྱིས་ོགས་པ་བཟི།

102. ཞྱིས་ོགས་པ་བཟི། ཞྱིས་ོགས་པ་བཟི།
    ཞྱིས་ོགས་པ་བཟི། ཞྱིས་ོགས་པ་བཟི།

103. ཞྱིས་ོགས་པ་བཟི། ཞྱིས་ོགས་པ་བཟི།
    ཞྱིས་ོགས་པ་བཟི། ཞྱིས་ོགས་པ་བཟི།

104. ཞྱིས་ོགས་པ་བཟི། ཞྱིས་ོགས་པ་བཟི།
    ཞྱིས་ོགས་པ་བཟི། ཞྱིས་ོགས་པ་བཟི།
105. "གསར་སྲེན་སྐད་དཔལ་བརྟེན་བྲུག ।  བློ་གྲངས་འཛིན་བྲུག་ ।  ལྷ་མྱིག་མགོ་གྲོ་བྱེད་ ।  བློ་གྲངས་དབང་ཤེས་བྱེད་ ।"

106. "གསར་སྲེན་སྐད་དཔལ་བརྟེན་བྲུག ।  བློ་གྲངས་འཛིན་བྲུག་ ।  ལྷ་མྱིག་མགོ་གྲོ་བྱེད་ ।  བློ་གྲངས་དབང་ཤེས་བྱེད་ ।"

107. "དབུང་བབྱུག་གི་དགེ་ ।  དེས་དཔལ་སྐབས་བྱེད་ ।  རྐྱ་རྣམ་ཞབས་གི་དགེ་ ।  དབུང་བབྱུག་གི་དགེ་ ।"

108. "དབུང་བབྱུག་གི་དགེ་ ।  དེས་དཔལ་སྐབས་བྱེད་ ।  སྲིད་མོ་ཞབས་གི་ ।  དབུང་བབྱུག་གི་དགེ་ ।"

109. "དབུང་བབྱུག་གི་དགེ་ ।  དེས་དཔལ་སྐབས་བྱེད་ ।  སྲིད་མོ་ཞབས་གི་ ।  དབུང་བབྱུག་གི་དགེ་ ।"

110. "དབུང་བབྱུག་གི་དགེ་ ।  དེས་དཔལ་སྐབས་བྱེད་ ।  སྲིད་མོ་ཞབས་གི་ ।  དབུང་བབྱུག་གི་དགེ་ ।"

111. "དབུང་བབྱུག་གི་དགེ་ ।  དེས་དཔལ་སྐབས་བྱེད་ ।  སྲིད་མོ་ཞབས་གི་ ।  དབུང་བབྱུག་གི་དགེ་ ।"

112. "དབུང་བབྱུག་གི་དགེ་ ।  དེས་དཔལ་སྐབས་བྱེད་ ।  སྲིད་མོ་ཞབས་གི་ ।  དབུང་བབྱུག་གི་དགེ་ ।"

113. "དབུང་བབྱུག་གི་དགེ་ ।  དེས་དཔལ་སྐབས་བྱེད་ ।  སྲིད་མོ་ཞབས་གི་ ।  དབུང་བབྱུག་གི་དགེ་ ।"
114. "\text{བོད་དོན་རྒྱ་མཚོ་དབྱེ་བཟུང་།}
\text{ད་ཀྱང་གི་མཚོ་དབྱེ་བཟུང་།}
\text{ད་ཀྱང་གི་མཚོ་དབྱེ་བཟུང་།}"

115. "\text{བོད་དོན་རྒྱ་མཚོ་དབྱེ་བཟུང་།}
\text{ད་ཀྱང་གི་མཚོ་དབྱེ་བཟུང་།}
\text{ད་ཀྱང་གི་མཚོ་དབྱེ་བཟུང་།}"

116. "\text{ནོར་པོ་མོ་རྒྱ་མཚོ་དབྱེ་བཟུང་།}
\text{ད་ཀྱང་གི་མཚོ་དབྱེ་བཟུང་།}
\text{ད་ཀྱང་གི་མཚོ་དབྱེ་བཟུང་།}"

117. "\text{ད་ཀྱང་གི་མཚོ་དབྱེ་བཟུང་།}
\text{ད་ཀྱང་གི་མཚོ་དབྱེ་བཟུང་།}
\text{ད་ཀྱང་གི་མཚོ་དབྱེ་བཟུང་།}
\text{ད་ཀྱང་གི་མཚོ་དབྱེ་བཟུང་།}

