वाह्यसिद्धिकारिकानाम II
कृत्विनासिद्धिकारिकां,जयसरसीसमस्रासयम्।

BAHYARTHA SIDDHI KARIKA

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BAHYARTHA SIDDHI KARIKA

Introductory

Genesis of the Treatise.

We have in the collection of Tibetan Tripitaka Tangyur five works attributed to Bhadanta Subhagupta in the following order: (1) Sarvajnasicchikatika, (2) Bhauryasiddhi Kari ka (3) Sutiparipaksa, (4) Anyapaktecavata, (5) Isvaradipakakarika. Of these the second, viz. Bhauryasiddhi, Tib. phy.rol.gyi.don.grub, pa is the most valuable and interesting. It consists of about 190 verses (as it stood) counted for convenience into 188 verses.

The purpose of the treatise, as its title implies, is to refute the Yogacara idealistic philosophy and to prove the reality of the external universe from the standpoint of the Sarvastivada-Vaibhasika. Vasubandhu, for example, in his Vimuktiksa elaborated a good deal to demonstrate the impossibility of atomic theory of the Vaisesikas. Dignaga again in his Abhidhammaparipaksa confirmed Vasubandhu's opinion on the basis of his logical and epistemological foundations.

Next the upholder of the Idealistic School of Buddhism was Dharmakirti who embarked on the task of establishing his philosophy of absolute Idealism by enumerating several logical arguments. Of those, the argument of Suhopalantha-niyama, concomitance of co-cognition is most powerful and proverbial with all the posterior writers of Indian philosophy. Now the uphill task of reviewing all the arguments set up by the above masters of Idealism rests with Bhadanta Subhagupta, a renowned master of the Vaibhasika school of Buddhism. Subhagupta, in the present treatise takes up to examine in detail all the points raised in favour of Idealism and succeeds in presenting his case, the case of the Vaibhasika masters (on the subject) so brilliantly and vehemently that still later some masters, like Santarakshita and Kamalasila could not remain without making another attempt to vindicate their own positions in opposition to Subhagupta's premise. In course of their examination into Externalism (Bhairartopaaparidhaka) they quote Subhagupta's passages verbatim and refute his arguments one by one. Thus we have about 11 verses of Subhagupta cited all of which are traced in the present treatise (see verses Nos. 29, 35, 44, 66, 68, 71, 81, 87, 89, 95, 91). Kamalasila cites also some prose passages (v. Panjika, p. 574, 20) from Subhagupta giving rise to a surmise that Subhagupta might have also written some commentary on the treatise which is not translated into Tibetan.
This appraisal of the treatise may give a fair idea of when the author Subhāgūpta must have flourished. His time must be fixed between Dharmakirti (650 A.D.) and Santarakṣita-Kamalakirti (700-80 A.D.). He must be also anterior to Akaśānta, a Jain author (c. 700 A.D.) since the latter quotes the former in his Niyāyavaniścaya the verses: sāka-saṅbhvesa loke 'mī, etc. (Bhāyāratha, ver. 71). We may therefore place him during 650-700 A.D. (Cf. T. Sanghab, Intro. XXXIV).

REVIEW OF TOPICS

Now let us make a brief survey of the whole contents of the treatise. One of the most powerful arguments in favour of Idealism is the example of dream experiences. Subhāgūpta refutes it by pointing out the differences between the wake experiences which are never contradicted and the dreams which are always contradicted. To the convention of the Yogacara that all our knowledge and experience are illusory, the author replies that some knowledge may err on account of some defect in our cognitive apparatus but to say that it err even in the absence of such defects creates an absolute darkness in the universe (v. ver. 31 with note).

Dignāga holds that because each atom is not separately cognized there could be no atoms at all; the author points out in reply that the reason, i.e. non-cognition of atoms in isolation (saṅkalpa-apariccheda) is not conclusive; mind and mental phenomena, though not separately experienced, exist (v. ver. 33, 34). He maintains further that atoms cannot appear in life in isolation; when they appear in association with others they loose their atomic characteristics; how, then, could each of the atoms be reflected in our consciousness?—he asks (ver. 43). On an external material object which is constituted of several atoms, we have an idea of 'one' but this idea of oneness is illusory and is produced as a result of cognition of the uninterrupted and homogeneous atoms (ver. 35) and that is our mental construction (36). The atoms being congealed into an integrated form discharge a uniform action and therefore they cannot be designated as non-substances (40).

Vasubandhu's criticism of atomic theory on the basis of spatial distinction (dīghaṅgabheda) which contradicts the theory itself is not at all reasonable; for we hold that there is no space apart from the atoms themselves. When we talk of space we mean the atoms themselves spread in certain fashion (45-46). The conception of one whole (mahāyānī) is also illogical. If you
consider it possible as a result of the atoms being closely knit together in a large number, you may better also conceive one time-unit on the moments that are preceding and succeeding in an uninterrupted succession (50). Atoms have a peculiar relationship amongst themselves due to which no intruder could enter in the midst of atoms; by virtue of the same relationship the covering of atoms by other atoms has been upheld and therefore there is not any reason to presume the atoms have parts (52). The atoms, though mutually unrelated and partless become collocated and accomplish the gross things like the globe of earth, etc, on account of some excellence of mutual efficiency (samgrahavisesa) (56-57). Certain number of atoms alone enter into combination by virtue of that substance-efficiency (adantar-sakti) but there are many others which could not do so on account of their meagre power (58-59). The atoms could be counted by some spiritually advanced saints alone and therefore conceive them to be existing even though we do not cognize them. (65).

Next the author taking up to examine the maxim of Sahajamambudiyama remarks that the knowledge is only cognizet and that too is only in the presence of some visible object and therefore they are cognized simultaneously but this fact does not testify their identity (67). Then the said how, reason has been pointed out to be defective in several respects; sometimes it is indefinite, sometimes contradictory and sometimes unproved and so on. The term saha 'together' always implies a companion and if there is really Sahajamambudiyama, 'together-cognition', the reason will obviously prove the contrary to what is cherished. The object felt by some other person in his own mind cannot be denied by us because it is far removed from our cognizance. The meaning of Sahajamambudiyama according to the author is that when the knowledge-factors, sense-organ, etc. being present previously produce the sensuous consciousness in the next moment, then it may be termed Sahajamambudiyama (82). Speaking truly, the knowledge is not at all cognized, but it is said to be cognized figuratively since it cognizes its object by the law of nature. But the object is indeed cognized since it gives rise to its knowledge (85). To the question: How a knowledge cognizes, the author replies: the knowledge functions as if it measures the external thing (90-92).

We have to take note here that the author does not plead, as the Sautrantika does, that the knowledge cognizes through the process of assuming the image of its object. Therefore he says: The image which you presume as existent in the object-
knowledge truly exists in the external things alone and not in
the knowledge (95). This image-theory is not favoured by the
advocates of Cittamātra, idea-alone in the ultimate plane of
existence. The point becomes evident from the following statement
of the author: "You plead that the knowledge which, in fact,
is imageless experiences its unreal images. I, likewise, advocate
that the imageless knowledge experiences real things (102). He
makes his position further clear by saying that the conscious-
ness which is imageless and formless comprehends (garicūla)
through the agency of material sense-organs like the eye, etc.
(105). The author turns the image theory as an unfavourable
proposition to the opponent thus:

When a consciousness—form is accepted to be shared
by the form of an object, how does it mean that the
consciousness comprehends it? (90). When we maintain that
consciousness flasher up in the presence of its object, your
query as to how it does so is an irrelevant question (91).
The consciousness is not creator of its object; nevertheless
people on its simple awareness of its content, attribute to
it a creative function (92). The author's realistic outlook is
quite obvious in his solemn declaration that the process of
perceiving the external things is the same with the saints
as with the worldly, with this much difference that the
former is characterized by his detached and comprehensive
vision (Sāravatāvādhiya) whereas the latter by crouched observation
of things (94). Immediately after this assertion however, the author
concedes a special privilege to Buddha whose power of know-
ledge cannot be interrogated whether it comprehends simul-
taneously or in succession and whether it assumes the image of
the object or does not (95). This opinion may not be shared
by the Sautrāntika who is not in favour of allowing any ex-
ception to the general law of knowledge operating always in a
gradual process. Note Vasubandhu's clear-cut exposition of this
law: Sūtrānāma samantarāvat yathā ghih sarva-dhīya mōtha; Tathā
sarvaśānd evam na sakān sarva-vedāya kṣayākārīka, IX, 1.

The Kramaśāstra is also the opinion of Harivaran.- Satya-
siddhi, Chaps 15, 76, etc. Cp. Pancavastuka-Vibhasa, p. 27 (Visva-
Bharati Annals, X).

It is interesting to note that the well-known lamp example
cited in favour of Sāva-samāveda theory has been turned by
the author to his advantage thus: As you hold that the lamp
illuminates itself as well as others, just so I hold that a knowledge
illuminates the selves of two or more abhandanas of the same kind
Therefore according to Subhāgucita, the visual consciousness, e.g. can comprehend simultaneously several visible things falling within its range; thus our cogitation of several colours in a carpet (citarratana) is quite reasonable.

The Yogacāra maintains that knowledge cognizes its own aspect as its objects and hence what is cognizable (prahyā) is only a part of knowledge. On this point the author remarks that the Tathāgata's sayings like everything is impermanent, etc. do not at all disclose that things meant there are the aspects of consciousness itself (104). Some doctors maintain that a knowledge of previous moment serves as the object-cause of the next following knowledge; this view is not acceptable to the author; for, no knowledge necessarily follows immediately after another knowledge (118-119). Some other doctors consider that some force (sakti) productive of knowledge is regarded as the object-cause; this too is not appropriate for the reason that not any Sakti is experienced in our sensuous consciousness (120-21).

It has been stated finally on the authority of the world and scripture that the external things alone are reasonable to be upheld as the object-cause of our cognitive experiences (123-24). The author further states that the external things are established not merely on account of their simple efficiency in their presence but also on account of such efficiency being experienced even in the case of their mistaken knowledge (viparyyapāna) (129-31); that is to say, when we mistake a snake for rope and tread upon it we are at once startled by its reaction.

According to this author the knowledge of the discerner of other's thought is not untrue but it is quite natural. The others mind could be comprehended just as any other external things are comprehended. The grasping of an object by our mind is not an act of running towards its objects, but simply an act of measuring (pariccheda). The Buddha is omniscient because he comprehends the entire universe through the agency of his cognizing knowledge (147-48). In the absence of external things none can become omniscient (150). The author has not accepted what Dignaga states in regard to an in-describable form of the object being cognized in the first moment (149-49). Nor does he subscribe his opinion to Dignaga's theory of construction-free mind in the first moment. (115). Dignaga's theory of Visnuvedda, introspection is also not favoured by this author, who constantly maintains that knowledge is always a cognizing agent and never becomes cognized. The theory of intro-cognition is generally believed to have been propounded by the Sautrantikas on the strength of memory of the knowledge in a later
The author further points out some more flaws in the system of the Yogacaras. When we assume some entity existing externally than alone the contemplation upon it as no-soul becomes possible; but no such contemplation is possible in the case of Idealism (159). The Buddhahood which is according to you, completely an inactive state can be secured without making any efforts (161). The person who conserves the charity, etc. as mere thoughts is not able to release any person from poverty even by repeated practice of the charity-mind (168). These are some of the objections that are levelled against Idealism; and therefore the scriptural passages which speak of cittamatra must not be interpreted quite literally. Their interpretations, according to Subhagupta are as follows: The Buddhā has declared (cittamatrā) with reference to the imaginary aspects of the external things but that does not at all imply that the external things are absolutely non-existent (179). Likewise the doctrine of no-soul has been preached with reference to the imaginary aspect of things in order to remove all the passions in the mind of worldly addicted to sexual pleasures (180). It has also been stated in some place that the external things do not exist in such forms as the ordinary worldlings entertain in their mind (181).

In fine the author sums up his constructive conclusion of his system as follows: There is something inferred (kalpita), something fancied (vikalpita) and Dhamma. The inferred (kalpita) is nothing but bhava, some basic entity, atoms; the fancied is diversity of the former (like the earth, etc.) and Dhamma finally is the self-substance (svaśakten). Of these three the author probably views the first and the last as real and the second, i.e. Vikalpita as unreal. This explanation may quite accord with the opinions of the Vaibhavikas.
Text and Translation

The Tibetan text that is presented in the following pages is based on Bstan hgyur collection of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka preserved in our Visva-Bharati Library (Nurthang edition) and then it was collated with the same in Peking Edn. recently printed in Japan and preserved in the Library of the Sahitya Akademy, New Delhi. Different readings are all noted in the foot-notes to the Tibetan text.

The Tibetan text has been preceded by its English translations with copious annotative foot-notes supplying all the available references and informations on the topics discussed in the text. A tentative rendering into Sanskrit of each verse of the treatise has also been provided in the foot-notes with a view to making the trend of discussion more understandable to the readers who may be familiar with Indian philosophical texts and their styles. Indian (Sastraic) texts are generally not very easy to interpret without having recourse to some commentary. The present text being not provided with any commentary, the task of interpreting it properly has become much tough. I have, however, endeavoured to understand the text with the sole aid of my limited experiences and studies in Buddhism and its philosophy. My Tibetan-Sanskrit glossary contains only those words that are found in the original Sanskrit verses arranged in a separate page 9. My thanks are due to Geshe Byam pa thsul khrim, a Tibetan refugee Lama working in the VisvaBharati for supplying me with a transcript of the Tibetan text included in this publication.

N. A. Sastrī
The original Sanskrit verses of the Bhażyartha Siddhi identified so far

थिमातृश्रणं संतोषे नं गणानवाद साधनम्
विज्ञातिसमाविषययः सर्वं शेषकृपये।।

तुम्वयपरशोभावत् तथा निवयाविषययः
अविज्ञातसन्तीतीतोऽवत् नीर्वियत्वः।।

श्रेयेन्द्रसागरः व्याकरणोपायविलयस्माः
अविद्या रसायनसाध्विविलयभवस्माः।।

संज्ञानोदत्त वाक्यो शास्त्रं विज्ञातिप्रतिविन्दुम्
अतः सहायतदिविनिर्द्विन्दुः।।

प्रकरणविवलयस्माः संप्रदायान्वितस्कन्तः
विधवाय दशुद्धिः सर्वधेराङ्गिनीको नरः।।

सहायद्रव्यं शक्तियमित्वं दशूबाहिं दशितम् रतिः
विशेषोऽन्त्यं दसूर्योऽगती शाहस्मिनश्च।।

पूर्ववर्तसदृश तु साधन यथार्थ विन्यासायणाः
साधनेवन्द्रयु रुपसिंहं यथस शास्त्रं सहायद्रव्यस्माः।।

साधनेवन्द्रयु रुपसिंहं तत्विन्यासायणाः
साधनान्वितस्कन्तः सर्वत्रधेराङ्गिनीको नरः।।

सवरं तदुपदात्रहं तत्विन्यासायणाः
विधानं तद्वाय नाममुख भवः तत्विन्यासायणाः।।

साधनां च निवयार्तं तत्विन्यासायणाः
इति बोधेन्द्रविधानं दशुद्धिः निवयार्तं।।

यथा धिं प्रत्यां साधन नामस्त्रिपक्षकाः
वेष्टितं शास्त्रसाधनं धिं तत्विन्यासायणाः।।

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BAHYARTHA—SIDDHI

Establishment of Objective Reality

1. One who fulfilled in every aspect all duties beneficial to his own person (Ghartha) as well as duties beneficial to other living beings; to Him I salute in order to achieve the success (artha-siddhi) and demonstrate the truth of the objective universe.

2. (The Idealist says:) The external thing that serves as the object of consciousness in the person of perfect eyesight does not exist (as real); (Reason): because it is a (mere) idea and because the idea manifests itself as external thing, (example:) just like a dream-thought and the double-moon idea.

3. Thus the advocate of Idealism (theory of mind alone) proves the non-existence of the external thing. Now, we at the outset prove that the external things on the basis of experience never contradicted in our daily life (avisamvadadrsti).

4. The alternative proposition, that either the object-cause (agambara) is unreal because its knowledge is contradicted in our daily experience, or it is so, because the material and other things are not fit to exist, is, both unsatisfactory.

5. One experiences in dream one's own body chopped up into pieces; but this act of chopping is utterly unreal. If externalism is true in dream, does it apply to the waking stage?

6. If you mean (lit. desire) that the beheading of a waking person and his bodily exterminance resemble a dream experience, why are you then so much care-laden about your gain and loss.

7. If you say that every human activity is guided by illusion; but there is no perversion in naming things, A knowledge which is non-illusory is never contradicted. What is contradicted is always illusive.

8. A knowledge of a material thing which differs from neither space nor time is never contradicted; hence it is non-illusory (abheerati). This alone is the characteristic of non-illusory knowledge and nothing else.

9—10a. The person who comprehends the extremely long things as well as the extremely small things is distinguished as the Saint (Yogan). (In case of absolute denial of external things)
the Buddhist Saint would not be omniscient and not get double sided release (abhayatobha-vimuktat) and thus Buddhism would also be contradicted.

10. *bd. (The Idealist continues) Even our truly apprehension (vyavaharpriyata) that every thing exists absolutely resembles the experience of things in dream.

Now, why does it not become possibly contradicted (as a dreamy thing does)?