118. "\text{ད་ཀྱང་གི་མཚོ་དབྱེ་བཟུང་།}
\text{ད་ཀྱང་གི་མཚོ་དབྱེ་བཟུང་།}
\text{ད་ཀྱང་གི་མཚོ་དབྱེ་བཟུང་།}
\text{ད་ཀྱང་གི་མཚོ་དབྱེ་བཟུང་།}

119. "\text{ད་ཀྱང་གི་མཚོ་དབྱེ་བཟུང་།}
\text{ད་ཀྱང་གི་མཚོ་དབྱེ་བཟུང་།}
\text{ད་ཀྱང་གི་མཚོ་དབྱེ་བཟུང་།}
\text{ད་ཀྱང་གི་མཚོ་དབྱེ་བཟུང་།}

120. "\text{ད་ཀྱང་གི་མཚོ་དབྱེ་བཟུང་།}
\text{ད་ཀྱང་གི་མཚོ་དབྱེ་བཟུང་།}
\text{ད་ཀྱང་གི་མཚོ་དབྱེ་བཟུང་།}
\text{ད་ཀྱང་གི་མཚོ་དབྱེ་བཟུང་།}

121. "\text{ད་ཀྱང་གི་མཚོ་དབྱེ་བཟུང་།}
\text{ད་ཀྱང་གི་མཚོ་དབྱེ་བཟུང་།}
\text{ད་ཀྱང་གི་མཚོ་དབྱེ་བཟུང་།}
\text{ད་ཀྱང་གི་མཚོ་དབྱེ་བཟུང་།}

122. "\text{ད་ཀྱང་གི་མཚོ་དབྱེ་བཟུང་།}
\text{ད་ཀྱང་གི་མཚོ་དབྱེ་བཟུང་།}
\text{ད་ཀྱང་གི་མཚོ་དབྱེ་བཟུང་།}
\text{ད་ཀྱང་གི་མཚོ་དབྱེ་བཟུང་།}

123. "\text{ད་ཀྱང་གི་མཚོ་དབྱེ་བཟུང་།}
\text{ད་ཀྱང་གི་མཚོ་དབྱེ་བཟུང་།}
\text{ད་ཀྱང་གི་མཚོ་དབྱེ་བཟུང་།}
\text{ད་ཀྱང་གི་མཚོ་དབྱེ་བཟུང་།}
124. སྣོན་ལེན་དེ་དུ་དེ་བཞི། སྣོན་ལེན་དེ་དུ་དེ་བཞི།
    སོགས་ལེན་དེ་དུ་དེ་བཞི། སོགས་ལེན་དེ་དུ་དེ་བཞི།

125. སོགས་ལེན་དེ་དུ་དེ་བཞི། སོགས་ལེན་དེ་དུ་དེ་བཞི།
    སོགས་ལེན་དེ་དུ་དེ་བཞི། སོགས་ལེན་དེ་དུ་དེ་བཞི།

126. སོགས་ལེན་དེ་དུ་དེ་བཞི། སོགས་ལེན་དེ་དུ་དེ་བཞི།
    སོགས་ལེན་དེ་དུ་དེ་བཞི། སོགས་ལེན་དེ་དུ་དེ་བཞི།

127. སོགས་ལེན་དེ་དུ་དེ་བཞི། སོགས་ལེན་དེ་དུ་དེ་བཞི།
    སོགས་ལེན་དེ་དུ་དེ་བཞི། སོགས་ལེན་དེ་དུ་དེ་བཞི།

128. སོགས་ལེན་དེ་དུ་དེ་བཞི། སོགས་ལེན་དེ་དུ་དེ་བཞི།
    སོགས་ལེན་དེ་དུ་དེ་བཞི། སོགས་ལེན་དེ་དུ་དེ་བཞི།

129. སོགས་ལེན་དེ་དུ་དེ་བཞི། སོགས་ལེན་དེ་དུ་དེ་བཞི།
    སོགས་ལེན་དེ་དུ་དེ་བཞི། སོགས་ལེན་དེ་དུ་དེ་བཞི།

130. སོགས་ལེན་དེ་དུ་དེ་བཞི། སོགས་ལེན་དེ་དུ་དེ་བཞི།
    སོགས་ལེན་དེ་དུ་དེ་བཞི། སོགས་ལེན་དེ་དུ་དེ་བཞི།

131. སོགས་ལེན་དེ་དུ་དེ་བཞི། སོགས་ལེན་དེ་དུ་དེ་བཞི།
    སོགས་ལེན་དེ་དུ་དེ་བཞི། སོགས་ལེན་དེ་དུ་དེ་བཞི།

132. སོགས་ལེན་དེ་དུ་དེ་བཞི། སོགས་ལེན་དེ་དུ་དེ་བཞི།
    སོགས་ལེན་དེ་དུ་དེ་བཞི། སོགས་ལེན་དེ་དུ་དེ་བཞི།

133. སོགས་ལེན་དེ་དུ་དེ་བཞི། སོགས་ལེན་དེ་དུ་དེ་བཞི།
    སོགས་ལེན་དེ་དུ་དེ་བཞི། སོགས་ལེན་དེ་དུ་དེ་བཞི།
134. གས་བཟོ་བདོན་པ་དང་ལེན་པ།
    དགའ་པོ་བདོན་པ་དང་ལེན་པ།
    དགའ་པོ་བདོན་པ་དང་ལེན་པ།

135. སྲིད་པོ་བདོན་པ་དང་ལེན་པ།
    ཞེས་པོ་བདོན་པ་དང་ལེན་པ།
    ཞེས་པོ་བདོན་པ་དང་ལེན་པ།

136. སྲིད་པོ་བདོན་པ་དང་ལེན་པ།
    ཞེས་པོ་བདོན་པ་དང་ལེན་པ།
    ཞེས་པོ་བདོན་པ་དང་ལེན་པ།

137. སྲིད་པོ་བདོན་པ་དང་ལེན་པ།
    ཞེས་པོ་བདོན་པ་དང་ལེན་པ།
    ཞེས་པོ་བདོན་པ་དང་ལེན་པ།

138. སྲིད་པོ་བདོན་པ་དང་ལེན་པ།
    ཞེས་པོ་བདོན་པ་དང་ལེན་པ།
    ཞེས་པོ་བདོན་པ་དང་ལེན་པ།

139. སྲིད་པོ་བདོན་པ་དང་ལེན་པ།
    ཞེས་པོ་བདོན་པ་དང་ལེན་པ།
    ཞེས་པོ་བདོན་པ་དང་ལེན་པ།

140. སྲིད་པོ་བདོན་པ་དང་ལེན་པ།
    ཞེས་པོ་བདོན་པ་དང་ལེན་པ།
    ཞེས་པོ་བདོན་པ་དང་ལེན་པ།

141. སྲིད་པོ་བདོན་པ་དང་ལེན་པ།
    ཞེས་པོ་བདོན་པ་དང་ལེན་པ།
    ཞེས་པོ་བདོན་པ་དང་ལེན་པ།

142. སྲིད་པོ་བདོན་པ་དང་ལེན་པ།
    ཞེས་པོ་བདོན་པ་དང་ལེན་པ།
    ཞེས་པོ་བདོན་པ་དང་ལེན་པ།

143. སྲིད་པོ་བདོན་པ་དང་ལེན་པ།
    ཞེས་པོ་བདོན་པ་དང་ལེན་པ།
    ཞེས་པོ་བདོན་པ་དང་ལེན་པ།
144. རོག་དབུམ་ཀུན་ཡིད་ན་བཞིན་བཟོ་ན།
   དབུམ་པོ་མ་ཡིད་ཞེས་བོ་དུ་།

145. རོག་ནི་ཐུབ་པའི་སྐུལ་ཐུབ་མ་ལ།
   དབུམ་པོ་མ་ཡིད་ཞེས་བོ་དུ་།

146. ཡོན་ཏན་ཕྱིན་ལེན་དུ་སྡུག་པ།
   དབུམ་པོ་མ་ཡིད་ཞེས་བོ་དུ་།

147. རོག་དབུམ་ཀུན་ཡིད་ན་བཞིན་བཟོ་ན།
   དབུམ་པོ་མ་ཡིད་ཞེས་བོ་དུ་།

148. རོག་དབུམ་ཀུན་ཡིད་ན་བཞིན་བཟོ་ན།
   དབུམ་པོ་མ་ཡིད་ཞེས་བོ་དུ་།

149. རོག་དབུམ་ཀུན་ཡིད་ན་བཞིན་བཟོ་ན།
   དབུམ་པོ་མ་ཡིད་ཞེས་བོ་དུ་།

150. རོག་དབུམ་ཀུན་ཡིད་ན་བཞིན་བཟོ་ན།
   དབུམ་པོ་མ་ཡིད་ཞེས་བོ་དུ་།

151. རོག་དབུམ་ཀུན་ཡིད་ན་བཞིན་བཟོ་ན།
   དབུམ་པོ་མ་ཡིད་ཞེས་བོ་དུ་།

152. རོག་དབུམ་ཀུན་ཡིད་ན་བཞིན་བཟོ་ན།
   དབུམ་པོ་མ་ཡིད་ཞེས་བོ་དུ་།

153. རོག་དབུམ་ཀུན་ཡིད་ན་བཞིན་བཟོ་ན།
   དབུམ་པོ་མ་ཡིད་ཞེས་བོ་དུ་།
154. মানুষ না করলিমাতুক সে কী তুলে নিল | মনেতে শোন তার দেখী মনেতে | সেই প্রতি সে আজ সে যে যে কী প্রতি | এভাবের মায়ে যাচাই করছে ।