11. If (things exist) on account of deep-rooted impressions (vasana), why are not the dreamy things also explained (in the like manner?) Hence the cognizable things like village and garden, etc. are true and become visible.

12. The mere thought bereft of sense-data and its impression (vasana) are all momentary; (thus) the gain of their resultant fruits is interrupted. (Therefore) the sense-data (be admitted) as the stable causes of fruition.

13. For him who opines that the knowledge of one taste does not at all arise from any sense-datum, the nature of that knowledge (we ask) is whether permanent or impermanent.

14. If it is similar to a dream (lit. sleep) will it not produce its resultant fruit? The cause of fruition (vipaka) being present, the destruction of fruition is improper.

15. Just as something seen by a sleepy person in his dream does not appear the same in the next moment, and hence becomes impermanent; likewise the destruction of the matured fruition is possible.

16. In whose opinion, the sense-data are non-existent and hence there is no occasion (lit. cause) for perishing, (for him) the fruition will repeat endlessly even after its destruction.

17. Why do you view that a man does a religious action by virtue of his deep-rooted impressions (vasana) of non-contradiction? If you say: because the material and other external things are unit to be real, to this point we shall reply (later on).

18. If non-contradiction in the waking state persists on account of the maturation of *arsya (=Alayavipasyana) why is it
not (like this) that as long as there is eye-diseae (simira) as basis (asraya), so long there is non-contradiction?

19. Suppose the Yogacarin acts (pravrtti) on the notion of mind alone (Cittamattra) and on the presumption of the all alambana as false; when in the interval the notion of Cittamattra is absent, even then the act is not contradicted (avishamvada) and therefore the act is not caused by that notion.

20. The Sakti matured (paripaka) for arupa, assumption is produced from some other external thing and not from the self just like the sesame seed produced is from its flower.

21. And the seed from the water, etc. What is produced from a cause, that product is similar to its cause. No vasana is to be assumed on account of the genesis of the fruit as one infers the fire at the sight of the smoke.

22. Things are made fragrant on account of an act produced from some other thing; for example, the sesame seed becomes fragrant on its contact with the Jata flowers.

23. Here the seven kinds of consciousness are produced from their upadana consciousness and their seeds being previously imputed there and dormant become matured into such consciousness under favourable conditions.

24. Therefore the theory of vasana needs not to be assumed (as the Idealist does) on the presumption that no entity is produced from another entity, declare the advocates of Sakti.

25. Nevertheless, if you say: the knowledge of adhisama (rtogs.pas), definite perceptual experiences arises of its own accord (vatantiyak) and this my opinion may be compared with the act of the seed which being sowed matures of itself.

26. This opinion too is not acceptable. Again your plea that its dependence on its upadana consciousness is common to us both, is not valid as it inures a logical fallacy of mutual reliance (aryon asraya).

27. This defect is absent in the system which holds that Sakta that are imputed (aropya) by the knowledge produced by the sensuous objects get nourished and matured into seven kinds of sensuous consciousness by dint of some Visesa, excellence of favourable conditions, like the object, time, individual, etc.
28. *b-d. But there is a system of thought which maintains that there is not any cause (of our objective experiences) other than the knowledge itself named *upadana* (= Alaya-vijnana) and this is quite irrelevant.

29. When the proposition of Cittamārata that is to be established the proof or argument (saññana) is the knowledge itself (*sunnata*); this proof is non-contradictory to any heterogeneous case (*vijñatiya*) and therefore the said proposition is declared to be *sesavr* (= i.e. sesavand-anumaṇo).

30. A close scrutiny (*laksana-dhyāyi*) joyfulness (*lakṣaṁ myra*) engagement (*pravṛtti*) gain of the good and rejection of the bad; all these activities of the wake-up person never exist in dream.

31. Certain sensuous knowledge errors on account of some impediment (*this is possible*). But to say that even in the absence of an impediment there is an error creates an absolute darkness in the universe.

**ATOMIC THEORY PROVED.**

32. Others say: Everything is nothing but consciousness; the notion that there is an external object (corresponding to the sensuous consciousness) is a mental illusion. The knowable (object) is what is produced internally from one's own mind but it is not a visible object (*rupa*) (existing externally outside of the mind).

33a-c. The proposition that there exists no object is to be maintained (*samaññhya*); because each atom is not separately cognized, atoms do not appear in knowledge. — So says Dimnaga.

33d-34. (*Heti-Reason*) would become doubtful (*sandhi-dhā*) when it is applied to Citta and Caitta, mind and mental-phenomena.

Just like momentary things are not cognized in their discrete moments, the atoms would be undetermined even by the understand of Tathagata.

35. (The author continues:) Just as the illusive idea of permanence appears to us as a result of continuous rise of homogeneous moments (= momentary atoms) in succession, just so the illusive idea of a patch of blue appears as a result of cognition of the uninterrupted and homogeneous atoms.
36. When we cognize in our mind the uninterrupted and homogeneous atoms, our constructive thought constructs their oneness.

37. Therefore the theory (of the Idealists) that the atoms in their self-substance are not reflected in our consciousness is totally unfounded.

38. What a form of object is reflected in a knowledge, from that object-form its knowledge does not arise, and this object-form is not a substance (dravya) and resembles the double moon: (says Dinnaga). This conclusion is not a sound one because its hetu, prebams is not at all proved as valid one.

39. The atoms which being integrated, discharge a uniform action are termed Sancta, integrated—to the upholder of this opinion how do the atoms become non-substances (adaraya)?

40. They (atoms) are spoken of as one but they possess no oneness. For, the import of all words being investigated is not at all reflected in the sensuous consciousness.

41. The philosopher (i.e. Idealist) who states that one part of the mind reflects as the object-image in consciousness must have witnessed a piece of carpet with pictures in variegated colours (Citrapatala).

42. In certain place, when an image of certain object (rupa) is cognized, that image being related to higher and lower areas (asraya) appears divided (to form) a picture in varied forms.

43. As atom which may manifest its own single knowledge cannot appear in life as separated from other atoms. When it appears associated with other atoms it loses its atomic form, how then could each of the atoms appear to our knowledge?

44. Atoms cannot each individually and independently appear in life and this is also the reason why each of the atoms never flashes out in our consciousness.

45. Vasubandhu’s criticism of the atoms on the basis of their spacial distinctions is tascess. For, the term, space (dikṣabda) is employed on the atom itself that is associated with some other atoms.
46. Hence by the spacial distinctions the atoms themselves are meant when surrounded by several other atoms but never the atoms are constituted of parts.

47. When one atom is situated at the bottom and the other on the other side they so situated never become double on account of these two sides.

48. Where the atoms are situated in the midst of several atoms, they are imagined as many and likewise by the process of reverse of the one they are assumed as many.

49. A gross form distinct from its own, for example, is witnessed on the atoms as a result of their mutual combinations (Lit. one depending upon another) but this gross form does not at all exist there just like a distinction of the front and the back made on the atoms.

50. If as a result of atoms being uninterruptedly knit together in a large number, one substantial whole (avayavin) is conceived, why will not the moments that are preceding and succeeding in an uninterrupted succession be conceived so (i.e. one indivisible time-unit)?

51. Since knowledge continues to exist for two moments its uninterrupted existence (antaraya) is possible, yet the form of one unit (avayavi-nipa) is not permissible on the knowledge; the same principle is likewise applicable to the atoms also.

52. By virtue of a peculiar relationship (pratyasastra) amongst atoms the entry of a moving body into the aggregated company of atoms is hindered and by the same device the covering of atoms by other atoms is accepted, but not due to their constituent parts.

53. The shadow is produced when there is a covering of the sun, but that shadow is not proper to be accepted as existing in between the two atoms of the sun.

54. Just as the power of producing the shadow and covering is the phenomenon of several united things so also is the case with several atoms but no single atom can produce such phenomenon.

55. Therefore what is stated by Vasubandhu that a lump (pinda) is impossible to exist, since the distinction between the
atoms and the lump is not available, may perhaps be accidental (kadacita) if there is any propriety in maintaining the atoms as stagnant (i.e. never transformed into any other form under any circumstances).

56. The atoms, (though) they are mutually un-related and devoid of parts, nevertheless become integrated and accomplish (the gross things like) the globe of earth, and others.

57. By virtue of some excellence of mutual efficiency (anyagaha) the atoms become transformed and likewise they never become scattered (i.e.) of the diamond (vajra) and other such things.

58. Certain atoms become integrated by virtue of their peculiar substance-efficiency (drtvy-sakti) just like the evil spirit (pusa) the serpent and others are subdued by force of mantra-sakti.

59. But there are many other atoms having very little power and strength (to appear in life).

The person endowed with a sharp intellect and living in a mountain (acala) and such other places could count the atoms of the hell (and the heaven), etc. with their numbers and other distinctions.

60-61a. Therefore it is not proper to declare that the atoms do not at all exist. If you say that the affirmation of the atoms has been made due to some illusion (bhrama) then your understanding that everything is nothing but the activity of the sixth knowledge (= intellect) would be much more illusory resembling an illusory knowledge of the number ‘eight’ on the aggregate of eight atoms.

61b-62. If you plead that the conception of the atoms is a notion mistaken for some other basic thing for these two considerations, viz. (1) that things like the hell, etc. are known as nothing but condemned living beings and (2) that the atoms are never cognized directly (in our perceptual experiences), then why do you not state likewise (as illusory) of the number form and other characteristics of Pradhama and Purusa, etc.?

63. You may say: The same remark holds good with regard to such things also because Pradhana is regarded in the terms of some excellence of characters (gunatitsaya) (like satvya,
raja and tama). I now reply: though the conception of Pradhana, etc. is illusory, this does not warrant us to forsake our previous contention (about the atoms).

64. Therefore the atoms are existing really. They are not cognized by any body other the sages living in a mountain and other places. The atoms are conceived because the saints cognize them.

Saha-vedana, co-cognition possible

65. When two persons (look at an object) in a place, it is an invariable rule that they have simultaneous cognition of it; it is also the law of nature that knowledge with its content (lit. knowable) are invariably cognized at once.

66. There is no cognizer other than knowledge and the visual knowledge is no more cognizer in the absence of visible objects, and therefore their cognition is simultaneous but this co-cognition is not due to the identity between the object, i.e. patch of blue and its cognizer.

67. If the consciousness is not in the mood of cognizer or the knowledge is bereft of an object, then only that could reasonably be stated so and not otherwise.

68. If the term saha is employed to signify one and the same time the reason (i.e. Sahopadambha) becomes indefinite in all respects (ausmaktika) when it is applied to the Buddha's knowledge which co-exists with its content, other's mind (jneyacetas) and the mind that co-exists with mental properties (citta-cuditatas).

69. If the mental properties are not illusory as they are sanctioned in the scriptures: how do you then say that the knowledge of the ghost, hell and others is an illusion?

70. If, even in the absence of any relevancy some distinction (between the idea of the hell, etc and the mental elements) saves your difficulty (lit. serves your purpose), that distinction is absolutely unproved, yet you cherish it proved; thus your rejoinder is based again on illusion.

71. The term 'saha' co-existence is never employed in the world in any place where a companion is not available. The reason (hetu—Sahopadambha) will then be a contradictory one if there is really a co-cognition.
72. If the term *Saha* 'co-existence' is taken to mean one and the same thing (ekartha) then *hetu* would be unproved (asiddha) for other party 323 for example when some common things are present, how does only one person look at them?

73. If every mind of other living beings is cognized by the knowledge of the omniscient being, then, where is it proved that only one person experiences it (ekena upalambha)?

74. The object-cause felt by a person internally in his own mind cannot be denied by any other person, as there can be no evidence for doing so.

The reason (*hetu*) further becomes doubtful and unproved on the ground that it is, in its very nature, far removed, i.e. beyond the reach of other's cognizance (svabhara-viprakeśa = nan-dharm. bhuk. ha).

75. If the reason (*hetu*) considered to be proved as a result of the denial of external things and (thus leading to the conclusion) that one aspect of the consciousness itself is cognizable, then the reason would be known to only one party 328 who pleads for the doctrine of mind alone (cittamatrata).

76. If you consider it a proven fact that the knowledge and the knowable flash out as identical (aprikhilahaw), then the reason would simply prove what is already proved. Even the advocate of knowledge having the capacity to assume the image of the object (sakara-prajñanadhir) would not dispute here in this matter 329 (thus leading to siddhasadhanata).

77. If you conceive the object-cause as identical (with its knowledge) how is it that the object-cause is cognized distinctly from the knowledge?

78. Suppose, for example, a man, while experiencing an external object (artha), has joyful feelings in this wise: this shell is black, if these feelings are regarded as coming from the knowledge itself this will be improbable in the absence of experience of the object in that fashion. 330

79. If certain imaginary form (kalpta-rupa i.e. black) of knowledge is experienced, then its real form is not experienced; therefore the reason (Sakopalaṁbha) is not proper to set up.

80. For this reason two forms 40 of the knowledge are to be experienced in the same manner as the double moon is
looked at by some. Thus the author's (=Dharmakirti) statement of "one" (adhida) becomes unfounded.

81. The causal factors (sangār) of the preceding moment give rise to a full cognition of the object in the next moment just in the same fashion as a visible object (rūpa) in association with the light produces its cognition, due to which fact a successive cognition (sañcār) would become justifiable.

82. When the knowledge and its sense-organ happen to be just one after another (purvapara) the term co-cognition (sañcār) is used by way of similarity (with a simultaneous phenomenon) but never there is literatcly co-cognition (sañcāranta na attho'ph).

83. Since the knowledge-content is felt internally, it is no entity other than the self of knowledge; to the advocate of the system of maintaining the knowledge possessing a knowable aspect in itself the reason becomes undetermined.

84. Since it is the law of nature that a knowledge cognizes its content (jananatvā), the knowledge is said to be cognized; since the content produces the knowledge as reflector of itself it is considered as cognized.

85. Though the term 'cognized' (sañveda) is applied equally to the knowledge and its content, its import is quite different. For, the wild cow, etc., e.g. are not regarded of the (same) forms, visiṇנט, horned figure on account of the usage of the term, cow, etc.

86. There are certain dharmas which are contemplated in the minds of other streams of elements (sañcāranāna) are perceived by the knowledge of the Omniscient (Sarvajña). Then the reason (when it is applied to those dharmas) becomes uncertain, (because they are perceived simultaneously, yet distinct from the knowledge of the Omniscient). If he does not comprehend them, how can he be an Omniscient?

87. In the system of the image-invested knowledge of the Sañcārin the knowledge is perceived only when it reflects the image of an object. If you desire to prove the identity of the knowledge with its reflected image the reason would then, simply achieve what is already achieved (siddha-adhānta).

88. The external thing (artha) produces in the knowledge an image similar to itself and as a result of this fact it is
considered as perceived figuratively. The external thing is not as all perceived and hence its identity with knowledge will not be proved.

89. If you ask: How is the knowledge (or consciousness) considered to be the cognizer of its object? (we answer:) the consciousness is characterized as (if it is) measuring the object (tat pariccheda lakṣaṇa) and therefore no query should be made as to: how is it and what like it is?

90. (In the system of the Sautrāntika-Yogascaras) an image is aroused and imprinted in consciousness by the external things; how could it be said that the consciousness is a measurer of the external thing (artha-paricchedaka)?

91. Consciousness (by law of nature) is considered to be entirely a comprehending agent and hence it is irrelevant to ask how the consciousness would comprehend its own object.

92. The consciousness is not creator of any thing and in fact, it is functionless. Its characteristic, however, is mere awareness of the presence of an object (vrittimatra), but the act of creation, is attributed to it by imposition (samaropa).

93. Just as a saint of detached vision enters into the self of knowledge (prajña-rupa), etc. so also the person of a meagre vision enters into it.

94. No distinction exists between the Saint and the worldling so far as their knowledge alone is concerned. But the great souls however, are distinguished by their knowledge of varied aspects (Sarvakaranadhi).

95. Do we enquire into the knowledge of the Buddha whether it assumes the image of the object or does not, and again whether it comprehends the object simultaneously or successively?

Akṣara-vada disproved

96. What image according to you, presumably exists as pertaining to an object-knowledge, that image exists in fact only in the external thing like the visible element (rupa), etc. but it is assumed to exist in the knowledge.

97. It is irrelevant to say that not any cognizable thing exists for the Saint who has given up all obscurations (avṛttana); for, he is anchored in this cognizable (world); how can it be substituted and equalized to the mind alone (tanmatre-saṅga)?
98. Our intellect is sole demonstrating agent whether the external thing exists or does not exist. There really exist the external objects to which fact no contradiction is experienced, for example in the case of eye-disease etc. some figure is observed even when there is not any figure.

99. Likewise one thinks that he experiences in the knowledge a patch of blue and accordingly imposes upon the knowledge the presence of the blue image but in fact no such image exists in it.

100. The assumption that the image exists in the knowledge or does not exist is a type of consciousness in the nature of a productive imagination (Kalpana). The consciousness, however, becomes differentiated due to visesa, individual characteristic of the observed object.

101. You plea that the knowledge which in fact imageless experiences its unreal image, I likewise, advocate that the imageless knowledge experiences the real external thing.

102. There is not a distinct self of the knowledge (in the form of a separate knowable aspect); for, to assume it would contradict the non-dual essence of the knowledge (advaya-jnana). No unreal image could be experienced by the knowledge; (if the image is experienced) it would turn to be non-illusory.

103. If you argue that the above arrangement has been made in accordance with the presumption under the influence of the deep rooted illusion, then the image of the knowledge ought to be viewed as illusory, otherwise how could it be an assumed image?

104. Hence consciousness which is imageless in truth, would comprehend (particular) through the agency of the material eye, etc. all the fitting things whether existent or non-existent.

105. If you say that just as the lamp illumines the self as well as others, just so the consciousness (illumines) the selves of two alambanan (of one kind); then, there would be no contradiction at all.

106. However the various objects, visible, sound etc. are domains of various sense-organs; hence they cannot be experienced by one sense-organ.
107a-b. (According to you) even when different causes are absent the knowledge is experienced as (in the presence of) alambana.

107c-9a. A knowledge arises from an external object as similar to it and that knowledge in the immediately next moment bears an image similar to that external thing:—this contention is a simple illusion; for, the knowledge does not exist as permanent (to assume the image of the object). Further there is not any experience of the self of the knowledge similar to the object at the moment when the object becomes illuminated.

109b-10c. In every mind the knowledge form is uniform if this view is favoured, it could not be stated particularly, it is similar to this object.

110b-d. When this (knowledge) illuminates the cognizable thing no knowledge immediately after that would appear, because it becomes entirely assimilated with its context (vasya).

111-12b. If while the knowledge lights up last a patch of blue, etc. the knowledge lighting up the patch of blue, etc. exists immediately after that, and then, if it exists having the patch of blue as its content, then at that time the knowledge is not similar to the object. True, it exists indeed, but never similar (to its content).

Grahyas aspect criticized

112c-13. The Tathagata's saying, for example, that all is impermanent and sorrowful does not exhibit as content the cognizable aspect of knowledge (grahyathaga).

If you are inclined to plead that since the object-cause (alambana) is not fit to exist in the external, the cognizable aspect of the knowledge is accepted as the content, then the characteristic of the content cannot appropriately be applied to it (as content).

114. How does the mind exist as separated from its act of construction? That idea is only an image of your mind (citavasa-thasa). There does not exist the mind shedding light on its content, because the latter is not available (for you) other the mind itself.

115a-5b. If there is nothing productive (of the knowledge), how is it at all desired (as context)?
Discussion on the actual object

115c-16b. The simple atoms and the co-agulated atoms (in your system) are not the object-causes, because they lack one requisite (arga) each. How is the denial of both (simple and co-agulated atoms) cherished?

116c-17b. The knowledge in the form of cognizer is devoid of two characteristics (of alambana, viz. objectivity and causality). Then if there is no object-cause (alambana) (for you) the cognizable aspect of knowledge is also not accepted (by us).

117c-18b. The opinion that a similar knowledge of the previous moment serves as the object-cause (of the next following knowledge) is also improper: for, no knowledge flashes up (bhāti) immediately after a similar knowledge.

118c-19b. If the knowledge in the form of a visible object (rupa) arises due to contact with the knowledge of the sound, how will that knowledge of rupa be similar to the alambana, i.e. sound?

119c-20b. Some consider that a force (saketi) producing a knowledge akin to its content is the object-cause. This opinion is also improper; for, no force, saketi is reflected in the sensuous knowledge.

120b-21b. If (you again argue that) the objectivity lies in the cognizable part of knowledge and that alone remains invariably as the object, (we may reply that) the external thing (artha) (as the object) has been proved from the standpoint of the world and therefore its characteristic as alambana exists indeed though not expressly stated.

121c-22b. If you say that the knowledge of knowledge is also quite familiar with the world, it is not definitely proved as the content (artha). If it lacks the characteristic (of alambana) how can it be alambana?

122c-23b. (Thus it is proper to maintain on close scrutiny that the external object-cause alone is desirable on the authority of the world and scripture, but never the cognizable aspect of knowledge by any means.

123c-24b. The objects like desirable and undesirable never exist in the external in truth and hence all this is nothing but mind: this contention is absolutely irrelevant.
124c-25b. On certain unpleasant material object if one meditates as good (the experiences it as good); for, the result becomes distinguished with some benefit on account of varied causes.

125c-26b. Certain knowledge relating to an object (artha) reflects (the same object) as a patch of blush (visilaka) and immediately after that (the object) turns to be in the form of unpleasant thing, etc. (bidhisparupati) on account of meditation; likewise it may become otherwise on account of other causes.

126c-27b. Feelings like joy, sorrow and dullness are all become differentiated by virtue of kinds of meditation but they never arise from any kind of external things— if this is your contention; how is it proper?

127c-28b. (The Idealist continues) All you refusals are made on the assumption (of external things) (aropa); Why is it unreasonable to accept the truth of no alambana in the external? The external things we establish by virtue of their efficiency (aradhakriya) and we negate them when there is no efficiency.

128c-30c. If you say, even in the absence of the external things the purposive action is achieved and therefore the external things are not accepted, then we may reply that we establish their existence not merely on account of their efficiency, but also on account of efficiency being witnessed even in the case of their perverted knowledge (viparyaya-jna).

130d-31c. But again as a result of locating the external things good or harm could be afflicted to the body; some sort of simple efficiency (kriyamatra) is experienced even in the case of a mistaken notion (vibhrana) of some thing present for something absent.

131d-132c. As to the argument based on the sexual act (kama-carita) in dream, we may say that the semen-discharge is a necessary phenomenon. If one has not that phenomenon, how can he be considered to have gained the sexual pleasure (one of the four purposes of human actions)?

132d-133c. Since the semen-discharge and the extreme passion (rage) are specially related (to each other) the former happens also on the occasion other than the dream; for example when one embraces a woman out of extreme love no contradiction is felt to the phenomenon of semen-discharge.
133a-134c. If in the presence of a woman, the discharge happens out of extreme passion why does one not discharge the nail, the tooth, etc. as he discharges semen in dream?

134d-135c. If in the absence of a woman, the discharge happens out of extreme passion, why does he not discharge the nail, the tooth, etc. as he discharges semen in dream?

135d-136b. The semen being discharged out of extreme passion (raga) the purpose of life is fulfilled—this idea is not a happy one.

136d-137b. For example, when it is not spoken even as a simple act, the gain of the son, etc. that are experienced in dream as realities are all contradicted to the actually perceptual experiences.

137c-138c. Since there really exist the keepers of the hell, etc. as produced from the said acts, the system of everything as a reflected image of consciousness is neither admirable nor is any purposeful action in dream possible. Therefore the doctrine of Cittanaruta "mind alone" becomes unproved.

138a-139c. When different living bodies are evident for proving the existence of other minds, the existence of the hell also may likewise, be (entertained). On what evidence then do you deny the existence of other living beings?

139d-140c. Similarly the god (i.e. Garuda) bestowing the boon of reviving the life (amogara) on the person who is dead on account venom poured out from the hood (of a serpent), remains true in his promise.

140d-141b. In the absence of preliminary rites efficient act cannot be accomplished; therefore that (efficient act) is not a simple creation of the mind.

141c-d. Why is the knowledge of the others' thought-discerner is untrue (ayathartha)?

142. When other's mind being present our knowledge enters into it (that knowledge is considered to be its cognizer). (or) when some object being present, the knowledge assumes the image of that object, then the knowledge is considered to be its cognizer.

143b-c. The grasping of an object (by the mind) is not an act similar to that of running towards its object, just immediately after which the knowledge would arise.
143d-144b. So also is the case with the knowledge of one’s own mind.  In both the cases the mind is regarded as cognizer in the manner above described (i.e. pariccheda-laksana).

144c-145b. The memory is a mind being directed towards the past thing. What is directed towards the past (bhava = yan-dag) is not a cognition (graha) because that mind does not flash up from its cause.

145c-146b. The non-dual form (advaya-rupa) which is (supposed to be) domain of the well-awakened (Samatha) is not cognizable to us and therefore we are not true (ayathartha). What is said to be untrue, is unsatisfactory because of the non-dual nature (advayavat) of the knowledge.

146c-147b. The Buddha is omniscient because he comprehends the entire cognizable universe through the agency of his cognizing knowledge, and not because he does so in a non-dual form.

147c-148c. To what is said (by Dignaga), viz. a non-describable form is cognized (by one’s own self, we now ask) What is cognized by other person, is it possible to describe because the other’s mind can be comprehended?

148d-49. Then there exists definitely the object-cause in the external and therefore every mind is not at all (proved to be) objectless (niralamkara). If the mind has not any cognizable in the external anywhere, how could one become omniscient?

156-151b. By comprehending one’s own mind alone there may be nothing but the self-knowledge of the mind (svamavedana).

If any one is supposed to be omniscient by merely comprehending one’s own mind and he is known to be a separate individual then there would be no realization of the mind alone (cittanatra-darsana).

151c-152b. If you think that this defect is obviated in view of the fact that the knowledge is non-dual in its nature, how, then does that (non-dual) knowledge comprehend its content?

152c. If you say again, that when the knowledge becomes freed from every kind of dual form then it comprehends the universe in all aspects—this saying is indeed a matter of great wonder. Therefore there is one (i.e. omniscient) in the nature of comprehending (grahaka-rupa) (the entire universe).
153. There is not any person known to us as omniscient—
says self-styled wisdom amongst the so-called learned persons: but this saying reveals his dull intellect (sva-durmati) being engrossed in it.

154. As the actual experiences dictate it is possible that as a result of contemplation on certain definite antidote the whole group of desire and other defilements are entirely destroyed.

155. But there is hardly any possibility of applying an antidote in the case (of the Yogacara conception of emancipation; for the Yogacara holds) that the mind of all wordlings is under the firm grip of dual forms (subject and object) and this idea of dual form may be destroyed by contemplation on some object.

156. The knowledge which flashes out in the form 'this is void (sunya)' is related to (it entered into) to the said dual forms and such knowledge being associated with dual forms; how can it serve as an antidote?

157. Just as one meditating on a desirable object does not destroy his desire, just so a man meditating on a thing in dual form does not destroy the idea of dual form.

158. Assuming in the mind an idea of entity one contemplates upon it of no-soul. But the principle of non-duality, a mere word has not any purpose (nirvartha) and hence a contemplation upon it will be quite unnecessary.

159. The contemplation upon impermanence frees one quickly from the delusion of permanence (a reasonable proposition). (But in your system) by discarding every kind of perceptual experiences one necessarily secures Buddhahood (no a reasonable proposition).

160. The person who is free from every kind of perceptual experiences is completely inactive. Thus Buddhahood is desired (by you) without making any effort and practice.

161. Therefore the state of well-faring (Saugata-paia) i.e. Buddhahood is secured on constant practice of compassion towards the sentient beings, doing good for them, and meditating on every manifested elements of existence as impermanent (samas kri-antitya).
162. When one entertains the idea of mind alone, how could he fulfill the preliminary duties such as charity, etc. In the absence of charity there is no possibility of one obtaining the Buddhahood.

163. If you argue that under the influence of mutual causation and on the principle of mind-alone thought arises in the form of acts like giving and taking the charity. That cannot be proved either by perception, inference or reliable scripture. Such system is only a presumption and it is nothing but a verbal eloquence.

165. When one practises repeatedly and several times mentally a charity-thought (i.e. the thought in the form of charity) it never releases anybody from poverty.

166. Even if innumerable thoughts (manaskara) of Yogins are meditated upon (by us) neither happiness is gained nor misery is removed in reality.

167. In doling out everything (material) to all living beings and in fulfilling the charity of compassion there exists no distinction in the nature of things (artharmanas arthasvarupa) however, in practising the compassion-charity we have a prohibitive injunction not to give certain things (viz. three garments, etc).

168. There was great Decease of the Buddha in the world and we have his relic now as his mortal remains. The mansion and monastery, etc. are with us; how can they be products of the mind-alone (lit. pararastra) ?

169. If these things have no existence of their own how can we infer therefrom the great events of the past? If the past events are not inferred, the whole system would be reduced into an extreme materialism (lojayata).

170. A man witnessing the relics of the Saint who is purified through emancipation of the Sravaka, disciple becomes free from passions. If he has no recollection (lit. inference) of the past event, how can he entertain the faith (in his relics)?

171. If (you say) it is produced by succession (prabhanda) of people the life is seen to be cut off. If you again say that one continues to exist due to other, how would there be complete and last deliverance (parinirvaha)?
172. It is the sealed fact in the worldly system that from the seed, etc. come up sprout, etc. and therefore there is not any sound reasoning for the plea that the whole universe is nothing but the mind.

173. When a knowledge arises immediately after a knowledge, the subsequent knowledge is the result of the previous knowledge-cause. This rule is also not permissible (in your system).

174. Thus (e.g.) there would arise the knowledge of smoke in the absence of the knowledge of the fire, and also the knowledge of the sprout would arise from non-knowledge of the seed.

175. If you plead that mind perfumed by the knowledge of the fire produces (lit. is the cause of) the knowledge of the smoke; when there are several potentialities (sakti) in the mind, wherefrom could arise the thought of distinction?

176. If the cause immediately preceding knowledge (or mind) of fire is the cause of the mind of the smoke, that also is not good; for, the mind of fire is not definite (=concomitant) with the mind of smoke.

177. When the concomitance is completely unproved how do the people talk in the unmixed terms about the cause thus: this result arises from that cause?

178. Therefore the doctrine that the whole universe is Chittamatra, ‘mind-alone’ has been declared (by the Buddha) aiming at the imaginary or assumed aspect of the external things (kalpita asriya) but not because the matter, etc. are improbable to exist.

179. For what (object) one may display desire and other passions. Buddha viewing that object as merely an imaginary (kalpita-Vikalpita) has preached the doctrine of no-soul with reference to these (the assumed) things in order to remove all such passions (dosa) of the worldings.

180. Similarly in other places too the Buddha has stated that the external things do not exist in such forms as are assumed by the ordinary worldings. Why is it so? (Buddha’s knowledge) is superior to (that of ordinary worldings).

181. Since some sort of agent has been just previously stated and the duties are understood alongside of the attachment
towards an agent as real the idea of agent as real is necessarily to be negated.  

182-183. In other places it has been likewise declared thus: There is something inferred (kalpita) and some other thing fancied, vikalpita (=parikalpita). The true form of dharmata (dharmata-rupa = gzugs = form = svarupa) has been explained thus: dharmata is svatoksa, self-essence. What is kalpita is no other than a basic reality (bhavamatra), and the vikalpita is its diversity (bheda). This diversity of dharmata will be inappropriate in the absence of bhava (some basic entity, i.e. atoms).

184. If the Rupa is declared to be svapa (devoid of rupa-nature) how the term rupa is employed on it? If you argue that it is done so on the assumption of the rupa-nature, what is the ultimate objective (phala) gained from (therefrom)?

185. Other what object any contradiction is impossible to exist that object thereby is verily existing. (But, for the opponents) since everything is non-existing their experiences are not really there as is the dream.

186. The advocates of the external reality point out to the Idealist (cittra-matrata-yadin) thus: Let the men of erudition investigate whether this (my conclusion) is just appropriate or not.

187. But I have no wonderful (wise) knowledge suited to investigate what is right and what is wrong; I have however stated in brief the truths propounded by other masters.

188. The wise men realize the destruction of ignorance darkness by means of the lustre of their true knowledge. Henceforth let the unlearned get purified in the path of the great men.
1. This verse may be rendered into Sanskrit:

परिशुद्ध च स्फागे पराशे जायं जासणी।

ब्रह्मोद्भविष्यति विश्वासपुर्णे निश्चये॥ ॥

2. In accordance with the tradition the author speaks of the Buddha as possessing two qualities, svarga and parama as done by Vasubandhu (Kosa, I, ver. 1), Damaga (Pram. Sam. I, ver.-1, with vritth. v, my Review in A.L.B.) and the author of the Sutralankara (=Kalpanamandalika), Chap. I (v. my Sanskrit text, published in the journal of Sri Venkata Institute, Tirupati, 1941).

3. स्वर्गविश्वासपुर्णो नं ब्रह्मोऽभ्यासते।

स्वर्गविश्वासपुर्णाः परायणो यथा विद्यते॥ ॥

a. lit विद्यते—Inanatva as Sadhana, reason is referred to in the verse 29 below.

4. This is the conclusion arrived at in the Vimśatika and the Alambana-parīkṣa.

5. ब्रह्मो: साधने नेति ईश्वरकृतवैधानिनाः।

अभिव्यक्तार्काद्वादिनां विद्यते॥ ॥

6. Dharmakīrti's definition of pramāṇa is: प्रमाणस्वरूपः सत्यः साधनः, अन्यत्यंतिश्च प्रभुवः त्वथ। Pram. varitka, I, ver. 1, Subhagupta's one of the arguments to prove his externalism is evamadidra; cfr. Tatt. San. panjika. p. 574, II, 20, ff.

7. शास्त्राय अर्थार्थाय वृत्तः कथा तथा वृत्तमाख्यपदः॥ ॥

8. स्वर्गविश्वासपुर्णो र्वाहः। भवेऽति [॥] न भवति तेऽति ।

स्वर्गविश्वासपुर्णो र्वाहः। भवेऽति [॥] न भवति तेऽति ॥

"The word it is used to bring out the Tib. expression: mi gyur-ram implying a simple query.