155. মন এক আঁধারে ব্যাধিগত জীবনে পড়ে নামে | পাহাড় গড়ে পাহাড়ের মুখে পড়ে | পাহাড় নীলান মুখে সুচনা করছে | পাহাড়ের পারে যায়ন দেখায় ।

156. পাহাড় গড়ে ব্যাধিগত জীবনে পড়ে | পাহাড় গড়ে পাহাড়ের মুখে পড়ে | পাহাড় নীলান মুখে সুচনা করছে | পাহাড়ের পারে যায়ন দেখায় ।

157. পাহাড় গড়ে ব্যাধিগত জীবনে পড়ে | পাহাড় গড়ে পাহাড়ের মুখে পড়ে | পাহাড় নীলান মুখে সুচনা করছে | পাহাড়ের পারে যায়ন দেখায় ।

158. পাহাড় গড়ে ব্যাধিগত জীবনে পড়ে | পাহাড় গড়ে পাহাড়ের মুখে পড়ে | পাহাড় নীলান মুখে সুচনা করছে | পাহাড়ের পারে যায়ন দেখায় ।

159. পাহাড় গড়ে ব্যাধিগত জীবনে পড়ে | পাহাড় গড়ে পাহাড়ের মুখে পড়ে | পাহাড় নীলান মুখে সুচনা করছে | পাহাড়ের পারে যায়ন দেখায় ।

160. পাহাড় গড়ে ব্যাধিগত জীবনে পড়ে | পাহাড় গড়ে পাহাড়ের মুখে পড়ে | পাহাড় নীলান মুখে সুচনা করছে | পাহাড়ের পারে যায়ন দেখায় ।

161. পাহাড় গড়ে ব্যাধিগত জীবনে পড়ে | পাহাড় গড়ে পাহাড়ের মুখে পড়ে | পাহাড় নীলান মুখে সুচনা করছে | পাহাড়ের পারে যায়ন দেখায় ।

162. পাহাড় গড়ে ব্যাধিগত জীবনে পড়ে | পাহাড় গড়ে পাহাড়ের মুখে পড়ে | পাহাড় নীলান মুখে সুচনা করছে | পাহাড়ের পারে যায়ন দেখায় ।

163. পাহাড় গড়ে ব্যাধিগত জীবনে পড়ে | পাহাড় গড়ে পাহাড়ের মুখে পড়ে | পাহাড় নীলান মুখে সুচনা করছে | পাহাড়ের পারে যায়ন দেখায় ।
164. [བཟོད་ཕྲོད་བཟོད་པར་བཟོད་།] [བཟོད་ཕྲོད་བཟོད་པར་བཟོད་།]
165. [བཟོད་ཕྲོད་བཟོད་པར་བཟོད་།] [བཟོད་ཕྲོད་བཟོད་པར་བཟོད་།]
166. [བཟོད་ལེན་བཟོད་པར་བཟོད་པར་བཟོད་པར་བཟོད་] [བཟོད་ལེན་བཟོད་པར་བཟོད་] [བཟོད་ལེན་བཟོད་] [བཟོད་ལེན་བཟོད་]
167. [བཟོད་ལེན་བཟོད་] [བཟོད་ལེན་བཟོད་] [བཟོད་ལེན་བཟོད་] [བཟོད་ལེན་བཟོད་]
168. [བཟོད་ལེན་བཟོད་] [བཟོད་ལེན་བཟོད་] [བཟོད་ལེན་བཟོད་] [བཟོད་ལེན་བཟོད་]
169. [བཟོད་ལེན་བཟོད་] [བཟོད་ལེན་བཟོད་] [བཟོད་ལེན་བཟོད་] [བཟོད་ལེན་བཟོད་]
170. [བཟོད་ལེན་བཟོད་] [བཟོད་ལེན་བཟོད་] [བཟོད་ལེན་བཟོད་] [བཟོད་ལེན་བཟོད་]
171. [བཟོད་ལེན་] [བཟོད་ལེན་] [བཟོད་ལེན་] [བཟོད་ལེན་]
172. [བཟོད་ལེན་] [བཟོད་ལེན་] [བཟོད་ལེན་] [བཟོད་ལེན་]
173. [བཟོད་ལེན་] [བཟོད་ལེན་] [བཟོད་ལེན་] [བཟོད་ལེན་]
174. [text]
175. [text]
176. [text]
177. [text]
178. [text]
179. [text]
180. [text]
181. [text]
182. [text]
183. [text]
1. This introductory sentence is not found in the Snar-thang edn. (= N.)

2. N. དགའ་

3. N. རྡོ་ for རྡོ་

4. Peking (= P.) རྡོ་རྟེན་

5. P. རྡོ་

6. P. རྡོ་ for རྡོ་

7. P. རྡོ་

8. P. རྡོ་

9. P. རྡོ་

10. P. རྡོ་

11. P. རྡོ་

12. P. རྡོ་

13. N. རྡོ་

14. P. རྡོ་

15. P. རྡོ་ (?)
16. P. तृप्ति
17. N. अवधारणा
18. P. रमण
19. P. विषय
20. P. द्वार
21. P. नाद
22. P. चित्र

Verse 95a: Read धुन्सिन for धुन्सम.
“d” Read दक्षिणम् =किता for दक्षिणा ग्राम
TIBETAN-SANSKRIT GLOSSARY
(Figure refers to the verse number)

68.

81. 101.

86. 101.

88. 101.

88. 68.

95.

98. 29.

104.

107.

114.

117.

87.

87.

87.
93

མཐོང་ དུས་ཀྱི་གཞག་འབྱུང་པོ་སྣྲུབ་ སྤྱོད་བུ་སྤྱོད་པ་ 95.

བོད་ནི་ཕན་ 83, 71.

ཏོ་ དི་ཤུ་མ་

ོགས་ཤེས་ དགུ་དཔེ་ སྒོ་བོ་སྐྱེས་ བོ སྦྱོང་ 35.

གཞན་ཚིག་ མཐོང་ 87, 8 གཞན་ 87, 29.

ཉོ་ཁོ་མངོན་ འདོར་བོ སྒོ་ 89.

ང་ ལོ་ ལོ་ pro. instrumental ཉོ་ ང་ རི་

བོད་ཀྱི་བཤད་ཀྱི་ཤེས་ཤིང་ 83.

དོན་སྟོབས་ དཔེ་ སྐྱེས་ སྒྲོལ་ རྒྱུས་ 68.

དོན་ ལྷོ་ ལྷོ་ སྐྱེས་ སྒྲོལ་ རྒྱུས་ 95.

བོད་ཀྱི་ཤེས་ དཔེ་ སྐྱེས་ སྒྲོལ་ རྒྱུས་ 87.

དོན་ ལྷོ་ ལྷོ་ སྐྱེས་ སྒྲོལ་ རྒྱུས་ 87.

དོན་ ལྷོ་ ལྷོ་ སྐྱེས་ སྒྲོལ་ རྒྱུས་ 89.

དོན་ ལྷོ་ ལྷོ་ སྐྱེས་ སྒྲོལ་ རྒྱུས་ 44, 66, 87; མ: 71.

དོན་ ལྷོ་ ལྷོ་ སྐྱེས་ སྒྲོལ་ རྒྱུས་ 89.

དོན་ ལྷོ་ ལྷོ་ སྐྱེས་ སྒྲོལ་ རྒྱུས་ 101.

དོན་ ལྷོ་ ལྷོ་ སྐྱེས་ སྒྲོལ་ རྒྱུས་ 101.

བོད་ཀྱི་ཤེས་ ངག་ཏྱོག་ སྨན་ སྨན་ སྐྱེས་ སྒྲོལ་ རྒྱུས་ 35.

བོད་ཀྱི་ཤེས་ ངག་ཏྱོག་ སྨན་ 44.