9. ब्रह्मोपदेशतः विस्मृतादेशस्वो यथार्थस्व भवतः।

उत्ति यथा यथा ज्ञातः विद्यते ॥ ॥

10. The Realists, while opposing the extreme idealism, generally raises such objection as the present one to prove its absurdity. It may be interesting to Compare a European parallel: Dr.
Johnson is said to have expressed his opinion on Berkeley's philosophy by kicking a stone with his foot and saying: No, Sir, I prove it wrong (Sir James Jean, Mysteria Universe, the Bridge series, p. 71).

11. भारतद्वारा सर्वक्षेत्रभरसे गति नामतिबद्धतया।
अभ्रातंशतरंशानं श्रीनारायणविवलक्षे हि हि।
ा = विशीलता अभ्रातिः।

12. In the illusion there is always a perversion in naming things; e.g. in rope-snake illusion the snake-name is mistaken for the rope-name.

13. देवसु कलालोककालकालमय दश विवलक्षे।
तद्भ्रातं गुणानां नायननामकलालालम्या। भि हि।

14. The idea meant here is this: Time and space are not different from the material things, i.e. atoms; cp. Nya. binda-pradipa p.24. नीलकंठ हि सुभवान हो नामसे देवे: कविशिष्ठजे तं और Pram. vr. bhaya p. 188: न ले नामारो भविष्यं। The Buddhists including the Sarvasti-vadin maintain that every thing is momentary and the moment is no other than the thing itself.

15. द्विपेक्षातिक्रियान्त: योगीति तु विस्तिताः।
असिद्धं स्वयंतोहस्यिह्रुधयः। भि हि।

16. A partly definition of yogin.

17. This is explained in the Puggalapannatti, p. 145: वाक् यो गुणो जाता विवलक्षे कालेन पुरुषस्वरूपी हि हि। पक्षाय पुरुष व्यस्तृ आलम्य परं गुरुस्वरूपी हि हि। अर्थ गुरुत्त पुरुषो यथा गुरुविशिष्टिः। Abh-kosa (Poussin, VI, p. 276): One who is entered in Nīlakṣaṇaṁpattī is named 'doubly delivered', because by force of prajna and Samadhi he is delivered from klesa-aravana and vimokṣa-aravana (cp. 8 imokṣas in VIII, p. 205) Satya Siddhi, chap. 163 (Eng. Summary). If he gains both, he is ubhaya-bhaga-vimukta; for the delimitation is one part and the element hindering dhyaṇa-concentration is another part. (iv. also chap. x. end) V. Magga (XXI para 78). अक्षादित्वे नेत्र विवलक्षे श्रीनारायणविवलक्षे हि हि। यथा गुरुविशिष्टो यथा गुरुविशिष्टो यथा गुरुविशिष्टो यथा. . . . . . . .
21. It is difficult to understand the author’s intention here. According to Abh. kosa theory of momentariness is applicable to the elements both internal and external. It is the Theravadin who makes a distinction in applying it to the elements and pleads that the material elements continue to exist for 17 thought-moments (v. Abh. Athasan, IV. 86, Kosambi’s Tika, p. 67). Despite the momentary-theory the Vaibhavika maintains that karman produces its fruits through avijnapti which continues to exist on the support of four great elements (v. Kosa, I. 11). This may not hold good in the Yogacara system.
27. The idea seems to be that when the Yogacara deities the external things, there will be no occasion for preaching dharma or listening to it and arousing the right view which leads to the destruction of Vipaka. Dharmakirti, however, defends his position thus: वर्णो वासुदेवाय वाहिन्यत ।

28. गृहश वासुदेवाय वाहिन्यत ।

29. पुद्गलस्तरीत च च ।

30. The knowledge of the eye-diseased person (tāmirikā) is, however, contradicted at once.

31. तात्त्विक्ता न कुशल तात्त्विक्तानां तत्त्वीति ।

31a. cp. Nya., bindu-Tippani, p. 19: कुशलाय तात्त्विक्तो तत्त्वाय।

32. This Sakti, according to the Idealist comes into existence from the self of consciousness and not from some other external causes.

33. तत्त्वाय तत्त्वाय तत्त्वाय तत्त्वाय तत्त्वाय तत्त्वाय तत्त्वाय तत्त्वाय

34. तत्त्वाय तत्त्वाय तत्त्वाय तत्त्वाय तत्त्वाय तत्त्वाय तत्त्वाय तत्त्वाय

35. This is probably adadikālikā-nasana accepted by the Idealists to account for the universal causation cfr. Madh. avatarā, VI, ver. 46 with Bhasya, my sanskrit text, p. 42-43; Bud. Logic II, p. 367 with note 3 and p. 400 Jñendrabuddhi's comment: Every notion of causation is produced by Biotic Force; and Alambanaparikṣa, ver. 8.
36. ब्रम्हारोड़ियात्तू निर्दविकरण कर्मयानं सावते च \n नासपुरस्म संधुर्गुष्या गाय अपरेयोदित \\
\n37. Jati flower as a factor in producing fragrance is a common example in Indian Sastriya literature. cp. Kosay. II p.39, 22

38. सत्यरूपश्रवणजागरणोऽवस्थाये सृष्टिविद्या \n तत्त्वस्य सत्यावर्गेण नित्याविधिः \n
39. अधी योगब्रहमानिते भावो नासरीत वासना \n नारायण वस्थिते इत्यादि शास्त्रविद्याः \n
40. Here Sakti-vadin is the Saurrantika. According to him seven kinds of consciousness (five sensual, one nonsensuous consciousness and one mind) are produced from their apadana consciousness, a subtle mind in possession of all seeds, something resembling the Atitya-consciousness of the yogacarin. The saurantarika contradicts the vasna theory postulated by the latter on the assumption that nothing is produced from anything but the mind=Atitya-consciousness, or the Saurantarika’s subtle mind, v. Et. Lamotte, Histoire du Bouddhisme, p. 673; and Masuda, Sects p. 68. The kosa speaks of the seven types of vijnana in this line: शरद्यानकालस्य यत्वना/ (1, 16).

We may note here a parallel discussion between the Yogacara and the Saurantarika as reproduced by the Stcherbatsky from Vaccaipata’s Vagyanavatika: (The Yogacara): (The external object is superficial, there is in the internal) Biotic force which incidently becomes mature and evokes an idea; this is also accidental (and changing coevitably with a change its cause). (The Saurantarika:) But, is it not your Biotic force in this case simply the force of the subject thought contained in one continuous stream, the force to produce out of itself, a corresponding the objective thought, Bud. Logic, II p. 367-68). One interesting reference to the Saurantarika may be noticed here: शीलानिसिद्धिनः त्रिविन्यासः च। रष्यायणं संसारायणस्वादिभाष्यं \n संसारायण निबधिजनपदं न संशिलविग्रहान्योऽवस्थित्तुि। Arthavivisayaka Sutrakta. The idea probably meant here that the six consciousness-bodies are conditioncd by Samskara, a subtle Sakti formed from the experience of external things; cp. the ver. 27 below the same idea.
41. सत्यस्वत कार्याविभाग भाषावशेष तथा नम्भय श्रवणपि बन्धु ॥ २७॥
   a नक्यन्वितविदान ।

42.

43. प्राकृतार्थ विकर्षणमेंपदाधारनिधयः
   अक्षराधाराक्षरोपिताः २४ ॥

44. Pravṛtti-vijnana depends on upadana-vijnana and the latter again on the former to produce kā.

45. समयविधाय अद्यतनम्बनके व श्रवणः
    निकाशयासंविधानाः प्रयोगाः ३ ॥

46. This is the Sautrantika's standpoint. v. ver. 24, 76.

47. अन्यप्रारम्भमान्यकालः
    अन्तःष्ठत्ता नालस्थि न तत् च ' ॥ २९॥

48. This is the system of the Yogacara. Alaya is named upadana, cfr. Trisvamadita, ver. 3 with Bhāya of Sthimati.

49. भिक्षुकुक्ति सवाहृती ।
    अन्तःष्ठत्ता नालस्थि ।

50. This verse is cited in Tatt. p. p. 582.


52. सन्निधानमन्वन्ति ।
    अन्तःष्ठत्ता नालस्थि ।
    सन्निधानमन्वन्ति ।
    अन्तःष्ठत्ता नालस्थि ।

53. According to the Yogacara every human knowledge is illusion with reference to its object (v. note 31a above). The author asserts that knowledge can be illusion if it is situated in a later stage.

54. अनेन सर्वस्य विकारार्थेनीनान्तरस्य सम्बन्धः।
    अनेन सर्वस्य विकारार्थेनीनान्तरस्य सम्बन्धः।
    अनेन सर्वस्य विकारार्थेनीनान्तरस्य सम्बन्धः।
    अनेन सर्वस्य विकारार्थेनीनान्तरस्य सम्बन्धः।
55. This and the following are the opinions of Dīgācara, v. Alān. patika, ver. 6.

56. अः शब्दाक्षरित साक्षर्यक्षरितसाधितम्।
शास्त्राभिखिनितम् प्रमुः।

57. This is the main argument set up by Dīgācara in favour of his idealism, v. Alān. par. ver. 1.

58. तिष्ठितम् तिष्ठित्य शब्दाक्षरितम् ५४।
वाक्याचेत शब्दाब्यांश्च।
वाच्याविशेषितेन शब्दाब्यांश्च।
वाच्याविशेषितिभवत् ५५॥
वाच्याविशेषितिर्दशिष्ठितम्।

This verse is made of 5 lines, the next four lines being traced to the original Sanskrit. The implied hetu is ekāśīna-ṣajjātācāra.

59. तुषाराकाश्यायकर्माविशेषितम्।
वाच्याविशेषितिर्दशिष्ठितम्।

Tatt. san. p. 552 cites this verse with the reading मण्डिरम् for न्यात्र—. The Pūnjabīcāra further quotes his comments thus: बुधा-अन्य अथात्तारे अप्रार्थकष्टकम्य नृपकुप्पी अप्रार्थकष्टकम्य सहस्त्रो वाच्याविशेषितिभवत्। यस्य पर्यालोकितसाधित्वमेव सहस्त्रो वाच्याविशेषितिभवत्। (Cp. p. 199 and ver. 589).

It is interesting to note the difference in readings. Kamalaśāla thinks that sila is empirically real from the Sautrantika standpoint of view but śūnyata is unreal. Subha-gupta, on the other hand, thinks that śūnyata is a real substance rather than sila, a quality, derivative element. The idea may be clear if we look into the discussion in Kosa, IV, 8—12 on Samkhya.

60. शुद्धि हृदर्य वाच्याविशेषिततः जस्मि।
वाच्याब्यांश्च शुद्धिवाच्याब्यांश्च।

61. The idea of oneness as illusive is explained in Tatt. san. ver. 598-9. Similarly the idea of grossness as illusive in ver. 592-4 (ibid). This latter position is of the Sautrantika.

62. अधिकारायनेन शवस्यायनेन साम्यायनः।
शवस्यायनेन शवस्यायनेन साम्यायनेन शवस्यायनेनसाम्यायनेन।

63. The opinion of Vasubandhu, Vinaṭikā, ver. 11, and also of Dīgācara, Alān. par. ver. 1.
64. विटवन्ति [2041] नातिन् गुप्तायामाध्यमाचाराः।
द्यति विद्वान् धनिः गुण न च चेत द्विविधत्वं ॥ ३८ ॥


66. शुद्धम् देशाः समानं सामाङ्गिकत्वावलम्।
रूपे साधितां हृष्ट श्रौच्यमयायति क्रिया मेतुः ॥ ३८ ॥

a = Tib. hidus. pa.

67. The author thinks that Śaṅcita atoms are dasya, substance since they discharge a uniform function. The same opinion in his Anyopaha-vicara, ver. 2. The logical school of Dignaga following the Sautrantik system defines dasya as one capable of discharging a perposive action: dasya-kiya-akṣaram sātya-takṣaram. V. Tatt. pan. p. 730,

(18; Nya. bindu Tika p. 76-77) cp. pram. var. III, ver. 195.

प्राणेनाविकासानां वज्रं गोयकोपते।
उपन्यास नन्दितां हृ प्रविज्ञिता सत्त्वानां ॥

It may be noted here that the opinion of Śaṅcita-ānu as the object of consciousness is attributed to the Neo-
Sarvastevadin, (Sanghahabdra) by Kuei. chi. v. my forthcoming edition of the Alam. par.

68. द्वारकारणयोगेश्वरे न शेषकेवाचारिनः ॥

69. The same idea in the author’s Anyopaha-vicara, ver. 7. cp. Tatt. van. ver. 870.

70. तर्क मय इत्यस्य दितिः प्रविलोकयति ॥ ७० ॥

71. This very instance compels the Yogacara to declare that the images that are reflected in our consciousness are all false (alika) v. Tatt. pan. ad ver. 2037; सत्यात्मात्मात्मानांतत्तत्त्त्तस्तत्वात्.

यथा तदातिष्ठति नामवेदेनावलम्। द्वितीयस्वरूपोद्धारस्त्रविलयान्ति।

येस्य हंसकं निर्देशत् विविधत्वानां परिक्षये। विविधत्वानां परिवर्तनस्य तद्दृश्यमात्र अनामयतिरिवर्तनस्य स्वतं विविधतादानां ज्ञातं न भवति।

एवम् ज्ञात्वार्थविद्वेषति ज्ञानात्मानोऽवत्। p. 271, cp. p. 181,
ver. 536. साहाय न्यू विन्याय... A thorough examination of this topic from the Yogacara standpoint has been made by Ratna-kirti in hi. Cita-adhata-pakasa-rada (v. Ratnakirtimabodha. K. P. J. Instituts. Patna, 1957.

Dharmakirti from the standpoint of his logic offers this explanation: Our practical experiences dictate that several non-sensuous consciousnesses can arise simultaneously; v. Pram. var. मानसिक भाव, समय, विश्वासविस्मिति. विकलित:-
कानोत्तरोऽस्मि विनयायिनी प्रालाम्। वेषयं। Pram. var. 197–201; Tat. san. var. 1253; कल्याणं विनयं न सन्धिपर वनस्। विकलित-मानसिक भाव, समय, विश्वासविस्मिति, etc.

Another explanation is offered in the following lines:
कति वर्ण नाती ब्रह्म यह तर्कार्यातः। इति मानसिक भाव, विश्वास विश्वासविस्मिति। Pram. var. III, 222. Bhavya: तस्मात् विनृत्तकोयवर्धानः विनयायुविनयायिनी प्रालाम्। विकलित-प्रालाम्। p. 290.

Dharmakirti further argues as another solution that several things can produce simultaneously one cognition: तस्मात् विनृत्तकोयवर्धानः। विश्वासविस्मिति। Bhavya: तस्मात् विनृत्तकोयवर्धानः। विश्वासविस्मिति। विकलित-प्रालाम्। p. 296. Kosz (IV.10) also refers to the citrasatava problem. v. Note. 178 for the author's solution.

72. वाचक साहाय, विनोदात्मकदृष्टी में विनयाय।

73. आस्था विद्याविद्यायिनी समयविस्मिति।

74. वविद्याविद्यायिनी समयविस्मिति।

75. यथाविद्यायिनी समयविस्मिति।

76. यथाविद्यायिनी समयविस्मिति।
6. The verse is cited in T. Panji. p. 551, l. 21: अमाविश्वा रूपात् नास्ति निर्देशत् एवं इत्यादि. 

7. The second line of this verse is cited in prose in T. Panji. p. 356, cp. n. 79 below.

8. The author refers here to Vasubandhu's criticism of atomic theory in his Vimsa. ver. 12, 14: विद्यमानं पूर्ववर्तीं इत्यादि. 

9. Some similar criticism has also been made by him in the koṣabhasya, I. ver. 43. Tīb. pp. 81-84. and the Yaśibhasika's defence.

10. The same idea in the ver. 8 above, cp. note 14.

11. The present verse answers this objection.
82. अनेकाचविविधारोनेकों विवाचनले।
बहिनिरुपनालाईरोमालेको विवाचन।

The idea of this verse is also included in the prose passage above cited in n. -79. अनेकाचारोनेकों विवाचनले।
This explanation suggests idea of manifoldness on the atom is imaginary as the idea of the oneness on the aggregate.

83. तत्तत्त्वाचर्यांच रीत वीरन्तर्देवविकोसय।

84. The explanation is made here of how an invisible atomic form becomes a visible gross form.

85. नेवलाल्यानिरुपनालांच बहिनिरुपने।
विवाचनात: पुनरस्थापना न ताप्पदा। कथा।

86. If the latter proposition is acceptable, the former one also will be so.

87. वाक् विवाचनानिरुपनालांच तत्तत्त्वाचर्यांच।

88. The advocate of knowledge of two and more moments, duration is probably the Naiyayika. The Theravadin pleads that it exists for three moments, v, Abh. San. IV.