ོགས་ནི་ཕན་ འདོར་བོ སྒོ་ 89.
संभवतः प्रो. गणेश, ब. कुमार
कृपया स्वागत 87. ब. गृहयुक्त
-पृथक्काल हिंदुस्तानी संयुक्त नक्काश के विरासत 95.
-पृथक्काल विज्ञान 101.
-पृथक्काल विज्ञान 87. ब. रघुनाथ
-पृथक्काल हिंदुस्तानी संयुक्त नक्काश 81.
-पृथक्काल हिंदुस्तानी संयुक्त नक्काश 44.
-पृथक्काल विज्ञान 87.
-पृथक्काल हिंदुस्तानी संयुक्त नक्काश 44.
-पृथक्काल विज्ञान 29.
-पृथक्काल विज्ञान 87. ब. गृहयुक्त
-पृथक्काल हिंदुस्तानी संयुक्त नक्काश 68.
-पृथक्काल हिंदुस्तानी संयुक्त नक्काश 44.
-पृथक्काल हिंदुस्तानी संयुक्त नक्काश 29.
-पृथक्काल हिंदुस्तानी संयुक्त नक्काश 66.
-पृथक्काल हिंदुस्तानी संयुक्त नक्काश 71, 81.
-पृथक्काल हिंदुस्तानी संयुक्त नक्काश 87.
-पृथक्काल हिंदुस्तानी संयुक्त नक्काश 29.
-पृथक्काल हिंदुस्तानी संयुक्त नक्काश पुरस्कार हिंदुस्तानी संयुक्त नक्काश 81.
मदुलिपति शरण 89. ए. अधिकारी

लाहकः वह 35. ए. तुक

— वहाँ 66.

— कहाँ वहाँ 89.

लेख प्रो. लेखकः वे 89. ए. देवकृष्णन

सति 89.

भासकः अन्य 66.

—भासकः कवि 71.

सति — शहर 71. तुका

अन्य 71. तुका

मालिकः का 71. तुका

अतिक्रान्तकर हस्ताक्षर: 101.

—द्वार 71. महाकाव्य 101.

पुरुषभाषानुसार शिलालेखन 81.

— शिलालेखन अनुसार शिलालेखन 66. (III. शिलालेखन शिलालेखन)

अधिकारी धारा 89. परिचय 71.

सति वस्तु 71.

सति — अन्य 44.

सति प्रकटित प्रो. प्रिय स — 95.

कहाँ 66. ए. तुका

— तुका 44. ए. तुका

न व्यक्त 35. ए. तुका

— तुका 44. ए. तुका
—་དོན་རྩེ་འདོད་པའི།

_—་,_ pro. locative v. ས་_ འིན་

_སེམས་_ བཙན 81.

_སེམས་པ་_ རང 101.

_བོད་ཀྱང་བོད་ལོངས་པའི།_ སྐོ͘ར་ཆད་ལེན་བསོད་

_བོད་ལོངས་པའི།_ རབ་ 66.

_བོད་པོ་ཉིམ་_ རབ་ 29.

_བོད་_ pro. ལམ་

_བོད་ཀྱང་བོད་ལོངས་པའི།_ དཔལ་ཐབས་ 68.

_བོད་ཀྱང་བོད་ལོངས་པའི།_ ཞེས་ཞིག 95.

_བོད་ཀྱང་བོད་ལོངས་པའི།_ རིཤི་ 95. v. ས་

_བོད་ཀྱང་བོད་ལོངས་པའི།_ རིཤི་ 68.

_བོད་ཀྱང་བོད་ལོངས་པའི།_ ཨེ་ཤིང་སེར་ 68.

_བོད་ཀྱང་བོད་ལོངས་པའི།_ གྲུབ་ རབ་ 29.

_བོད་ཀྱང་བོད་ལོངས་པའི།_ གྲུབ་ རིཤི་ 66.

_བོད་ཀྱང་བོད་ལོངས་པའི།_ བོད་ 71. v. ས་_ འིན་

_བོད་ཀྱང་བོད་ལོངས་པའི།_ བོད་ 81. v. ས་_ འིན་

_བོད་ཀྱང་བོད་ལོངས་པའི།_ བོད་ 71.

_བོད་ཀྱང་བོད་ལོངས་པའི།_ བོད་ 81. sino. Tib.
"Holding the banner of wolf symbolises holding by force, that is, conquest."  

It is true that the expression "grey wolf" is used much later than "wolf", though ordinarily the colour of the wolf is grey in Tibet as in other parts of the world too (2). The first instances—in the works on Mahakala (mgon-po erahö) and Kila (phur-pa erahö) in Kanjur (bkas’-‘gur erahö) and Tenjur (bstan-‘gyur erahö) (3)—did not use the epithet grey while later in Sakya Kabbam (ska-skya-bka’-bum erahö) (4), Rinchen Terzer (rin-chen-gter-mchod erahö) (5) and the 5th Dalai Lama’s (lha-spu-gter-mchod erahö) works, (6) the epithet was quite current.

When the Mandala (dkyil-khor erahö) (7) of a deity was threatened by the evil spirits an animal like tiger, elephant or wolf emerged from the body of the same deity to protect the Mandala. The fat of the wolf is used in Tantric (rgyud erahö) chemistry (8) and some Mandala is surrounded by eight graves and also eight different creatures (9). Wolf is one among the eight creatures.