89. Atoms, though existing is an uninterrupted series are not conceived as on arayavada on the analogy of knowledge.

90. प्रतिस्थाप्याक्रमणस्य गतिलेलसं गतिमेक।

91. This is in reply to Vasubandhu's criticism: साक्षरस्य गतिलेलसं

92. वक्ता नस्ति नास्ति सङ्क्यस्य ित्र विवाचने।

93. This answers Vasubandhu's query: खंडवाहींतं कथा बौमसा. 74.

94. शास्त्रिकाल्यानेकों गतिलेलसं तथा बौमसा।

पराशुरामाचार्यांच विवाचने।
95. को निर्णय मात्राभाव निष्क्रिय नामित यथा।
कालानुसार अपवर्गवान् अपरिवर्त्ती व न वृत्तते। ॥ ॥
a = parivarna = hgyur. ba.
96. cp. Vimssa. 12d. तिष्क: स्वाध्यायलक।
97. अन्योपायस्मात नुहं अञ्जलाय अन्वितातः।
अव: स्वाभाविक संविधि गृहीतार्काविवेकः ॥ ॥
98. This makes clear that the author holds the opinion that atoms do not contact with one another. Read in Tib. reg. pa for rig. pa.
99. दशनामात्ममव निष्क्रिय । अपरिवर्त्तीः।
परावर्त अपरावर्त निविद्यादेव वेदस्य न स ॥ ॥
100. विलासरूपमनुष्यांत्वमनातः उपस्थित ।
a = brgyas. pa. दिननी स. Das, Dictionary.
101. रस्ते अन्वितातः: वृद्धिमानातारिहः।
संसारिकांसिद्धिः कल्पितान्तराकृयः ॥ ॥
102. It appears that there are millions of atoms having no capacity strong enough to come into combination and to form any visible object.
103. The Yogi can count the number of atoms even of the hell, etc. remote objects. The expression: acataligha is again used later in ver. 64 below.
104. को नामितत्र तो हृदयः । तत्र अविविद्याहिः।
महाबोधिकारात ए. a भास्करामप्रमुखः ॥ ॥
बहुत : अविविद्याः हृदय में। नेव.
105. The idea may be amplified thus: If my apprehension of atoms by outer senses is illusive, your understanding of the mind alone with equilly be illusive. Here the author's reference to the mind as the sixth sense is suggestive of the fact that the mind understands always what is apprehended by the outer senses. Cp. the Saying ; अवाञ्चितो सत्यते अविविद्याः स्वाध्याय लपकः न मन्नता ॥ ॥ cited in Nya-Tippani, p. 26.
106. The Yogacara conceives the mind as the basis of illusion of the whole universe; thus the mind is a real entity while the objective universe is illusory.

107. The Yogacara's conception of the hell is well explained in the Vimśa-bhasya ad. 4. Read my English translation of the treatise and a bilingual edition of the text with notes from Venkatesa's comments (Institute of Tibetology, Gangtok, 1964).

109. The author thinks: As you (opponents) declare the atoms, etc. as illusory, why do you not say likewise of the Pradhana and Purusa as illusory?

110. The same expression previously in ver. 59, n. 103.

112. T. Panjij clarifies Jaina-Jneya-sabdana thus: विवढ़विनिर्मित विमुक्तिविपर्यायं निर्माण-निर्मित्यं सम्पर्यायं। ततां अभ्रन्य प्रकृतं एव, यद्यपि विमुक्तिविपर्यायं स्वयमानं एव स्व堆मं। श्रवण-श्रवणान्तर-निर्मित्यं, श्रवण-श्रवणान्तर-निर्मित्यं। न क विवढ़विनिर्मितिः प्रकृतिः तथाविपर्यायं निर्माणं।

114. T. Panjij. explains Jnaṇa-Jneya-sabdana thus: विवढ़विनिर्मिति विमुक्तिविपर्यायं स्वयमानं सम्पर्यायं। ततां अभ्रन्य प्रकृतं एव, यद्यपि विमुक्तिविपर्यायं स्वयमानं एव स्व堆मं। श्रवण-श्रवणान्तर-निर्मित्यं न क विवढ़विनिर्मितिः प्रकृतिः तथाविपर्यायं निर्माणं। तथा हि साधनं व विद्वानविद्वानविपर्यायं निर्माणं।

115. नामोदित गान्ये श्रवणं विपर्यायं विद्वानं विद्वानं विद्वानं।

This is cited in T. Panjij. v. note. 1/4. end.
116. अनास्य प्रभु न विषयं जान ना विधिविविधम्।
तथा कथा तथा वसं युक्ते नास्य वणु: पुनः॥ ९७॥
a2 lit. स्वागतः।

117. What is implied in the previous verse is made clear here, viz. in the absence of either of the two, knowledge or the object no cognition flasks out and that is the reason why they are felt simultaneously.

118. एकादिविविषयत: सत्येऽवतं न मेहत्तपको।
वसंस्वेतस्म परामर्शत: न च ॥ ९८॥
This verse is cited in T. Panji (p. 568 l. 4) in prose: अथ सत्येऽवतं एकादिविविषयत: सत्येऽवतं न मेहत्तपको।

119. ब्रम्हधर्मसौ विद्यान्वयं साक्षता अविनाश न बायु।
विद्याधरमविनभि न च प्रकृति भ्रम्म ॥ ९९॥

120. The author probably intends to say thus: The ghost, the hell, etc. are equally spoken off in the scripture, why do you say that our knowledge of these things is an illusion?

121. आयुर्विद् सन्मथेऽ विशेषः इकङ्किवदी
पौराणिकिभ्रमविभ्रमो विभ्रमः॥ १००॥

122. सत्येऽवतं साक्षत्वानुभूतः स्वसंस्वेतं दिति किनम्।
विनिमयं सत्यं हेतुविनिमयं साक्षत्वानुभूतः॥ १०१॥
Kamalavita introducing this verse remarks: अथ सत्येऽवतं साक्षत्वानुभूतः साक्षत्येऽवतं हेतुविनिमयं साक्षत्वानुभूतः ॥ १०२॥ This objection is also noticed by Dharmapala in his comment an Alam par.

133. एकार्थं नवन्दोषेऽविनयतः तथा।
तथा सयायने भव एवं वधु सदाम् ॥ १०३॥

124 T. Panji. refers to this idea of oneness and its implications thus: पुनः यथा एवः वधु नवन्दोषेऽविनयतः तथा हेतुग्रिहत।
तथाति नवन्दोषेऽविनयतः नवन्दोषेऽविनयतः नवन्दोषेऽविनयतः
तथाति नवन्दोषेऽविनयतः सर्वनवन्दोषेऽविनयतः सर्वनवन्दोषेऽविनयतः।
देवः तथा सोब (sic)
नवन्दोषेऽविनयतः नवन्दोषेऽविनयतः नवन्दोषेऽविनयतः।
तथा सर्वनवन्दोषेऽविनयतः सर्वनवन्दोषेऽविनयतः
नवन्दोषेऽविनयतः नवन्दोषेऽविनयतः नवन्दोषेऽविनयतः।
सम्बन्धितं विनिमयसंगमं विनिमयसंगमं विनिमयसंगमं।
125. The idea expressed in this verse is well stated in T. Panji. passage cited in the previous note.

126. The idea of this verse has been summed up in T. Panji. passage cited in the note 124.

127. Thus the reason becomes aryatara-āsidhā. 

128. For the advocate of sakara jñāna, the image is a part of the knowledge. To prove it is useless.

129. The author appears to mean this: If the experience of the black shell consist, in the nature of knowledge alone, the knowledge should then be experienced as black. Since the black colour cannot be attributed to the knowledge, there ought to be something black material other than the knowledge. The classical example is: pitah sankhāra. This example of bhūtrana jñāna seems to be purposefully employed in order to point out that there are two aspects of the object, viz. black and the shell which cannot be accommodated in the only knowledge.

137. उक्ति तु सत्यी यास्य विसंघानम्।
सामस्याकालाय कुर्सिं आन्दोस्य सहाय्यवान्।
॥ २९ ॥
This verse is cited in T. panji, p. 569, il. 16-17 along with the verse, भक्ति एक्तिमया। l-v, n. 114.

138. Saneerī, according to early Buddhist includes three factors: (1) vedasīya (2) ṣīpṛṣa, and (3) ṣāṃjña, manaḥ and it gives rise to a sensation, ṣāṃjña, which is followed by feeling, vedanā, and then image, samjña, v. Bud. logic, l, p. 311, Table, Cp. Kosa. III, p. 63. 23.

139. Here the term saha is in the sense of immediate succession: cfr. the next verse.

140. सुरिपरस वदा सामस्याकालाय सब्योहै।
क्षायश्चेत्त लोगम गतिणः सहाय्यवान्।
॥ ३० ॥

141. वेदानतेषां विसंघामानोऽवै, शामस्याकालाय।
सामस्याकाले ते भावायृ भृतोऽविद्यवान्।
॥ ३१ ॥

142. That is, the reason is doubtful, (v. ver. 74 above.) Sandhyā-asūdāna.

143. सामस्याकाले च देवो देहं नेत्रो भवते।
विद्यवान्तत्त्वाभित्त्वेत्ताः चेतनाः।
॥ ३२ ॥

144. The idea is made clear in T. Panji, p. 570, l. 18, ff.

145. The idea of this verse is also referred to in T. Panji, p. 570, l. 50, ff.
The definition of pariccheda, v. ver. 92. below.

This verse is cited with this remark:

Mrs. Stoddart's translation is given at the end of this paper.

Verse 26.1.11 refers to the following passage:

145. The idea is well explained in the passage quoted in note 145. This is the standpoint of the Sautrantika also. He is therefore called Bhavyartha-vadin and his paper: Bod. Idealism, ob. cit. p. 78; Tsan. p. 402, ver. shuddhavasata uppavagase jana asravine.

A—Bhavyartha-vadin is the Sautrantika.

Verse 26.1.11 refers to the following passage:

This verse is cited with this remark:

Mrs. Stoddart's translation is given at the end of this paper.

Verse 26.1.11 refers to the following passage:

The definition of pariccheda, v. ver. 92. below.

A—Bhavyartha-vadin is the Sautrantika.
151. This is probably the author’s criticism of the *saupya* theory of the Sautrantika-Yogacara.

152. अध्यात्मिकिः विद्वानः विवादनात्मकः प्रायः

वर्णोऽभेदाय भवेत्।

153.

154. विद्वानं तन्त्रकारस्त्रे न विद्वानं पराञ्चत्।

विद्वानः कारणस्त्रे सारस्त्रे हि सः

155. Thus the above stated *paniçehe* of the ver. 89 is simply *vittanatra*.

156. अनुभवतां द्वारा न किल किलते तथा।

किल्लुस्ती तथा ज्ञानार्थम्।

157. सहस्यं तद्यथा न भेदो वामार्थम्।

पाराधेवेऽक्षणं सवेः व्यवहाराय विद्वानः।

158. This is very important to note that the author denies an apparent distinction between the Saint and the ordinary man in respect of their grasping the external things. The Saint has an additional virtue of penetrating into different aspects of things: *sarvakāra-jñana* is one of the qualities attributed to the Buddha, *r. kosa* IX, ver. 1.

159. तांत्र्याल्योऽवाच सार्वाय तुवाहानमात्।

इन वेदांतिः धर्मातन् सन्तु भिन्नता ॥

160. Sakara-vadin is the Sautrantika, and nirakara-vadin Vaibhav-sika. The Yoga-cara is tulya-kāla-vadin and the Vaihāsika and Sātrasiddha are *atulya-kāla-vadin=Krma-vadin*. Similarly Vasubandhu, a follower of the Sautrantika school pleads for *atulya-kāla-vadana*, a Successive comprehension even of omniscient buddha thus:

सार्वार्थम् समर्थेऽविन्यासः

विद्वानुष्ठानम्।

तथा सर्वादेवेऽक्षणं न हि वाल्मीकिन्तुः।

*Kosa* IX, I.
161. आसारक वल्ल गन्धकाशा दृश्यः।

162. We experience different things in different shapes. some long, some short, some square and so on. These shapes according to the Vaiśeṣikas are external and real belonging to the congealed atoms. The Sautrantika and Dignāga school on the other hand, hold that they are internal and unreal as they are merely our mind’s construction.

163. वाणाशिकवादु सुप्रभाव ऐवेसे निविवे नात्रूमः।

164. The Mahayanists think that the yogin, having removed the two kinds of obscuration, klesa and jñeya-avarana would not have any idea of external things. The author ridicules this point, cp. T. Panjji, p. 574 ad. ver. 2048.

165. विकारनीलस्य स्वृष्टिः सम्प्रयोगिन्यन्याचारः।

166. तिमिरिक्षो विकारविशेषः।

167. अर्थसंवर्धितं विकारं वस्तुसाधारणः।

168. The author probably means to say what constitutes distinction of one knowledge from another in his theory of imageless knowledge.
169. श्रावं श्रावं हरं दिनकारश्रावं श्रावं ।
६७-२१ ॥

This verse is cited in T. sm. p. 572.

170. For the Yogacara the true knowledge is non-dual, advaya as stated in the next verse and imageless, cfr. T. Panj. p. 182: तिष्ठतामत्तेवाद्विष्ठीचिन्नगृहविकल्पनाद्वारामानसत्तां श्रीरोक्त।
The imageless, produced by anadi-śrāvana or sakṣaḥ formed out of knowledges by the sensuous object for the Sautraṇa-tikā, n. ver. 27. above.

171. भाषणं फलस्मयेन नाग्नगणि विनियोगंगतिवादिन्यानेन।
अभूतं बैठे यव प्रस्तुतयं भवश्चैव श्रव्यं ॥ १०-२॥

a. In the sense of a separate image, prthik akara.

172. अवपारितिष्ठितं अन्तः क्षणवेशं श्रीयोजयते ॥
[207] भाषणाः फलस्मयेन नाग्नगणि विनियोगंगतिवादिनेन।
a. or निमित्तम् या.

173. This is exactly what the Yogacara say; this is accepted by the author himself, note श्रवणं हरं दिनकारश्रवणं in the ver. 101. The author, has, however, stated it as kalpita by way of pratunga.

174. अहं ग्रहितं निवर्णस्तु अ नैनुभक्तः।
निर्विशेष्यं विनियोगंगतिबन्धं योजयते ॥ १०४॥

a.a. ग्रहितद्विशेष्यं.

175. This is the basic conclusion of the author. The sense-organ, for the Vaibhāṣikā, are derivative material elements; but for the Yogacara they are some forms of Sakti, v. Alambanap, ver. 7. with Vinitadeva's tika, cfr. Sayasyidhi, chap. 45, they are nominal. Paricitraka is explained in ver. 89-92 above. Yogava, an object that falls within the range of senses and not a remote one.

176. श्रावस्य अवपारितिष्ठितं सञ्ज्ञांबन्धं श्राहेण ॥
निग्रहं निविदंगतिवादिनैव तथा भवेत् ॥ १०२॥

निविदं गौतम नैवेदितः।

This verse is made of 3 lines in order to complete the sense.

177. The lamp-example is cited by the Sautraṇa-tikā-Yogacaras in favour of their theory of sanātana-dhana which is criticised in Mad. Iridika, VII, 8 and Madh. avataras, my Sanskrit text,
p. 60: अतः किमतु होतानि विज्ञानमनुसार। इt seems that the early Saur- 
तारनिका, i.e. Darsaniika, does not accept the theory of svam 
सूत्राणाम, cfr., Kosa, IX, p. 231, n 4; Vyakhya, p. 698, 2-3; 
Satya-Siddhi, chap. 68,71,72. The Vaibhavika maintains that 
one knowledge cognizes its preceding one, (cfr., ver. 84, n. 
144, cp., ver. 90, 144 and 147, also) In case of not accepting 
svamvedana, how the memory is possible is explained in 

178. This implies that the simultaneous grasping two and more 
colours, e.g. is possible. Therefore the cognition of several 
coleurs in the case of citrasamana is quite permissible, T. 
T. Panjji, p. 571: देव मात्र गणना निवासाध्यायिा Classi 
काव्य सिद्धांतार्थायिा सुवासिता अनुमानन्तर 
काफी स्मरणार्थार्था नियमि। तथा अस्वज्ञ नियमि। 
नेता कल्पितादेवी चतुः पार्थ कस्मार्थुः भेदे न 
कल्पितार्थार्थानीयानाद्वार्थानान्यान्यान्यान्यान्य 
व्यवस्थित। तथा एवं तथा केवल चतुः। Kamalasila probably means 
some Sautrantika author who pleads that several images are 
simultaneously experienced in the case of citrasamana. But 
Subhagupta may not agree with this opinion, as a sensible 
knowledge, according to him can comprehend several 
homogeneous objects at once.

179. कल्पास्थापीयविषयोऽविद्यन्तात्रयोऽसाध्यः। 
तेन तेन द्वेष्टं कल्पितसघनणाय न च 

180. cp. M. I, 295; S. V, 218, cited in kosa IX, 242; Swayydditi, 
chap. 35. The different kinds of objects, such as colour, 
sound, etc., cannot be simultaneously cognized by their respec- 
tive sense-organ-says the Vaibhavika. The Yogacara on the 
other hand, thinks that simultaneity of different nonconstruc- 
tive consciousnesses is possible as T. san, says: 
सत्तिदाहुपाध्याय्यानि वैधेषीत | त्वस्त्वं त्रयं |

भूतेष व मात्र तथावचो अयथानित न प्रयत। 
अतः सत्त' सिद्धम्ये न क्लप्पार्थ अन्तेशेन। 
हाप्रथापाहतपालोभ्यासितविद्यां (1250-55) 
The same in vram. var. III, 136-37, 
सत्तिदाहुपाध्याय्यानि वैधेषीत सत्तवः 
…………सत्तिदाहुपालोभ्यासितविद्यां नियमि। 

cp. Ibid. 208: मात्रानितस्मृतम् मात्रानितस्मृतार्थिक्षानात। 
कल्पितार्थार्थानीयानीयानीयानीयानीयान 
Prajnalara's Bhaya: विश्वसमायात दिव्यास्मात्तीमयां नियम्ये।
54

The last sentence makes clear that the Yogacara bans the simultaneity of different constructive thoughts. Cfr. again T. san: अनिन्द्रम् इति सहस्रों Panji. p. 241: नक्ते थिकाई रेवे तुम्हारीड़-लाम रेवे। See also note 71 above.

181. अनिन्द्रम् पु. 199

182. कर उनके गाढ़े, मानने करते तबड़ेम्म 197

183. Here and onwards the author criticises the opinion of some Sautrantika masters who hold that our consciousness while grasping an external thing, moulds itself into an image similar to that of the external thing and that this moulding is effected in just immediately next moment after the external thing falls within the ken of the sense-organ. According to Dharmakirti a non-constructive mental perception intervenes in the second moment and the synthetic cognition (uavikalpa) is effected with the image-formation in the third moment (v. Bud. logic. II, p. 312, the Table) our author here, without taking notice of the second stage mental perception speaks of the image-invested knowledge as immediately following the first moment's pure sensation.

184. शान्तिकराम मानाम्।

185. Jnanakara, for this author, is janaśrakara, cfr. n. 165n.

186. अहिम्सकम् प्राप्तिभावनासकम्।

187. cfr. T. San. ver. 2039. सत्यम तथा सत्यम ज्ञातितातसंगति कोऽत्र।

188. नीतिविश्वसायते च ज्ञातं नीतिविश्वसायते।

तत्त्वज्ञानोऽस्बं भवेत् तत्त्वज्ञानोऽस्बं भवेत् । 121

तत्त्वातिभावस्मात्सत्वं न तुयथकं।
190. Causality and objectivity are two characteristics of the content.

191. The kind of nirvikalpa mind that is pleaded by the Sautrantika-Yogacara school is not accepted by the author. The Vaibhasika conception of nirvikalpa is explained in kosa. 1, ver. 33, with Poussin's note.

192. This argument is set up by Dignaga, v. Alambanap. ver. 1-3.

193. Here 'similar' is with reference to the objective element. The idea seems to be this: the knowledge first becomes similar to its object and this simulated knowledge becomes the object of its immediately following knowledge. The author objects to this because no knowledge flashes up immediately after its predecessor. In Tib. or after stva-ma stands for objective case governed by the verb bdal, pa.

200. The author's objection appears to be this: Suppose in the first moment there is a knowledge of the Sound and in the next
moment a knowledge of rupa arises in its continuity. This second knowledge must bear the image of the sound according to your Saropya theory. Therefor it is not well founded.

202. केवलिनिद्धरूपतत्त्वशास्त्र-विवेचन: b वि प्रारम्भितम् ॥ १२१ ॥

203. २६८. द्वारकादत्त कृपाजी केवल उपलब्धि हि सिद्धि: ॥ १२२ ॥

204. द्वारकादत्त कृपाजी केवल उपलब्धि हि सिद्धि: ॥ १२२ ॥

205. द्वारकादत्त कृपाजी केवल उपलब्धि हि सिद्धि: ॥ १२२ ॥

206. The Characteristics as stated before (note 190) are causality and objectivity. Sakti may fulfill the first but not the second.

207. द्वारकादत्त कृपाजी केवल उपलब्धि हि सिद्धि: ॥ १२२ ॥

208. द्वारकादत्त कृपाजी केवल उपलब्धि हि सिद्धि: ॥ १२२ ॥

209. द्वारकादत्त कृपाजी केवल उपलब्धि हि सिद्धि: ॥ १२२ ॥

210. The opponent thinks that there cannot be any thing in the external like desirable or undesirable; for, what is desirable for one person is undesirable for another, v. Bhavaantika, p. 39.

211. दूरस्तितथे केवलिनिद्धरूपतत्वशास्त्र-विवेचन: ॥ १२४ ॥

a ति. भावसंहितः तृतीयः—The case-ending is not in Tib.
212. The idea here and in the following seems to be this: The Yogacara thinks that the yogin can change any thing into another form by dint of his deep meditative power or adshaksana, ep. Madh. Avatara, VI, 69. - 213. as Vibh. v. 214. - 215. asSw. v. 216. asSw. v. 217. S vapropaghata, v. note 221 below. The Sautrantika-Yogacara's definition of reality is: Nyayabindu, i, 15; T. Panji, p 730, l. 16: asSw. v. 218. asSw. v. 219. This is already pointed out in the previous verse. 220. [208a] asSw. v. 221. This is given as example to disprove externalism by Vasyabandhu in his Yima Veda, 3 a: asSw. v. 222. asSw.
222. साखाराम गुप्तानन्द: a 131 b
बनास गाये संवत 1892 कानत सिंध।
याना लेखनिकित्तानुसार:

233. कामिन्या पत्रे कविता: 133 b
कामाक्षी काला संभवूँ, हस्ताक्षर बनानिर्देश।

244. निर्देशस्तोत्र: 134 b
संसारीय कालावधी राजाविषय वादिकानाराम्य।

255. पश्चिमज्योतिः: 135 b
यहाँ देव-देवी ग्रंथमें भागमें 136 b
सुझाव: हृदय दृष्टि नरुँग ग्रंथमें।

266. Bio yi-don zbudher arilab probably is the same as kamartha previously stated in the ver. 132, note, 220, i.e. purvartha purpose of human action.

227. क्यापा यस्य नामक पुस्तकाधीन रहे: 136 b
कालान: उनें खजने लिखने लिखने शहीद।

228. The definition of action is: केसा कई हादसे केहिं ने नुमा ने कोणमा कोण संयोगमा अनुसार पत्र A. III. 415. Ref. Karhavathu, p. 393. Madh. kar. XVIII, 2-3, Madh. Av. VI, ver. 89. cited in Boch. Panji. p. 472-Pouslin, kosa. IV, n. 3. since there is no cetana, will to dream, there is no real action.

229. पीवाड़ुम्बिकाज्ञान: संबंध 137 b
अन्यो निपुनिकता b ले न कार्यनिवय विप्रत भिन्न।
किस्मतकोहरानुसार:

230. The author refutes the Vimsott, ver. 4... 138 b
सब स्तूपमलाई धूली कों जमाने.

231. नानाकनिरमाणसे: 138 b
संसारकथा मनोहरी नरुँग तथाकथा नु.
परस्पर: किन्ने নির্দিষ্ট।

233. तथा निःस्वममतत्त्वन् ॥ ६३५ ॥

234. Reference is probably a Caruda-mastra promising the boon.

235. वृजी-न मित्र स्त्रा: ॥ १४० ॥

236. Pavana, rituals containing the Buddhist Tantric rites described in Tantric literature as to how one may ward off the influence of the evil spirits and gain earthly prosperity. Here reviving the dead person cannot be accomplished without the assistance of such rituals.

237. परिक्षितो तमसशापाय गर्भ गंगेष ॥ १४१ ॥

238. Vasubandhu contends that para-citta-jnana is untrue, y. Yimsa ver 20, but is true for the author, y. ver. 148. below.

239. तालावे कपिल मने तितिद्वृत्त प्रति श्रद्धा ||

240. This is said from the standpoint of the Sautrantika-Yogacaras.

241. कपिलाशचर्चायाः क्यदर्शन्न नौ न च ||

242. The author probably refers to the Naiyayika’s theory of of rasa: moving towards the object much criticised in the Sutya-siddhi, Chap. 49-50 what is termed, कपिल (vyapana) for Dignaga, Pram-sam I, 9, T. Panji. p. 399:

243. सुधा श्रावण स्वक्षेपः ॥ १२५ ॥

244. Svaca-citta-jnana, knowing one’s own mind is possible in the same manner as para-citta-jnana is. This is not, however,
swa-samvedana, self-knowledge of the Yogacaras, but simply one mind knowing the other mind.


247. a=Tib. don-ba-te-min. The same expression in Vimsa.

248. cp. Vimsa p. 13.: .... the... Swabhāṣṭāvat. The same expression in Vimsa.

249. This is the Vaiśhāsika's conception of Sūtrasastra.


254. In the absence of an object nothing could be regarded as cognizer of it v. n. 249-50.

255. Vimsa p. 13.: .... the... Swabhāṣṭāvat. The same expression in Vimsa.

256. Sthānadharmasūtras 216. The same expression in Vimsa.
257. तात्त्विक-णिय विशिष्टकर्तव्य अर्थात् ॥ १२ ॥
258. तत्व: विनिवेशितं; दिशातिकाकल:।
सन्तुष्ट उत्तरयोगः।
a तिति: स्वेच्छयः।
259. This probably refers to Kumarila’s objection.
260. गणपतिविवेशितं तत्व: विशिष्टकर्तव्याः।
रामायणोपनयम् नित्यात् ।
a तिति: निरन्तरप्रवाहमः।
b तिति: स्वयंप्रियम:।
261. तत्त: वे गणपतिविवेशिताः
श्रवणाय प्रसन्नम्।
a तां तत्त: वेदः।
262. युद्धपरिवर्त्य तत्त: उपदेशिकाराकर्तारः
शिक्षाय व्यवस्था तत् तत्त: ॥ १२ ॥
a तिति: निराकर्षः।
263. This probably refers to the Sunyata-meditation as interpreted by the Yogacara.
264. कमलापृष्ठचन्द्राकोणो न प्रकरण: ॥ १२ ॥
265. तुहै गणपतिविवेशितो [200a] न एक्षमायितवेशितः।
266. It is interesting to note that the author’s statement to the effect that our idea of one entity (dhāva) in as assumption on the discrete atoms.
267. निशाजानंशिकाराम्
निशाजानंशिकाराम्।
a तिति: न नित्यात्।
268. कथितविवेशित:।
शिक्षाय व्यवस्था ॥ १२ ॥

Note: The text contains Sanskrit verses and phrases, which might require knowledge of Sanskrit for natural reading.
269. It is historically true that the Buddha obtained his enlightenment as a result of long practices and effort. That enlightenment can not be obtained very easily and in a moment by the Yogis.

270. अत: सांस्कृतिक फलणा तत्त्वरोपतप्त: पुंसः ।
तत्त्वानुप्राप्तिविनियमः सोलम पूर्णिमो ॥ १२७ ॥

271. The author has summed up here how Buddhahood should be secured in the system of the Vaibhasikas.

272. कथा कौशलस्वयमः द्वाराधिनिषु ।
देव न विकते तस्मात् हुदाक्षर न सम्बेदः ॥ २१२ ॥

273. कथों गृहस्त्याय विकारात्मिनमस्य च ।
बालोदस्ताक्षरिणा च विविधादिहै ॥ २१४ ॥
सत्त्वगृहस्तास्ताक्षरात्मिनमस्य विकारात्मिन ॥ २१४ ॥
सत्त्वः कौशलयोऽवस्य केवल परिवर्तनम् ॥ २१४ ॥

274. cp. Vimsa. ver. 18: कौशलस्वयमानविनियम सिद्धिनिर्मिति विद् ।

275. द्वाराधिनिषु इत्यत: श्रद्धालोकितवर्षतः
सरस्य कौशलः मित् न द्वाराधिनिषु भवन्ति ॥ २१४ ॥

276. अज्जनातां मन्नकर्षः मायिकविनि हि द्वाराधिनिषु ।
न द्वाराधिनिषुः हि विनेिनिषु ॥ २१४ ॥

277. सत्त्ववेयं अवहितेऽवहिते च द्वाराधिनिषुर्यूः
अभिषेकवेय्य न योगां विनिषु तत्त्वारदिनिषु ॥ २१४ ॥

278. See Bodhic vart. V, 86 and Panji, citing the authority of the Bodhisattva-pratinoksa.

279. परिवर्तनसवयीय अध्याय तत्त्वारक्षरिकवर्तमान: ।


281. यद्य तत्त्वनां न सत्त्वज्ञ विविधानुप्राप्तिविनियमः
सत्त्ववेयिनि च यथा तत्त्वारक्षरिकान्तः ॥ २१४ ॥

282. भक्षुपुज्याः श्रुतिः महत्मा महत्त्वपूर्वतं
अण्डां श्रगते यद्य यथा च द्वाराधिनिषु ॥ २१४ ॥
283. Tib. nan-thos-grol pas-mian-dag- gi... Svanaka-moksa is the highest perfection attainable by any disciple of the Buddha.

284. नाश मात्र: पीड़ा: मान्यता: [209]) विज्ञ रचनेतेः।

285. मत्त सन्तोषभीत्ते अद्वय गतिनिष्ठेः।

286. A tentative interpretation.

287. अस्मि नेत्रोद्वै नर्तकिन्स्तानां सुशीलारुपयुक्तः।

288. a z Ses-pa-gan-njü-gongs-su. cp. ver. 143 above.

289. cp. T. Panj. p. 180: नर्तकिन्स्तानां नवत विनु नए नायिकांपतेः।

290. This prasanga has been made, because the knowledge of smoke is not inconsistent with the knowledge of fire; this will become clear from the just next verse.

291. आदर्शविचारार्थं विनत ् धूमपीकरणं विदर ।

292. अक्रियार्थविचारार्थं धूमपीकरणं कृपया ।

293. आदर्शविचारार्थं विनत ् धूमपीकरणं कृपया ।

294. मत्त सन्तोषभीत्ते मान्यता: मात्र: पीड़ा: मान्यता: [209].

295. The author, from here, attempts to offer his own interpretation of those passages which speak of citta-mūraṭa.

296. भास्मादाय वन्यात: सजीवविशेष व सविशेष।

297. a z lit. नसे कसे।

298. This is the author's explanation of Dharmacāracarita, a Mahayanaic idea of the external things. Thus, according to
hin all the passages declaring *dharma-nairatmya* are to be understood in the manner indicated here.

297. अनवासित सम गोरें गाय विकल्पिताः।

वासनाविलक्तं न वित्ततः विनिविषयः [पत्रम् १०४]

298. *cp. ver. गाय से विवहे गाय गरीखिताः।*

वासनाविलक्तं विनिविषयः [पत्रम् १०६]


299. अनवासित वायु विद्यामानविद्विप्रकृतिः।

वासनाविलक्तं परिवर्तः [पत्रम् १०६]

300. *Pudgala-nairatmya* is also accepted by the Sarvastivadi-Vaiśnavakas. The author here puts forth the reason for accepting it.

301. अनवासित वायु विद्यामानविद्विप्रकृतिः।

याकालणं वासनाविलक्तं परिवर्तः [पत्रम् १०६]

302. It is well-known that the Yogacara accepts three characteris-
tics (laksana), viz. Parikalpita, paratantra and parinigama. Likewise this author enumerates three things, viz. kalpita, vikal-

pa and dharma, of which the last one is explained as svalak-

sana corresponding to Parinigama of the Yogacara. Kalpita, a basic entity, i.e., a bhavanatra may correspond to Paratantra and Vikalpita, a false aspect imputed on may correspond to parikalpita. Thus according to this Vaibhasika author as in the case of the Yogacara, two things, Kalpita and Dharmata are true whereas vikalpita like parikalpita of the Yogacara is untrue. That the vikalpita is untrue has already been pointed out in the note 297 above. It is entirely false in as much as fancied by worldlings. *cp. ver. 40. विकल्पितं वायु विद्यामानविद्विप्रकृतिः। धर्मता, an everlastingly true as it is the same as svalakṣaṇa, is an everlasting svalkṣaṇa, (svalkṣaṇa sarvadā casti . . . . .) Kalpita that is explained as bhavanatram, a basic entity probably implies atomic foundations on which the various things are fancied. Atoms are kalpita, i.e., inferred, *ver. 64, (n. 111):* why the separate atoms are not cognized is made clear by the author in the *ver. 44 (n. 76), though the aggregate atoms are cognized in their svalakṣaṇa,* *ver. 37. (n. 62).*
303. वर्ण रूपः रुपायुक्तः कारणम्: कथिताः ।
कथिताच्याच्या हैरस्ते देहः कथिताचायुक्ते ॥ १५४ ॥

304. This is said probably with reference to the Madhyamika standpoint.

305. कालावधि यद (२१००) मात्री तेन सम गम्य एव सः ।
अभयार्द्ध स्वमय ६००० एवं विद्युतु त्वमस्यः ॥ १५५ ॥
a Tib. dnigsmayin.

306. The author's repeated argument of reality of the external things is avisonvade, a non-contradicted experience, v. verr. 5, (n. 5) 19 (n. 31) and 36. (n. 168).

307. This refers to the Madhyamika's position. The sentence may also read thus: their experiences resemble the dream, and [therefore] are non-existent.