In Eastern Tibet (kham erahö) a traveller would regard it as a good omen, if he comes across a hawk, a kite or a wolf on the way. This belief can perhaps be traced back to King Gesar (gesar erahö). Gesar had three big generals who were represented by these three creatures. In the epic of Gesar one reads about the general who was symbolised by wolf and who described himself as the wolf of a man who killed or preyed on others as if they were lambs (10).

There are possibilities that the grey wolf motif itself might have developed in Khotan (hi-yul erahö) and had come to Tibet via India, in the time of Guru Padmasambhava (eighth century A.C.). The Tsenmars (tsi’u-dmar-po erahö) and his six brothers appeared as wolves in seven different colours and approached Guru Padmasambhava, desiring to distrub him while he was in meditation in a grave in India (11). On asking who the demons
were, Guru was told that they were the sons of the king of Khotan. By his supernatural power the seven demons were made to be the protectors of the Doctrine. They are known as Tsenmar Pun Dun (bsan-dmar-spun-bdun) in Tibet.

In Tibetan literature the banner of wolf (spyang k'i-rgyal-mtshan) is found in the books on Gyalpo Ku-nga (rgyal-po-skhu-ha: five kings who are the protectors of the monasteries and the State Oracles of Tibet) who are known as “to-bun-ke-gham” in Mongolia. In those books the symbolic meaning is as explained above in the opening para. Among those deities, the chief deity known as Pehar (pe-har) or Pekar (pe-kar) is sometimes addressed as the god of war of all men (skyes-bu-yongs-kyi-dgra-lha) or simply as great god of war (dgra-lha-chen-pc) who came to Tibet in the eighth century from Bhatar Hor (bha-ta-hor) (13). The books on these deities narrate almost the same story about the appearance of Pehar—first in Khotan, then in Bhatar Hor (Mongolia) and finally in Tibet (14). It is said that after the completion of Samye (bsam-yas) monastery the Guru asked a serpents to be the guardian of the monastery but it refused (15). Then the Guru advised the king Thrinpo Tseten (khrri-rgong-lde-bsan) to send an army to Bhatar Hor for bringing certain objects from the Gomda (sgom-grwa, Meditation School). An army was sent and they ransacked that school and brought the objects which included a small turquoise image of the Buddha and a mask (16). These were in the monastery of Samye till 1959. Pehar, as custodian of religious property in that school could not leave the site but had to follow those articles, as it was said by Guru. Thereupon he was appointed by the Guru as the guardian of the monastery. There is a temple in Samye which is known as Pehar Chog (pe-har-loog) and on which there was a banner of wolf on the roof of the temple on the north (17). Mongolia being on the north of Tibet, the northern direction is significant.

It is interesting to note that in Tibetan tradition a deity riding a grey wolf or having a grey wolf head is usually found on the north, northwest or back of the principal deity surrounded by its retinues (18). In Mongolia the word for north, umar-a, also stands for back.

The animals which the Dharmapalas (Defenders of Law) have are tiger, wolf, kite, crow and owl etc. Thu'u Kan (thu'u-bkan) divides the day and night into six periods and finds the
evil spirits disguised in six forms. To subdue these evils there are six retinues; for instances, when an evil spirit appears in the form of a sheep, the wolf is the subduer of it (19).

Dhalha (dge-’bal-ba) [god of war, see Sarat Chandra Das: Tibetan English Dictionary] is one of the five gods, who are inseparable companions of humanity. Dhalha is accompanied by a wolf and a hawk; it is said that Dhalha let emanations of wolves and hawks (20).

The Turks might have got grey wolf banner from Tibet. When the third Dalai Lama visited the Mongol Khan in the 16th century, as it was prophesied in Kadam Leshtam (bla’-gams-glegs-bam ye-sgrags-pa) and also by Chogyal Phagpa (chos-rgyal-phags-pa) (21), he (D.L.) built a monastery which included a temple named Pehar Chog (22). Whether there was a wolf banner or not on the roof of that temple but there must have been paintings of all the retinues of the Pehar. Among the retinues of Pehar, some hold the banner of wolf (23).

The third Dalai Lama was born in Water Rabbit year corresponding to 1543 and passed away in Mongolia in Earth Rat year, that is, 1588. A recent traveller to Mongolia says that Erdeni Tsu, the largest monastery, was founded in 1586 (24). Though the founder of the monastery is not mentioned in this travel book, one can guess by its date that the third Dalai Lama may have been the founder of it.