308. नाशायत्वविलयः मात्रेः ६५विद्युत्वविलयः ।
कि व्याख्योपनृत्ताः ते वा विद्युत्वपरम परिवर्तः ॥ १५६ ॥
a=lt. विलयः ।

309. नाशायत्वविलयः मेधृत सुपरिनीलः ।
श्लेष्टविद्येनाशायत्वम् बषुस्मयः ॥ १५७ ॥

310. ज्ञातनां भोज्यात् भोज्यात् भोज्यात् समयः ।
अभयार्द्ध स्वमय ६००० एवं सत्ता ॥ १५८ ॥
a. Tib. mon. matzed. cin=सत्ताः—
b. Tib. skye. ba glew=हृत्ताः—
c. Tib. duang-bi=हृत्ताः.
1. ལ་ལོག་པར་ཐོབ་པ་ནི་ཐོབ་པའི་འབྲི་སོགས་
2. མཐུན་པོ་གཞི་རྒྱལ་པོ་ཆོས་ཞིང་། ས་རྒྱན་བོད་ཞིས་གྱིས་བཟོ་བོད།
3. ཕྱིན་ཏུ་དོན་དོན་ལྟར་སོགས་
4. ཞེས་ཤུས་ཐོབ་པ་ཀུན་ཞིང་། ཚེ་བི་བོད་མོ་རིམ་ཞིབ།
5. འཁྲི་བཞི་དོན་དོན་ལྟར་སོགས་
6. རྩེ་ཁྲི་བཞི་དོན་དོན་ལྟར་སོགས་
17. གཞི་ཨ་ཐོས་པ་ཐག་པ་བཤད་དཔེ་མེད། འོ་བཞི་ཤེས་ཐོས་པ་ཐག་པ་བཤད་དཔེ་མེད།
18. ག་ལོ་ཐོ་ཐོས་པ་ཐག་པ་བཤད་དཔེ་མེད། འོ་བཞི་ཤེས་ཐོས་པ་ཐག་པ་བཤད་དཔེ་མེད།
19. ག་ལོ་ཐོ་ཐོས་པ་ཐག་པ་བཤད་དཔེ་མེད། འོ་བཞི་ཤེས་ཐོས་པ་ཐག་པ་བཤད་དཔེ་མེད།
20. ག་ལོ་ཐོ་ཐོས་པ་ཐག་པ་བཤད་དཔེ་མེད། འོ་བཞི་ཤེས་ཐོས་པ་ཐག་པ་བཤད་དཔེ་མེད།
21. ག་ལོ་ཐོ་ཐོས་པ་ཐག་པ་བཤད་དཔེ་མེད། འོ་བཞི་ཤེས་ཐོས་པ་ཐག་པ་བཤད་དཔེ་མེད།
22. ག་ལོ་ཐོ་ཐོས་པ་ཐག་པ་བཤད་དཔེ་མེད། འོ་བཞི་ཤེས་ཐོས་པ་ཐག་པ་བཤད་དཔེ་མེད།
23. ག་ལོ་ཐོ་ཐོས་པ་ཐག་པ་བཤད་དཔེ་མེད། འོ་བཞི་ཤེས་ཐོས་པ་ཐག་པ་བཤད་དཔེ་མེད།
24. ག་ལོ་ཐོ་ཐོས་པ་ཐག་པ་བཤད་དཔེ་མེད། འོ་བཞི་ཤེས་ཐོས་པ་ཐག་པ་བཤད་དཔེ་མེད།
25. ག་ལོ་ཐོ་ཐོས་པ་ཐག་པ་བཤད་དཔེ་མེད། འོ་བཞི་ཤེས་ཐོས་པ་ཐག་པ་བཤད་དཔེ་མེད།
26. ག་ལོ་ཐོ་ཐོས་པ་ཐག་པ་བཤད་དཔེ་མེད། འོ་བཞི་ཤེས་ཐོས་པ་ཐག་པ་བཤད་དཔེ་མེད།


42. ི་དས་བས་དི་ལེ་བ། 2010 ཡོང། [ཤི་ཤེལ་ཕུ་ཕུག་བཞི་གཅིག་]  [1] དུས་ཚོ་བཅོ་ི་ཤུ་བཐོ་ [དུས་ཚོ་བཅོ་ི་ཤུ་བཐོ་]  [1]

43. ི་དས་བས་དི་ལེ་བ། 2010 ཡོང། [ཤི་ཤེལ་ཕུ་ཕུག་བཞི་གཅིག་]  [1] དུས་ཚོ་བཅོ་ི་ཤུ་བཐོ་ [དུས་ཚོ་བཅོ་ི་ཤུ་བཐོ་]  [1]

44. ི་དས་བས་དི་ལེ་བ། 2010 ཡོང། [ཤི་ཤེལ་ཕུ་ཕུག་བཞི་གཅིག་]  [1] དུས་ཚོ་བཅོ་ི་ཤུ་བཐོ་ [དུས་ཚོ་བཅོ་ི་ཤུ་བཐོ་]  [1]

47. ས་དཔལ་ནུས་ཞིབ་དེབ་གཞི་གྲོལ།  ་ཐོབ་མ་མ་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ།
    ས་དཔལ་ནུས་ཞིབ་དེབ་གཞི་གྲོལ།  ་ཐོབ་མ་མ་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ།
    དཔལ་ནུས་ཞིབ་དེབའི་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ།

48. ས་དཔལ་ནུས་ཞིབ་དེབ་གཞི་གྲོལ།  ་ཐོབ་མ་མ་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ།
    ས་དཔལ་ནུས་ཞིབ་དེབ་གཞི་གྲོལ།  ་ཐོབ་མ་མ་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ།
    དཔལ་ནུས་ཞིབ་དེབའི་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ།

49. ས་དཔལ་ནུས་ཞིབ་དེབ་གཞི་གྲོལ།  ་ཐོབ་མ་མ་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ།
    ས་དཔལ་ནུས་ཞིབ་དེབ་གཞི་གྲོལ།  ་ཐོབ་མ་མ་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ།
    དཔལ་ནུས་ཞིབ་དེབའི་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ།

50. ས་དཔལ་ནུས་ཞིབ་དེབ་གཞི་གྲོལ།  ་ཐོབ་མ་མ་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ།
    ས་དཔལ་ནུས་ཞིབ་དེབ་གཞི་གྲོལ།  ་ཐོབ་མ་མ་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ།
    དཔལ་ནུས་ཞིབ་དེབའི་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ།

51. ས་དཔལ་ནུས་ཞིབ་དེབ་གཞི་གྲོལ།  ་ཐོབ་མ་མ་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ།
    ས་དཔལ་ནུས་ཞིབ་དེབ་གཞི་གྲོལ།  ་ཐོབ་མ་མ་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ།
    དཔལ་ནུས་ཞིབ་དེབའི་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ།

52. ས་དཔལ་ནུས་ཞིབ་དེབ་གཞི་གྲོལ།  ་ཐོབ་མ་མ་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ།
    ས་དཔལ་ནུས་ཞིབ་དེབ་གཞི་གྲོལ།  ་ཐོབ་མ་མ་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ།
    དཔལ་ནུས་ཞིབ་དེབའི་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ།

53. ས་དཔལ་ནུས་ཞིབ་དེབ་གཞི་གྲོལ།  ་ཐོབ་མ་མ་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ།
    ས་དཔལ་ནུས་ཞིབ་དེབ་གཞི་གྲོལ།  ་ཐོབ་མ་མ་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ།
    དཔལ་ནུས་ཞིབ་དེབའི་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ།

54. ས་དཔལ་ནུས་ཞིབ་དེབ་གཞི་གྲོལ།  ་ཐོབ་མ་མ་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ།
    ས་དཔལ་ནུས་ཞིབ་དེབ་གཞི་གྲོལ།  ་ཐོབ་མ་མ་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ།
    དཔལ་ནུས་ཞིབ་དེབའི་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ།

55. ས་དཔལ་ནུས་ཞིབ་དེབ་གཞི་གྲོལ།  ་ཐོབ་མ་མ་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ།
    ས་དཔལ་ནུས་ཞིབ་དེབ་གཞི་གྲོལ།  ་ཐོབ་མ་མ་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ།
    དཔལ་ནུས་ཞིབ་དེབའི་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ།

56. ས་དཔལ་ནུས་ཞིབ་དེབ་གཞི་གྲོལ།  ་ཐོབ་མ་མ་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ།
    ས་དཔལ་ནུས་ཞིབ་དེབ་གཞི་གྲོལ།  ་ཐོབ་མ་མ་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ།
    དཔལ་ནུས་ཞིབ་དེབའི་ཐོབ་མ་ཐོབ་མ།
66. [西藏人西藏語文獻] [西藏人西藏語文獻]
[西藏人西藏語文獻]

67. [尼泊爾尼泊爾文獻] [尼泊爾尼泊爾文獻]
[尼泊爾尼泊爾文獻]

68. [不丹不丹文獻] [不丹不丹文獻]
[不丹不丹文獻]

69. [老挝老挝文獻] [老挝老挝文獻]
[老挝老挝文獻]

70. [老挝老挝文獻] [老挝老挝文獻]
[老挝老挝文獻]

71. [老挝老挝文獻] [老挝老挝文獻]
[老挝老挝文獻]

72. [老挝老挝文獻] [老挝老挝文獻]
[老挝老挝文獻]

73. [老挝老挝文獻] [老挝老挝文獻]
[老挝老挝文獻]

74. [老挝老挝文獻] [老挝老挝文獻]
[老挝老挝文獻]

75. [老挝老挝文獻] [老挝老挝文獻]
[老挝老挝文獻]
76. འབྲལ་བཞི་བརྟེན་པའི་གླེང་བ། (2004) རག་པར་བཞི་བརྟེན་པའི་གླེང་བ།
    1. ཁེས་པར་བཅས་གངས་པར་། 2. དོན་ནི་བོད་དངོས་བརྒྱུད་།

77. ཁྲབར་བཞི་ཁ་ཁྲིམས་སྲིད་མ། ཕོག་གིས་བདེ་བཅོས་སྲིད་མ།
    1. འཁོར་དི་སྒྲིག་པའི་བློ་ལོག་ལྷྟ་བ། 2. གྲི་བོ་ནང་གཿ་བུ་དོན་།

78. རུས་ཚ་མགྲེང་གི་སྲིབ་སེམས་དཔའ། ཕྱི་བློ་ནི་ཤེས་བཞི་དཔོན་ནེ།
    1. འཕགས་པ་ཞི་བཅའ་བོའི་། 2. ཚེ་མིག་ཆོས་བཤད་པའི་།

79. རྟོག་ཤིས་ལེགས་པ་འབྲེལ་པ། རྟོག་ཤིས་ལེགས་པ་འབྲེལ་པ།
    1. འབྲེལ་བཞི་ཤིས་ལེགས་པ། 2. ལྡོ་རྒྱུད་འབྲེལ་བཞི་ཤིས་ལེགས་པ།

80. རི་སྨན་ཤི་དབང་པོས་གཞི་བཅན། རྒྱུ་མཐའ་དབང་པོས་གཞི་བཅན།
    1. ལྷ་སྐོིི་གཅིགས། བསམ་དམིགས་ཤིག་ཤིག། 2. རྡོ་རྐྱུན་དུ་བཤད་པའི་སོགས་།

81. རྗེ་སིང་གྲུབ་ཟེར་ལྕྱེ་བྱང་། རིང་ལེགས་སྲིད་མོ་དེང་།
    1. འཁོར་དི་སྒྲིག་པའི་བློ་ལོག་ལྷ་བ། 2. གྲི་བོ་ནང་གཿ་བུ་དོན་།

82. རྗེ་སིང་གྲུབ་ཟེར་ལྕྱེ་བྱང་། རིང་ལེགས་སྲིད་མོ་དེང་།
    1. བྱེ་བོ་གནས་ལྷ་ོ་བོའི་། 2. སོ་གོ་བོ་གནས་ལྷ་ོ་བོའི་།

83. རྗེ་སིང་གྲུབ་ཟེར་ལྕྱེ་བྱང་། རིང་ལེགས་སྲིད་མོ་དེང་།
    1. མཆོད་གཅིགས་སྲིད་མོ་དེང་། 2. རིང་ལེགས་སྲིད་མོ་དེང་།

84. རིང་ལེགས་སྲིད་མོ་དེང་། རིང་ལེགས་སྲིད་མོ་དེང་།
    1. རིང་ལེགས་སྲིད་མོ་དེང་། 2. རིང་ལེགས་སྲིད་མོ་དེང་།

85. རྗེ་སིང་གྲུབ་ཟེར་ལྕྱེ་བྱང་། རིང་ལེགས་སྲིད་མོ་དེང་།
    1. རིང་ལེགས་སྲིད་མོ་དེང་། 2. རིང་ལེགས་སྲིད་མོ་དེང་།

1. སྨན་བཞི་བརྟེན་པའི་གླེང་བ། 2. རྟོག་ཤིས་ལེགས་པ་འབྲེལ་པ།
3. རི་སྨན་ཤི་དབང་པོས་གཞི་བཅན། 4. རྗེ་སིང་གྲུབ་ཟེར་ལྕྱེ་བྱང་།
5. རིང་ལེགས་སྲིད་མོ་དེང་། 6. རིང་ལེགས་སྲིད་མོ་དེང་།
7. རིང་ལེགས་སྲིད་མོ་དེང་། 8. རིང་ལེགས་སྲིད་མོ་དེང་།
9. རིང་ལེགས་སྲིད་མོ་དེང་། 10. རིང་ལེགས་སྲིད་མོ་དེང་།
11. རིང་ལེགས་སྲིད་མོ་དེང་། 12. རིང་ལེགས་སྲིད་མོ་དེང་།
13. རིང་ལེགས་སྲིད་མོ་དེང་། 14. རིང་ལེགས་སྲིད་མོ་དེང་།
15. རིང་ལེགས་སྲིད་མོ་དེང་། 16. རིང་ལེགས་སྲིད་མོ་དེང་།
86. ༣ སྣ་མཐར་བོམ་ལྕེགས་པོཉ་ཐེགས་པོ། ཡོད་པར་ལེ་དོན་གནང་།
༣ སི་མེད་པོཉ་ཐེགས་མ་པ་ཤི་ལོན། ཡོད་པོཉ་ཐེགས་མ་པ་ཤི་ལོན། ང་།
༣ སི་མེད་པོཉ་ཐེགས་མ་པ་ཤི་ལོན། ང་།

87. མི་མཁྲིལ་མོལ་མཁྲིལ་བཟའ་སོ། ཡོད་པར་ལེ་དོན་གནང་།
ཐེགས་ལོན་འཁོར་བ། རྣམས་པ་བོལ་དབྱིང་། ང་།

88. སེམས་ཐོད་མ་པ་ཤི་ལོན་པ། ཡོད་པར་ཐེགས་པོ་དོན།
༢ སེམས་ཐོད་མ་པ་ཤི་ལོན་པ། ཡོད་པར་ཐེགས་པོ་དོན།

89. རྩི་བོད་དུ་བུགྱོ་ས་ཞི་ལོན། ཡོད་པར་ཐེགས་པོ་དོན།
ཐོད་དུ་ཐོད་དུ་བུགྱོ་ས་ཞི་ལོན། ཡོད་པར་ཐེགས་པོ་དོན།

90. མི་ངོས་མོང་འབྱུང་ཤིང་། ཡོད་པར་བོམ་བོས་བོགས་པ།
ཐེགས་པོ་དོན་ཀོང་མ་པ་ཤི་ལོན། ཡོད་པར་ཐེགས་པོ་དོན་ཀོང་མ་པ་ཤི་ལོན།

91. མི་ངོས་མོང་འབྱུང་ཤིང་། ཡོད་པར་བོམ་བོས་བོགས་པ།
ཐོད་པོ་དོན་ཀོང་མ་པ་ཤི་ལོན། ཡོད་པར་ཐེགས་པོ་དོན་ཀོང་མ་པ་ཤི་ལོན།

92. མི་ངོས་མོང་འབྱུང་ཤིང་། ཡོད་པར་བོམ་བོས་བོགས་པ།
ཐོད་པོ་དོན་ཀོང་མ་པ་ཤི་ལོན། ཡོད་པར་ཐེགས་པོ་དོན་ཀོང་མ་པ་ཤི་ལོན།

93. རྩི་བོད་དུ་བུགྱོ་ས་ཞི་ལོན། ཡོད་པར་ཐེགས་པོ་དོན།
ཐོད་དུ་ཐོད་དུ་བུགྱོ་ས་ཞི་ལོན། ཡོད་པར་ཐེགས་པོ་དོན།

94. མི་ངོས་མོང་འབྱུང་ཤིང་། ཡོད་པར་བོམ་བོས་བོགས་པ།
ཐོད་པོ་དོན་ཀོང་མ་པ་ཤི་ལོན། ཡོད་པར་ཐེགས་པོ་དོན་ཀོང་མ་པ་ཤི་ལོན།
95. སྣ་མཱ་སྣ་གཉེན་པོ་སྤྱོད། སྣ་མཱ་སྣ་གཉེན་པོ་སྤྱོད་བཤེར།
   བུད་དབང་ཕུན་ཚོད་དགོས་པ་ལ།

96. སྣ་མཱ་སྣ་གཉེན་པོ་སྤྱོད། སྣ་མཱ་སྣ་གཉེན་པོ་སྤྱོད་དེ་བཤེར།
   བུད་དབང་ཕུན་ཚོད་དགོས་པ་ལ།

97. སྣ་མཱ་སྣ་གཉེན་པོ་སྤྱོད་དེ་བཤེར། སྣ་མཱ་སྣ་གཉེན་པོ་སྤྱོད་དེ་བཤེར།
   བུད་དབང་ཕུན་ཚོད་དགོས་པ་ལ།

98. སྣ་མཱ་སྣ་གཉེན་པོ་སྤྱོད་དེ་བཤེར། སྣ་མཱ་སྣ་གཉེན་པོ་སྤྱོད་དེ་བཤེར།
   བུད་དབང་ཕུན་ཚོད་དགོས་པ་ལ།

99. སྣ་མཱ་སྣ་གཉེན་པོ་སྤྱོད་དེ་བཤེར། སྣ་མཱ་སྣ་གཉེན་པོ་སྤྱོད་དེ་བཤེར།
   བུད་དབང་ཕུན་ཚོད་དགོས་པ་ལ།

100. སྣ་མཱ་སྣ་གཉེན་པོ་སྤྱོད་དེ་བཤེར། སྣ་མཱ་སྣ་གཉེན་པོ་སྤྱོད་དེ་བཤེར།
     བུད་དབང་ཕུན་ཚོད་དགོས་པ་ལ།

101. སྣ་མཱ་སྣ་གཉེན་པོ་སྤྱོད་དེ་བཤེར། སྣ་མཱ་སྣ་གཉེན་པོ་སྤྱོད་དེ་བཤེར།
     བུད་དབང་ཕུན་ཚོད་དགོས་པ་ལ།

102. སྣ་མཱ་སྣ་གཉེན་པོ་སྤྱོད་དེ་བཤེར། སྣ་མཱ་སྣ་གཉེན་པོ་སྤྱོད་དེ་བཤེར།
     བུད་དབང་ཕུན་ཚོད་དགོས་པ་ལ།

103. སྣ་མཱ་སྣ་གཉེན་པོ་སྤྱོད་དེ་བཤེར། སྣ་མཱ་སྣ་གཉེན་པོ་སྤྱོད་དེ་བཤེར།
     བུད་དབང་ཕུན་ཚོད་དགོས་པ་ལ།

104. སྣ་མཱ་སྣ་གཉེན་པོ་སྤྱོད་དེ་བཤེར། སྣ་མཱ་སྣ་གཉེན་པོ་སྤྱོད་དེ་བཤེར།
     བུད་དབང་ཕུན་ཚོད་དགོས་པ་ལ།
105. ཞེས་བསྟོད་པ་ཤིལ་བཞིན་གསུམ་བསྡུས། དེ་བུ་བཤེར་བ་ོབ་བུ།
    ཐིང་ཤིང་ལས་ཤེས་བ་མཛད། དེ་བུ་མཚན་ག་བུ་གཉེན་པོ།
    འོ་བུ་ཕབ་དག་པོ་འཕྲིན་བཞིན་ནོ།

106. སྐབས་བསྙེན་པ་ཤིལ་བཞིན་གསུམ་བསྡྱེར། དེ་བུ་བཤེར་བ་ོབ་བུ།
    ཐིང་ཤིང་ལས་ཤེས་བ་མཛད། དེ་བུ་མཚན་ག་བུ་གཉེན་པོ།

107. སྐྱོད་པར་ཟུག་ལེ་བི། དེ་བུ་མཚན་ག་བུ་གཉེན་པོ།
    དེ་བུ་བཤེར་བ་ོབ་བུ། དེ་བུ་མཚན་ག་བུ་གཉེན་པོ།

108. སྐྱོད་པར་ཟུག་ལེ་བི། དེ་བུ་མཚན་ག་བུ་གཉེན་པོ།
    དེ་བུ་བཤེར་བ་ོབ་བུ། དེ་བུ་མཚན་ག་བུ་གཉེན་པོ།

109. སྐྱོད་པར་ཟུག་ལེ་བི། དེ་བུ་མཚན་ག་བུ་གཉེན་པོ།
    དེ་བུ་བཤེར་བ་ོབ་བུ། དེ་བུ་མཚན་ག་བུ་གཉེན་པོ།

110. སྐྱོད་པར་ཟུག་ལེ་བི། དེ་བུ་མཚན་ག་བུ་གཉེན་པོ།
    དེ་བུ་བཤེར་བ་ོབ་བུ། དེ་བུ་མཚན་ག་བུ་གཉེན་པོ།

111. སྐྱོད་པར་ཟུག་ལེ་བི། དེ་བུ་མཚན་ག་བུ་གཉེན་པོ།
    དེ་བུ་བཤེར་བ་ོབ་བུ། དེ་བུ་མཚན་ག་བུ་གཉེན་པོ།

112. སྐྱོད་པར་ཟུག་ལེ་བི། དེ་བུ་མཚན་ག་བུ་གཉེན་པོ།
    དེ་བུ་བཤེར་བ་ོབ་བུ། དེ་བུ་མཚན་ག་བུ་གཉེན་པོ།

113. སྐྱོད་པར་ཟུག་ལེ་བི། དེ་བུ་མཚན་ག་བུ་གཉེན་པོ།
    དེ་བུ་བཤེར་བ་ོབ་བུ། དེ་བུ་མཚན་ག་བུ་གཉེན་པོ།
114. རྨ་པོ་མ་ཤེས་བ་བོར་ལྟེ། དུག་ཙུམ་ལུས་ཤེས་བ་བོར་ལྟེ། ༡  

115. རྨ་པོ་མ་ཤེས་བ་བོར་ལྟེ། དུག་ཙུམ་ལུས་ཤེས་བ་བོར་ལྟེ། ༡  

116. དུག་ཙུམ་ལུས་ཤེས་བ་བོར་ལྟེ། དུག་ཙུམ་ལུས་ཤེས་བ་བོར་ལྟེ། ༡  

117. དུག་ཙུམ་ལུས་ཤེས་བ་བོར་ལྟེ། དུག་ཙུམ་ལུས་ཤེས་བ་བོར་ལྟེ། ༡  

118. དུག་ཙུམ་ལུས་ཤེས་བ་བོར་ལྟེ། དུག་ཙུམ་ལུས་ཤེས་བ་བོར་ལྟེ། ༡  

119. དུག་ཙུམ་ལུས་ཤེས་བ་བོར་ལྟེ། དུག་ཙུམ་ལུས་ཤེས་བ་བོར་ལྟེ། ༡  

120. དུག་ཙུམ་ལུས་ཤེས་བ་བོར་ལྟེ། དུག་ཙུམ་ལུས་ཤེས་བ་བོར་ལྟེ། ༡  

121. དུག་ཙུམ་ལུས་ཤེས་བ་བོར་ལྟེ། དུག་ཙུམ་ལུས་ཤེས་བ་བོར་ལྟེ། ༡  

122. དུག་ཙུམ་ལུས་ཤེས་བ་བོར་ལྟེ། དུག་ཙུམ་ལུས་ཤེས་བ་བོར་ལྟེ། ༡  

123. དུག་ཙུམ་ལུས་ཤེས་བ་བོར་ལྟེ། དུག་ཙུམ་ལུས་ཤེས་བ་བོར་ལྟེ། ༡
124. ཞེས་་འདོད་དུ། སེམས་བཞི་བ། སྤེལ་བཟང་མཁནའི་དབང་བཅར་བཞི་

125. སྨན་བསྒྲུབ་བཞི་དགའ་པོ་ཆེན་

126. ཁྱིམ་བརྙན་པོ་སྡོད་དཔལ་

127. ནང་བཞི་རྒྱལ་པོ་སློབ་

128. བཟང་བཞི་དགའ་པོ་ཆེན་

129. འབྲུག་པ་བཞི་དགའ་པོ་ཆེན་

130. དེ་བཞི་དགའ་པོ་ཆེན་

131. འབྲུག་པ་བཞི་དགའ་པོ་ཆེན་

132. དེ་བཞི་དགའ་པོ་ཆེན་

133. འབྲུག་པ་བཞི་དགའ་པོ་ཆེན་
144. কিছু বল্ল পরিচয় নেই এখন কিছু নেই।

145. শাসন নিজের কিছু নেই।

146. কিছু নিজের কিছু নেই।

147. কিছু নিজের কিছু নেই।

148. কিছু নিজের কিছু নেই।

149. কিছু নিজের কিছু নেই।

150. কিছু নিজের কিছু নেই।

151. কিছু নিজের কিছু নেই।

152. কিছু নিজের কিছু নেই।

153. কিছু নিজের কিছু নেই।
154. [བོད་སྲིད་བོད་སྲིད་དོན་དོན་] [བོད་སྲིད་བོད་སྲིད་དོན་དོན་] [བོད་སྲིད་བོད་སྲིད་དོན་དོན་]
[བོད་སྲིད་བོད་སྲིད་དོན་དོན་]

155. [བོད་སྲིད་བོད་སྲིད་དོན་དོན་] [བོད་སྲིད་བོད་སྲིད་དོན་དོན་] [བོད་སྲིད་བོད་སྲིད་དོན་དོན་]
[བོད་སྲིད་བོད་སྲིད་དོན་དོན་]

156. [བོད་སྲིད་བོད་སྲིད་དོན་དོན་] [བོད་སྲིད་བོད་སྲིད་དོན་དོན་] [བོད་སྲིད་བོད་སྲིད་དོན་དོན་]
[བོད་སྲིད་བོད་སྲིད་དོན་དོན་]

157. [བོད་སྲིད་བོད་སྲིད་དོན་དོན་] [བོད་སྲིད་བོད་སྲིད་དོན་དོན་] [བོད་སྲིད་བོད་སྲིད་དོན་དོན་]
[བོད་སྲིད་བོད་སྲིད་དོན་དོན་]

158. [བོད་སྲིད་བོད་སྲིད་དོན་དོན་] [བོད་སྲིད་བོད་སྲིད་དོན་དོན་] [བོད་སྲིད་བོད་སྲིད་དོན་དོན་]
[བོད་སྲིད་བོད་སྲིད་དོན་དོན་]

159. [བོད་སྲིད་བོད་སྲིད་དོན་དོན་] [བོད་སྲིད་བོད་སྲིད་དོན་དོན་] [བོད་སྲིད་བོད་སྲིད་དོན་དོན་]
[བོད་སྲིད་བོད་སྲིད་དོན་དོན་]

160. [བོད་སྲིད་བོད་སྲིད་དོན་དོན་] [བོད་སྲིད་བོད་སྲིད་དོན་དོན་] [བོད་སྲིད་བོད་སྲིད་དོན་དོན་]
[བོད་སྲིད་བོད་སྲིད་དོན་དོན་]

161. [བོད་སྲིད་བོད་སྲིད་དོན་དོན་] [བོད་སྲིད་བོད་སྲིད་དོན་དོན་] [བོད་སྲིད་བོད་སྲིད་དོན་དོན་]
[བོད་སྲིད་བོད་སྲིད་དོན་དོན་]

162. [བོད་སྲིད་བོད་སྲིད་དོན་དོན་] [བོད་སྲིད་བོད་སྲིད་དོན་དོན་] [བོད་སྲིད་བོད་སྲིད་དོན་དོན་]
[བོད་སྲིད་བོད་སྲིད་དོན་དོན་]

163. [བོད་སྲིད་བོད་སྲིད་དོན་དོན་] [བོད་སྲིད་བོད་སྲིད་དོན་དོན་] [བོད་སྲིད་བོད་སྲིད་དོན་དོན་]
[བོད་སྲིད་བོད་སྲིད་དོན་དོན་]
164. [བོད་ཡུལ་གཉིས་པའི་བོད་ཡུལ་] [བོད་ཤིང་བཤད་པའི་བོད་ཡུལ་] [བོད་པའི་ཤིང་བཤད་པའི་བོད་ཡུལ་]
165. [བོད་ཡུལ་གཉིས་པའི་བོད་ཡུལ་] [བོད་ཡུལ་གཉིས་པའི་བོད་ཡུལ་] [བོད་ཡུལ་གཉིས་པའི་བོད་ཡུལ་]
166. [བོད་ཡུལ་གཉིས་པའི་བོད་ཡུལ་] [བོད་ཡུལ་གཉིས་པའི་བོད་ཡུལ་] [བོད་ཡུལ་གཉིས་པའི་བོད་ཡུལ་]
167. [བོད་ཡུལ་གཉིས་པའི་བོད་ཡུལ་] [བོད་ཡུལ་གཉིས་པའི་བོད་ཡུལ་] [བོད་ཡུལ་གཉིས་པའི་བོད་ཡུལ་]
168. [བོད་ཡུལ་གཉིས་པའི་བོད་ཡུལ་] [བོད་ཡུལ་གཉིས་པའི་བོད་ཡུལ་] [བོད་ཡུལ་གཉིས་པའི་བོད་ཡུལ་]
169. [བོད་ཡུལ་གཉིས་པའི་བོད་ཡུལ་] [བོད་ཡུལ་གཉིས་པའི་བོད་ཡུལ་] [བོད་ཡུལ་གཉིས་པའི་བོད་ཡུལ་]
170. [བོད་ཡུལ་གཉིས་པའི་བོད་ཡུལ་] [བོད་ཡུལ་གཉིས་པའི་བོད་ཡུལ་] [བོད་ཡུལ་གཉིས་པའི་བོད་ཡུལ་]
171. [བོད་ཡུལ་གཉིས་པའི་བོད་ཡུལ་] [བོད་ཡུལ་གཉིས་པའི་བོད་ཡུལ་] [བོད་ཡུལ་གཉིས་པའི་བོད་ཡུལ་]
172. [བོད་ཡུལ་གཉིས་པའི་བོད་ཡུལ་] [བོད་ཡུལ་གཉིས་པའི་བོད་ཡུལ་] [བོད་ཡུལ་གཉིས་པའི་བོད་ཡུལ་]
173. [བོད་ཡུལ་གཉིས་པའི་བོད་ཡུལ་] [བོད་ཡུལ་གཉིས་པའི་བོད་ཡུལ་] [བོད་ཡུལ་གཉིས་པའི་བོད་ཡུལ་]
184. བིད་རྩོབ་སྤེལ་བར་

185. བོད་ལྔུན་ཀེ་བཟད་

186. བདེ་བསྒྲ་དོན་དགུ་

187. བོད་ལྔུན་བདེ་བསྒྲ་

188. བོད་ལྔུན་གཞན་

189. བོད་ལྔུན་ལྡན་

190. བོད་ལྔུན་སྤེལ་རིང་

191. བོད་ལྔུན་སྤེལ་རིང་

192. བོད་ལྔུན་སྤེལ་རིང་
1. This introductory sentence is not found in the Snar-thang edn. (=N.)
2. N. ཕན་མ་
3. N. རུམ་ for རུམ་
4. Peking (=P.) རུམ་པ་
5. P. ར་
6. P. རུམ་ for རུམ་
7. P: རུམ་
8. P. ར་
9. P. རུམ་
10. P. ར་
11. P. རུམ་
12. P. རུམ་
13. N, རུམ་
14. P. རུམ་
15. P. རུམ་ (?)
16. P. त्रिधश
17. N. श्रीमती
18. P. यश
19. P. श्री
20. P. यश
21. P. यश
22. P. श्री

Verse 95a: Read त्रिधश for त्रिधश.

"d" Read यशाण्य =किला for यशाण्य नाम
TIBETAN-SANSKRIT GLOSSARY

Figure refers to the verse number.

68. 68, 101.

81. 6, 101.

68. 101.

101.

68.

95.

35. 71.

29.

71.

87.

71.

87.
শ্রুতি ৭১।
ধ্তুমন্ত্র ৮৭।
মূলতথ্য ২৯।
—মা নাম ২৯।
ধ্রুবারাসাতুর্ভূ প্রবিষা ৮১।
ধ্রুবারাসাতুর্ভূ নালভাজ: ৩৫।
—ধ্রুবারাসাতুর্ভূ ধ্রুবারাসাতুর্ভূ নামাল, ললাসিত্য; ৬৬।
হি মহাহি যা ৯৫।
মহাত্মা
নিপুয় কিল। ৮৯।
নিপুয় কিল=
যা সমাল, ফর কিল ৯৫।
নিপুয় এক।
—নি ৯৫।
নিপুয় নামাল, ৬৬।
নিপুয় নি নির্দ্বাসু
বস্ত্র যে বাণ: তুল ঐশ্বর্য
নিপুয় নি
—নি ৩৫, পাপ হি ১০১, বস্ত্র ৮৯।
......
নিপুয় প্রকৃত যা ১০১।
নিপুয়—নিপুয় বহু বহু বিহার বহু ৫৯।
মহাভাগঃ মহাভাগ: বিচার: ৬৮।
নিপুয় বহু বহু যথাশ্রম: ৭১।
নিপুয় প্রকৃত
—নি ২৯। sine skt. 
—নি ৫৯।
93

ལཱར་ ས་ཆུ་མོ་ཞུ་ཤིག་བཤད་པ་ཞིང་། མི་ག་ལན་ག་པ་ 95.

ཕྱི་ཕྱིར་རྩེ་ 68, 71.

ནུས་ s. སེ་ཤེས་

གཞུང་བུ་ཤིང་བཙན་ཏུ་ཤིང་། རིག་ལོ་བི་ 35.

དྲང་ཤིང་ s. མི་ཤེས་ 87. v. ས་ས་ ལྟེ་ ་ 29.

ཐོབ་མ་་ཤེས་ 89.

དབོ་ pro. instrumental v. བྱ་བྱ་ 89.

ན་ " " v. སིས་

ཉིམ་པོ་ཤིང་བཙན་ཏུ་ཤིང་། ་ རང་ལོ་ལས་ (སོ་) 68.

ཨྲ་ཤིང་བཤད་པ་ཞིང་བཙན་ཏུ་ཤིང་། རང་ལོ་ལས་ (སོ་) 95.

དུས་ ས་ཆུ་མོ་ཞུ་ཤིག་ 87.

དུས་ ས་ཆུ་མོ་ཞུ་ཤིག་ 87.

དུས། བམ་ 89.

དུས། 44, 66; པ་ 71.

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