A special importance of the wolf for the Mongols is that the first Mongol king had the name Borte-chinia which means grey-blue wolf (25); and the Mongols also believed that their first king was descended from the Tibetan kings. The Mongol historians say that he was the youngest son of Dalai Subin Aru Altan Shiregetu (Tibetan gri-gum-bsdan-po) whose name was Shaza Thi (sha-zas-khi), means flesh eater) and his two brothers fled to Kongo (kong-po) after their father’s assassination (26). From there he crossed over the Tenggis Sea in the direction of the north and came to the land of the Mongols (27). Mongol Chronicles of the Seventeenth century say “there gongbo-yin utus-i ulu nigezsen” meaning that he (Borte-chinia) did not trust the Kongo people (28). and came to Mongolia. On the other hand the Tibetan historians as Golotsawa (gser-los-’tsa-wa) and Sonam Gyaltseten (sod-nams-rgyal-mtsho) and fifth Dalai Lama describe the first Mongol king Borta Che (sbor-tsa-che), the son
of Heaven (29) and about Shaza Thib, they said that he later on became the king of Kongpo (30).

The wolf was also described as the god of the travellers (‘gro-lha ལྷ་) (31). It is however difficult to say whether the association of wolf with travels is Bon (པོན) or Buddhist (ངནག-པ་) (32).

NOTES

(1) རྫུང་ རྣམ་གློག་ རྒྱུད་ རྫུང་ རྣམ་གློག་ རྒྱུད་ Vol. ལ་: རྫུང་ རྣམ་གློག་ རྒྱུད་ pp. 10, 11; and རྫུང་ རྣམ་གློག་ རྒྱུད་ Vol. ལ་: book No. 37, pp. 13, 19.


Tenjur རྫུང་ Vol. ལ་: p. 185.


(5) རྫུང་ རྣམ་གློག་ རྒྱུད་ Vol. ལ་: རྫུང་ རྣམ་གློག་ རྒྱུད་ pp. 8, 12; and Vol. ལ་: རྫུང་ རྣམ་གློག་ རྒྱུད་ pp. 3, 6.

(6) Fifth Dalai Lama Vol. ལ་: རྫུང་ རྣམ་གློག་ རྒྱུད་ རྫུང་ རྣམ་གློག་ རྒྱུད་ pp. 177, 188; རྫུང་ རྣམ་གློག་ རྒྱུད་ Vol. ལ་: p. 5.


(8) Kanjur རྫུང་ Vol. ལ་: p. 56.

(9) Tenjur རྫུང་ Vol. ལ་: p. 185.
(10) Ms. with author part II, p. 35. reads as: "..."

(11) Vol. 3: "..."

(12) RENE DE NEBESKY: *Oracles and Demons of Tibet* (London 1916) p. 16.

(13) Ms. in Namgyal Institute of Tibetology p. 160; and same thing is said by the Fifth Dalai Lama: Vol. 3: p. 13. In the Golden-Annals the Bhaṭa Hor is described as middle (मन्द) Mongolia. see part I, p. 3, in LOKESH CHANDRA (ed. New Delhi 1964)


(18) Vol. 3: "..."

(20) Ms. with author. p. 86; book No. 43, p. 2.


(22) Fifth Dalai Lama: Vol. 5: "...and the king..." (Life story of the III Dalai Lama) p. 96.


(25) Ms. in NIT p. 90; Mr. Ms. in NIT p. 27 and *The Mongol Chronicle Altan Tobei* (Wiesbaden 1955), p. 113.

(29) 新京拉梅·西藏阿里·白卡·布巴·书No. 4: p. 26 and GEORGE N. ROERICH: *The Blue Annals* (Calcutta 1949) part I, p. 57 and 新京拉梅·西藏阿里·白卡·布巴·书No. 11: p. 177.

(30) 新京拉梅·西藏阿里·白卡·布巴·书No. 27: 新京拉梅·西藏阿里·白卡·布巴·书No. 87: *The Red Annals* (NIT 1961) and *Primary School Reader 5*, published by the Council for Tibetan Education 1963) p. 148.

All these books mention their (three sons of 䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞䝞东盟龙: p. 136.
Price per copy Rupees Five

Bulletin of Tibetology along with other publications of Namgyal Institute of Tibetology are available with

KEGAN PAUL, TRENCHE, TRUBNER & Co.
63 Gee Avenue Street
London W. G. 1

FIRMA K. L. MUKHOPADHYAY
63A Baburaham Alur Lane
Calcutta 12

and all leading bookdealers